

Foreword



Fumio Kyuma
Minister of State for Defense

The transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry, which had been a long-term concern, was approved by a majority of Diet members, and the Ministry of Defense was set up on January 9, 2007.

Since the foundation of the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces (SDF) more than 52 years ago, the security environment surrounding Japan has undergone many significant changes. Accordingly, urgent improvements in regard to the structure of the Defense Agency and the SDF became necessary so that the two organizational entities could more promptly respond to a variety of problems and accurately but flexibly meet the requests and expectations of the public. To meet these challenges, the Agency has made transition to the Ministry of Defense.

The Ministry of Defense, to meet the expectations and trust of people, will plan and formulate a variety of policies to fulfill its responsibility as the ministry in charge of national defense, which is one of the central government's fundamental missions. We at the Ministry will further make vigilant efforts with a strong sense of responsibility to respond to any possible emergencies in a prompt and appropriate manner.

The security environment surrounding Japan remains severe. North Korea's test-launch last year of ballistic missiles and its announcement that it conducted a nuclear test, for example, are of major concern. The establishment of the Ministry of Defense marks a fresh start for Japan toward the achievement of new policy goals. The Ministry of Defense will more actively implement diverse measures, including those regarding the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) and international peace cooperation activities.

First, we must implement the Japan-U.S. agreement on the realignment of the USFJ. It is extremely important to implement the realignment in a smooth and prompt manner to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and decrease the burden that the U.S. military bases in Japan impose on local communities. At the last session of the Diet, a bill to promote smooth realignment has passed. Through implementation of the measures provided for in the law, we will steadily press ahead with the realignment.

International peace cooperation activities conducted by the SDF are highly appreciated by countries throughout the world. These activities include those in the Indian Ocean conducted under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law as well as those being conducted in Iraq under the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi

Reconstruction Special Measures Law. The SDF will continue to proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities, which were upgraded to one of its primary missions. In addition, the SDF will continue to improve aspects of its education and training as well as transportation and other systems.

The Ministry of Defense must successfully begin its rebirth as a policymaking organization. In order to develop a strategic plan for the nation's future, ensure Japan's security, and fully meet the expectations of the international community, the Ministry must strengthen its policymaking function. Within the present fiscal year, we will reorganize its structure, enhance the policymaking function, and boost contact with local communities.

As demonstrated by North Korea's test launch of ballistic missiles in 2006 and Pyongyang's announcement of the same year that it had implemented a nuclear test, there is a range of problems affecting Japan's security and the peace and safety of the international community. In order to deal with these problems in an appropriate manner, we will steadily improve the nation's defense capabilities as required. In particular, in order to intercept any possible ballistic missile attacks, we aim to deploy SM-3 equipped ships and Patriot PAC-3 units at an early date.

Through these measures, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will devote themselves to contributing to the future of Japan and its people and to the peace and stability of the world.

Defense of Japan 2007 is the Ministry of Defense's first white paper. It clearly describes important matters related to Japan's defense and SDF activities conducted both at home and abroad, including the transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry, in order to deepen understanding both at home and overseas. In addition, the white paper introduces the activities of SDF personnel who are fulfilling their missions with vigilance and a strong sense of responsibility under severe conditions.

I hope that as many people as possible will read this white paper and go on to offer us their frank opinion.

TOPICS

Japan's Defense— Events in the Past Year

QWhat were the reasons for the effective implementation by Japan's GSDF of humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq?

The GSDF troops sent to Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction support activities returned home after having fulfilled their duties, without experiencing a single human casualty. Behind the GSDF's support activities being conducted effectively were a good selection of an area where GSDF troops would be dispatched, collaboration with the ODA policy, formulation of response measures against hard working conditions in Iraq, promotion of human exchanges of the dispatched GSDF with local Iraqi people and establishment of friendly relations with organizations of foreign countries in charge of defense affairs.

At present, ASDF troops are still undertaking airlifting operations in Iraq and Kuwait, while MSDF troops continue their operations in the Indian Ocean.

International peace cooperation activities by the SDF, which started with the dispatch of MSDF minesweeping units to the Persian Gulf and participation in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, have become its primary mission.

We have entered an era in which Japan's peace and independence must be ensured, not only through domestic activities, but also through international peace cooperation activities undertaken in various parts of the world, such as those mentioned above.



QTest firing of ballistic missiles by North Korea and Japan's response to the incident

In July last year, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan. North Korea also announced in October last year that it had conducted a nuclear test.

How should Japan respond to the threat of ballistic missiles and nuclear arms? We think it necessary for Japan to make its own efforts to respond to such threats, including establishing a system aimed at protecting itself against ballistic missiles, and maintaining a "nuclear deterrent" through the further strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance, in addition to promoting "diplomatic efforts."

Overseas Events

Partial revision of Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (two-year extension)

6

Japan-Australia "two-plus-two" security meeting of Defense and Foreign Ministers

Trilateral meeting of defense chiefs between Japan, U.S. and Australia

500 times of airlifting operations)

5

Joint exercises between Japan, U.S. and India

4

Defense policy dialogue between Japan and India

Personnel dispatch to U.N. Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

3

Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

2

2007 Meeting of Japan-ROK Defense Ministers

1

1

5th anniversary of MSDF's dispatch to Indian Ocean

12

700 times of refueling operations

11

2006

Partial revision of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (one-year extension)

10

North Korea's announcement of nuclear test

9

Withdrawal of GSDF from Iraq

8

Test firing of missiles by North Korea

7

Domestic Events

6

Enactment of law for fiscal 2007 organizational changes of Defense Ministry

5

Enactment of special measures law to realign U.S. Forces in Japan

4

Deployment of PAC-3 at ASDF Iruma Base

3

Formulation of emergency response procedure

2

2007

2

Transition of Defense Agency to Defense Ministry

1

12

Start of partial operation of U.S. PAC-3 Missiles at Kadena Base

11

2006

10

Establishment of the Council for Examination of Drastic Reforms in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force

8

7

Fiscal 2006 organizational changes of Defense Agency

QWhat is the significance of the transition of the Defense Agency to the Defense Ministry?

Following the transition to the Ministry, the Ministry of Defense earned the status of a governmental organization in charge of planning and formulating policies on national defense and security. Also, the transition enabled Japan to clarify its determination to tackle issues related to our national defense and the peace of the international community.

The Ministry of Defense, under the leadership of the Minister of Defense, a minister exclusively in charge of affairs on national defense, is committed to carrying out its duties of policy planning and responding to emergency situations, with responsibility, authority, and conviction.





Instructions by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Commemorative Ceremony for the Transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (January 9, 2007)

Nearly 55 years have passed since the San Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan came into effect and Japan recovered its sovereignty. Today, in the capacity of prime minister, I am proud to witness the establishment of the Ministry of Defense as an organization to take charge of national defense—a mission indispensable for the protection of national sovereignty. Commemorating this historical day, I would like to express some of my ideas to all staff of the Ministry of Defense and personnel of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

In 1954, as Japan was making its first strong steps toward recovery after the devastation of World War II, the National Safety Agency was reorganized into the Defense Agency, and the SDF was founded as a national defense organization of a democratic country based on a concept entirely different from that which formed the basis of the former Japanese military. Japan thus started literally from nothing in terms of its national defense. National defense is one of the most basic functions a country needs to fulfill to protect the lives, welfare and property of its citizens. Domestic and overseas situations, however, have long positioned the governmental organization in charge of national defense not as a ministry but as an extra-ministerial bureau of the Prime Minister's office.

In the Cold War era, the severe confrontation between East and West substantially affected the domestic politics of Japan. In that era, some even objected to the existence of the Defense Agency and SDF. Those at the SDF, however, encouraged by the silent support and trust of many people, patiently and doggedly engaged themselves in daily training, sometimes clenching their teeth and sometimes in tears, and fulfilled their duties in disaster relief missions, while assisting the welfare of the Japanese people.

The end of the Cold War, however, dramatically changed the security environment surrounding Japan. It was a time for Japan to squarely face the crises and fundamentally review the roles of its defense capabilities.

Since the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, the SDF has been engaged in a range of overseas operations, including peacekeeping operations (PKO). SDF personnel worked and sweated to protect the lives, welfare and property of people, devoting themselves to overseas operations, disaster relief missions in large-scale disasters that befell Japan, such as the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and maritime security operations, including operations to deal with an incident involving a suspicious boat off the coast of the Noto Peninsula. Many Japanese citizens felt sympathy for and trust in SDF personnel who conducted these activities.

The law for the transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense passed with the support of more than 90% of the Diet members in both the Upper House and Lower House. This was made possible because those concerned, including active and retired SDF personnel, made efforts to fulfill their high and noble mission of national defense over many years.

Ministry of Defense officials and SDF personnel are required to devote themselves to meeting the expectations of people, heedless of danger. We, however, must not forget that since the launch of the SDF, more than 1,700 SDF personnel lost their precious lives in the course of fulfilling their missions. I would like to express my sincere and heartfelt condolences to the family of those who sacrificed their lives to fulfill the high and noble mission for the nation and its people.

It is no exaggeration to say that our country is now at the dawn of a new age. I have repeatedly mentioned that we must make a clean break with the post-war regime. In order to make Japan a “beautiful country,” we must part with the dogma that the post-war regime will never change. We must pursue new goals and new ideals for Japan in the 21st century and give specific form to them.

A young Charles de Gaulle wrote in his book, *The Edge of the Sword*, “When faced with the challenge of events, the man of character has recourse to himself. His instinctive response is to leave his mark on action, to take responsibility for it, to make it his own business. . . . It is not that he wishes to turn a blind eye to orders, or to sweep aside advice, but only that he is passionately anxious to exert his own will, to make up his mind.” With a similar attitude, I am determined to devote myself to the creation of a beautiful country. As for the right of collective self-defense, I will give first priority to national safety at all times, exploring what kind of activities in specific situations could constitute the exercise of the right to collective self-defense which is prohibited under the Constitution of Japan.

Following the revision of the Defense Agency Establishment Law, the Defense Agency was elevated to Ministry status, to a governmental organization in charge of planning and formulating policies on national defense and security. Also, the transition to a Ministry clearly shows Japan’s commitment to national defense and to the peace of the international community. This marks a big stride in parting with the post-war regime and creating a new country.

The enactment of the law for the transition of the Defense Agency to a Ministry demonstrated to those both within and outside the country the maturity of Japan as a democratic state, its confidence in civilian control, and the will of the nation and its people to play a responsible role for the peace and stability of the international community.

At the Japan-Philippines summit meeting held the other day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, kindly welcomed the transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense. I believe this implies that the President expects Japan to play a more active role in the security of the East Asian region and she has great confidence in the maturity of Japan’s civilian control of the SDF.

Even at this very moment, SDF personnel are carrying out their missions under difficult conditions in Iraq, the Golan Heights, the Indian Ocean, on isolated islands, and at the bases and camps of the SDF.

I can see in my mind how each of them is fulfilling their duties. As supreme commander, my heart is always with the SDF personnel. I am always proud of their activities and I expect them to go beyond the call of duty.

Finally, I hope that SDF personnel will maintain their high discipline and morale to ensure the peace and prosperity of Japan and make dedicated contributions for the future of this beautiful country and people and for the fulfillment of their high and noble mission for the world peace and stability. These are my instructions to you.

January 9, 2007

Shinzo Abe
Prime Minister

Summary of *Defense of Japan 2007*

More Reliable in Times of Crisis, A More Effective Force for World Peace

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

The international community today is facing a range of problems, including those related to traditional relationships between countries (e.g., rise of China and India), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and missile issues of North Korea), and new threats such as terrorism (situations in Iraq and Afghanistan).

Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community

Countries have been implementing countermeasures against terrorism, but terrorist activities continue to occur around the world. Concerns about the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are increasing, and international efforts are being made to solve the problems, including the nuclear issue of Iran.

The security situation in Iraq remains dire, and new security measures were started in the country in accordance with the new policies of the United States.

Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries

The United States has been continuously reviewing its military posture. Also, the country aims to increase the personnel of its Army and Marine Corps to expand its military capabilities and reduce the burdens imposed on individual units.

In July 2006, North Korea test-fired ballistic missiles, and in October of the same year, it announced that it had conducted a nuclear test. The series of actions taken by North Korea poses a serious threat to the peace and stability of the international community, in particular to East Asia.

China continues to modernize its military capabilities and it is necessary to carefully analyze the influence. It does not show detailed breakdowns of its national defense budget. Furthermore, China did not give a satisfactory explanation for the anti-satellite weapons test that it conducted in January 2007. The country needs to improve transparency in terms of its military capabilities. Also, attention should be paid to its maritime activities.

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts on Japan's Defense Policy

Peace, security, and independence are not brought about merely by wishful thinking. They cannot be achieved without a comprehensive approach—including various means, such as diplomatic approaches and cooperation with allies, as well as the nation's own defense efforts.

Japan has been making efforts on its own initiative to build a modest defense capability under the Constitution, in accordance with the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defense oriented policy, and not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as well as firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-Up of Defense Capability

In December 2004, Japan formulated the National Defense Program Guidelines in and after Fiscal 2005 (hereinafter referred to as NDPG 2004) as a means of showing the country's basic policy on national security, the significance and roles of Japan's defense capability, and the basic principles of the defense capabilities to be built up in the future.

The NDPG has set two objectives for Japan's security—to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan, and to improve the international security environment. In order to achieve the two objectives listed above, the NDPG calls for the integrated combination of Japan's own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community.

In addition, Japan formulated the Mid-Term Defense Program for fiscal 2005-fiscal 2009 (hereinafter referred to as MTDP) to realize the new defense capabilities envisaged under the NDPG. Based on the MTDP, Japan has been building up its defense capability.

In fiscal 2007, Japan is set to strengthen its policy-devising function and build a new defense organization aimed at responding to a new era. Moreover, Japan will try to build up its defense capabilities in a more efficient manner by placing emphasis on responding to new threats and diverse contingencies, including responding to attacks from terrorists, guerrillas and special operations units, as well as enhancing abilities to counter missile attacks and gather intelligence, and warning and surveillance abilities.

Chapter 3 Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as a Primary Mission

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) must continue to abide by Japan's basic defense principles even as it ensures that its approaches and roles are at all times suited to a changing security environment.

The transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry, the stipulation of international peace cooperation and other activities as primary missions, and the reorganization of the MOD, are all viewed as efforts in this direction. The MOD is seeking through these steps to become an organization that can be more robust in crises and that can contribute to world peace.

With the end of the Cold War marking a key turning point in the changes that have taken place in the security environment, the missions and roles of the MOD and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have since expanded to include responses to large-scale disasters inside and outside of Japan, and international peace cooperation activities. The importance of defense has increased, and the nation's expectations of the MOD and the SDF have risen accordingly.

In order to bolster defense policy planning functions and reinforce the structure for dealing with emergency situations, as well as to maintain a system for proactively striving for peace and stability in the international community on Japan's own initiative, the government in June 2006 submitted a bill to the Diet to upgrade the Defense Agency to a Ministry and stipulate international peace cooperation and other activities as primary missions. This bill passed in December 2006.

To adequately address the policy issues of a new age, the MOD and the SDF must regularly conduct reviews to ensure that their organizations are suited to the times. To that end, the MOD carried out an organizational restructuring just last fiscal year, and will be pursuing further restructuring this year.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief and Civil Protection

As manifested in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), efforts have been made to better prepare the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for the defense of Japan through the improvement of its responses to situations,

such as new threats, diverse contingencies, and full-scale invasion, and the framework for such responses has also been developed.

In order to ensure the peace and safety of the nation and the people at times of armed attack, emergency legislation has been established to coordinate the activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces. Regarding the operations of the SDF, a joint operation posture has been formed, and various efforts have been continuing for the SDF to execute their tasks for various contingencies in a timely and effective manner.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been preparing themselves with the ability to respond adequately to new threats and diverse contingencies without delay, including the contingencies exemplified in the NDPG: (1) responses to ballistic missile attacks, (2) responses to attacks by guerrillas and special operation forces, (3) responses to aggression towards offshore islands, (4) warning and surveillance in sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, and responses to the violation of airspace and to armed special operations vessels, and (5) responses to large-scale and special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological) disasters.

When North Korea launched ballistic missiles in July 2006, Japan's response posture and information collection capabilities were reinforced through close coordination with relevant institutions in Japan and concerned nations, including the United States. In March 2007, the Patriot system PAC-3 was introduced, and emergency response procedures were defined for operations. Thus, various efforts have been made to enable effective response to attacks by ballistic missiles.

In the event of a full-scale invasion, the SDF shall respond effectively without delay by taking organic and unified action together with the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF). In such an eventuality, U.S. forces will support the operations undertaken by the SDF, and conduct operations complementary to those of the SDF, possibly including operations employing striking force.

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the Japan-U.S. alliance based thereon are crucial for the defense of Japan, the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, and the improvement of the international security environment.

The USFJ act as deterrence preventing an armed attack against Japan, and play a vital role in helping both Japan and the U.S. take bilateral actions immediately, as well as providing bases for reinforcements of U.S. forces, in the event of an armed attack against Japan. Thus, the USFJ play an extremely important role in ensuring the security of Japan.

In recent years, Japan and the United States have been engaged in consultations on the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance, including force posture realignment, to develop the alliance in response to changes in the security environment from time to time.

Based on the basic policy of maintaining a deterrent force and reduce burdens on local communities, these Japan-U.S. consultations have been conducted in the following three stages: (1) Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage); (2) Roles, Missions, and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage); and (3) Force Posture Realignment (the Third Stage). At the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006, Japan and the United States finalized the force posture realignment in a document titled the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. This document indicated the details for implementing the concrete initiatives.

To facilitate rapid and full implementation of these initiatives, the Government of Japan enacted the Special Measures Law concerning Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan in May 2007. For example, the Law provides for the institutionalization of new grants and the establishment of special operations for Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

In addition to the above, Japan has so far taken various measures concerning USFJ facilities and areas,

enacted diverse laws to improve the reliability of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and taken measures concerning Japan-U.S. joint exercises, the mutual exchange of equipment and technology, and other issues.

Chapter 3 Improvement of International Security Environment

Japan's security goals set forth under the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) are: to improve the international security environment, and to prevent any threats from reaching Japan, as well as to ensure the defense of Japan.

Japan has pledged to undertake international peace cooperation activities proactively and on its own initiative. Based on this idea, international peace cooperation activities have been upgraded to the primary mission of the SDF.

Based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, Japan has engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq, as well as providing support to the Middle Eastern nation via the Government's Official Development Assistance (ODA). Last year, the Government of Japan judged that the reconstruction stage in which quick support measures had been necessary has basically been brought to completion in Muthanna Province, both on the rehabilitation and security fronts, and thus has withdrawn GSDF troops from the province. Meanwhile, an ASDF squadron has still been undertaking Iraqi aid operations aimed at the country's reconstruction and stability, providing airlifting support to United Nations and multilateral forces.

In order for Japan to contribute both proactively and on its own initiative to the global battle against international terrorism, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, has been refueling naval vessels of the United States and other nations operating in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has been also airlifting goods and supplies of the U.S. military.

International peace cooperation activities being undertaken by Japan include continuous participation in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and peacekeeping operations under the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). All of these activities undertaken by Japan have won high acclaim from various countries around the world.

Japan has been promoting security dialogue and defense exchanges, including bilateral and multilateral defense exercises. As part of such efforts, the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was released in March this year. In April of the same year, Japan had its first defense policy dialogue with India.

Japan has been actively participating in various activities geared towards arms control and non-proliferation, including support of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

No matter to what extent the equipment and system of the SDF are improved and modernized, they cannot be operated without personnel. Equipment capability cannot be maximally derived without individual personnel. Moreover, regardless of the enhancement in the level of individual personnel and strengthened Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, it is still necessary to meet preconditions. Without the understanding and cooperation of the citizens of Japan, it will not be possible for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to fulfill their missions.

A wide range of necessary measures are being implemented for the establishment of basis of human resources, while supported by cooperation from local public organizations and other related organizations—from recruitment, employment, and education and training of personnel to their retirement and outplacement. In particular, in regard to new measures concerning personnel, various discussions are underway following the setting up of the Investigative Commission on Drastic Reform Concerning the Human Resource Factors of Defense Capability.

Moreover, to efficiently acquire equipment and material, various approaches are being taken. Among such approaches are the promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reform, and the strengthening of ties with the private sector in the field of technical R&D.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense will make concerted efforts to prevent further information leakage based on the recognition that it is essential for the national defense and security to keep confidentiality.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF also carry out wide-ranging cooperative activities to support civilian livelihoods, so as to contribute to the fostering of mutual trust with the local community and the wider public. In addition, to ensure harmony between defense facilities and the surrounding communities, the Ministry of Defense will appropriately review measures, such as projects to improve living environments, and also strive to enhance new measures.

Most importantly, a Ministry of Defense and an SDF that do not have the support of the strong confidence of the people cannot adequately fulfill their functions. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF reflect deeply on the fact that incidents undermining the people's confidence have occurred, and are determined to make every effort to prevent the reoccurrence of such incidents in the future.

Table of Contents

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

- 1. General3
- 2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region4

Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community

Section 1. International Terrorism

- 1. Overview8
- 2. Fight against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan8
- 3. Terrorist Attacks around the World9

Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

- 1. Nuclear Weapons11
- 2. Biological and Chemical Weapons11
- 3. Ballistic Missiles11
- 4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs12
- 5. Iran's Nuclear Issue13

COLUMN

- (COMMENTARY) Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Issues Surrounding North Korea and Iran14

Section 3. Situation of Iraq

- 1. Security Situation after the Establishment of New Iraqi Government16
- 2. Security and Other Measures by Iraqi Security Forces and Multinational Forces16
- 3. Efforts by the Iraqi Government and International Community toward Reconstruction17

Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts19

Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1. The United States

- 1. Security and Defense Policies26
- 2. Military Posture32
- 3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region33

Section 2. Korean Peninsula

- 1. North Korea35
- 2. The ROK43
- 3. U.S. Forces Stationed in the ROK45

Section 3. China

- 1. General Situation47
- 2. Military Affairs52
- 3. Military Capabilities of Taiwan60

COLUMN

- (COMMENTARY) Aerospace Development in China62

Section 4. Russia	
1. General Situation	64
2. Security and Defense Policies	64
3. External Relations	66
4. Military Posture	68
5. Russian Forces in the Far East Region	69
Section 5. Southeast Asia	
1. General Situation	75
2. Cooperation with the United States in Security Issues	76
3. East Timor Situation	77
4. Spratly Islands	77
Section 6. South Asia	
1. India	79
2. Pakistan	81
3. India-Pakistan Conflict	82
Section 7. Australia	84
Section 8. Europe	
1. General Situation	86
2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks	87
3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Conditions	89
4. Efforts toward Stabilization in Europe	91
Section 9. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community by the U.N. and Other Scheme	
1. General	92
2. Developments in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)	92

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts on Japan's Defense Policy

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security	108
COLUMN (COMMENTARY) National Security Council (NSC)	108
Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense	
1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense	110
2. The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution	110
The Permitted Self-Defense Capability/Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense/ Geographic	
Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised/The Right of Collective Self-Defense/	
The Right of Belligerence	
COLUMN (COMMENTARY) Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security	111
Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy	
1. National Defense Policy	112
2. Other Basic Policies	112
Exclusively Defense Oriented Policy/Not Becoming a Military Power/The Three Non-Nuclear Principles/	
Ensuring Civilian Control	

COLUMN

(COMMENTARY) Strengthening Intelligent Capabilities of the Prime Minister’s Office113

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-Up of Defense Capability

Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Background of Formulating the NDPG118
Changes in International Situation and Diversifying Roles of Military Capability/Remarkable Developments of Scientific Technologies/Expansion of the SDF Activities and the Improvement of Japan’s Emergency Response Mechanism/Characteristics of Japan
2. Circumstances for Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines120
3. The Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Guidelines121
Two Objectives and Three Approaches/New Concept for Defense Capability (Shifting emphasis from “deterrent effects” to “response capability”)

Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy124
Japan’s Own Efforts/Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)/Cooperation with the International Community
2. Vision for the Future Defense Capability125
Role of the Defense Capability/Fundamental Elements for Japan’s Defense Capabilities
3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability129
Ground Self-Defense Force/Maritime Self-Defense Force/Air Self-Defense Force/Major Equipment and Major Units that can be also Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
4. Additional Elements for Consideration135
Fiscal Conditions, Procurement of Defense Equipment and Maintenance and Operation of Defense Facilities/ Timeframe for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review
5. Three Principles on Arms Exports135

Section 3. Mid-Term Defense Program

1. Policies for the Program136
2. Review of Organizations of Defense Ministry and SDF136
3. Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF137
4. Measures to Strengthen Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements137
5. Scale of Build-Up and Necessary Budget137
Scale of Build-Up/Necessary Budget

Section 4. Defense Build-Up Program for FY 2007.....141

COLUMN

(COMMENTARY) Organization of the Self-Defense Forces Command and Communication Unit (Tentative Name)145
(COMMENTARY) New Equipment (New Destroyer)146

Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures

1. Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures147
Breakdown by Expenses/Breakdown by Organization and by Use
2. Comparison with Other Countries150

Chapter 3 Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF’s Primary Mission

A new organization for defense—Building an organization more capable of coping with crises and better able to contribute to world peace—156

Section 1. History of the MOD/SDF—Expansion of the Duties/Roles Required of the MOD/SDF—	
1. The History of the MOD/SDF	158
From the Establishment of the Defense Agency/SDF to the End of the Cold War/The Post-Cold War Era	
2. MOD/SDF Activities Today	167
Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities/Ballistic Missile Defense/Issues Involving U.S. Military Facilities/Areas in Japan	

Section 2. Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF’s Primary Mission

1. Basic Concepts in Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF’s Primary Mission	173
Background/Necessity of Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as Primary Mission of the SDF	
2. Significance of Transition to a Ministry	174
Significance of Transition to a Ministry/Adherence to the Fundamentals of Defense Policies/History of the Transition to a Ministry	

COLUMN

(Q&A) Will the transition of the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry facilitate the Self-Defense Forces to respond quickly to diverse emergency situations?	177
(Q&A) How has the transition to a ministry been accepted by other countries?	178
(Q&A) Has the transition to a ministry affected civilian control of the Self-Defense Forces in any way?	180
(Q&A) Why was the ministry named “Boei-sho (Ministry of Defense)” rather than “Kokubo-sho (Ministry of National Defense)”?	181
3. Significance of Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as SDF’s Primary Mission	182
Traditional Concepts/Review on Positioning of Missions/Operations Newly Stipulated as Primary Missions	

COLUMN

(Q&A) How has the Self-Defense Forces Law been amended to upgrade international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces?	184
(Q&A) International peace cooperation activities have been upgraded to a primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces. Does this mean that the SDF now can perform any activity without limits in foreign countries?	186
(Q&A) Why have activities to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan been upgraded to a primary mission?	186
(Q&A) Why have minesweeping and evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad in emergency situations been upgraded to a primary mission?	186
(Q&A) Why have activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq been upgraded to a primary mission?	187
4. Development of a Legal Structure Related to Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as SDF’s Primary Mission	187

COLUMN

(Q&A) How has the government been explaining the transition to a ministry to the people of Japan?	190
(Q&A) Will the transition to a ministry lead to the increase in defense spending?	190
(VOICE) The Road to the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense	191

Section 3. Organization of the MOD/SDF

1. Organization of the MOD/SDF	193
Organization of the MOD/SDF/System to Support the Minister of Defense	
2. Restructuring of the Defense Agency (previous fiscal year)	196
3. Restructuring of the MOD (current fiscal year)	196
Examination Process/Abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and Consolidation into the Ministry of Defense/Restructuring of Internal Bureaus/Creation of the Office of the Inspector General of the MOD/Creation of New Local Defense Bureaus	

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief and Civil Protection

Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

- 1. The Basic Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations204
The Background to Laws for Responses to Armed Attack Situations/Responses to Armed Attack Situations/
Responses to Emergency Response Situations other than Armed Attack Situations
- 2. Measures based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and other Relevant Laws209
Measures to Protect the Lives of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People/
Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations/Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of the International
Humanitarian Laws/High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations
- 3. Measures for Protection of Civilians212
Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Measures)/The Basic
Guidelines for Civil Protection/Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection
- 4. Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures216
Participation in Training for Civil Protection/Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

COLUMN

- (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in a Joint Field Exercise for Civil Protection:
Having Participated in the Tottori Prefecture Civil Protection Field Exercise217
- 5. The Operation of the Self-Defense Forces218
Outline of Joint Operations Posture/Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operations Posture/
Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under the Direct Command of the Minister of Defense

Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

- 1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks221
Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)/Improvement in Legislations and Operations/Missile Defense of the
United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Cooperation/North Korea's Ballistic Missiles Launch and Japan's Response
- 2. Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces232
Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces/Response to Armed Agents/Response to
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons

COLUMN

- (COMMENTARY) Central Readiness Force238
- 3. Response to Aggression on Islands239
Operations to Respond to Aggression on Islands
- 4. Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas and Airspace surrounding Japan, and Responses to
Violation of Airspace and Armed Special-Operations Vessels239
Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas surrounding Japan/Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (scrambles) in
Preparation against Violation of Territorial Airspace/Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial
Waters/Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels
- 5. Response to Large-Scale and Special-Type Disasters243
Mechanism of Disaster Relief Dispatches/Initial Operations Postures and Implementation Status of Disaster
Relief Dispatches/Efforts Made in Peace Time in Preparation for Disaster Relief

COLUMN

- (COMMENTARY) Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron247
- (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Relief Mission to Support Water Supply
in Kure and Etajima249
- (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Relief Mission for the Rainstorm Disaster
in the Hokuriku Region253

6. Response to Other Events	254
Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities/Preparing for Transporting Expatriates of Japanese Nationality/Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan/Collecting Military Information	

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of an SDF Officer Working as the Defense Attaché in Belgium	257
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Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression

1. Air Defense Operations	258
2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas	259
3. Operations for Defending Japan’s Territory (Response to Landing of Invading Forces)	261
4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic	262

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements	270
Maintenance of Japan’s Security/Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan/Improvement of International Security Environment	
2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan	272
Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)/USFJ Facilities and Areas and Local Communities which Host such Facilities and Areas/USFJ in Okinawa	
3. Post-Cold War Developments Concerning the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements	274
Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security and Subsequent Developments/Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia	

Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1. Outline of Recent Japan-U.S. Consultations	277
2. Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)	277
3. Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)	279
Outline/Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions and Capabilities/Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved/Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation/Enhancement and Expansion of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation	
4. Force Posture Realignment, Including USFJ (the Third Stage)	283
Outline/Force Posture Realignment in Okinawa/Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capacity/Yokota Air Base and Airspace/Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Base to Iwakuni Air Base/Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)/Training Relocation	
5. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ	297
Basic Policy/Development of a Law for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ	
6. Various Measures Concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas	302
USFJ Facilities and Areas Located in Japan, Excluding Okinawa/USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa	

Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Japan-U.S. Policy Consultation	309
Major Forums for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security/Recent Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States	
2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure their Effectiveness	314
The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation/Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines	
3. Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises	320
4. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA)	321
5. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology	321
6. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of USFJ	322
Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ/Ensuring the Stable Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas/Efforts to Preserve the Environment Surrounding USFJ Facilities and Areas	

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of an SDF Officer Working as the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters Liaison Officer326

Chapter 3 Improvement of International Security Environment

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities Proactively and on Its Own Initiative ...332
History of Japan's Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities/Reviewing the positioning of SDF's International Peace Cooperation Activities/Establishing the System to Adequately Undertake International Peace Cooperation Activities/Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Personnel

COLUMN

(COMMENTARY) The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit335

2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq336
Details about Japan's efforts to support Iraqi reconstruction and significance/Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and the Basic Plan/SDF Operations/Evaluation of Japan's Efforts by Other Countries

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (I)341

(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (II)344

3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism346
Efforts of International Community/Japan's Efforts in Combating Terrorism/Outline of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Basic Plan/SDF Activities/Commendation from the World for Japan's Contribution

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Worked as Liaison Officer for Cooperation and Support Activities for the Indian Ocean351

4. Efforts to Support U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO)352
Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law/United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)/International Peace Cooperation Activities in the Golan Heights/Dispatch of Self-Defense Officials to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Working as a Member of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)357

5. International Disaster Relief Operations358
Outline of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster-Relief Teams/International Disaster-Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF's Posture/International Disaster-Relief Activities by Japan after Earthquake in Central Java Island

COLUMN

(COMMENTARY) The Prime Minister Visits SDF Units Engaged in International Peace Cooperation Activities360

Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

1. Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges362

2. Bilateral Defense Relations	363
Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Exchanges/Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges/Japan-China Defense Exchanges/Defense Exchanges with Australia/Defense Exchanges with U.K./Japan-India Defense Exchanges/Defense Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries/Defense Exchanges with Other Countries	

COLUMN

(VOICE) Studying at the NATO Defense College	375
3. Multilateral Security Dialogue	376
Significance of Multilateral Security Dialogue/ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)/Multilateral Security Dialogue Sponsored or Participated in by the Japan Defense Ministry and the SDF	
4. Multilateral Exercises	381
Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region/Efforts on multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region	

Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (The preamble)

1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	384
Nuclear Weapons/Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons/Delivery Means (Missiles)	
2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons	387
Relevant Treaties/Japan’s Efforts	
3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others	388
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)/U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	

Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities

1. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF	396
Recruitment/Employment	

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of a Newcomer (GSDF Enlisted (Upper) Candidate): My Best Colleagues	400
(VOICE) Voice of a Newcomer (MSDF Trainee Officer)	400
(VOICE) Voice of a Newcomer (ASDF Student Pilot)	402
(VOICE) Voice of Reserve SDF Personnel: Having Participated in a Japan-U.S. Combined Command Post Exercise	404
2. Daily Education and Training	405
Education of SDF Regular Personnel/SDF Training	

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of an Instructor for the Ship Inspection Course (MSDF)	409
3. Working Conditions of Personnel, Measures on Personnel Matters, and Other Related Issues	411
The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force/Efforts to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel/Commemorating Personnel Killed in the Line of Duty	

COLUMN

(COMMENTARY) Opening of a Ministry of Defense Day Care Center (Mishuku Garrison)	414
(Q&A) How is mental health care provided to personnel of the Ministry of Defense/the Self-Defense Forces?	414
4. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel, and Related Issues	415
Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel/Regulations on Outplacement of Personnel after Retirement/Reappointment System	

COLUMN

(COMMENTARY) The Prime Minister Attends the Memorial Service for SDF Personnel who Lost Their Lives on the Duty417

5. Enhancing Information and Communications Capabilities418
Response to the Information Technology (IT) Revolution/Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)

6. Efforts for Efficient Acquisition of Defense Equipment419
Promotion of Acquisition Transformation—the Reform Process and Outline of Various Efforts—Enhancement and Strengthening of the Defense Industry & Technological Bases

7. Enhancement of Technical Research & Development420
Research & Development of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)/Strengthening Relations with the Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology Field

8. Preventing Information Leaks422
Protection of Classified Information/Countermeasures for Information Leaks through the Internet/Occurrence of Case Regarding the MSDF Destroyer Shirane and Responses

Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens

1. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations with the SDF427
Cooperation in Recruitment of SDF Regular Personnel and Support for Outplacement/Support of SDF Activities

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of an Administrative Official Working as an Interpreter and Coordinator428

2. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society429

3. Harmony between Defense Facilities and the Local Community, and Environmental Conservation ...430
Scale and Features of Defense Facilities/Resolving Defense Facility Issues, and Various Measures/
Environmental Conservation

4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities435
Various Public Relations Activities/Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System and Personal Data Protection System/Appropriate Operation of the Whistle-Blower Protection System/Engagement in Policy Evaluation

Section 3. Gaining the Trust of Japanese Citizens

1. Actions Taken Against Collusive Bidding, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency438
Report on Drastic Measures to Prevent Collusive Bidding, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency

2. Measures against Drug Abuse439

COLUMN

(VOICE) Voice of a Female SDF Member Working as a Base Security Guard440

Reference.....445

Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

[Main Points]

- Security environment in the Asia-Pacific region
- North Korea's announcement of ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests
- Resolution to impose sanctions on North Korea and six-party talks

Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community

[Main Points]

- Trends in international terrorism
- Transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Situation of Iraq
- Complex and diverse regional conflicts

Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries

[Main Points]

- Efforts to stabilize the international community by the United States, North Korea, the Republic of Korea, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Australia, Europe, the U.N., etc.



Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 1
The Basic Concepts of Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 2
The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-Up of Defense Capability

Chapter 3
Transition to Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission



Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Efforts by Japan

Chapter 1
Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief and Civil Protection

Cooperation with Allies

Chapter 2
Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Cooperation with International Community

Chapter 3
Improvement of the International Security Environment

Ties with Japanese Citizens

Chapter 4
Citizens of Japan, and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF



Overview

1. General

Last year and the first half of this year witnessed a variety of events and incidents noteworthy from the perspective of peace and security of Japan and the international community. They include North Korea's ballistic missile launches and announcement of nuclear tests, and the declaration of a new Iraq policy by the United States.

The most characteristic features of today's security environment are increasing diversity and complexity of threats and difficulty of accurately estimating emergence of such threats. This requires each country to develop new approaches to them.

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as ballistic missiles and other delivery means for these WMDs is recognized as one of the greatest threats to security today. Efforts to counter the proliferation of WMDs have become a pressing issue for the international community. The problems of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles not only impact the security of Japan seriously, but also have become an important issue for the international community from the perspective of the non-proliferation of WMDs. Iran continues its uranium enrichment and this issue also remains unresolved despite the pressure from international community through U.N. Security Council resolutions and other means. Furthermore concerns have risen about the acquisition and use of WMDs by international terrorist organizations that have no state or people to protect and therefore conventional deterrence are not effective.

The heightened threat posed by international terrorist organizations and other non-state actors is one of the notable features of the world's security environment in recent years. Non-state entities such as international terrorist organizations against which conventional deterrence does not function effectively now possess, due to the spread of globalization, means of attack and destructive power that were previously beyond their grasp. In addition, many non-state entities, unlike conventional military forces, are believed to have scattered, network-type organizations with members of various nationalities and this makes it very difficult for states to combat them effectively. This fact became clear with the 9/11 terrorist attacks that took place in the United States in 2001. The clash between Israel and Hizbollah last year demonstrated that the abilities of non-state entities should not be underestimated.

Patient, long-term approaches have become necessary in addressing threats such as terrorism. Although some success has been achieved in the fight against terror by the United States and other countries, efforts continue to address severe challenges presented in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are regarded by the United States as front lines in this fight. An intensification of the sectarian conflict in Iraq since last year has caused a serious deterioration in the security situation. Consequently, the United States announced a review of its Iraq strategy in January and dispatched additional U.S. forces. With the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan, efforts are being made to reinforce the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Therefore a considerable number of troops must still be stationed in both countries, creating a crunch in troops deployable overseas by major countries and impacting the world's security environment in various ways.

Furthermore, relations between sovereign states remain a factor that cannot be overlooked in today's security environment. The emergence of China and India and the resurgence of Russia should be regarded as major opportunities for international collaboration and cooperation. Simultaneously, interest has risen in their policies, their mutual interaction, and their relations with other countries since any moves by these powers may have a significant impact on the security environment.

As seen above, today's international community confronts a range of issues from traditional inter-state relations to new threats and diverse circumstances. These issues may arise simultaneously or in combination. It has become difficult for any country, including the sole superpower, the United States, to address these

complex issues on its own. Therefore, cooperation with allies and friendly countries has become necessary, and so do more active measures to prevent the emergence of threats and comprehensive approaches that include not only military means but also diplomatic, judicial, police, information, economic and other measures. The roles required for military forces have also diversified beyond deterrence and armed conflicts to include a broad spectrum of tasks from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance. Accordingly, each state continues to enhance its military capabilities in line with its resources and circumstances, and pursue international cooperation and partnerships in security areas.

2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region, in which some countries such as China and India are enjoying rapid economic development, is drawing heightened attention worldwide and has seen enhanced coordination and cooperation among countries, mainly in economic affairs. On the other hand, this region boasts considerable political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain despite the end of the Cold War. Since views on security and threats differ by country, major changes in the security environment, which are seen in Europe following the end of the Cold War, have yet to be found. In addition, long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification still plague the region.



Prime Minister Abe at press conference during visit to South Korea following North Korea's nuclear test announcement (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

On the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the face-off continues between the military forces of North Korea and the Republic of Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the overlapping territorial claims on the Spratly Islands. Japan also confronts unresolved territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima,

both of which are integral parts of Japanese territory.


Concerns over North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have grown more serious. North Korea launched ballistic missiles in July last year, and announced in October that it had conducted an underground nuclear test. These actions are seen as clear threats to the peace and security not only of Japan but also of the international community. The international community strongly condemned these actions and took firm steps including U.N. Security Council resolutions. In February 2007 the Six-Party Talks adopted "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," marking an important step toward denuclearization. However, careful monitoring of the nuclear issue including North Korea's reaction is necessary. The abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea also poses a major threat to the lives and security of the Japanese public, and the solution of this problem requires more sincere actions by North Korea.

Moreover, many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic growth to expand and upgrade their military forces by increasing their defense budgets and introducing new weapon systems. In particular, China, a regional power with tremendous political and economic influence, has been continuously boosting its defense spending and has been modernizing its military forces. Consequently, China has drawn international attention. There are also concerns about the lack of transparency regarding China's military capabilities. When China destroyed one of its own satellites in a test in January this year, the absence of a sufficient explanation by the Chinese government has aroused the concern of other countries, including Japan with regard to the

peaceful use of space and their own security. (See Fig. I-0-0-1)

In recent years, terrorism and piracy in Southeast Asia have been seriously affecting the region's security.

Fig. I-0-0-1 Major Military Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)



- Notes:
1. Source: "Military Balance" (2007) publications of the US Department of Defense and others (actual numbers as of the end of fiscal 2006 are shown for Japan)
 2. US ground forces in Japan and the ROK are combined figures of Army and Marine Corps personnel
 3. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft
 4. Figures inside parentheses show the number of divisions

Legend

Ground forces (200,000 troops)	Naval vessels (200,000 tons)	Combat aircraft (500 aircraft)
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Terrorist organizations and separatist/independence groups have reportedly conducted terrorist attacks in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The Malacca Straits and the Singapore Straits, important international sea lanes of transportation, are suffering from frequent piracy incidents, and joint efforts are underway to combat these threats.

In the Asia-Pacific region, where elements of opacity and uncertainty still exist as described above, the presence of the U.S. military remains extremely important. Japan and other countries have established bilateral alliances and friendly relations with the U.S. and, accordingly, they allowed the stationing or presence of U.S. forces in their territories.

Recent years have also seen an increase in opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries

in the region. Efforts continue to take root in order to promote multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and conferences hosted by non-governmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers. Promoting and developing such confidence-building measures among countries, alongside a stable U.S. military presence, is important to ensure security in the region.

Chapter 1

Issues in the International Community

Section 1. International Terrorism

Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Section 3. Situation of Iraq

Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts

Section 1. International Terrorism

1. Overview

The 9/11 attacks that took place six years ago prompted the entire world to reaffirm the threat of international terrorism, and became the spark that ignited the current fight against terrorism by the United States and other countries.

In the invasion of Afghanistan launched by U.S. and U.K. forces shortly after the 9/11 attacks, many of the leaders of Al Qaeda, who had directed the 9/11 attacks, and the Taliban, who had harbored Al Qaeda, were killed or captured. However, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar and remnants of their respective organizations are believed still to be hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region¹, and the U.S.-led multinational forces, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)², the Afghan military, and the Pakistani military are engaged in clearing operations.

Countries have banded together in an international coalition, committing not only military forces but also diplomatic, law enforcement, judicial, intelligence and economic resources, but there has been no halt on acts of terrorism and terrorist plots around the world. In August 2006, for example, the U.K.'s authorities disrupted an extensive terrorist plot to blow up several in-flight passenger airplanes bound for the United States from the United Kingdom. It is reported that this attempted terror plot was possibly backed by the existence of a criminal group spanning the United Kingdom and Pakistan and Al Qaeda's involvement.

International terrorist organizations have recently been organizing cells in a more decentralized fashion, while local terrorist organizations and individuals sympathetic to their ideology have been carrying out terrorist activities on their own or in concert with these international terrorist organizations. Police investigations have revealed, for example, that the July 2005 subway and bus suicide bomb attacks in London (U.K.) were not carried out by foreign terrorists, but rather by the sons of Muslim immigrants born and raised in the U.K.³ The suicide bomb attack against a U.S. military convoy near Baghdad, Iraq, in November 2005 was also discovered to have been carried out by the Belgian wife of a Middle Eastern man.

In light of the present situation, many countries in Europe and elsewhere have enacted stronger counterterrorism measures, including domestic counterterrorism laws, since the London subway and bus bomb attacks. Among the harsher steps taken by the Russian government, for instance, was the passage of a revised Counterterrorism Law in March 2006 that authorized the downing or sinking of a passenger aircraft or ship hijacked by a terrorist organization and posing the danger of loss of life or a large-scale disaster⁴.

Counterterrorism measures are also being implemented through multinational frameworks such as the United Nations, the G8, and regional cooperation organizations. These efforts include ensuring stability and supplying recovery/reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq, enhancing systems for exchanging counterterrorism intelligence, reinforcing international legal frameworks to sternly punish terrorists, cutting off terrorist funding and strengthening air security (including the prevention of hijacking), tightening immigration controls, adopting more effective approaches to ensure the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting countries with inadequate counterterrorism measures to enhance their capabilities, and taking steps to reduce or eliminate poverty, economic and social disparities and unfairness in developing countries.

2. Fight against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan

The United States together with other countries has continued military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the Arabian Sea, naval vessels from various countries have endeavored to keep these terrorists from escaping by sea and to prevent the proliferation of terrorism from Afghanistan.

Terrorist forces such as Taliban appear to be on the rebound since 2006, and the security situation in Afghanistan remains unstable. As the presence of the U.S.-led multinational forces, the ISAF, the Afghan military, and the police have been further strengthened in the southern and eastern areas adjacent to the border with Pakistan, the number of suicide bombings and attacks mainly targeting these multinational forces have correspondingly increased. There have been also scattered terrorist bomb attacks in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and in the northern and western areas, which were relatively stable and peaceful. These circumstances impel the multinational forces and the ISAF to collaborate in large-scale military operations in the southern and eastern areas of the country. The ISAF has set up five Regional Commands under the General Headquarters in Kabul. There have 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) under the Regional Commands to maintain security and conduct reconstruction assistance activities in the whole of Afghanistan. Similar activities are also continuing through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan, all located in Central Asia, declared their intent to cooperate in the counter-terrorism operations conducted by the United States and its allies following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and some of them have served as rear bases in the fight against terror by allowing the stationing of United States and other troops⁵. These four countries are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Within that framework, they are actively involved in activities including counterterrorism exercises of the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) set up for joint efforts to fight against terrorism.

3. Terrorist Attacks around the World

Since Saddam Hussein's regime was brought down by U.S. and U.K. military operations in 2003, it seems that terrorists have been flowing into Iraq due to degraded security and insufficient border controls, and terrorist attacks have taken place on almost a daily basis, targeting not only U.S. and other soldiers but also general Iraqi citizens and foreign civilians. In June 2006, Abu Musab Al Zarkawi, the leader of "Al Qaeda in Iraq" was killed in an air attack by multinational forces, but activities probably attributed to that organization have continued. The activities of these terrorist organizations have become a major obstacle to rebuilding Iraq.

Terrorist attacks have also continued in countries near Iraq. In April 2006, a series of terrorist bomb attacks, which targeted at a supermarket and other shops in Dahab in the southern part of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, killed more than 20 persons. In November 2005 three Western hotels were bombed in Jordan's capital of Amman, killing more than 50 people.


Southeast Asia ranks alongside Iraq and its neighbors as an area subject to large-scale terrorist attacks. Between 2002 and 2005, Indonesia suffered large-scale terrorist attacks⁶. In these terrorist incidents, the involvement of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a radical Muslim organization, is suspected. In addition to the arrests of more than 300 JI activists since 2002, the police authorities have achieved a certain level of success against JI, killing Azhari bin Husin, one of JI's top leaders and an explosives expert, in November 2005. Since 2004, southern Thailand has also witnessed frequent attacks and bombing/arson incidents by radical Muslim separatists against facilities such as military and the police.

South Asia, too, has seen frequent large-scale terrorist attacks. Terrorist bombings targeting multiple trains in city of Mumbai on India's western coast in July 2006 killed more than 180 people. The Mumbai police authorities have announced the results of their investigation—that the attack was planned by the intelligence organs of the Pakistani military and

carried out by a Pakistan-based radical Muslim organization—but the Pakistani government has denied any connection with this incident. In central Sri Lanka, an October 2006 suicide terrorist bomb attack against a convey of buses carrying naval soldiers left more than 100 people dead, including civilian bystanders. The involvement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a militant secessionist Tamil organization, in this incident is suspected. (See Fig. I-1-1-1)

Fig. I-1-1-1 Major Terrorism Incidents in the World (July 2006 – May 2007)

* Excluding Iraq and Afghanistan



Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles carrying such weapons has been regarded as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, there have been growing fears that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence works less effectively, will acquire and use weapons of mass destructions.

1. Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 made it clear that there was a risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)⁷ of 1968 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 1966⁸ from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations⁹.

Under the NPT, signed by 190 countries, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China are now permitted to have nuclear weapons. While some countries that had nuclear weapons abandoned them and became signatories of this treaty¹⁰, some countries still refuse to sign this treaty¹¹. Thus, in addition to the five countries permitted to have nuclear weapons, there are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons. For example, North Korea announced it had conducted a nuclear test in October 2006.

2. Biological and Chemical Weapons

It is easy to manufacture biological and chemical weapons at a relatively low cost. Because most of the materials, equipment and technology that are needed to manufacture them can be used for both military and civilian purposes, disguising them is easy. This makes biological and chemical weapons attractive to states or terrorists who seek asymmetric means of attack¹².

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: 1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, 2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days from exposure to onset, 3) their use is hard to detect, 4) even the threat of use can create great psychological pressures, and 5) heavy casualties can be caused depending on circumstances and the type of weapon¹³.

As for chemical weapons, asphyxiants such as phosgene were known during World War I. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas as an erosion agent and tabun and sarin as nerve agents¹⁴ against Iran. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds¹⁵. Other chemical weapons include VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds¹⁶.

North Korea (see Chapter 2, Section 2) is one country seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin attack that took place in Japan in 1995, and mail in the United States containing anthrax bacillus in 2001 and ricin in February 2004, respectively showed that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage in cities if terrorists use them. Since January 2007, Iraq has seen terrorist bomb attacks using chlorine gas, and containers of chlorine as well as weapons caches have been uncovered by Iraqi security forces and multinational forces.

3. Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles can carry heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of projecting weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed. No states have completed full spectrum deployment of an effective system of defense against ballistic missiles at this moment.

If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could intensify or expand. The deployment of ballistic missiles could further exacerbate tension in a region where armed antagonism exists, and could destabilize that region. A country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in terms of conventional forces.

In addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention is now increasingly being paid to the threat of cruise missiles, because it is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state entities to procure

them¹⁷. Although the speed of a cruise missile is slower than that of a ballistic missile, it is difficult to detect once it is launched and in flight¹⁸. Because cruise missiles are smaller than ballistic missiles, a terrorist can hide one in a ship and secretly approach a target. If a cruise missile carries a weapon of mass destruction, its threat would be enormous.

4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs

Weapons that are purchased or developed by a country originally for its own defense purposes could be easily exported or transferred if the country successfully manufactures these domestically. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks are transferring weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and intend to compensate for this with weapons of mass destruction. These states that seek weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk. Because governance is poor in such countries, terrorist organizations are reported to be active. Therefore, the chance of actual use of weapons of mass destruction may generally be high in these cases.

In addition, since it is unlikely that such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, the high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states to other countries is cause for concern. Even without this technology, there is the risk that a terrorist will use a dirty bomb¹⁹ as a means of attack simply by acquiring a radioactive substance.

All countries have come to share concerns about the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities. Based on these concerns, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, declaring that all states should adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws that prohibit non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery thereof, as well as refrain from assisting such non-state actors. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in April 2005.

Activities related to weapons of mass destruction were secretly pursued in some countries. Such activities have come to light since 2002, revealing the fact that nuclear weapon technologies have been proliferated and transferred. On the other hand, the international community's uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries involved with such weapons, leading some of them to accept inspection by international institutions or to abandon further programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

During (then) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry's visit to North Korea in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea had admitted to the existence of a project to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, pointing out the possibility that North Korea was pursuing the development not only of plutonium-based weapons but also uranium-based nuclear weapons.

It has become clear that Iran, too, has been engaged in uranium enrichment-related activities since 2002, and efforts by the international community to resolve this issue continue.

As a result of behind-the-scenes discussions with the United States and the United Kingdom from March 2003, Libya announced in December 2003 that it would abandon all of its weapons of mass destruction programs and accept immediate inspections by international organizations. Subsequently in August 2006, the country ratified the additional IAEA protocol.

Pakistan seems to have launched its nuclear development program in the 1970s, and suspicious technology transfers concerning uranium enrichment from Pakistan to Iran and Libya were revealed in 2003. In February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, have been transferred to North Korea, Iran and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists for personal gain. These transfers have been shown to have been secretly conducted using global networks involving Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia²⁰. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohammad El Baradei has reportedly stated that this network spans more than 30 countries²¹.

Further, ballistic missiles have significantly proliferated or been transferred. The former Soviet Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess them. Pakistan's Ghauri and Iran's Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North Korea's No-Dong missile²². Libya, which agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, reportedly disclosed production lines for Scud-Cs and other facilities built with the technological assistance of North Korea²³. It has been reported that Ukraine illegally exported cruise missiles capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads to Iran and China around 2001²⁴.

5. Iran's Nuclear Issue

Since the 1970s Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that this plant was to be used for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, it was announced by a group of dissidents that Iran was secretly constructing a large-scale uranium enrichment facility, and subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran had engaged in the enrichment of uranium and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons without notifying the IAEA, in violation of the IAEA's safeguards agreement. Since this revelation regarding Iran's nuclear program, Iran has insisted that it has no intent of developing nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the international community has expressed strong concerns about obtaining assurances of Iran's claims, and has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment and reprocessing activities until it can confirm that Iran's nuclear development activities are solely for peaceful purposes.

Exercising initiative to resolve the issue, the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) held discussions with Iran in hopes of resolving this issue; an accord (Paris Accord) was reached in November 2004 on halting uranium enrichment and all other nuclear-related activities, and Iran accordingly ceased its nuclear-related activities. However, Iran rejected as unsatisfactory the proposal²⁵ for a Long-Term Agreement presented by the EU-3 in August 2005 and announced the start of preparations for the recommencement of uranium enrichment in January 2006 (Iran recommenced uranium enrichment in February). The IAEA then convened an emergency Board of Governors meeting in February 2006 that by a majority vote adopted a resolution to report

the issue to the U.N. Security Council. In March 2006, the U.N. Security Council approved a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, but in April Iran announced that it had successfully achieved low-grade (3.5%) uranium enrichment²⁶ and stuck to its policy to continue uranium enrichment-related activities. In June 2006, a comprehensive proposal was presented to Iran under an agreement of the 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany. The proposal included cooperation in the event that Iran suspended all its nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment-

related activities; Iran nevertheless continued its nuclear activities. In view of Iran's response, the U.N. Security Council in July adopted Resolution 1696 demanding Iran to suspend all of its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities and warning that appropriate measures would be taken under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter if Iran were not to comply with this resolution by the end of August 2006.

Because Iran continued its uranium enrichment-related activities, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1737²⁷ on December 23, 2006, and then Resolution 1747²⁸ on March 24, 2007, to impose stricter sanctions in accordance with Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. Despite these efforts by the international community, Iran in April 2007 declared that its nuclear fuel production was in industrial scale. Although the Iran's nuclear issue remains unresolved, the U.N. Security Council and the rest of the international community are continuing to pursue political and diplomatic solutions through negotiations.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Issues Surrounding North Korea and Iran

Nuclear power is useful when used for peaceful purposes under the strict safeguards mechanism of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, since nuclear power can also be used to produce nuclear weapons, the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues are currently posing a serious threat to the international society. This column explains the two key terms of the issues—nuclear weapons and reactors.

(1) Energy sources of nuclear weapons¹: uranium and plutonium

Nuclear weapons utilize gigantic energy released at the time of nuclear fission activated by neutron absorption. Therefore the production of nuclear weapons requires, first and foremost, materials made up of atoms that are easy to split (fissile materials). The two most typical fissile materials are uranium and plutonium.

Natural uranium consists mainly of uranium-235, which is fissionable, and uranium-238, which is not. Since uranium-235 makes up only 0.7% of natural uranium, the enrichment process is required to separate uranium-235 from natural uranium before using it as a material of nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment generally necessitates a large-scale facility with several thousands of centrifuges linked with each other. The concentration of uranium-235 can be increased to a weapons grade (90% or more) at such an enrichment facility.

Plutonium, on the other hand, seldom exists naturally, and is created artificially in reactors. Most of the existing nuclear weapons are the plutonium type. In reactors, when uranium fuel is irradiated with neutrons to cause nuclear fission of uranium-235 to generate energy, uranium-238 is also exposed to neutrons and produce plutonium as a by-product. The spent fuel therefore contains uranium-235, uranium-238 and plutonium in a mixed state, and has to be chemically processed at reprocessing plants to separate plutonium from the other remnants. However, plutonium extracted from fuel used for power generation in nuclear power reactors—often called “reactor grade plutonium”—has a high plutonium 240² content, and is generally considered unsuitable for nuclear weapons.

(2) Types of reactors, and nuclear suspicion about Iran and North Korea

Reactors are divided into graphite moderated reactors (GMRs), heavy water reactors (HWRs) and light water reactors (LWRs). GMRs and HWRs can use natural uranium as fuel, and are believed to be more suitable for producing plutonium than LWRs. LWRs, on the other hand, use uranium-235 enriched to 3 to 5% (low-enriched uranium (LEU)). LEU can be produced domestically or imported from abroad, and in the case of the former, it is important for other countries to determine whether the enrichment facility is for peaceful or military use. Since LWRs need to be deactivated when their fuel is replaced, they are believed to be easier than GMRs and HWRs to monitor the disposal of spent fuel containing plutonium.

Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to demolish its GMR on condition that, among others, an LWR would be provided to the country in place of the GMR. The framework seemed to put an end to the suspicion about North Korea developing plutonium-type nuclear weapons. However, North Korea allegedly tried to import materials to produce centrifuges although the country was expected to import LEU for the LWR. This has led other countries to suspect that North Korea may be developing, this time, uranium-type nuclear weapons. (See Chapter 1, Section 2 (p.36))

Iran is trying to establish its own uranium enrichment technology, which the country claims is to be used to produce LEU necessary for an LWR currently being constructed. However, since Iran had been conducting various activities including uranium enrichment without reporting to the IAEA until 2002, the country's claim that its nuclear development is intended solely for peaceful purposes is regarded by the international community as unconvincing, and is suspected to be developing nuclear weapons. Iran has been continuing with uranium enrichment, defying Security Council resolutions several times, and the IAEA reported in May this year that about 1,300 centrifuges are currently in operation in the country. In addition, Iran has begun to construct a research HWR. Since it is not clear why an HWR is needed in addition to the LWR, and HWRs are more suitable for producing plutonium than LWRs, it is also suspected that the country may be developing plutonium-type nuclear weapons, causing concern to the international community. (See Section 2 (p.14))

1) There are in fact two types of nuclear weapons: nuclear fission weapons and nuclear fusion weapons. But this column focuses only on the former.

2) Unlike plutonium 239, plutonium 240 is likely to fission spontaneously. Therefore, plutonium with a high plutonium 240 content is considered unable to effectively produce nuclear explosions.

Section 3. Situation of Iraq

1. Security Situation after the Establishment of New Iraqi Government

Even after the establishment of a new Iraqi government in May 2006, the public security situation in Iraq is as challenging as before. Attacks against multinational forces and Iraqi security units are common, particularly in the “Sunni Triangle”²⁹ and parts of northern Iraq, and sectarian conflicts have been severe. Especially, the February 2006 bombing of a Shiite mosque in Samarra in central Iraq triggered fierce sectarian violence, resulting in a rapid increase in Iraqi civilian victims, particularly in Baghdad, and creating major problems for the country’s security and stability.

In the backdrop to this violence are radical Islamists, who apparently are continuing terrorist attacks both to create the impression in Iraq and abroad that the Iraqi government is unable to govern and the multinational forces incapable of maintaining order, and to create political chaos by fueling sectarian and ethnic disputes. This gives rise to a “chain of retaliation,” with sects that have been attacked calling on private militia organizations to exact revenge.

Attacks against multinational forces, Iraqi security forces and civilians continue in Iraq, by a variety of means such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).

The influence of nearby countries has also been noted with regard to the security situation in Iraq. In particular, it has been reported that Iran has been providing weapons and financial support to militia organizations within Iraq, and that the remnant of supporters of the Hussein regime and Islamic radicals are pouring into Iraq from Syria³⁰.

2. Security and Other Measures by Iraqi Security Forces and Multinational Forces


With the increasingly fierce sectarian rivalry described above producing a deteriorating security situation in Baghdad and elsewhere and becoming a serious obstacle to political and economic progress, President Bush implemented a review of the United States’ Iraq policy. After discussions with the Iraqi government, he announced a new strategy with regard to Iraq in January 2007. Positing the restoration of order in Baghdad as the key to success, this new policy seeks to tackle head-on the issue of ensuring the security of local residents, as opposed to the focus of the previous policy on transferring the responsibility for security to the Iraqis. As the strengthening of the Iraqi security forces’ capabilities, which is the premise of the strategy, may not prove sufficient on its own, the United States decided to send more than 20,000 additional combat troops. The dispatch of an additional carrier strike group to the Middle East and the deployment of Patriot air defense systems were among other steps taken to bolster the security of Iraq and protect U.S. interests in the Middle East³¹.

Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki then initiated a new security policy for Baghdad in February 2007 that called for approximately 90,000 Iraqi security and U.S. forces to be dispatched to Baghdad to crack down on all illegal behavior regardless of affiliation.

Transfers of responsibility for security from multinational forces to Iraqi authorities are proceeding in the provinces in which the capabilities of Iraqi security forces have been enhanced and local conditions have

improved. Thus far, authority for security has been transferred in seven provinces, including southeastern Iraq's Muthanna Province, in which the GSDF was engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities. (See Fig. I-1-3-1)

Fig. I-1-3-1 Countries Dispatching Forces to Iraq and Primary Areas of Operation



As of May 2007, military units from 26 countries, including approximately 150,000 U.S. troops, are deployed within Iraq and are given responsibility for security and reconstruction assistance, but changing circumstances have led to changes in the scale of some of the multinational forces. For instance, the United Kingdom, citing progress in handing over the responsibility for security in southern Iraq, announced in February 2007 that it would be reducing the British contingent in Iraq from 7,100 to about 5,500 within a few months.

The basic idea underlying the activities of the multinational forces is that the presence of such forces is necessary until Iraqi security forces are able to maintain security on their own. Consequently, the multinational forces assert that they cannot set out in advance a deadline for terminating their activities, even while insisting that their involvement in Iraq is not unlimited. They say that more time will be needed until the Iraqi security forces are able to maintain order and stability in Iraq on their own.

3. Efforts by the Iraqi Government and International Community toward Reconstruction

Breakthroughs in the situation in Iraq will require not only security measures but also political efforts by the Iraqi government on its own initiative to promote national reconciliation. Prime Minister Maliki in June 2006 devised a national reconciliation plan, and held a national reconciliation conference in Baghdad in December. Thus Iraq is continuing efforts to build a democratic and stable state on the basis of national reconciliation.

Many countries have contributed to Iraqi reconstruction through the dispatch of troops and bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. Since 2005, the United States and others have deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) made up of military and civilian personnel to provide support to local governments in Iraq, and the United States decided in the previously mentioned new Iraq strategy to double the number of PRTs in giving greater emphasis to both military and non-military cooperation. The United Nations has been coordinating reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance through the United Nations


Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

In the mean time, the Iraq Compact was launched in May 2007 by an international framework co-chaired by the Iraqi government and the United Nations to build a new partnership between the Iraqi government and the international community. In this Iraq Compact, the Iraqi government has presented its policy objectives for the next five years in the areas of governance, security, and economic recovery, and the international community has promised assistance for such efforts by the Iraqi government.

Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts

Complex and diverse regional conflicts are erupting around the world. The characteristics of regional conflicts differ from one conflict to another, whether they be inter-state or intra-state conflicts. They may result from various ethnic, religious, territorial or resource-related problems, and may range in form from armed conflict to sustained armed antagonism. The resultant human rights violations, refugees, hunger, poverty and terrorism have at times become international issues. For that reason, it has become more important for the international community to determine the character of complex and diverse conflicts and seek out approaches appropriate to their character, including approaches involving international frameworks. (See Fig. I-1-4-1)

Fig. I-1-4-1 Main Areas of Conflicts and Disputes



Sources: "Military Balance" (2007) and others

The Middle East has witnessed four wars between Israel and Arab states or Palestinians since the foundation of Israel in 1948. The Oslo Agreement concluded in 1993 marked the start of a peace process through negotiations, but the Israelis and Palestinians subsequently suspended their negotiations due to the intifada that started in 2000 and resulted in the exchange of violence between the two parties. In 2003, both the Israelis and Palestinians accepted a "Road Map" that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative between the Israelis and the Palestinians on the principle of the peaceful coexistence of two nations. However, the implementation of the Road Map has not yet been promoted. The Israelis would not make any compromise regarding their own security and demands the Palestinians to disband terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Israeli government takes a stern approach toward the Palestinians, saying that in the event that they do not make appropriate responses, the government will no longer regard the Palestinians as its dialogue partner and unilaterally build a barrier and draw *de facto* borders. On the Palestinian side, the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas, which does not recognize Israel and which advocates a continuation of armed conflict against Israel, won the Palestine Legislative Council elections of January 2006 and established a Hamas-led administration in March 2006.

In June 2006, following the capture of Israeli soldiers by Palestinian militants in Gaza, the Israeli military invaded the Gaza area, from which it had withdrawn in 2005. After about five months of fighting, which included air strikes by the Israeli military and rocket attacks by Palestinian armed groups, a ceasefire went into effect between the Israelis and the Palestinians in Gaza in November 2006. Within the Palestinian ranks, however, the rivalry between Fatah, a mainstream part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hamas intensified, and clashes among Palestinians resulted in deaths and political chaos. To bring this dispute to an end, an accord reached in Mecca in February 2007 led to the formation of a unified Palestinian government by Fatah and Hamas in March. In May 2007, however, Fatah and Hamas clashed, Hamas attacked the Israelis, and the Israeli military resumed its military operations. The situation thus does not allow premature conclusions.

Israel has not yet signed peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. There are different stances between Israel and Syria on the returning of the Golan Heights that Israel occupied after the 1967 Arab-Israel War, and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which observes the implementation of ceasefire and disengagement between two nations, is deployed.

The July 2006 capture of Israeli soldiers by the Shiite Islamic organization Hezbollah near the border between Israel and Lebanon was followed by air attacks against Lebanon and the insertion of ground troops by Israel. Hezbollah declared a do-or-die resistance and launched rocket attacks against Israeli territory. Fierce fighting continued for about a month between the Israeli military forces and Hezbollah, and both Israel and Lebanon suffered major damage. Israeli air strikes on Qana in southern Lebanon that killed numerous children and other civilians sparked more urgent efforts by the international community to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 called for a cessation of aggression, and this ceasefire went into effect on August 14. In line with this resolution, an expanded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed alongside the Lebanese military in southern Lebanon to monitor the ceasefire.

India and Pakistan gained their independence from the former British India after World War II, but three large-scale armed conflicts have broken out between the two countries over Kashmir and other issues. (See Chapter 2, Section 6)

On the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea are confronting each other with tension across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), with a total of approximately 1.5 million ground forces; this military confrontation has been ongoing since the end of the Korean War (1950–1953). (See Chapter 2, Section 2)

In Nepal, armed conflict with the Maoist faction of the Nepal Communist Party has caused a great number of casualties since 1996. A democratization movement produced a new government in April 2006, and a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in November between this government and the Maoists. Following this agreement, the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has been deployed in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1740, and among its duties are monitoring the status of weapons and soldiers.

In Sudan, disputes over local autonomy and developmental disparities led in 2003 to intensified fighting between the Arab government and the African anti-government forces (both Muslim) in Darfur region of western Sudan. The Arab militia known as Janjaweed has continued attacks against local African residents, creating large numbers of internally displaced persons and an outflow of refugees into neighboring Chad. The United Nations and the rest of the international community have been treating the Darfur issue as a serious humanitarian crisis. Recently it seems that this conflict is spilling over into Chad and the Central African Republic, and showing signs of escalating into an international conflict. To settle the Darfur conflict, the African Union (AU) has dispatched the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to mediate negotiations for peace between the government and rebels. The government and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

(SLM/A), one of the major rebel groups, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, and efforts are ongoing to persuade rebels who did not accept the DPA. On the other hand, the Sudanese government has consistently remained noncommittal about (then) U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's November 2006 proposal on the African Union-United Nations hybrid operation of about 20,000 troops, the final stage of the U.N.'s assistance program for AMIS.

Somalia had been in a state of anarchy since 1991, but in 2002, a peace process was promoted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and in January 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in Nairobi and members of the TFG returned to Somalia in June 2005. Last year, fighting intensified between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamic fundamentalist organization. In January 2007, the TFG forces and the Ethiopian military, which was deployed in Somalia in response to the TFG's request for support, brought under control the south central area including the capital of Mogadishu. In February 2007, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1744 and based on this resolution, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been deployed. There were, however, armed attacks against the TFG, Ethiopian military, and AMISOM, and the situation remains unclear.

Notes

- 1) During his February 2007 trip to Pakistan to meet with President Musharraf, U.S. Vice President Cheney clearly expressed apprehensions of regrouping of Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan and requested that Pakistan step up its efforts against Al Qaeda.
- 2) Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with the principal mission of maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510 (October 13, 2003) gradually expanded the area of deployment from December 2003. In October 2006, it covered the entire territory of Afghanistan. As of May 2007, approximately 41,000 troops from 37 countries have been sent to the ISAF.
- 3) Three of the four suicide bombers were sons of Pakistani immigrants and the fourth was born in Jamaica; all were British nationals.
- 4) On the other hand, in February 2006, the German Federal Constitutional Court decided that the provision of the Aviation Security Law stipulating that hijacked airplanes may be shot down is unconstitutional and should be repealed. Thus, views on anti-terrorism measures vary from one country to another.
- 5) In November 2005 the U.S. military withdrew from Karshi-Khanabad Base in Uzbekistan at the request of the Uzbek government.
- 6) For instance, in October 2002, terrorist bomb attacks in two clubs on the island of Bali killed 202 people. In October 2005, terrorist bomb attacks against restaurants and other locations on the island of Bali killed 23 persons.
- 7) The treaty took effect in 1970.
- 8) The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China signed the NPT in 1992.
- 9) Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith.
- 10) South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
- 11) Israel, India and Pakistan are nonmembers.
- 12) A means of attacking a country's most vulnerable points other than by conventional weapons of war (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks)
- 13) Former Defense Agency, "Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons" (January 2002)
- 14) Mustard gas is a slow-acting erosion agent. Tabun and sarin are swift-acting nerve agents.
- 15) It was reported that a Kurdish village was attacked with chemical weapons in 1988, killing several thousand people.
- 16) When this weapon is launched or exploded, two kinds of chemical agents are mixed, generating a lethal chemical agent. The handling and storing of this weapon is easy because its lethality is low before being used.
- 17) In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hizbollah used an anti-ship missile in attacking an Israeli naval vessel.
- 18) U.S. Department of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response" (January 2001)
- 19) Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by scattering radioactive substances.
- 20) In May 2004, a man regarded as the right hand of Dr. A.Q. Khan from the same network was arrested in Malaysia.
- 21) Statement at a press conference with Japanese reporters (September 29, 2004)
- 22) James A. Kelly, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said before the Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2004: "There are no longer any military dealings between North Korea and Pakistan. However, it was obviously not the case in the past...Iran had

some kind of cooperative relationship [with North Korea] in military affairs.” “What I can say in public is limited,” he added.

- 23) Testimony of then Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (February 24, 2004)
- 24) Accusation made by the Deputy Chairman of Ukraine’s Parliamentary Committee on Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (February 2, 2005)
- 25) This urged Iran to abandon its nuclear fuel cycle in exchange for assistance in a civilian-use nuclear power program that would guarantee a fuel supply for light-water reactors, the provision of civilian aircraft and parts, and support for Iran’s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
- 26) It is said that the uranium enrichment level for nuclear power generation is 3.5 to 5.0 percent, and for nuclear weapons is 90 percent or more.
- 27) This resolution puts in place measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of materials and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities.
- 28) In addition to the above measures, this resolution bans weapons shipments by Iran and monitors/restricts the supply, sale or transfer of tanks, fighter aircraft, missiles, and other such armaments to Iran.
- 29) A region centered on the triangle linking the capital of Baghdad with Ramadi in the west and Tikrit (Saddam Hussein’s birthplace) in the north, within which there are many Sunni residents and many people who support the former Hussein regime
- 30) U.S. National Intelligence Council, “Prospects for Stability in Iraq” (January 2007)
- 31) At an interview on January 29, 2007, Vice President Cheney stated that the deployment of an additional carrier group sent a signal to deal with the Iranian threat. Secretary of State Rice, at an interview on January 12, 2007, made remarks to the effect that the United States was assisting friendly countries to improve their defensive capability with air defense to counter Iran.

Chapter 2

National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1. The United States

Section 2. Korean Peninsula

Section 3. China

Section 4. Russia

Section 5. Southeast Asia

Section 6. South Asia

Section 7. Australia

Section 8. Europe

**Section 9. Efforts to Stabilize the International
Community by the U.N. and Other Scheme**



Chinese naval vessel refueling in the Philippine Sea

Section 1. The United States

1. Security and Defense Policies

For a long time, the defense policy of the United States—a continental state shielded by two oceans—was based on the assumption that war would not be fought on the country’s soil. However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (the 9/11 attacks) made the United States recognize that its geographic advantage could not make its territory free from a direct attack. As a result, the United States has decided to give top priority in its national security to homeland defense.

The National Security Strategy¹ released in March 2006 states that the United States can protect its nation by leading an effort of the international community to end tyranny and promote democracy. The United States, however, cannot achieve such idealistic goals alone, and so the United States is committed to taking a realistic approach that relies on cooperation with allies, partners, and the international community.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)² released in February 2006 states that the United States is in a “long war” against the terrorist networks and needs to reorient the capabilities of U.S. forces to address the new security challenges on the basis of the lessons learned from the recent operational experiences and to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges (see 1 below) while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.

Furthermore, the QDR repeatedly stresses that, as the Department of Defense cannot independently win the “long war” that the United States faces today, it is essential to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.

1. Assessment of Security Environment

The United States considers that the security environment of today is different from that of the Cold War era in that it is difficult to predict who, where, and when will pose threats to and attack the United States, while during the Cold war the Soviet Union was clearly recognized as an enemy. The National Defense Strategy³ identifies four challenges that the United States is expected to face in today’s uncertain security environment:

- 1) Traditional challenges: Threats of military conflicts among nations employing conventional forces. Although the United States takes advantage over other countries in this area, the possibility that enemies pose threats to the United States cannot be ruled out.
- 2) Irregular challenges: Challenges employing such irregular methods as terrorism and insurgency to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular challenges have been intensified by the rise of political, ethnic, and religious extremism and the ineffective control over the territories, which creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents in some countries.
- 3) Catastrophic challenges: Threats involving the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. In case rogue states or transnational terrorists seek to acquire WMD, the threat to the United States will particularly increase.
- 4) Disruptive challenges: Threats coming from adversaries who are seeking to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities by means of breakthrough technologies to offset the current advantages of the United States. Some

breakthroughs, including advances in biotechnology, cyber operations, and space weapons could endanger the security of United States.

2. Defense Strategy

The United States outlines the strategic objectives in the security environment as follows: 1) securing the United States from direct attack; 2) securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action; 3) strengthening alliances and partnerships; and 4) establishing favorable security conditions. In addition, the National Defense Strategy describes the following four measures to accomplish these strategic objectives:

- 1) Assure allies and friends by fulfilling alliance and other defense commitments.
- 2) Dissuade potential enemies from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions by sustaining and developing the military advantage of the United States.
- 3) Deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the strong will to resolve conflicts.
- 4) Defeat adversaries by employing military power, as necessary, together with other instruments when deterrence fails.

Furthermore, the National Defense Strategy shows the following four implementation guidelines to be followed in pursuing the aforementioned strategic goals:

- 1) Active, layered defense: it is necessary to defeat challenges to the United States early and at a safe distance. Therefore, preventive actions such as security cooperation, forward deterrence, and nonproliferation initiatives are critical. As these actions cannot be implemented solely by the United States, cooperation with allies and friends is essential. It is also necessary to improve the capabilities to defend homeland by strengthening missile defense and other defensive measures.
- 2) Continuous transformation⁴: In order that the United States ensures its advantage, it is necessary to continuously transform U.S. forces by changing long-standing business processes within the Department of Defense and its relationship with interagency and international partners as well as methods of fight (concepts of warfare, definition of threat, operation style, organization, and composition of weapons).
- 3) “Capabilities-based” approach: In current security environment, it is difficult to predict when and where threats to the United States will emerge. However, it is possible to predict the capabilities that enemies will employ to attack the United States. Therefore, the United States continues to adopt the “capabilities-based” approach proposed in the QDR 2001 and focuses on what capabilities are needed to counter enemy capabilities.
- 4) Managing risks: Based on the concept of risk management proposed in the QDR 2001, the United States identifies various risks that many arise in pursuing the strategic objectives with limited resources, and controls them properly⁵.


3. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The QDR states that it is necessary to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges on the basis of the security environment and the defense strategy described above. Specifically, it lists the following four priority areas for capability development:

- 1) Defeating terrorist networks: In order to win the war on terror, it is necessary to deter the terrorist networks from securing their sanctuaries by attacking them relentlessly. Therefore, in addition to developing intelligence collection capabilities and special operation capabilities, U.S. forces strengthen their cooperation with interagency partners and provide training to security forces of other countries. To defeat terrorist networks in a battle of ideas as well as in a battle of arms, U.S. forces will strengthen their strategic communication and improve language and cultural awareness.

- 2) Defending the homeland in depth: In order to cope with threats to the homeland of the United States, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with interagency partners as well as to maintain the posture to deter invasion. To implement this, U.S. forces need not only to strengthen their deterrence by missile defense and other defensive measures, but also to increase capabilities of consequence management in response to emergencies.
- 3) Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads: While the United States encourages the countries that will affect the future security to become constructive partners by expanding its security cooperation and other measures, it hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail by strengthening the capabilities of allies and partners, further diversifying its basing posture, and maintaining its military primacy in key areas.
- 4) Preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction: the United States needs to take both preventive and responsive measures so that it addresses the threat of WMD by adversaries. U.S. forces develop capabilities to lessen the damage in case of WMD attacks while they strengthen their capabilities to identify and track WMD and their related materials as preventive measures. (See Fig. I-2-1-1)

Fig. I-2-1-1 The Four Challenges and Priority Areas of QDR2006



4. Force Planning


The 2001 QDR described that the United States adopted an approach to construct its forces for the following four objectives: 1) to defend the United states; 2) to maintain forward-deployed forces in four critical regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia; 3) to defeat adversaries

swiftly in two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes and to defeat an adversary decisively in one of the two theaters, and 4) to conduct a limited number of small-scale contingencies

However, since the lessons learned from experiences in the war on terror suggest that U.S. forces need to operate around the globe and not only in and from the four critical regions and that “swiftly defeating” or “winning decisively” against adversaries may be less useful for some types of operations, such as a long-duration, irregular warfare campaign, the 2006 QDR concludes that while continuing to take the capabilities-based approach, the United States has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: 1) homeland defense; 2) war on terror/irregular (asymmetric) warfare; and 3) conventional campaigns:

- 1) Homeland defense: In steady state, U.S. forces deter external threats to the homeland of the United States and provide necessary supports to interagency partners by conducting joint trainings and other measures so that they can contribute to homeland defense. In surge, they respond to attacks by means of WMD and other weapons, and also take measures to minimize the damage from them.
- 2) War on terror/irregular warfare: In steady state, U.S. forces deter transnational terrorist attacks through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends and conduct counter insurgency operations. In surge, they conduct a potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign, whose level of effort is equal to that of the operations presently conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- 3) Conventional campaigns: In steady state, U.S. forces deter invasions or coercion by other countries through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends through security cooperation such as military exchanges and joint exercises. In surge, they wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. (See Fig. I-2-1-2)


Fig. I-2-1-2 Concept for Force Planning in QDR2006



5. Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The United States is currently working on the review of its global defense posture⁶. The Bush administration explained in August 2004 that, over the next ten years, the plan “will bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees.” By reviewing the posture of its forces, the United States will redeploy most of its large-scale forces that have stationed forward to cope with threats in the Cold War era to homeland, and strengthening its cooperation with allies and others, while making efforts to further improve rapid reaction capabilities by moving its most rapidly deployable forces forward in case of emergencies in unpredictable locations. Also, by capitalizing on force transformation, the United States aims to improve the capabilities of the forward-deployed force, while attempting to restore the morale and readiness of the military forces by sending many service members who are stationed aboard back to the United States. (See Fig. I-2-1-3)

Fig. I-2-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status



Note: Materials are taken from the published documents of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of September 2006) and others.

One of the reasons for this review is the change in the security environment. In the Cold War era, the United States deployed its heavy forces forward with the certainty that it knew adversaries and where potential battles would be fought. In the security environment after the end of the Cold War, however, it is difficult to predict who would be enemies and where the battles would occur. In addition, as the transformation of U.S. forces exploiting innovation in military technologies in recent years have improved their fighting capabilities and mobility, it is no longer appropriate to evaluate the capability of the forward-deployed forces by the number of military personnel. Another reason of this posture review is that as stresses on U.S. military personnel and their family members increased with frequent overseas operations after the end of the Cold war, there have grown greater concerns about the morale and readiness of the military forces.

As specific measures in this posture review, the United States will send two army divisions deployed in Europe back to the homeland while organizing more expeditionary forces by deploying Striker Brigade Combat Teams⁷, reinforcing the airborne brigade, and creating a joint task force as well as building new bases

and training facilities in East European countries. Also, the United States aims to introduce the missile defense (MD) system to Europe by around 2011 and 2012. Accordingly, the United States agreed with Czech and Poland to start formal negotiations on the deployment of a part of the MD system in the countries⁸.

As for Asia, the United States announced to improve the capabilities of U.S. forces to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in the region through strengthened long-range strike capability, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access agreements. Specifically, the United States is working on: 1) the forward stationing of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities in the Pacific⁹; 2) deployment of advanced strike assets in the Western Pacific¹⁰; 3) restructuring U.S. military presence and command structure in Northeast Asia, (see Section 2.3 and Part III, Chapter 2) ; 4) establishing a network of sites to provide training opportunities and contingency access in Central and Northeast Asia¹¹.

As for Africa, the United States announced in February 2007 that the United States Africa Command would be created by September 2008 as a new Unified Combatant Command of the U.S. forces that would have an area of responsibility covering Africa¹². Prior to the creation of this new Command, three Unified Commands have divided responsibility for U.S. military operations in Africa. Through the creation of the new Command, the United States aims to enhance its effort to bring peace and security to Africa and to promote development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in the region.

6. Nuclear Strategy


The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) announced in 2002 declares a U.S. shift in nuclear force planning from an approach based on threats of Russia: the United States should maintain the minimum required nuclear forces for the security of the United States, its allies, and friends, and the United States must have new deterrent force composed of nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defense systems (missile defense). The NPR asserts that deterrence should shift from the old triad in the Cold War era comprising 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); 2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); and 3) strategic bombers to a new triad of 1) non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities; 2) active and passive defense system; and 3) defense infrastructure (defense industry, procurement system, and others). The new triad depends less on nuclear weapons by emphasizing the importance of missile defense and conventional forces (advanced weapons in particular), and makes deterrence more reliable in an environment where WMD are proliferating. The 2006 QDR follows the concept of the new triad defined in the NPR and declares that the United States holds a wider range of conventional strike capabilities and missile defense capabilities, while maintaining a nuclear deterrent¹³.

7. FY 2008 Budget

The Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Message of the President, regarding the Department of Defense Base Budget, excluding the budget for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) , attaches importance to 1) ensuring a high state of military readiness and ground force strength; 2) enhancing the combat capabilities of the United States Armed Forces; 3) continuing the development of capabilities that will maintain traditional U.S. superiority against potential threats; and 4) continuing the Department of Defense's strong support for service members and their families. The budget amounts to \$481.4 billion.

The budget for the GWOT, which had previously been included in a supplementary budget, is included in the FY 2008 Department of Defense Base Budget in accordance with the direction of the Congress. In the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Message of the President, as much as \$141.7 billion is appropriated to continue the fight and reconstitute the force against terrorism. (See Fig. I-2-1-4)

Fig. I-2-1-4 U.S. Defense Budget from FY 2003 to 2007



Note: Expenses are shown in a narrow sense based on Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008; the amount for FY 2007 is an estimate

2. Military Posture

Regarding nuclear forces, the United States completed the reduction of the number of its strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) by December 2001, the deadline set in the treaty. The current nuclear forces of the United States consist of 550 ICBMs, 14 SSBNs (Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear-Powered), 432 SLBMs, 114 strategic bombers, and 5,966 nuclear warheads. In addition, the United States intends to decrease the number of its nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012 in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (“Moscow Treaty”).



U.S. soldiers engaged in security operations in Iraq [U.S. Army]

The U.S. ground forces consist of 10 Army divisions (approximately 510,000 soldiers) and three Marine Corps divisions (about 180,000 marines). U.S. ground forces are forward-deployed in Germany (two army divisions), the ROK (one Army division), and Japan (one Marine Corps division). To cope with the war on terror, U.S. ground forces are reorganizing their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units¹⁴. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the war on terror and in military operations in Iraq. It newly established Marine Corps

Special Operations Command (MARSOC)¹⁵ in February 2006, thereby improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare. The U.S. government is proposing to the Congress that Army permanent end strength be increased to 547,000 and Marine Corps permanent end strength to 202,000 in order to enhance the military capabilities and to reduce stress imposed on troops and soldiers deployed in global war against terrorism¹⁶.

The U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 950 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines), totaling about 5.68 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean, the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific, and the 7th Fleet to the

western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deploy at least six operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific in order to increase its military presence in the ocean. In addition, in March 2007, the United States announced that it would move the home port of an aircraft carrier from the Atlantic Ocean side to San Diego facing the Pacific in early 2010.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,840 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK. In the 2006 QDR, it is assured that the United States will strengthen its offensive capabilities with conventional weapons by developing a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018, modernizing B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers, and accelerating the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles. On the other hand, it states that the number of the Air Force end strength will be reduced by about 40,000 full-time equivalent personnel.

As for mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is procuring C-17 transport aircraft and modernizing C-5 transport aircraft to improve the transport capabilities of the forces¹⁷, and prepositioning equipment at various theaters.

The U.S. forces are increasingly depending on the space system for intelligence collection and communications. The country announced the U.S. National Space Policy in 2006, in which it states that space capabilities are vital to its national interests and that it will preserve its freedom of action in space, deter others from impeding its space system, take those actions necessary to protect its space system, and deny, if necessary, the use of space that is hostile to the United States.

3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys a total of approximately 22,000 personnel in the region: the 2nd Infantry Division, the 19th Sustainment Command, and others totaling about 20,000 in the ROK and the 9th Theater Support Command and others totaling about 2,000 in Japan.

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the east Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii. The 7th Fleet locates its main bases in Japan and Guam and deploys one aircraft carrier and other ships with about 15,000 personnel. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet include carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force, the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft is deployed in Japan, with about 15,000 personnel including the forces afloat. In addition, maritime prepositioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.


The Air Force deploys three air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-15, F-16, C-130 fighters in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force Stationed in the ROK, with about 22,000 personnel in total.

Section 2. Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, which covers an area equivalent to approximately 60% of Japan, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). North Korea has only half the population of the ROK, and is economically far outstripped by the ROK. Nevertheless, the size of North Korea’s armed forces far exceeds those of the ROK, as shown in the figure. Such military confrontation has continued since the armistice of the Korean War.

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia, to say nothing of Japan. (See Fig. I-2-2-1)

Fig. I-2-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula



		North Korea	ROK	U.S. Forces in ROK
Army	Total armed forces	Approx. 1,100,000 personnel	Approx. 690,000 personnel	Approx. 29,000 personnel
	Ground troops	Approx. 1,000,000 personnel	Approx. 560,000 personnel	Approx. 20,000 personnel
	Battle tanks	T-62, T-54/-55, and others Approx. 3,500	88, M-47, M-48 and others Approx. 2,330	M-1 Approx. 110
Navy	Naval vessels	Approx. 640; 109,000 tons	Approx. 180; 141,000 tons	Supporting corps only
	Destroyers		6 vessels	
	Frigates	3 vessels	9 vessels	
Marines	Submarines	23 vessels	9 vessels	
	Marines		2 divisions; approx. 28,000 personnel	
Air Force	Combat aircraft	Approx. 590	Approx. 600	Approx. 60
	3rd and 4th generation fighters	MIG-23 x 46 aircraft Mig-29 x 20 aircraft Su-25 x 34 aircraft	F-4 x 130 aircraft F-16 x 153 aircraft F-15 x 12 aircraft	F-16 x 40 aircraft
	Population	Approx. 23,110,000	Approx. 48,600,000	
Reference	Military service	Army: 5-12 years Navy: 5-10 years Air Force: 3-4 years	Army: 24 months Navy: 26 months Air Force: 27 months	

Note: Materials are taken from The Military Balance 2007 and others.

1. North Korea

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a “powerful and prosperous nation” as its basic national policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs and economy—and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The policy has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution¹⁸. Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea’s military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and regularly visits military forces. It would appear that he intends to continue running the country by attaching importance to and relying on the military forces.

Although North Korea is faced with serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5% of the overall population¹⁹. It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to an official announcement made at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April this year, the proportion of defense budget in this year’s national budget is 15.8%, but it is estimated that the official defense budget represents only a portion of the real defense expenses.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and also by maintaining large-scale special operation forces.

By acting in this way, North Korea increases military tension over the Korean Peninsula, and its behavior constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan.

1. WMD and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its capability of chemical and biological weapons. In particular, North Korea’s nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan’s national security and it is also a critical problem to be solved by the entire international community to ensure non-proliferation of WMD.

As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D to extend the range of its ballistic missiles and to use solid fuel²⁰. Also, it is continually pointed out that North Korea is proliferating ballistic missiles²¹. Combined with the nuclear issue, North Korea’s missile issue is thus becoming a destabilizing factor not only for the Asia-Pacific region, but also for the entire international community, and there are strong concerns about the movement of the country.

Furthermore, following the launch of seven ballistic missiles on July 5, 2006, North Korea claimed to have conducted a nuclear test on October 9 of the same year²². These series of acts by North Korea pose serious threats not only to Japan but also to the peace and stability of East Asia and the international community, and evoked considerable debate in Japan.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

North Korea had been suspected of developing nuclear weapons. In 1993, North Korea refused to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct a special inspection and declared its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As a result, suspicions of North Korea developing nuclear weapons at a graphite-moderated nuclear reactor (5-MW reactor)²³ in Yongbyon, to the north of Pyongyang, were aggravated. The Agreed Framework²⁴ signed between the United States and North Korea in 1994 once showed a roadmap to settle this issue through dialogue.

Under the Agreed Framework, the United States had been supplying heavy oil as an alternative energy to North Korea since 1995, and the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established to provide North Korea with light water reactors.

Since then, no violations of the Agreed Framework by North Korea had been detected. However, in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea admitted the existence of a uranium-enrichment program for nuclear weapons when James A. Kelly, then Assistant Secretary of State visited North Korea that month.

As the international community's concerns over the nuclear issue of North Korea mounted, North Korea announced in December 2002 that it would resume the operations of the nuclear-related facilities in Yongbyon that had been frozen under the Agreed Framework. In January 2003, North Korea again declared the withdrawal from the NPT. In February of the same year, the IAEA submitted a report on the North Korea nuclear issue, including the violation of the IAEA Safeguard Agreement, to the U.N. Security Council. At the end of the month, it was confirmed that the operation of the graphite-moderated nuclear reactor (5-MW nuclear reactor) in Yongbyon, which had been frozen, was resumed. Subsequently, North Korea claimed that it needed to maintain a "nuclear deterrent" and indicated the reprocessing of spent fuel rods²⁵ in April 2003, declared the completion of the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods in October of the same year, released the statement of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs that North Korea had already produced nuclear weapons in February 2005, and announced the completion of the extraction of 8,000 spent fuel rods from the restarted graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in May of the same year. Thus North Korea repeatedly increased international tensions by its words and actions. In the course of these movements, the supply of heavy oil and the construction project of light water reactors by the KEDO had been suspended. Eventually in May 2006, the organization officially decided to abolish the construction project.

On the other hand, in the pursuit of a peaceful solution to this problem and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular, Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks held in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which focused on the verifiable abandonment of "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" by North Korea. Subsequently, however, North Korea

strongly accused the United States of designating a bank in Macao dealing with North Korea as "a financial institution of primary money laundering concern," claiming that it is a financial sanction by the United States.

North Korea suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks and in 2006, it launched seven ballistic missiles and claimed that it had conducted a nuclear test despite advance warnings by the nations concerned. Against these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and

1718 and imposed economic sanctions on North Korea. In December 2006, North Korea finally returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks²⁶ and in February 2007, the parties, including North Korea, reached an agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” to implement the Joint Statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. The agreement, however, was not implemented as planned.

Regarding North Korea’s response to nuclear issues described above, some people argue that it is resorting to brinkmanship by intentionally heightening tension to receive compensation. However, others argue that North Korea’s ultimate objective is to possess nuclear weapons. Because the ultimate goal of North Korea is believed to be the maintenance of its existing regime, it appears that the two foregoing views are not incompatible.

In light of a series of North Korea’s words and actions and the fact that the issue of North Korea’s suspected development of nuclear weapons is not yet elucidated, there is some possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. In addition, it was concluded in 2006 that the probability that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test was extremely high (see Note 5). This implies that there is a high possibility that the country has further advanced its nuclear weapons program, and it is necessary to keep an eye on the country’s future movement, including the downsizing of nuclear weapons and deployment of nuclear warheads.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons


Because North Korea is an extremely closed country and most materials, equipment, and technology used in the manufacture of biological and chemical weapons are for dual-use, which makes camouflaging their actual use quite easy, details of biological and chemical weapons developed or held by North Korea are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons, although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, it is also believed that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has substantial stocks of such agents. It has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention²⁷.

(3) Ballistic Missiles

It is believed that since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C²⁸, a variant of Scud B with extended range, and exported these missiles to Middle Eastern countries and others. By the 1990s, North Korea allegedly began developing longer-range ballistic missiles, such as Nodong. There is a strong possibility that the ballistic missile that North Korea test-launched over the Sea of Japan in 1993 was a Nodong. In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile based on Taepodong-1 over Japan. Furthermore on July 5, 2006, completely lifting its freeze on the launch of ballistic missiles since 1999, North Korea fired six ballistic missiles early in the morning and a seventh missile in the evening. The third missile is assessed to have been Taepodong-2 and others Scud and Nodong missiles. Partly because North Korea is an extremely closed country, details of its ballistic missiles are still unclear. It, however, appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles not only to enhance its military capabilities but also to earn foreign currency²⁹ and for other political and diplomatic purposes. At present, the country is thought to be developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile in addition to the existing inventory of ballistic missiles³⁰. Also, it is necessary to pay attention to the possibility that the country is improving existing Scuds and Nodongs for the extension of their range or other purposes. (See Fig. I-2-2-2)

It seems that Nodong is a single-stage ballistic missile based on a liquid fuel propulsion system and a significant number of Nodong missiles seem to have already been deployed. It is thought to have a range of about 1,300 km, and is able to reach almost all parts of Japan. Although its specifications are not confirmed in

Fig. I-2-2-2 Missile Ranges from North Korea



Note: Materials are taken from Jane's and others.

detail, it is thought to be based on the Scud technology, which would indicate that it does not, for example, have the accuracy to carry out pinpoint attacks on specific target installations.

Because North Korea is a closed country, it is extremely difficult to verify the intention of its military activities. It is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country. Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility. Therefore, it would be difficult to detect the concrete signs of the launch of Nodong in advance, such as its specific launch location and timing.

Also, North Korea has been developing Taepodong-1 with an estimated range of at least 1,500 kilometers. Taepodong-1 missile is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The missile launched in 1998 was thought to have been based on Taepodong-1. It is surmised that North Korea was able to verify the performance of the technology concerning the separation of a multistage booster, attitude control, and thrust control through the launch of this missile. North Korea seems to have now shifted its focus to the development of Taepodong-2 with a longer range: Taepodong-1 might have been a transitory product to develop Taepodong-2.

On July 5, 2005, North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 missile from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area of the country. The missile is thought to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, and with an estimated range of approximately 6,000 kilometers. It seemed to fail in mid-flight (at a height of several kilometers) several tens of seconds after launch without separating the first stage and fall near the launch site. North Korea, however, would learn lessons from this failure and would continue to extend the range of its ballistic missiles. It might even develop derivative missiles of Taepodong-2³¹.

Also on July 5, 2006, North Korea fired other six ballistic missiles from Kittaeryong (approximately 35 km from Weonsan) located in the southeastern coastal area of the country. All of these missiles seemed to fly a

suborbital flight over approximately 400 km and landed in the Sea of Japan. These missile launches have the following characteristics, which seem to have simulated real-world combat situations. This is indicative of the improvement of North Korea's capability to launch ballistic missiles³².

- a. Launch began before dawn
- b. Multiple, serial launches of different types of missiles within a short period of time
- c. Use of multiple TELs
- d. Missiles with differing operational ranges successfully landed within a certain, concentrated geographical area.

As the background of North Korea's rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or its related technologies including Nodong and its related technologies to Iran and Pakistan and that North Korea promotes the development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation³³. In light of this, it is necessary to monitor the transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea in addition to the development and deployment of these missiles by the country.

2. Military Posture

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive additional training for existing soldiers, modernizing of the armed forces, arming the entire population, and converting the entire country into a fortress)³⁴.

North Korea's military capabilities³⁵ are made up mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. Although North Korea has been making efforts to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities and readiness, most of its equipment is outdated.

On the other hand, North Korea has large scale special operation forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerilla warfare. These forces are thought to be composed of approximately 100,000 personnel³⁶. Moreover, it seems that there are many underground military installations across the country.

(1) Activities in Recent Years


North Korean forces appear to be constantly maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and readiness and continuing their infiltration exercises³⁷.

In June 2002, there was an exchange of fire between North Korea and the ROK's naval vessels across the Yellow Sea. In February 2003, a North Korean MiG-19 flew over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) across the Yellow Sea. In March 2003, North Korean military planes including MiG-29 approached and pursued a U.S. military plane flying over the Sea of Japan.

These military activities may have been simple incidents, or have been intentionally conducted in order to increase tension as a part of brinkmanship or to raise the morale and support the military structure under the "military-first politics". (See Section 2, 1)

In December 2001, a suspicious boat was detected to the southwest of Kyushu and the boat eventually sank. After salvaged and inspected, the suspicious boat was identified to be a special operations vessel of North Korea. In 1999 as well, a ship suspected of being a North Korean special operations vessel infiltrated Japanese territorial waters. It was judged that the boat had later arrived at a harbor in the north of North Korea. (See Fig. I-2-2-3)

Fig. I-2-2-3 Recent Military Trends on the Korean Peninsula



(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed in the forward areas along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces, including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is thought to have deployed long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240-mm multiple-launch rockets and 170-mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities including the capital city of Seoul and bases in the northern part of the ROK.

The Navy has about 640 ships with total displacement of approximately 109,000 tons and is chiefly made of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo-

class submarines and about 60 midget submarines and about 140 air-cushioned landing craft, the former of which are thought to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces.

The Air Force has about 590 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2s as well, which are believed to be used for the transportation of special operation forces.

North Korea continues to give various types of training to its forces to maintain and strengthen their state of readiness. On the other hand, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance work as well.

3. Domestic Affairs

In 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly³⁸ was held for the first time in four and a half years after President Kim Il Sung died in 1994, and Kim Jong Il, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea was reappointed as Chairman of the National Defense Commission, which was newly defined as "the highest post of the state." At the Supreme People's Assembly held subsequently in September 2003, Kim Jong Il was reappointed as Chairman of the National Defense Commission again. Some point out that the North Korean regime is not as stable as it was due to loosening of social control resulting from both an increasing disparity between the rich and the poor and a trend of money-worshipping, and declining military morale. However, in view of the fact that national events³⁹ are held and negotiations with other countries are made in an orderly manner, the regime in North Korea based around Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be still on the right track.

On the economic front, North Korea has been facing chronic economic stagnation and energy-food shortages in recent years due to a number of factors including the fragility of its socialist planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries⁴⁰. It is, however, pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and their sense of moral has declined.

In response to these various economic difficulties, North Korea is trying some realistic reform measures and changes in its economic management systems, although limited in scale. It is believed that since July 2002, North Korea has been carrying out a new economic policy, in which wages and commodity prices are raised and exchange rates are devaluated⁴¹. However, as it is considered that North Korea is not likely to undertake a structural reform that would affect its current regime, the country would face various difficulties in fundamentally improving its current economic situation.

4. External Relations

Although North Korea has improved its relationship with Western European countries and others, its activities related to nuclear and missile issues have raised international concerns.

The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to solve the problem through the Six-Party Talks. North Korea said that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the "dying wish" of Kim Il Sung and promised to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear program." North Korea, however, continued to criticize various policies of the United States, insisting that the United States had yet to abandon its "hostile policy" toward North Korea, and so there exists a significant gap between the two countries' stances. In addition, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials by North Korea and the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by the country.

Furthermore, the United States has designated North Korea as a terrorist-supporting state because the abduction issues involving Japanese nationals has not yet been solved and North Korea continued to provide a haven to the hijackers of Yodo⁴².

North Korea and the ROK, while international concern is increasing about the nuclear and other issues of North Korea, have been consistently continuing talks and economic and human exchanges. North Korea insists the importance of North-South cooperation and the ROK is willing to continue North-South talks and exchanges. On the military front, no specific results were achieved after defense ministerial talks were held in 2000. In 2004, however, military talks by generals-level were held twice and the two sides agreed on measures to prevent incidental conflicts in the Yellow Sea and on the suspension of propaganda activities and the removal of facilities and equipment for propaganda near the DMZ. Furthermore, by the summer of 2005, a certain progress was made, including the opening of a hotline between the headquarters of the fleets of North Korea and the ROK and the completion of the removal of facilities and equipment for propaganda. Since then, however, no further progress has been made.

Concerning relations between North Korea and China, the China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still effective. In 1992, China and the ROK established diplomatic relations and after that, North Korea's relations with China seemed to have changed from the close relationship they enjoyed during the Cold War. Subsequently, however, the leaders of the two countries made mutual visits and the relationship appeared to have been improved again. Regarding North Korea's nuclear issue, China has repeatedly expressed its support to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and has played an active role in resolving this issue by, for example, acting as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and contributing to reaching agreement at the forth and fifth rounds of the Talks. Some, however, point out that relationship between China and North Korea seems to be not as close as they were.

Although relations between North Korea and Russia cooled compared with their relations during the Cold War, the relations improved as the two countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation, which lacked articles on military alliance⁴³ unlike the previous treaty, in February 2000. Subsequently, in July of the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea. In return, Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission visited Russia both in 2001 and 2002. Relations between North Korea and Russia have thus been strengthened in recent years.

Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with Western European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries and participation in ARF ministerial meetings. On the other hand, the EU and ASEAN have traditionally expressed concerns over North Korea's nuclear and other issues.

In order to solve North Korea's nuclear issue, it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to keep working closely together. At the same time, other states such as China and Russia, which are also participants of the Six-Party Talks, and international organizations including the United Nations and the IAEA should play important roles in this concern.

It is quite natural to prohibit North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons. There are, however, security concerns other than nuclear issues regarding North Korea, and it is necessary to closely monitor future developments on the Korean Peninsula, such as military antagonism as well as the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Because North Korea is a closed country, it is difficult to clarify the trends of its policies and activities. It is, however, necessary to continue to pay close attention to such trends to understand the real intentions of North Korea.

2. The ROK

1. General Situation

In the ROK, democracy has taken root through such means as the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution. The Roh Moo-hyun administration, inaugurated in February 2003, upholds “Policy of Peace and Prosperity,” which succeeds to the thinking of “Engagement Policy” promoted by the administration of former President Kim Dae-jung.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the cease-fire of the Korean War. The ROK has established close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries are committed to solving the issues such as the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and the transition of the operational control authority⁴⁴ over ROK forces, which is currently held by the United States, to the ROK in times of war. As for the realignment of U.S. forces in the ROK, relocation of U.S. Forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area to the south of Seoul and the reposition of U.S. troops stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. It has, however, become difficult to complete the relocation to the Pyongtek area by the targeted deadline of the end of 2008 due to delayed purchase of land required and also for other reasons. As for the transition of the operational control authority, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed at their meeting in February 2007 that the two sides would disestablish the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command on April 17, 2012 and complete the transition of the wartime operational control authority to the ROK. In the future, transition to the new “supporting-supported” command relationship between U.S. and ROK forces will be promoted in line with a substantial decrease in the ROK’s forces, and it is necessary to monitor if the transition is conducted while maintaining deterrent on the Korean Peninsula.

To assist U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan, the ROK forces continue to dispatch engineering and medical units there. Regarding the units dispatched to Iraq in response to the request from the United States, the ROK continues the dispatch although the scale of dispatched forces has been reduced to at least 1,200 or approximately one-thirds of the initial size. The country, however, states that it will establish a plan for the troops dispatched to Iraq to successfully complete their duties there, comprehensively considering the movements of other countries that have dispatched their units to Iraq.

Between the ROK and China, since the first visit by then ROK Minister of National Defense Cho Seong Tae to China in August 1999 and the first visit by then Chinese Minister of Defense Chi Haotian to the ROK in January 2000, efforts have been made to promote military exchanges between the countries, including mutual visits of naval vessels and air-force planes. In March 2005, the ROK Minister of National Defense visited China for the first time since 2001 and in April 2006, the Chinese Minister of National Defense visited the ROK for the first time since 2000. Subsequently in April 2007, the ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Jang Soo visited China and discussed with the Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan on the establishment of hotlines between the navies and air forces of the two countries as well as on other topics. At the ROK-China summit talks held in July 2003, it was agreed for the two countries to develop their cooperative partnership into all-around cooperative partnership. Their relations in the security area, however, remain on an initial level compared with relations in other areas, including the economic area.

Between the ROK and Russia, military exchanges have been made in recent years, including exchanges between senior military officials and mutual visits of naval vessels. When then Russian Minister of Defense Ivanov visited the ROK in April 2003 and then ROK Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung visited Russia in April 2005, the two countries agreed once again on the cooperation in the areas of military

technology, defense industry, and war materials in addition to the promotion of military exchanges. In February 2004, the navies of the two countries conducted joint search and rescue exercises for the first time⁴⁵ and at the ROK-Russia summit meeting held in September 2004, it was regarded that the bilateral relations were shifted from the “constructive and mutually complementary partnership” to “comprehensive partnership of mutual trust.” In addition, the ROK has been purchasing tanks and armored vehicles from Russia since 1995 as means for the redemption of debt from Russia.

2. Military Affairs

(1) Defense Policies

The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country’s population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: “defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace.” As one of “external military threats,” the ROK had been designating North Korea as its “main enemy,” but in its Defense White Paper 2004, North Korea was no longer described as such⁴⁶.

The ROK currently intends to promote “National Defense Reform 2020” to satisfy its defense needs such as the organization of its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies, balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Force, elimination of inefficiency, and buildup of barrack culture in accordance with social trends. The reform program is based on the following ideas and the bill on the national defense reform incorporating most of these ideas was passed at the parliament in December 2006.

- 1) Expansion of civilian base for national defense: Establish the structure in which civilians have the central role in deciding and implementing defense policies and the military forces focus on executing combat missions.
- 2) Buildup of the military structure and system of the forces in conformity with the characteristics of modern wars: While reducing the size of the standing forces from 680,000 personnel to the level of 500,000 personnel mainly in the Army and that of reserved troops from 3 million personnel to the appropriate level in line with the reduced size of the standing forces, enhance its war potential by such means as modernizing equipment.
- 3) Reorganization of the national defense management system into a low-cost and highly efficient system: Improve the organization and system to ensure transparency of procurement service and expertise, and in the area of logistic support, strengthen the infrastructure for computerization and promote outsourcing.
- 4) Improvement of barrack culture in accordance with trends of the time: Take measures to improve the environment of military personnel’s service and establish the system to prevent accidents.

(2) Trends in Defense Buildup


As for the ROK armed forces, the ground forces consist of three ground army commands of 22 divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 590,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of three fleets of about 180 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 141,000 tons; and air forces (Air Force and Navy together) of nine combat air wings with approximately 610 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been trying to modernize its Navy and Air Force with the introduction of submarines, multi-role helicopters, and F-15Ks as next fighters (F-X). Also, the ROK plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012, and domestically manufactured destroyers (KDX-IIs and KDX-IIIs). The KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) will be in service in 2008. In addition, the

ROK Navy plans to construct two large transport ships by 2010. In November 2001, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) test-launched a short-range missile, and the ROK is believed to be promoting the domestic production of missiles⁴⁷.

The 2007 defense budget amounts to approximately 24,500 billion won, up approximately 8.8% over the previous fiscal year. (See Fig. I-2-2-4)

Fig. I-2-2-4 ROK's Defense Budget from FY 2003 to 2007



Note: Based on the Defense White Paper (for FY 2003 to 2006) published in 2006; based on press releases from the Ministry of National Defense for the FY 2007 budget

3. U.S. Forces Stationed in the ROK


Combined with the ROK's own defense efforts, U.S. forces stationed in the country play a vital role in preserving the military balance on the Korean Peninsula and providing a deterrent against large-scale armed conflicts on the peninsula.

At present, the United States is changing the posture of its forces stationed in the ROK based on the agreement to reposition them to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages (made in June 2003) and the agreement to reduce the number of its stationed military personnel (approximately 41,000) by 12,500 (made in October 2004). In the course of these changes, the United States is making efforts to maintain and strengthen the deterrence capabilities of U.S.-ROK allied forces both by retaining forces of approximately 29,000 personnel (as of the end of September 2006) in the ROK under the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and by investing \$11 billion in the modernization of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK. On the other hand, the ROK, under a maxim of "cooperative independent defense," is committed to ensuring its own defense capabilities and to firmly developing the ROK-U.S. alliance towards the future. (See Fig. I-2-2-5)

The United States and the ROK have engaged in joint exercises in order to increase their combined

defense capabilities in dealing with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Among these is the “Fool Eagle” exercise, a large-scale joint logistics support field exercise, which was staged in March 2007 concurrently with the Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI) joint exercise⁴⁸.

Fig. I-2-2-5 Agreement on the Transfer and Relocation of the U.S. Forces in ROK



Note: ROK Defense White Paper 2006

Section 3. China

1. General Situation

1. General situation

China has the world's largest population with a variety of races, religions, and languages in a vast land surrounded by as many as 14 countries and the Pacific Ocean. Most of its ethnic minorities populate the borderlands, and have neighbors with the same ethnic origins beyond the borders. China has a long history with a distinct culture and civilization. The pride derived from the unique history and the experiences of semi-colonization after the 19th century have driven their desire for a strong nation and nationalism. China is a state with a socialist regime, and under the leadership of the Communist Party, aims at building a modern socialist nation.

To continue the modernization of the country, China promotes trade, personnel exchanges, and economic and technological cooperation with other countries in the world, and makes a point of establishing a stable security environment in the surrounding areas. Furthermore, China aims to establish cooperative relations with other countries in areas of non-traditional security such as international crimes, terrorism, maritime search and rescue, countermeasures for piracy, and regulation of drug smuggling.

Especially in recent years, China has significantly increased its international trade, attracted much investment from foreign countries, and achieved dramatic economic growth. China has been mounting its position in the world economy and now many countries welcome deeper economic relation and mutual benefit with China. At the same time, it is pointed out that China is seeking diplomacy to acquire more natural resources. On the military front, China has been modernizing its military capabilities, backed up by a constantly increasing defense budget. The country has thus been steadily growing as an outstanding political and economic power in the region, and the trend of its military development draws attention from countries in the region.

Domestically, however, China has various problems. Corruption of Communist Party cadres and other local and central political elites has become a serious political issue, and separatist and independent movements are also serious. Furthermore, as a result of rapid economic growth, economic gap among urban residents and environmental pollution have come to surface in addition to widening urban-rural and coastal-inland gaps. The Hu Jintao administration aims to build a "harmonious society" as its fundamental policy and is committed to giving first priority to the solution of the aforementioned domestic problems⁴⁹.

2. Relations with Taiwan

China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore an internal matter. The country maintains that the one-China principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China has claimed that it would never abandon efforts for peaceful unification, taking policies and measures to solve issues of the Taiwanese interest including security of their rights, while it has also expressed strong opposition against any intervention in unification of China by foreign



Prime Minister Abe talking with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the summit meeting (October 2006) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

powers, or against any move toward independence by the Taiwanese and the country has repeatedly stated that it will not renounce the use of force against Taiwan. In the Anti-Secession Law enacted in March 2005, it is clearly stated that China will not renounce the use of force. Specifically, the law states that China will employ non-peaceful means if a major event occurs which would lead to Taiwan's separation from China.

Since April 2005 when General-Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (President) Hu Jintao invited then President Lien Chan of the Nationalist Party of Taiwan to discuss economic cooperation and facilitation of prompt resumption of talks between China and Taiwan, China has put an emphasis on exchanges mostly with the opposition parties and business circles of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has clearly stated his position of taking up the one-China issue as an agenda, not as a premise for discussion. There is a gap in the fundamental stances between China and Taiwan as explained above, and the two sides are unable to find a path to negotiations, and the stalemate continues without any official dialogue. Attention should be paid to future trends toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The point is whether they will find any meeting ground to reopen the official dialogue.

3. Relations with the United States

There are various problems between the United States and China, such as human rights issues in China, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Taiwan issue, and trade imbalance between the two countries. Also, China seems to be concerned about increased U.S. influence over the international community through the war on terrorism, increased U.S. presence in Central Asia, and strengthened cooperation between the United States and its allies following the review of the U.S. military posture, and to be wary of the inclination towards "U.S. unipolarity." On the other hand, the two countries have close relationship on the economic front, and China would maintain stable relationship with the United States in the future for the sake of its steady economic development.

The United States believes that international peace and stability and expansion of free and fair trade are crucial for China as well as for other countries in the world and that China has a responsibility to support these common interests in cooperation with other major powers in the world. At the same time, the United States recognizes that China is facing strategic crossroads and has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages. Accordingly, the United States thinks it necessary to urge China to become a constructive partner in the international community, and to hedge against the case that such effort would fail⁵⁰. Based on this recognition, the United States makes it an objective of its policy that China continues to be its economic partner and becomes a "responsible stakeholder."⁵¹

In response, Chinese President Hu Jintao, when he visited the United States in April 2006, stated that China shared strategic interests with the United States in a wide range of areas and the country would promote constructive and cooperative relationship with the United States. China is thus showing an attitude of attributing importance to stable China-U.S. relationship.

Military exchanges have been promoted between China and the United States. In October 2005, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited China, and in July 2006, Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong visited the United States. Also, in April 2006, President Bush and President Hu Jintao agreed that the two

countries would begin a dialogue about the strategic nuclear policies and others. The United States has stated that it would accept a visit by the commander of the Chinese Second Artillery Corps (Strategic Rocket Forces) to the United States.

As for military exercises, China dispatched an observer to a U.S. military exercise (U.S. Pacific Command exercise “Valiant Shield”) for the first time in June 2006 and the delegated Chinese officer visited USS Kitty Hawk, an aircraft carrier. Subsequently, in September and in November 2006, when ships of the Chinese Navy visited Hawaii and San Diego and when ships of the U.S. Navy visited Chanchiang, China, respectively, the Navies of the two countries conducted joint exercises.

The United States, regarding the development of a U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, states that Our goal is to improve mutual understanding and prevent conflict by communicating U.S. resolve to maintain deterrence and stability in the Asia-Pacific region⁵².

4. Relations with Russia

Since 1989 when then Secretary-General Gorbachev of the Soviet Union’s communist party visited China to end China-Soviet confrontation, both countries have maintained a stance of placing importance on the bilateral relation. Deepening of “strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which was established in the middle of the 1990s, has been emphasized through a regular exchange of visits by their leaders. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation⁵³ was concluded. Subsequently in 2004, the longstanding issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once evolved into a military clash, came to a settlement.

The two countries, through these mutual exchanges, have had a goal in common to promote world multi-polarization and building of a new international order. In addition, some economic motives seem to have driven good relationship between them. China has a long-term concern of securing reliable supply of resources and energy, while Russia finds potential of Chinese markets attractive and shows a keen interest in diversifying exports to China, which are now lopsidedly dominated by resources and energy.

On the security front, Russia is the world’s largest exporter of weapons to China. Since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. At the Japan-Russia summit meeting held in November 2005, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pointed out to the Russian President Vladimir Putin that it was necessary to execute weapons export to China in a careful manner, and President Putin answered that Russia was not the leader of weapons export but the country surely felt its responsibility. During his visit to Russia in January 2006, then State Minister for Defense Nukaga also requested then Defense Minister Ivanov to ensure transparency of, and to be careful with, weapons export to China in order to maintain the regional military balance.

China and Russia keep steady military exchanges including a regular exchange of visits by highest-ranking defense officials. Also, the two countries have held a joint military exercise. They conducted their first joint exercise in Shandong Peninsula, China in August 2005. In August 2007, a multilateral joint exercise will be conducted in the Lanzhou Military Region in China and in the Volga-Ural Military District in Russia by the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)⁵⁴. Through these joint military exercises with Russia, China would be able to deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between the two forces; to demonstrate China and Russia as main players in multi-polar world; and to learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military doctrines.

5. Relations with North Korea

China regards the relation with North Korea as “traditional friendship,” and North Korea seems to heavily rely on China for food assistance and energy supply. Accordingly, China is believed to have a stronger influence on

North Korea than other countries do. China supported the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695, which condemned the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea in 2006 and Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea in relation to the country’s nuclear tests. China, wanting to ensure a stable regional situation, has played an active role towards the solution of North Korea’s nuclear issues, serving as chairman of the Six-Party Talks, which have been held in Beijing since 2003. In light of the influence of China over North Korea, the international community expects that China will continue to implement the active effort for the solution of the issues.

6. Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means⁵⁵. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN plus 3 and the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). Through these diplomatic forums, the country is deepening economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries. In addition, China is eager to promote cooperation relations in the security area.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjian Uygur region, a western province in China, is situated next to Central Asia. It directly shares borders with three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has many ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally the region has lively exchanges of people with those countries. Thus China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states, which might be influenced by terrorism caused by Islamic extremists and other factors. Chinese engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of such concerns held by China. (See Fig. I-2-3-1)

Fig. I-2-3-1 SCO Member and Observer Countries



In recent years, Russia and China, main member states of the organization, seem to especially aim at deterring the influence of the United States and expanding that of the SCO over this central region of the continent, by announcing the SCO summit communiqué, which in effect encourages withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Central Asia⁵⁶, and granting the observer status to regional powers such as India, Pakistan, and Iran.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

With regard to South Asian countries, it appears that China has been maintaining a hostile relationship with India due to border conflicts. However, it has a favorable relationship with Pakistan, which has a hostile relationship with India as well, including military cooperation, such as export of weapons and transfer of military technologies. On the other hand, China has been recently committed to improving its relationship with India. Through active mutual visits by leaders, China regards relations with India as a strategic partnership and states that the issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once culminated in military clashes, is also progressing. As regards military exchanges, the Chinese Navy conducted a joint naval search and rescue exercise with Pakistan off the coast of Shanghai in October 2003 as China's first joint exercise with a foreign navy, and a joint naval search and rescue exercise with India off the coast of Shanghai. Furthermore, in November 2005, the Navy conducted a joint naval search and rescue exercise with Pakistan as its first joint exercise abroad. With India as well, the Chinese Navy conducted the second joint naval search and rescue exercise in the India Ocean in November 2005. More recently, in April 2007, they conducted exercises including a communication exercise in Qingdao offshore. It seems that China has come to attribute importance to military exchanges with India as well, while keeping a good balance with military exchanges with Pakistan, which has been a traditional friend of China.

(4) Relations with EU Countries

Trade between China and EU countries has been remarkably growing in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important as Japan and the United States as a partner, especially in the economic area. China, through diplomatic opportunities, strongly demands EU countries to lift the arms embargo against China, which has been imposed since after the Tiananmen Square incident took place in 1989. Although some EU countries voiced their readiness for the lifting, Japan has sent messages to object to the lifting. In January 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso that the lifting of the arms embargo on China would have an impact on the East Asian security environment and so Japan was opposed to the lifting. In response, President Barroso assured Prime Minister Abe that the EU had no plans for an imminent lifting of its arms embargo on China, although it was working to lift the embargo based on the decision made by the European Council and that it would by no means lead to a qualitative or quantitative increase in arms sales even if the embargo was lifted. It is, however, necessary to pay attention to future discussions about the arms embargo on China made within the EU.

7. Overseas Activities

China states that it will consistently support peacekeeping operations conducted in line with the U.N. Charter and according to the "China's National Defense in 2006", the country has sent a total of 5,915 military personnel to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations and eight lost their lives in the operations. As of April 2007, China has dispatched a total of 1,820 troops, police officers, and military observers to 12 U.N. peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), thus showing its presence in the operations to some degree. Also, China is engaged in international disaster relief operations.

For example, some Chinese military personnel participated in international assistance to conduct relief activities in the area devastated by tsunami in the Indian Ocean at the end of 2004. (See Fig. I-2-3-2)

Fig. I-2-3-2 PKOs to Which China Has Dispatched Personnel

As of April 2007

		Troops	Police officers	Military observers
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	0	0	13
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	0	129	0
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	218	0	12
UNFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	343	0	0
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	0	0	1
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	0	0	7
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	0	18	0
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	565	18	5
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan	445	9	14
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	0	10	3
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire	0	0	7
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	0	0	3
Total		1,820	1,571	65

(Unit: persons)

8. International Transfer of Weapons

China has provided developing countries in Asia and Africa with weapons like small arms, tanks, and aircraft, and it is reported that the main recipients are Iran, Pakistan, and Myanmar. Some point out that China is supplying weapons to countries having problems in terms of democracy and human rights, and it is important to see whether China improves its transparency regarding the international transfer of weapons.

2. Military Affairs

1. General

China, as its basic objectives and obligations for national security, declares to defend its national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime rights and interests; to further develop its economy and society; and to

continuously strengthen its comprehensive national power. In order to achieve these objectives and obligations, the country is committed to balanced economic and defense construction. China is aggressively promoting the “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics” based on its military strategy to win an informationalized war⁵⁷, in order to cope with global trends in military developments, including those observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, and the Iraq War. As for the military capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, the PLA is not entirely equipped with weapons of sufficient firepower and mobility: many of its weapons are outdated although the Army has the world’s largest number of personnel and equipment items. Accordingly, China has been promoting the modernization of the PLA. Specifically, China has reduced the number of its military personnel, mainly in the army, and been modernizing its entire armed forces, especially its naval and air forces, and nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, it is focusing more energy on enrollment and training of highly talented personnel and on the improvement of joint operational capabilities among services and arms.

As for the specific objective of China’s rapid military modernization, it seems that the country is focusing on the implementation of measures to deal with the Taiwan issue⁵⁸. Some, however, argue that China is modernizing its military capabilities not just for the treatment of the issue, in light of the country’s rapid development, long-lasting modernization of its military forces, and lack of transparency regarding its military capabilities. Concerns over the future modernization of the Chinese military forces have been thus increasing⁵⁹. China regards the modernization of its military capabilities as part of the nation’s modernization⁶⁰, and it is necessary to carefully analyze the influence that the military modernization by China, which is steadily growing as a regional power, will exert on the regional situation and Japan’s national security.

2. Transparency in Military Strength

Historically, China has not disclosed information on its possession of equipment, the pace of acquisition, the unit-level compositions of services, records of main military operations and exercises, or the amount and detailed breakdowns of the national defense budget. As China is steadily growing as a political and economic power of the region, the trends of its military developments draw attention from countries in the region. Under these circumstances, in order to address concerns held by those countries over China, it is becoming increasingly important for China to increase transparency in its national defense policy and military capabilities.

China released a white paper on defense titled “China’s National Defense” in 1998, which has since been published every two years. In December 2006, China published “China’s National Defense in 2006”. It is appreciable that China has continuously published documents on its national security because such documents would contribute to improving transparency concerning China’s military capabilities. However, it needs to be pointed out that the five white papers published in the past have not substantially improved the transparency. For example, as to detailed breakdowns of the national defense spending, the papers merely announced the total amount and general purposes for each of the following three categories: living expenses of personnel, maintenance cost of operations, and expenditures for equipment.


Also, in January 2007, when China conducted an anti-satellite weapon test, Japan expressed concerns in relation to the safe use of space and national security and demanded China to give explanations about the test and the country’s intention. The Chinese government, however, did not give sufficient explanations about the details and intention of the test enough to allay Japan’s concerns.

It is desired that China will increase transparency in its military capabilities through various opportunities in the future.

3. National Defense Budget

As to the national defense expenditures, one of the elements to measure military strength of a state, China announced that its national defense budget for FY 2007 would be approximately 347.2 billion yuan, up 17.8% over that of the previous fiscal year. Thus China’s official defense budget recorded a growth rate of over 10% for 19 consecutive years in terms of the initial defense budget. This pace of increase in official defense expenditures means that the defense budget will increase two-fold every five years, and that the size of the official national defense budget of China has nominally grown 16 times in the last 19 years⁶¹. With respect to the relationship between national defense and economy, “China’s National Defense in 2006” states “guided by the principle of coordinated development of national defense and the economy., Thus, the country regards the buildup of defense capabilities as a task that is as important as economic construction. Accordingly, China will continue to input resources for the improvement of its national defense capabilities to the extent that it will not hamper its economic construction and so the country’s military capabilities will continuously be modernized. (See Fig. I-2-3-3)

Fig. I-2-3-3 Changes in China’s Official Defense Budget




Note: The total defense budgets for fiscal 2002 and 2004 were not disclosed, and there is a discrepancy when we apply the disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase to the initial budgets of FY 2001 and FY 2003. This graph uses 168.4 billion yuan and 210 billion yuan for FY 2002 and FY 2004, respectively. These are calculated on the assumption that disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase are based on the actual defense expenses for FY 2001 and FY 2003.

Also, it must be noted that the amount of defense budget announced by China is considered to be only part of its actual military expenditures⁶². For example, it is thought that not all of the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses are included in the official figures for defense expenditures.

4. Military Posture

China’s military forces are composed of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police Force⁶³, and the militia⁶⁴. The PLA, created and led by the Chinese Communist Party, consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps. (See Fig. I-2-3-4)

Fig. I-2-3-4 Deployment and Strength of PLA



		China	(Reference) Taiwan
Total military force		2,250,000 personnel	290,000 personnel
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 1,600,000 personnel	Approx. 290,000 personnel
	Tanks	Type-98A, Type-96, Type-88A/B, and others Approx. 8,580	M-60, M-48A/H, and others Approx. 1,830
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 780 vessels/ 1,070,000 tons	Approx. 330 vessels/ 207,000 tons
	Destroyers & frigates	Approx. 70 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 60 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 personnel	Approx. 15,000 personnel
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 3,520	Approx. 530
	Modern fighters	J10 × 62 aircraft Su-27 × 148 aircraft Su-30 × 121 aircraft	Mirage 2000 × 57 aircraft F-16 × 146 aircraft Ching-Kuo × 128 aircraft
Reference	Population	Approx. 1,300,000,000	Approx. 23,000,000
	Term of service	2 years	20 months

Note: Materials are taken from The Military Balance 2007 and others.

(1) Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Forces


China has made an independent effort to develop nuclear and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrent, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community. In addition to ballistic missiles, China possesses one hundred and several tens of medium-range H-6 (Tu-16) bombers.

As for ballistic missiles, China currently possesses approximately 30 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), of which main missiles are assumed to be the fixed type with liquid fuel propellant system. This type of missile, in general, requires time-taking injection of liquid fuel immediately before launching, thus signs of

launching can be detected beforehand, which may invite preemptive attack. For this reason, China has been promoting the development of the DF-31 series, new, mobile-type with solid fuel propellant system ICBMs to be mounted onto the transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) as well as the development of new-type submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) based on a solid fuel propellant system. Also, China possesses a considerable number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) covering the Asian region including Japan. Although DF-3 missiles of a liquid fuel propellant system have been traditionally deployed, it is believed that conversion to DF-21 missiles of a solid fuel propellant system, which can be transported and operated on the TEL, have been promoted recently. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Furthermore, as to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) including DF-15 and DF-11 missiles deployed along the shore of the Taiwan Strait, China is estimated to possess at least 700 plus several dozens of those missiles, and the number seems to be increasing every year. It is believed that efforts to improve the performance of aforementioned ballistic missiles including their accuracy are being continued. Also, research and development activities on missiles with multiple warheads are reportedly conducted⁶⁵.

In addition, China is believed to be advancing the development of cruise missiles. Once becoming available for practical use, those missiles might complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. (See Fig. I-2-3-5)

Fig. I-2-3-5 Range of Ballistic missiles from China (Beijing)



(2) Ground Forces

The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has been continuously seeking to modernize its armed forces by curtailing personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. The country aims to develop military forces with high capabilities, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. In addition, China has prioritized the introduction of modern equipment for its airborne troops and special operation forces and sought to improve its mobility. The country is also working on a reform to improve its logistical support capability.

(3) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets—the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 780 ships (including approximately 60 submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 1.07 million tons. The navy is in charge of the maritime national defense and protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. China imported modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and actively constructed new types of domestically-built submarines to enhance the submarine capabilities of the Navy. Also, the country is promoting the introduction of sea combatant crafts with improved air defense and anti-ship capabilities to the Navy and is strengthening the capabilities of landing ships and supply ships. In view of the way how the Navy is being modernized, it is believed that China is trying to build capabilities to perform operations in sea areas more distant from the country. Also, China seems to have strong interest in the possession of an aircraft carrier⁶⁶.

(4) Air Forces

As for air forces, the Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 3,520 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth-generation modern fighters is rising sharply. China mass produces J-10 fighters domestically and is promoting import and licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as import of Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface attack capabilities from Russia. With regard to surface-to-air missile units, it is reported that China plans to import high-performance S-300PMU-2 from Russia, in order to improve its air defense capabilities. In addition to the introduction of modern fighters, China continuously seeks to modernize its air forces to acquire the in-flight refueling capability and early warning and control systems, which are essential for the operation of modern air capabilities. Furthermore, it is reported that China plans to import a great number of Il-76 large cargo aircraft from Russia. In view of the way how the Air Force is being modernized, China seems to

aim at building air-to-surface and air-to-ship strike capabilities as well as combat capabilities to maintain a certain degree of air superiority in more forward areas, in addition to its air defense capabilities⁶⁷.

Also, China has begun to enhance airborne electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capability in addition to actual reconnaissance flights against surrounding countries. In particular, in recent years, flights by Chinese aircraft that are thought to be designed for intelligence gathering against Japan have been active, and attention should be paid to these activities conducted in the area surrounding Japan.

5. Trends in Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting large-scale exercises including joint exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as landing exercises, in order to advance its operational modernization. In 2002, the PLA promulgated the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation as a revision to the previous training doctrine, in order to reform exercises based on science and technologies and constantly promote new forms of exercises. Also, the national military training conference held in 2006 decided upon a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informationalization, and the PLA's General Staff Department indicated a policy of continuously conducting military training under the conditions of informationalization and joint exercises for multiple types of forces in stipulating the focus of exercises for this year.

In addition, the PLA is making efforts to develop military personnel versed in science and technologies. In 2003, a strategic project for talented people was launched to develop human resources capable of directing an informationalized war and of building informationalized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the training of talented military personnel by 2020.

6. Trends in National Defense Science and Technologies

In recent years, the PLA has introduced not only equipment imported from abroad such as Russia, but also domestically-produced new models. Modernization of Chinese military capabilities has been supported by progress in defense science and technologies. Favorable growth of the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by too much secrecy and other factors, but in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. According to China's National Defense in 2004, special focus has been placed on two-way exchanges of technologies where military technologies are utilized for building the national economy, and in turn civilian technologies are absorbed for the national defense build-ups. Specifically, technologies of the defense industry have contributed to development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the boats and ships industry.

In China's National Defense in 2006, the country states that the country "encourages and supports participation in international cooperation and competition in civilian-military industries," thus showing its interest in absorbing foreign technologies through civilian-military industries.

As to space technologies, the successful launching of the Shenzhou V spaceship in 2003, which sent China's first astronaut into space, followed by the successful 5-day trip in space of the Shenzhou VI spaceship in October 2005, which carried two astronauts, demonstrated anew to the world technological strength of China in this field. The field of space exploration and that of military are organizationally linked to each other in China, and also, space rockets and ballistic missiles share some technologies in common. Hence, two-way exchanges of technologies are believed to be promoted further in the future.

China conducted an anti-satellite weapons test in January 2007. Although the details of the test are unknown, it is presumed that the country conducted it by applying the ballistic missile technology, and there was a possibility that China used advanced technology for terminal guidance to the targeted artificial satellite and other purposes. The test implies the possibility that China regards attacks against artificial satellites as a part of their military operations.

7. Maritime Activities

In November 2004, a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine intruded into Japan's territorial waters, violating international law. Including this incident, Chinese naval vessels have been observed navigating near Japan. These vessels seem to have conducted some exercises or intelligence collections. Some other naval vessels as well as Chinese government-owned ships are also observed being engaged in oceanographic research within the exclusive economic zone of Japan. Furthermore, China has been exploring and developing oil gas fields including Shirakaba (Chunxiao in Chinese). Their contract mining field and the structure extend to the eastern side of the intermediate line between Japan and China. In September 2005, Chinese naval vessels were seen navigating near these oil gas fields⁶⁸. In October 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine broached in the vicinity of the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier of the United States in international sea waters reportedly near Okinawa. This is a noteworthy military incident⁶⁹. Also, Chinese naval vessels began to conduct overseas exercises, including the first joint exercises with foreign naval vessels in Pakistan, India, and Thailand in November 2005, first joint exercises with the U.S. Navy in the United States in 2006, and the first participation in a multilateral joint exercise in March 2007, a counterterrorism multilateral joint maritime exercise conducted in Pakistan. China has thus intensified its maritime activities. In addition to activities in the Japanese waters, China is enhancing its bases of activities in the Spratly and Paracel islands, over which it has territorial disputes with countries including ASEAN countries. China is seemingly interested in the Indian Sea area, which provides a shipping route for transporting crude oil from the Middle East.

China explicitly states in its laws and others that its Navy plays a role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety. Also, taking into general conditions of the country, including its geographic conditions and economic globalization, the objectives of Chinese naval activities are considered to be as follows.

The first objective is to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far possible from the country to defend the Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this, there is an increase in effectiveness of attacks at long ranges, which is due to recent progress in science and technologies.

The second objective is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent independence of Taiwan. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. If China aims to hold back by force foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea in all four directions, it needs to enhance its naval operational capabilities.

The third objective is to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests. China has embarked on the project of exploring and drilling oil and gas fields and building associated facilities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The project includes the building of drilling facilities in the oil and gas field, the geological structure of which runs to the eastern side of the intermediate line between Japan and China. It is believed that China aimed to highlighting its Navy's capabilities to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests by operating naval vessels near the drilling facilities in September 2005.

The fourth objective is to defend sea lanes of China, a lifeline for increasingly globalized Chinese economy. It depends on future international situations how far the Chinese Navy should protect sea lanes by itself, but given recent modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, reach of its capabilities appears to be expanding beyond waters near China.


China seems to conduct maritime activities to achieve the aforementioned objectives. Attention should be paid to these activities, including the operation of naval vessels and implementation of oceanographic research activities near Japan.

3. Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Since January 2004, Taiwan has been implementing a new transformation program called the “Jingjing Program” to manage national defense resources more efficiently, reduce the total number of military personnel, promote the restructuring of armed forces, and to shift to a voluntary service system. According to the program, the number of military personnel will be reduced to 275,000 by the end of 2008. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to the introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of joint operational capabilities. Taiwan’s defense expenditures had been remaining between 24 million to 28 million Taiwan dollars since 2000⁷⁰, but in August 2005, Taiwan President Chen Shui-ban announced Taiwan’s policy to increase the ratio of the national defense budget to its GDP to 3% within three years, which was approximately 2.4% in fiscal 2005, thereby meeting increasing demands for national defense. (See Fig. I-2-3-6)

At present, Taiwan has 41 army brigades and two marine brigades with a total of approximately 215,000

Fig. I-2-3-6 Taiwan’s Defense Budget from FY 2002 to 2006



Note: Based on Taiwan’s “2006 National Defense Report”

personnel. In addition, it is believed that the number of reserve personnel available for mobilization is about 1.65 million in total for air, naval, and ground forces. As to naval capabilities, Kidd-class destroyers imported from the United States have entered service, and relatively modern frigates are in possession. As to air capabilities, Taiwan imported F-16 fighters and Mirage 2000 fighters, and completed the introduction

of domestically produced Jing Guo fighters.

As mentioned earlier, in view of the fact that China is enhancing its missile forces and naval and air forces, Taiwan thinks it necessary to modernize the equipment of its armed forces. The Executive Yuan of Taiwan formulated a draft budget in June 2004 in order to purchase eight diesel submarines, 12 patrol planes (P-3C), a PAC-3 latest Patriot Missile System model, and a modernized PAC-2 from the United States, but the budget has not yet been approved by the Legislative Yuan, which is dominated by opposition party members. The Executive Yuan included the cost of purchasing F-16C/D fighters in the fiscal 2007 budget request, but the


request has yet to be approved by the Legislative Yuan.

In comparing military capabilities of China and Taiwan, various factors should be taken into consideration beyond simple quantitative comparison. In general, the capabilities of China and Taiwan can be compared as follows:

- 1) Concerning ground forces, China outnumbers Taiwan, but Chinese capabilities for airborne and seaborne landings on the Taiwan mainland are limited, and China is committed to constructing large landing ships.
- 2) Concerning naval and air forces, China has outnumbered Taiwan in terms of quantity, while Taiwan has had qualitative superiority so far. However, China is steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years.
- 3) Concerning missile attack capabilities, China possesses at least 700 and several tens of short-range ballistic missiles whose range covers Taiwan, while Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.


At any rate, the comparison of military capabilities should take account of various factors, such as operational postures, proficiency of military personnel, and logistics, as well as the size of forces and performance and quantity of weapons. In view of this, attention should be paid to the modernization of both Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and sales of weapons by the United States to Taiwan. As China is rapidly modernizing its military forces, the military balance between China and Taiwan is changing to the advantage of China, and major changes might be made in Taiwan's qualitative superiority in the near future. (See Figs. I-2-3-7 • 8)

Fig. I-2-3-7 Changes in the Number of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles of China



Source: The Military Balance of the corresponding years

Fig. I-2-3-8 Changes in the Number of Modern Fighters (Fourth-Generation Fighters) of China and Taiwan



Source: The Military Balance of the corresponding years

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Aerospace Development in China

China has been putting efforts in aerospace development, and according to China's Space Activities in 2006, a white paper published in October last year, the country has developed recoverable remote sensing satellites, Dongfanghong communication and broadcasting satellites, Feng Yun meteorological satellites, Shijian scientific research and technological experiment satellites, Ziyuan earth resource satellites, and Beidou navigation satellites. The country is also currently pushing forward with projects to develop an ocean satellite series and launch environment and disaster monitoring and forecasting micro-satellites¹. As for the Long-March launch vehicle series, the country achieved forty-six consecutive successful launches between October 2006 and the end of 2005 according to *China's Space Activities in 2006*. The projects in the next five years include the development of powerful thrust carrier rockets, high-resolution earth observation system, and scientific research satellites such as a space telescope and new recoverable satellites, the realization of extra vehicular activities and docking experiments, and the development and launch of the Chang'e 1 moon-orbiting satellite.

China's Aerospace Activities in 2006 cites national defense as one of the objectives of the country's aerospace activities, and it seems that China is considering aerospace development important from the military aspect as well. The China National Space Administration, the aerospace agency of the government, is, in fact, placed under the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National

Defense, and the *China's National Defense in 2006* white paper describes the current condition of the country's science, technology and industry for national defense as follows: "Major scientific and technological projects, such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, are being carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises combining military and civilian needs and to bring about overall improvements in defense-related science and technology." In this way, the military and non-military sections of China's aerospace development are seemingly closely linked, and there is a possibility that aerospace development in the country may be used for military purpose such as information collection, communication and navigation.

China shows interest in anti-satellite weapons as well, and conducted an experiment in January this year in which a satellite of the country was destroyed using the ballistic missile technology. It is also pointed out that China is developing a device to interfere with satellites by using a laser.

1) China is also putting efforts in aerospace international cooperation, and collaborating with Brazil, France, Russia, Ukraine and other countries. China is also taking part in GALILEO, the project of the European Space Agency to develop a satellite navigation system.

Section 4. Russia

1. General Situation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia fell into a state of confusion and chaos, and under these circumstances, the Putin administration's policy is supported by the Russians: the administration insists that only a strong nation would bring order and stability to the country. Towards the goal of creating a multipolar world, the administration has been conducting active summit diplomacy with major countries in the region including China and India. In July 2006, Russia successfully chaired the G8 Summit held in Saint-Petersburg.

At the inauguration ceremony making the start of his second term, President Vladimir Putin made clear his emphasis on domestic policy, and he has pressed ahead with social reforms. He has at the same time moved to rebuild a centralized structure by abolishing the direct electoral system of regional governors. The Russian economy remains in good shape thanks to a rise in the international market price of crude oil, its major export since 1999⁷¹. However, the economy depends on the export of energy resources and the living standards of Russians are not high enough. Russia is implementing economic structural reforms and other policies to solve these problems.

2. Security and Defense Policies

1. Basic Posture

Russia revised its "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation" in January 2000⁷². The Concept recognizes that two exclusive trends exist in the current international situation: the trend towards the multipolar world made by countries including Russia and the trend towards the world dominated by the Western countries. As threats to Russia's security under these international circumstances, the document lists international terrorism, a movement to decrease the role of the United Nations, the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)⁷³ and others⁷⁴, and states that these factors, together with an increase of hi-tech weapons in the Western countries and a delay in the reforms of Russia's armed forces and the military-industrial complex, have weakened Russia's national security. The Concept concludes that from this perspective, Russia should take deterrent measures, including the possession of nuclear forces, to prevent invasions of any scale.

In line with this Concept, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was stipulated in April 2000 as the basic philosophy underlying Russian national defense policies. The Doctrine states that potential threats remain both at home and abroad and in some areas these latent threats are growing despite the decreased possibility of large-scale wars and the reduced threat of a direct invasion in a traditional form. Based on this recognition, it states that the objective of national defense should be to deter aggression by any means including the use of nuclear weapons and that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliatory attacks in response to a large-scale invasion with the use of conventional weapons.

In addition, The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was published in 2003 to embody the aforementioned Concept and Doctrine. Concerning the military duties, this


report points out the possibility of using armed forces not only for national defense but also for the implementation of various peacetime operations including counter-terrorism measures⁷⁵. In addition, the importance of inter-theater mobility of permanent combat-ready troops⁷⁶ is also pointed out given the vastness of the Russian territory.

The occupation of a Moscow theater by Chechen armed rebels in 2002 drove a movement to review Russia's security posture throughout the country. President Putin directed the Defense Minister and others to review the National Security Concept. As of May 2007, however, the country has not yet announced the revised Concept.

2. Military Reform

In Russia, the overall restructuring of its armed forces had been delayed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since 1997, however, progress has been made in the modernization of military forces, including the reduction of the number of soldiers, structural reforms, and development and introduction of new-type equipment and in the improvement of combat readiness. The reduction of military personnel is coming to an end and no further large-scale reduction is planned for the future⁷⁷. In structural reforms, shift to three services and three independent corps⁷⁸ and the integration of military districts have been almost completed. As for the modernization of military forces, President Putin approved the state policy on military equipment for the period from 2007 to 2015 and accordingly, approximately five trillion rubles will be spent in the development and procurement of military equipment by 2015. At the same time, efforts are being made to create an integrated order placement system. On the other hand, in order to improve the quality of military personnel and maintain highly skilled forces, Russia is implementing measures toward the introduction of a contract-based service, under which soldiers are recruited not by conscription but by contract⁷⁹. Together with the ongoing improvement of the permanent combat-ready troops, the contract-based service would contribute to the improvement of the Russian military combat readiness. Also, Russia has been improving the military unit command system, and Russia is thought to continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain nuclear deterrent potential against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years⁸⁰. (See Fig. I-2-4-1)

Fig. I-2-4-1 Russia's Defense Budget from FY 2003 to 2007



Note: Official figures announced by Russia's Ministry of Finance

3. The Chechen Issue

Triggered by the invasion of armed groups of Chechen rebels into the Republic of Dagestan in 1999, the armed forces of the Russian Federation started military actions against the groups (the Second Chechen War). In April 2002, President Putin announced in his state of the union address that the military stage had already ended. However, military actions by the Russian forces continued thereafter.

In the midst of this conflict, there were frequent terrorist attacks by armed groups, including the occupation of a Moscow theater in October 2002 and the takeover of a school in the Republic of North Ossetia in September 2004. President Putin enhanced mop-up operations against armed groups, and in 2006, established the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAC) and enacted a new antiterrorism law. Also, Russia has been promoting antiterrorism operations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and NATO members.

In the Chechen Republic, a new constitution was adopted in 2003 and a parliamentary election was held in 2005, and thus the federal government has been implementing measures to stabilize Chechen. Also, as a result of mop-up operations by the government, leaders of pro-independence forces including Shamil Basayev, who was thought to be an extreme hardliner, were killed. However, the armed Chechen rebels have not been completely eliminated and it is difficult to tell what it will be in the future.

3. External Relations

1. Relations with the United States

The relationship between Russia and United States has been improved in various fields through cooperation in fight against terrorism and other measures⁸¹. The United States, however, expresses concerns about domestic affairs in Russia, while Russia expresses concerns regarding the U.S. foreign policies. Thus the two countries have different stances⁸².

The United States, which has been developing its ballistic missile defense program, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002. Russia criticized the U.S. decision, but did not regard it as a threat to Russia's security. Subsequently, however, the United States agreed with the Czech Republic and Poland to start full-scale negotiations to deploy part of its missile defense system to the countries, and Russia is strongly opposed to this, claiming that the system targets Russia and would badly affect its nuclear deterrent capabilities.

In pursuant to the Strategic Offense Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty), which was signed in May 2002 and came into effect in June 2003, both the United States and Russia shall reduce the number of nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The treaty provides that each country shall independently determine the composition and structure of their nuclear forces within its limits.

2. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Russia promotes military integration with CIS member countries, claiming that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS. To this end, Russia has dispatched its federal forces to stay in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyz. It also concluded agreements to form a unified air defense system or joint border security treaties with CIS member countries⁸³.

With increasing activities by Islamic armed forces in Central Asia/Caucasia, Russia pursued military cooperation to fight against terrorism in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force⁸⁴ in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. Since the U.S. and other military forces launched the military campaign in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001 in the United States, Russia has not opposed the U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Georgia or the U.S. military presence in these countries. On the other hand, in 2003, Russia established an air

Fig. I-2-4-2 CIS Member States



force base in Kyrgyz to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force⁸⁵. Russia also had a division (of approximately 8,000 personnel) stationed in Tajikistan, and afterward made an agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004 to secure a Russian military base in the country.

In the meantime, Georgia and Ukraine, both of which have new administrations that took office in 2003 to 2004, are aiming to strengthen their relations with Europe and the United States for their future accession to NATO, even as they emphasize relations with Russia. In May 2005, Russia and Georgia decided through negotiations that the Russian military base located in Georgian territory should be closed in 2008. As for Ukraine, if the Russian Black Sea Fleet continues to stay in Ukraine, it may be a barrier to its future NATO membership.

3. Relations with NATO

Russia, as a rule, has been against the accession to NATO of the former Soviet Union countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, it took steps to build a new cooperative relationship with NATO especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and a NATO-Russia Council was established as a mechanism to pursue joint activities in May 2002. Within the framework of this Council, Russia will participate in decision making to a certain extent and act as an equal partner in the fields of common interest⁸⁶.

4. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia is implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberia oil to the Far East and developing natural gas fields in Sakhalin. To develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social

infrastructure, it is important for Russia to enhance economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and China. To this end, Russia emphasizes relations with these countries in its foreign policies and has joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (see Section 3.1). Also, Russia signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004⁸⁷. President Putin has been actively engaged in summit diplomacy with Asian countries. For example, he has been maintaining close relationship with China and India through annual reciprocal top-level visits. In July 2006, President Putin had a trilateral summit meeting with Chinese and India leaders. Furthermore, due to the fact that regional peace and stability mean much to its national interests, Russia intends proactively to get involved in the solution of regional problems, such as those concerning the Korean Peninsula⁸⁸.

5. Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to be promoting the exportation of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of the military industry and make profit but also to help promote better foreign policies. The export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted an exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboronexport State Corporation as part of its lasting efforts to improve the export system. In addition, Russia regards the military industry as an integral part of the nation's military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia has exported jet fighters and warships to countries including China, India, and ASEAN member countries⁸⁹. In addition, Russia signed agreements on military technology cooperation with North Korea and Iran in 2001. The international community is concerned about the possibility of an outflow of materials and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, as well as personnel having knowledge and technology that are related to these weapons from former Soviet countries.

4. Military Posture

1. Nuclear Forces

Russia seems to have gradually reduced the number of its strategic nuclear missiles, and it also seems that building of a new-type nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying submarine (SSBN) has fallen behind schedule. However, Russia still maintains intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLMB) second only to the United States in scale. Although Russia totally abolished SS-24 missiles, which were only railway-mobile ICBMs, by the end of 2005, it decided to prolong the lifetime of its old-type ICBMs. While the aging of its nuclear missiles has been pointed out, Russia began to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, completed the test of the new mobile-type Topol-M ICBM, and started its deployment in 2006. Also, Russia started a flight test of the new-type Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile in September 2005, but some point out that the test failed in 2006. It seems that Russia has not yet deployed the missile.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Moscow Treaty, Russia and the United States shall reduce the number

of their nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The treaty raises international attention regarding whether the future disposal of nuclear weapons, including cost issues, will proceed smoothly⁹⁰. On the other hand, after the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia declared the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) nullified, and said that it would take countermeasures such as suspension of the disposal of multiple nuclear warhead missiles. In light of the fact that the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) would become null and void in 2009, Russia proposed to start negotiations about a new treaty to replace START I.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces.

Russia has been promoting modernization of its conventional forces. However, it has not progressed as planned. Given this, and as is indicated by the detailed description of the use of nuclear weapons in the Concept and the Doctrine, it is said that Russia emphasizes the importance of nuclear forces to make up for deficiencies in its conventional forces, and is making efforts to maintain the readiness of its nuclear forces.

2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Since 1990, Russian conventional forces have been reduced in size, but on the other hand, it seems that Russia is concentrating its limited resources on specific units to maintain their combat readiness⁹¹.

However, many problems remain, including a decrease in the number of men available for conscription, bad living conditions for military personnel, lax military discipline, and difficulties in securing military personnel due to broad-ranging deferments and exemptions from military service. It would thus appear difficult for Russia to maintain the same level of military activities as it was in the Soviet era⁹².

The future of Russian forces is unclear due to the opacity of both the political and economic conditions in the country, and it is necessary to continue monitoring the progress of military reform or Russian forces. It is, however, unlikely in the foreseeable future that the size and posture of Russian forces would return to their status during the Cold War era.

5. Russian Forces in the Far East Region

1. General


The present scale of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is much smaller than its peak. However, Russia deploys ground forces of about 90,000⁹³, approximately 250 warships, and roughly 630 combat aircraft in the Far East Region, and a considerable scale of military forces including nuclear forces still remains in the region. Training operations, after reaching bottom, have been slightly increasing in recent years. Since 2003, Russia has conducted military exercises in the Far East region, including “Vostok 2003” and “Vostok 2005,” both of which were large-scale exercises, and “Mobility 2004,” which was an exercise for the country’s permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region.

In Russia, the number of troops has been reduced due to military reforms, and as a result, the personnel vacancy rate of the troops is thought to be declining. However, only strategic nuclear units and permanent combat-ready troops maintain a state of readiness, and the readiness of troops in general seems to be under improvement now.

For the future of the Russian forces in the Far East region, it is necessary to continue to monitor the trend of Russian forces as well as what they will be in the future, because, as a whole, the forces tend to focus on

dealing with conflicts by inter-theater mobility of its combat-ready troops, and political and economic conditions in the country still remain quite uncertain. It is, however, unlike in the foreseeable future that the scale and posture of the Russian forces in the Far East region will return to what they were during the Cold War era. Contexts for this argument are as follows: military détente with the United States has made it less necessary for Russia to emphasize its military presence in the Pacific, and a reduction of military tension with China has reduced the need for military vigilance against the country. (See Fig. I-2-4-3)

Fig. I-2-4-3 Russian Military Deployment in Areas Close to Japan



(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers are deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained. The effects of the Moscow Treaty, which was signed between the United States and Russia in 2002, will have on strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region should be followed.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, Russian forces in the Far East Region have a variety of weapons, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and sea (undersea)-and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 70 Backfires are deployed in the west of Lake Baikal and the coast areas including the area across from Sakhalin.

(2) Ground Forces

Ground forces in the Far East region have continuously shrunk since 1990 and are currently made up of 15 divisions of approximately 90,000 personnels.

Also, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy has a naval infantry division with an amphibious capability. (See Fig. I-2-4-4)


(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk . The Fleet comprises approximately 250 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 600,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear-powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. These forces have been scaled down since 1990. (See Fig. I-2-4-5)

(4) Air Forces

Russia deploys approximately 630 combat aircraft of its Air Force and Navy. This represents a drastic fall from its peak, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities. (See Figs. I-2-4-6 • 7)

Fig. I-2-4-4 Changes in the Russian Ground Forces in the Far East Region



- Notes: 1. 1989 = peak year
- 2. Far Eastern region of the former Soviet Union until 1992
- 3. Numbers in 1989 and 1990 include those of Russian troops stationed in Mongolia.

Fig. I-2-4-5 Changes in the Russian Naval Forces in the Far East Region




Fig. I-2-4-6 Changes in the Russian Air Forces in the Far East Region (Fighters)





Fig. I-2-4-7 Changes in the Russian Air Forces of the Far East Region (Bombers)



2. Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on the Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan's Northern Territories. These territories are illegally occupied by Russia although they are integral part of Japanese territory. The number of Russia's military personnel in this region has been declining in recent years, and is considered to have far decreased from the peak. However, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are still deployed in the region. With regard to ground forces in the Northern Territories, then President Yeltsin officially announced during his visit to Japan in 1993 that half of the troops stationed on the four islands had already been withdrawn and the remaining half, with the exception of the national boarder guard, would also be pulled out. In the late 1990s, Russia repeatedly stated at various official meetings with Japan that the number of Russian troops stationed in this region had been reduced. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, but at the Japan-Russia summit meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would not either increase or decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to keep the status quo.

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be solved at an early date.

3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

Russian military operations have remained generally quiet in the vicinity of Japan, including exercises and training, as compared with those conducted by the former Soviet Union in the Cold War era. There are, however, signs that such operations have started up again.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from the peak number, but some activities seem to have been reactivated.

With regard to naval vessels, there is a sign of change in the naval training and other activities. For example, long sea training by submarines and surface ships was conducted for the first time in several years, and nuclear submarines resumed their patrols.


Flights close to Japan's territorial airspace, air exercises, and training seem to have reached bottom.

Section 5. Southeast Asia

1 General Situation

Southeast Asia is encompassed by the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the waters around Indonesia and the Philippines, thus occupying a key strategic position for traffic by linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The countries of this region have worked to achieve political stability and sound economic progress while striving to deepen relations of interdependence with other countries both inside and outside the region. However, this region still has unstable factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, minority ethnic issues, separatist and independent movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Also, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships was menaced. In response to these situations, the countries in the region are trying to build sufficient military capabilities to deal with their security issues, including antiterrorism measures and vigilance against pirates and armed robberies on the water. Also, they have been modernizing their military forces, including the introduction of new warships to improve their naval forces as well as the introduction of new-type fighters⁹⁴. (See Fig. I-2-5-1)

Fig. I-2-5-1 Military Powers in Southeast Asia (approximate)



In the region, multinational cooperation has also been promoted in order to deal with cross-border problems as represented by terrorism and piracy. ASEAN countries have been continuously discussing terrorism issues at various occasions. At the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in July 2006, the ministers adopted the ARF Statement on Cooperation in Fighting Cyber Attack and Terrorist Misuse of Cyber Space. In July 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore started the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols for

vigilance against pirates and armed robberies in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. For the patrols, the naval forces of the three countries patrol their own territories while exchanging information. Subsequently in September 2005, the countries launched their joint airborne patrols codenamed Eyes in the Sky. Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have conducted combined joint exercises including maritime interdiction training every year within the framework of the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA). In addition, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)⁹⁵, which was proposed and promoted by Japan, entered into force in September 2006 and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre was established in November 2006 in Singapore based on the agreement.

2. Cooperation with the United States in Security Issues

Many Southeast Asian countries have conducted joint exercises with other countries both inside and outside the region, including FPDA-based joint exercises. In addition, they have built cooperative relations in security with the United States.

The United States regards Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two nations signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, in order to strengthen the cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defense technology, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogues.

The Philippines and the United States resumed their large-scale joint military exercise Balikatan in 2000. In Balikatan 07 in February through March 2006 participated by about 1,200 Philippine military personnel and about 400 U.S. military personnel, the two nations conducted command post exercises as well as support activities for civilian reconstruction efforts in the areas such as the Sulu Archipelago.

Thailand and the United States started to hold a large-scale bilateral military exercise Cobra Gold in 1982. This exercise has become multinational since 2000. In response to the military coup in Thailand in September 2006, the United States announced the suspension of military aid of about \$24 million to Thailand. However, the military exercise Cobra Gold 07 for 2007 was jointly organized by the United States and Thailand as usual. In Cobra Gold 07 held in this May, the scope of the exercise includes a Field Training Exercise between the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces and a non-combat purpose exercise such as Command Post Exercise for PKO activities and Humanitarian/Civic Assistance around the exercise area⁹⁶.

In 2003, the United States granted Major Non-NATO Ally⁹⁷ status to the Philippines and Thailand.

For Indonesia, in response to Sumatra Earthquake and subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean, which occurred in December 2004, the United States promptly dispatched USS Abraham Lincoln Carter Strike Group to the devastated area, and played a key role in the relief activities conducted by many countries, in cooperation with the Indonesian Armed Forces. Also, in February 2005, the United States expressed its intention to resume the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Indonesia⁹⁸, which had been suspended since 1992. Subsequently in November 2005, the United States decided to resume the exportation of weapons to Indonesia.

For Vietnam, then Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited the United States in June 2005 and agreed with U.S. President George W. Bush to develop the bilateral relations to a new phase. In addition, the leaders concluded an IMET agreement. The prime minister's visit thus led to a great progress in military cooperation between the two countries. In June 2006, then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam and agreed with then Vietnamese Defense Minister Pham Van Tra to expand military exchanges between the two countries.

Since 2000, the Multinational Planning and Argumentation Team (MPAT) program organized by the U.S. Pacific Command, in which Southeast Asian nations, the United Nations and other international organizations participate, has been conducted. This program is designed to prepare for contingencies such as large-scale disasters where many countries would dispatch their troops for rescue operations. The purpose of the program is to promote personnel exchanges and discussions on standard operating procedure in advance among those who are expected to be dispatched. It is said that lessons learned from the MPAT program contributed to the relief activities following Sumatra Earthquake and subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

3. East Timor Situation

In the East Timor, unfair treatment of soldiers from the western side had developed into a political and social conflict, which caused riot incidents in its capital Dili in April 2006. Subsequently, in May 2006, military policemen deserted the national army and attacked the national army headquarters to aggravate the security. In response to the request from the East Timor government, four countries, i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia, dispatched international security forces there at the end of May 2006. Based on the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1704, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), having a mandate for such as support for presidential and national parliament elections, recovery and maintenance of public order, and support for the reconstruction of the security sector, was established in August 2006. The Mission is conducting activities in cooperation with international security forces⁹⁹. In April 2007, the first presidential election since the independence of the country was held, and as a result of the subsequent runoff vote in May then Prime Minister Ramos Horta was elected President.

4. Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands are located in the central part of the South China Sea and comprise some 100 islets and reefs. Undersea resources such as oil and natural gas are thought to exist in areas around the islands, besides abundant fishery resources. The islands also occupy an important strategic position for maritime traffic. At present, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam are laying territorial claim to the whole of the Spratly Islands, and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are claiming part of them. In 1988, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies had armed clashes over rights to the Spratly Islands. Although the clashes temporarily raised tensions, there have been no major military clashes since then. Chinese actions, however, such as the enactment of the Territorial Waters Law in 1992, the building of structures on Mischief Reef in 1995, and the subsequent extension of work on the buildings on Mischief Reef have drawn strong opposition from the countries involved. Also, there are many differences in opinions among ASEAN member countries, as exemplified by the Philippines' protest in 1999 against Malaysia building new structures on the reefs of the islands.

China had previously insisted on bilateral negotiations on this issue, but recently, there have been signs of an impetus to find a peaceful solution to the dispute among all of the countries involved. The ARF Ministerial Conference each year has adopted a chairman's statement to the effect that it welcomes efforts by all sides to find a peaceful solution to the problem, and ASEAN member countries drafted the Regional Code of Conduct

in the South China Sea that includes prohibition of any new occupation of uninhabited features in the sea¹⁰⁰. On the other hand, at the ASEAN-China Summit Meeting held in November 2002, ASEAN member countries and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea¹⁰¹, which aims for a peaceful settlement of the territorial issues of the South China Sea through dialogue.

Recently, China has aggressively proposed to the related countries that they give priority to the development of resources in the sea areas surrounding the Spratly Islands, apart from the territorial issue. For example, in September 2004, China agreed with the Philippines on the joint oil field survey in the sea areas, and in March 2005, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam reached an agreement on the launch of joint survey on oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. Furthermore, ASEAN and China agreed to establish a joint working group on resources development in the South China Sea and the agreement was approved by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in July 2005. The countries concerned, however, still have conflicting opinions regarding the territorial rights over the South China Sea including the Spratly Islands, and attention must be given to the actions of the countries involved and the developments on consultations to resolve the issue.

Section 6. South Asia

1. India

1. General Situation

India is surrounded by many countries and has long coastlines totaling 7,600 km. The country has the world's second largest population of more than one billion following China and has great influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographic position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. In particular, Andaman and Nicobar Islands located at the east end of the country are in the proximity to the Straits of Malacca, and India is greatly expected to play an important role in maritime security.

India has multiple races, religions, languages, and cultures within it, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world's largest democratic nation¹⁰². Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and systems, such as liberalism, democracy, and market economy.

India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s and maintaining high economic growth rates. Some estimate that the number of its middle-income group reaches 300 million. In recent years, the information technology (IT) industry has been showing a remarkable growth in India. Against the backdrop of these favorable economic tendencies, the country actively engages in multilateral diplomacy, thereby steadily increasing its presence in international society.

2. National Defense Policy

India, as its national security policies, lists the possession of military capabilities to protect the national interest and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism, low-intensity conflicts, to conventional wars and nuclear wars; and enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use on nuclear weapons and maintaining a unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test conducted in 1998. In addition, in its nuclear doctrine released in January 2003, India expressed its commitment to continuing to control the export of nuclear weapons and missile-related materials and technologies and participating in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, as well as to creating a nuclear-free world. On the other hand, the doctrine declares that India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India by biological or chemical weapons.

Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 12 corps with approximately 1,100,000 personnel; naval forces of two fleets, totaling approximately 354,000 tons; and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 990 combat aircraft. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier, and in addition to promoting the

construction plan of one new domestic aircraft carrier, will introduce another aircraft carrier from Russia upon completion of repair work as explained later.

3. Foreign Policies

(1) United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, while the United States is also promoting the expansion of its involvement in India in line with the economic growth of India, thus leading to increasingly stronger interactive relationship in various fields.

The U.S.-India joint declaration, which was made when then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the United States in November 2001, confirmed that qualitative improvement should be made for future bilateral relations. In January 2004, the two countries announced that they had agreed to expand mutual cooperation in the following three areas; civil nuclear activities, space programs, and high-technology trade, aiming to form strategic partnership between the two countries. In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States and made a joint statement with U.S. President George W. Bush that the relationship between the two countries would transform into a global partnership, through which they will cooperate in the field of space exploration, nuclear energy for civilian applications, and military and non-military technologies. Subsequently in March 2006, President Bush, in turn, visited India for the first time in six years as a president of the United States¹⁰³, and agreed with Prime Minister Singh to strategically strengthen bilateral relations.

In the security field, in June 2005, then Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year military agreement the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, based on the recognition that the U.S.-India defense relationship is an important pillar in the mutually beneficial relations between the two countries, which are changing over times. Furthermore, in March 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its intention to enhance cooperation with India in security issues, including maritime security¹⁰⁴.

India and the United States have made active military exchanges, including joint military exercises. The Indian and the U.S. navies carried out the joint naval exercise Malabar 06 off the coast of Goa in the Arabian Sea from October through November 2006. The exercise was participated in by one amphibious assault ship of the U.S. Navy, and Indian army soldiers and U.S. marines carried out the amphibious landing exercise, thus making the joint exercise with the United States increasingly enhanced both in quality and quantity¹⁰⁵.

As for cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, U.S. President George W. Bush changed its previous policy prohibiting cooperation with the countries not participating in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agreed in July 2005 with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on cooperation in civilian nuclear activities with India, which had conducted nuclear tests without participating in the NPT. Subsequently, in March 2006, U.S. President Bush agreed with Indian Prime Minister Singh on the implementation of cooperation in civilian nuclear activities. Furthermore, in December 2006, the U.S. Senate and Congress passed the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, which enables cooperation in civilian nuclear activities with India, where comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were not applied. The act was signed by President Bush and enacted in the same month. Meanwhile, coordination with the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and others are required for international cooperation in civilian nuclear activities with India.

(2) China

India has been trying to improve relations with China through mutual visits by leaders despite the national border issues between them and concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and modernization of

military forces including naval ones. In June 2003, then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China for the first time in the past ten years as an Indian prime minister and signed with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation¹⁰⁶ between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China. In November 2003, Indian and Chinese navies carried out joint naval exercise off the coast of Shanghai for the first time. Furthermore, when Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited India in March 2004, the two countries agreed on the expansion of military exchanges. Subsequently in December 2004, based on this agreement, a visit to China by an Indian Chief of Army Staff was made for the first time in approximately 10 years. Also in January 2005, a strategic dialogue was held for the first time by the two countries' Vice Foreign Ministers. When Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two countries reached an agreement on establishing strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity¹⁰⁷. In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India for the first time in the past ten years as a Chinese president to meet with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Both agreed that the development of strategic and cooperative partnership between China and India is commonly recognized as an important issue and announced a joint declaration that includes holding regular summit meetings¹⁰⁸.

(3) Russia

India has traditionally been on friendly terms with Russia and maintains close relations with the country through mutual visits made annually by their leaders. In October 2000, the two countries signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership to further strengthen their bilateral relations, and have been promoting acquisition of T-90 tanks by India from Russia and joint development of supersonic cruise missile¹⁰⁹. In January 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India and both leaders announced a joint statement as well as signed agreements, including the one for constructing nuclear power plants and the intergovernmental agreement on the peaceful use of the Global Navigation Satellite System GLONASS¹¹⁰.

Russia is a major provider of weapons for India¹¹¹. In January 2004, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and concluded a contract to sell a retired aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, to India. Also in January 2007, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and conducted a consultation meeting on military technology cooperation, joint exercises, and other issues¹¹².

Also, the two countries have conducted joint military exercises since 2003¹¹³.

(4) Asian Countries

Since the latter half of the 1990s, India has been emphasizing relations with East Asian countries including ASEAN members. In October 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).¹¹⁴ India, which has been historically on good terms with Japan, has been deepening cooperation with Japan in economy, security, and various other fields based on a global partnership.

In May 2006, then India's Defense Minister Mukherjee visited Japan and announced a joint statement with the Director General on the DFAA Nukaga. In this statement, the two countries agreed to deepen talks and cooperation in the field on defense cooperation.


2. Pakistan

Pakistan, with approximately 150 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Currently, Pakistan's attitude towards international fight against terrorism and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting international attention.

Pakistan, which has no nuclear umbrella, claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self defense.

The Pakistan Armed Forces include ground forces of 9 corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 45 warships, totaling approximately 81,000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 370 combat aircraft. (See Fig. I-2-6-1)

Fig. I-2-6-1 Size of Indian and Pakistani Forces (approximate)



Pakistan, while attaching importance to friendship and cooperation with Islamic countries, maintains close relations with China as a countermeasure against India¹¹⁵. Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan has been expressing its intention to join the U.S.-led fight against terrorism¹¹⁶. This cooperative attitude was highly appreciated by the international community, and the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan by the United States and other countries due to Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1998 were lifted¹¹⁷. Pakistan strengthened military cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism. In March 2005, the United States decided to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, lifting its freeze on the sale that had been lasting for more than 20 years. Furthermore in March 2006, U.S. President Bush visited Pakistan and highly appreciated Pakistan’s support in the global fight against terrorism, and the two countries confirmed their policy to promote terrorism-related information sharing¹¹⁸.

For the nuclear proliferation issue involving Pakistan, President Musharraf disclosed in February 2004 that some Pakistani scientists, including Doctor A.Q. Kahn, were involved in nuclear proliferation, though the president denied the Pakistani government’s involvement in any kind of proliferation activity¹¹⁹.

President Musharraf has been improving relations with India, including Kashmir issue, and also expressed his support for the U.S.-led antiterrorism measures and prevention of weapons of mass destruction. Islamic extremist groups both at home and abroad criticized president Musharraf’s policy, and in December 2003, there were two assassination attempts on the president¹²⁰.

Achieving stability in Pakistan is crucial from the viewpoint of enhancing the international fight against terrorism, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and securing stability in South Asia.

3. India-Pakistan Conflict

India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India after the World War II, had three large armed conflicts over Kashmir territorial issue and others¹²¹.

In 1947, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed over Kashmir, which developed into a large armed conflict. (This first war lasted until 1949.) After the second armed conflict (in 1965) and the third one (in 1971), the current Line of Control (LOC) was defined in 1972.

The territorial dispute over Kashmir has continued, while dialogues were resumed and suspended repeatedly, and it constitutes one of the root causes of confrontation between India and Pakistan. Military tension between the two countries sharply increased following the Kargil conflict in 1999 and an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. The situation, however, was not further aggravated due to efforts by the international community, which was strongly concerned about the two countries, because both of them made their possession of nuclear capabilities clear. In February 2004, the two countries commenced a process of a composite dialog to normalize their relations, including those related to Kashmir issue. A certain degree of progress has been made so far, including the start of the operation in April 2005 of direct buses across the LOC in the Kashmir region¹²².

In October 2005, a major earthquake occurred in Pakistan, with its epicenter located near the LOC in Kashmir. More than 73,000 people were killed by the earthquake in Pakistan and the country suffered devastating damage. Pakistan and India transported relief materials from India to Pakistan by air. Also, direct telephone call service was made available and five crossing points were opened on the LOC. The two governments thus implemented ground breaking measures in Kashmir following the earthquake.

Also, as part of its peace promoting measures, India withdrew some of its forces stationed in Kashmir in November 2004 and it announced a step-by-step reduction of these forces (by 15,000 personnel in total) again in February 2006.

India and Pakistan had far different opinions on Kashmir and the solution of the issues was thought to be difficult. However, tension between the two countries is further mitigated, and whether they may solve the issue is attracting much attention from the international community.

The two countries are confronted with each other also in such fields as nuclear and ballistic missile development. Neither country is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)¹²³. In 1998, they conducted a series of nuclear tests, which drew criticism from the international community, including Japan¹²⁴.

In more recent years, both countries have been actively promoting the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. India announced the deployment of Agni 2 intermediate range ballistic missiles to its ground forces in September 2003. The Agni 3 intermediate range ballistic missile was test-launched in April 2007, which was reportedly successful. Furthermore, it is reported that Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles, which were developed jointly with Russia, are now being deployed to naval warships.

Pakistan, on the other hand, first test-launched the Babur (Hataf VII) cruise missile in November 2005¹²⁵. It also conducted the test-launched of the Shaheen 2 (Hataf VI) intermediate range ballistic missile in February 2007. Furthermore, in the exercise of the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Strategic Missile Group (SMG) consecutively conducted the first exercise launch of missiles it owns, such as the Ghauri intermediate range ballistic missile (Hataf V) and the Shaheen 1 (Hataf V) intermediate range ballistic missile from November through December in 2006¹²⁶. This seems to demonstrate that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic missile to forces.

Section 7. Australia

Australia, as well as Japan and the Republic of Korea, has an alliance with the United States. As seen in its engagement in the North Korea, East Timor and other issues, Australia has actively been involved in resolution of Asia and Pacific security issues. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2)

In December 2000, Australia announced “Defence 2000-Our Future Defence Force”, which presented its defense policy for the coming decade. The document states that the Australian Defence Force has three missions: First, to defend Australia; Second, to contribute to the security of neighboring countries; and Third, to contribute effectively to international coalition forces to meet crises beyond Australia’s neighboring countries to support Australia’s wider interests and objectives. Having reviewed its national defense strategy in terms of security environment influenced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and by the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, Australia released “Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003” in February 2003, which focuses on such issues as the expanded use of its armed forces in remote areas to deal with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.



An Australian soldier providing training to Iraqi soldiers
[Australian Department of Defence]

In December 2005, based on the strategic principles stated in “Defence 2000” and “A Defence Update 2003,” Australia announced “Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005.” This report sets priorities in Australia’s security strategy to deal with threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and problems of failing states. Also, the report mentions that it remains unlikely that Australia will face conventional military threats, but there is a continuing need for military capabilities to address current international security issues such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Furthermore, based on a recognition that globalization has a significant impact on security policy-related decision making and that countries in Asia-Pacific region, especially in North East Asia, are increasing their military capabilities, Australia deems it necessary to build a defense capability that is versatile and adaptable, and easy to link with other arms of Australian government, and to build strong security relationships both regionally and globally through international contribution. Together with the new report, the Australian Department of Defence announced that it will enhance its army with additional 1,500 personnel in 10 years; however, it decided in August 2006 to further increase 2,600 personnel in the army in line with the necessity of contributing to the stability of the region and responding to terrorism.

Australia, attaching importance to its alliance with the United States, has concluded the ANZUS Treaty (the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America¹²⁷) and conducted joint exercises, such as Talisman Sabre. Also, Australia and the United States hold Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) every year¹²⁸. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Australia decided to invoke Article 4 of the said Treaty, which specifies the right of collective self-defense, and dispatched warships, combat aircraft, and special forces in order to support the U.S. forces conducting counter-terrorism operations. In the military operations against Iraq that started in March 2003, Australia also dispatched warships, combat aircraft, and special forces, and, as of May 2007, deploys about 1,580 personnel in Iraq to assist reconstruction activities.

Seeking to enhance interoperability with the United States, Australia decided to participate in the U.S.-led missile defense program in December 2003, but concrete form of participation is still under discussion. In August 2004, Australia determined to adopt the U.S. Aegis system to its new air warfare destroyers. It has also participated in the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, expecting F/A-18 and F-111, both of which are its main fighters, to retire in the coming several years, and upgraded the U.S.-Australia joint training facilities in Australia¹²⁹.

Australia also conducts joint exercises with Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and New Zealand based on the Five Power Defense Arrangements (which came into effect in 1971). In addition, Australia took part in U.N. PKOs, such as United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

In terms of relations with Indonesia, Australia has provided the country with cooperation to enhance its counterterrorism capacity after the Bali terrorist bombing in October 2002. However, another terrorist bombing occurred in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004 and another in Bali in October 2005, and both countries agreed to resume joint exercises between their respective special forces in December 2005¹³⁰. Furthermore, in November 2006, both countries signed the security agreement, which states cooperation in a wide range of fields, including defense, counterterrorism, and intelligence, to aim at strengthening cooperation and consultation on issues affecting their individual or common security.


Section 8. Europe

1. General Situation

Many European countries recognize that the threat of a large scale invasion by another nation has disappeared. At the same time, new security issues potentially affecting Europe have been identified, including regional conflicts, the rise of international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Following the end of the Cold War, European countries have been striving to stabilize the security situation through efforts to enhance and expand the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 26 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). In addition, many European countries have been making efforts to improve the capabilities to respond to aforementioned new issues, while reducing and rationalizing their armed forces. (See Fig. I-2-8-1)

Fig. I-2-8-1 European Security Organization (as of May 31, 2006)



Note: The Warsaw Pact Military Organization was dissolved in April 1991. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved as a political organization after the signing of the dissolution agreement on July 1, 1991 and ratification of the agreement by the parliaments of the member states.

2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks

1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peacekeeping Functions

(1) Commitment to a New Role

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has shifted the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

This shift is reflected in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, reviewed in 1999, in which missions such as conflict prevention and crisis management¹³¹ are added to its primary task of collective defense, based on the view that various dangers difficult to forecast, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, human rights suppression, and the dissolution of a state, still remain in Europe and surrounding regions.

NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003, which is the first operation outside Europe, and expanded the area of its operations to the entire Afghanistan in October 2006. The NATO Summit held in Riga, Latvia in November 2006 adopted the joint statement that the contribution to the peace and stability of Afghanistan is its first priority¹³².

For Iraq, NATO has provided assistance for the training of Iraqi security forces in accordance with an agreement reached at the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting held in June 2004.

As NATO thus expands and prolongs its operations, problems are pointed out, including shortage in force and tight financial conditions of NATO.

On the other hand, the EU, enhancing its own commitment to security issues, adopted its first document on security strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy*, in December 2003. This document regarded terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crimes as serious threats and showed the policies to be taken to deal with these challenges by stabilizing the surrounding area's situation and based on multinational cooperation.

The EU, in 2003, for the first time led a military operation to maintain public order in Macedonia using NATO equipment and capabilities¹³³. In the same year, the EU carried out its first peacekeeping operation (PKO) outside Europe and its first operation without using NATO equipment and capabilities in Democratic Republic of Congo. In recent years, the EU has engaged in activities in the areas of crisis management and security maintenance¹³⁴, such as taking over in December 2004 the activities of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina under NATO leadership.

(2) Pursuit of Military Capabilities Required for New Roles

NATO's bombing campaign conducted against Yugoslavia in 1999 revealed a capability gap between the United States and European countries. Given this, and based on the agreement reached at the NATO Prague Summit Meeting held in November 2002, NATO has moved forward with reforms of its military capabilities, including organizational transformation¹³⁵.



Japanese Prime Minister Abe at the NATO Council
[Cabinet Public Relations Office]

As the core of NATO transforms to improve its capability, the launching of the NATO Response Force (NRF), designed to respond swiftly to various types of crisis scenarios across the world, had started since 2002. The Force was declared to be at full operational capability in November 2006 and performs operations utilizing its special capabilities. For example, it transported relief materials when a large earthquake occurred in Pakistan in October 2005.

The EU has tried to become capable of conducting peacekeeping and other military operations independently in cases where NATO does not involve itself. The EU adopted Headline Goal 2010, and positioned the Battle groups concept as the core of its future military approaches in 2004. (See Fig. I-2-8-2)

Fig. I-2-8-2 Trend of Capability Build-up of NATO and EU

	NATO Response Force (NRF)	EU Battle Groups (Combat Groups)
Missions	Swiftly responding every situation worldwide	Responding EU-led missions, such as peacekeeping operations, in the case where there is no intervention by NATO.
Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standing joint task forces formed by mainly brigade-scale ground units (approx. 4,000 troops), plus maritime, air and specialized units • Size of force: approx. 25,000 troops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thirteen units of 1,500 troops will be formed. Of these, two units can be emergency deployed simultaneously.
Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployment begins within five days of an order. • Capability of 30-day operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deployment begins within five days of an order and is completed within 15 days. • Capability of 30-day operations
Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One year rotation (in the case of ground units, six months training and six months on standby) • Basic operational concept: to be dispatched as an initial response unit • Segmentation of units is possible according to the mission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Units will be formed and on standby by rotation within the unilateral or multinational framework.
Force building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiative was formulated in November 2002. • Prototype force was formed in October 2003. • Possession of initial operational capability in October 2004 • Complete operational capability was achieved in November 2006. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiative was formulated in June 2004. • Complete operational capability was achieved in January 2007.

The EU also set up the European Defense Agency in July 2004 with the goal of improving the defense capabilities of individual countries within a European-wide security defense policy. At the meeting of Ministers of Defense held in March 2006, the ministers agreed that European Defense Agency will examine the establishment of a fund for research and development. It is, however, pointed out that, due to such a fact that seven countries expressed their intention not to participate, there is friction with member states that lead this concept.

2. Stability by the Geographical Expansion of Security Frameworks

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework.

NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994³⁶, under which training exercises for PKOs and response to refugee problems have been conducted.


In 1994, the Organization initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue to contribute to stability in the Mediterranean region by provision of information and participation of Dialogue countries in NATO activities.

In addition, the 9/11 attacks in the United States promoted NATO and Russia to take steps to build a new relationship from the need to address common security issues. Accordingly, it was decided to establish the NATO-Russia council at the NATO-Russia Summit held in May 2002.

With seven countries (Rumania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia) becoming new members in March 2004, nearly all countries of Central and Eastern Europe have now joined NATO.

In a parallel development, 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Cyprus) joined the EU in May 2004, and Bulgaria and Rumania in January 2007. (See Fig. I-2-8-3)

Fig. I-2-8-3 Enlargement of NATO and EU Membership



3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Conditions

European nations attract more importance to military missions other than home defense, baring terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other new threats in mind. In defense build-up, they emphasize transport capability for overseas deployment given their roles in NATO.

1. The United Kingdom

The defense policy of the United Kingdom is based on the 1998 Strategic Defense Review (SDR).

In this document, the United Kingdom defined the tasks of its military forces such as peacetime security (support against terrorism of all kinds); security of the overseas territories; responses to crises both inside and

outside the NATO area, and has been committed specifically to reductions of nuclear forces, enhancement of joint combat capabilities, improvements in NBC protection, increase of mobility and striking power, improvements in service life, and greater efficiency in weapons/equipment procurement and others. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, A New Chapter was added to the SDR in July 2002, which provides guidelines for dealing with international terrorism.

In December 2003, the United Kingdom released a defense white paper, *Delivering Security in a Changing World*. It attracts attention that this white paper names international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states as major threats, and at the same time, emphasizes the need to strengthen overseas deployment capabilities, to improve readiness, and to make further reforms, based on lessons from military operations in Iraq¹³⁷. According to the report on specific future military capabilities released in July 2004, even while pursuing force reduction and consolidating its major military and naval facilities, the United Kingdom plans to enhance its ability to carry out target acquisition and attacks swiftly and accurately, to improve its ground fighting capabilities so that it can more effectively conduct small- to medium-scale operations, and to advance its anti-surface strike capabilities by upgrading its aircraft carriers and landing ships. In the aftermath of the terrorist bombings in London in July 2005, the United Kingdom formed the Special Forces Support Group (SMSG) against the terrorism.

In December 2006, the British government published a white paper titled *The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent* to indicate the policy to maintain nuclear deterrent based on the submarine-launched ballistic missile system beyond the 2020s¹³⁸. The white paper also describes efforts for nuclear disarmament, including the decision to reduce operational nuclear warheads from 200 or less to 160 or less.

2. Germany

The German White Paper of Defense was published after the interval of 12 years in October 2006. It states that the main mission of the German Federal Armed Forces continues to be home defense and the collective defense in traditional terms; however, that the mission most likely to come next will be conflict prevention and crisis management, including the combat against international terrorism, considering the current situation that new threats, such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are expanding.

Germany is committed to using resources focusing on the enhancement of such capabilities as strategic transportation, global-scale reconnaissance, and efficient and highly interoperable command in order for the capabilities of Federal Armed Forces to meet the above mission, and moves ahead with concrete plans to introduce A-400M transport aircraft and the synthetic aperture radar satellite SAR-LUPE. Also, Germany is promoting the plan to restructure its military into integrated forces with the three functions of intervention, stabilization, and assistance¹³⁹. In addition, efforts are made to reduce the total number of personnel and to relocate bases and facilities within Germany.

3. France

Nuclear deterrence, conflict prevention, overseas deployment of forces, and home defense (e.g. counterterrorism) are the core elements in France's defense strategy under its recognition that mass terror and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are a direct threat to French people.

France is building up its military capabilities based on *the Model of the Army in 2015* which was released in February 1996. Conscription was abolished and the military forces were reduced in accordance with the Military Program Law for 1997-2002. Now, based on the Military Program Law for 2003-2008, France plans to focus investments on the enhancement and improvement of command and intelligence functions, deployment and mobility capabilities, action and striking capabilities in depth, defensive means, and others. To

be specific, the plan includes the order of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and the acquisition of A-400M transport aircraft, Rafale fighter aircraft, and Leclerc tanks as well as the construction of a conventionally powered aircraft carrier in cooperation with the United Kingdom¹⁴⁰.

4. Efforts toward Stabilization in Europe

1. Arms Control and Disarmament

The Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which formally entered into force in 1992, set upper limits for five categories of weapons—tanks, wheeled armored combat vehicles, artillery, fighters, and attack helicopters—for both East and West¹⁴¹, and stipulates that weapons in excess to these limits should be eliminated. Under the treaty, more than 70,000 weapons of various types have already been eliminated.

Subsequently, given the changed strategic environment in Europe, the CFE application treaty was signed at the OSCE summit meeting in 1999, which transformed the earlier limits for the East and West as groups into limits for individual countries and territories¹⁴².

2. Confidence Building Measures (CBM)¹⁴³

Talks on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) have been held in Europe since 1989, and a plenary meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1992 adopted the Vienna Document 1992, which deals with annual exchanges of military intelligence as well as the notification, inspection, and regulation of military exercises above the prescribed scale¹⁴⁴.

The Open Skies Treaty¹⁴⁵, designed to improve the openness and transparency of military activities carried out by signatory countries and to supplement arms control verification measures by allowing reciprocal aerial inspections, was signed by 25 countries in 1992 and entered into force in January 2002.

Section 9. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community by the U.N. and Other Scheme

1. General

With the end of the Cold War, expectations grew on the role of the U.N. in peacekeeping, which had not been well played in the past. To respond to these expectations, the U.N. launched a number of peacekeeping operations (PKO). Recently, as new approaches to deal with conflicts in a proper manner, the African Union (AU) and other regional frameworks (see Chapter 1) have been playing an important role, and multinational forces, mandated by the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, have been conducting humanitarian and reconstructing assistance activities. (See Chapter 1) Thus, various international frameworks have been adopted to contribute to the stability of the situation. Under these circumstances, discussions are underway on organizational and other reforms of the U.N. to deal effectively with diversified problems. Reforms of U.N. organs in ways that increase their effectiveness and credibility are necessary for the international community to adequately address new issues of the 21st century, and Japan is actively involved in these reform efforts.

2. Developments in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)

U.N. PKOs have traditionally been conducted with the main purpose of preventing the recurrence of armed conflicts through activities such as monitoring ceasefires after ceasefires have been agreed. After the end of the Cold War, however, U.N. PKOs grew in scale as the scope of PKO missions expanded to include monitoring disarmament and civilian activities such as elections, monitoring governments, and humanitarian supports including repatriating refugees. Additionally, the U.N. is now engaging itself in disarmament and other activities in which it is allowed to take coercive measures as well as activities to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. As of the end of April 2007, 15 PKO missions are underway, participated in by approximately 83,000 people from 115 countries.

U.N. PKOs have problems such as shortage and security of personnel and instruments¹⁴⁶, therefore U.N. and related states have been discussing about measures for solution.

“A more secure world: Our shared responsibility,” a report released by the U.N. High-Level Committee in December 2004, requires developed states in particular to increase units for peace operations, because they need to almost double the number of personnel to conduct effective peacekeeping operations in existing conflicts. Also the report proposed the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, standby arrangement in brigade level, and composition of permanent police department for PKO. Among these proposals, the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission was decided at the end of 2005 and the first meeting was held in June 2006.

Notes

- 1) While the U.S. President is required to submit the National Security Strategy to the Congress every year in accordance with Section 404a, title 50 of the United States Code, the release of the National Security Strategy in 2006 was the second submission by the Bush Administration following the one in September 2002.
- 2) The QDR is a document that Secretary of Defense is required to submit to the Congress every four years according to Section 118, title 10 of the United States Code. It foresees the security environment in the next 20 years and clarifies issues including the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plan, defense infrastructure, and budget plan. The release of the 2006 QDR is the second submission by the Bush Administration following the one in September 2001.
- 3) The National Defense Strategy is a document released by the Secretary of Defense in March 2005 as a guide to implement the National Security Strategy as well as the basis of the QDR published in March 2006.
- 4) The Transformation Planning Guidance (April 2003) defines transformation as a “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”
- 5) The National Defense Strategy describes that as desirable strategic targets are not always attainable while attainable strategic targets are sometimes not worth the costs, there can be trade-off between strategic targets and scarce defense resources. Therefore, as stated in the 2001 QDR, it notes that the following four risks that are difficult to be eliminated at a time should be controlled carefully:
 - (1) Operational Risks: Risks associated with the current force executing the strategy successfully within acceptable costs
 - (2) Future Challenge Risks: Risks associated with the capacity to execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective future challenges
 - (3) Force Management Risks: Risks associated with managing military forces in the areas of recruiting, retaining, training, and readiness
 - (4) Institutional Risks: Risks associated with the capacity of new command, management, and business practices
- 6) Robert M. Gates, in securing an approval from the Congress, told in writing that he would examine the necessity of reviewing the posture of the U.S. forces after he was inaugurated as the new Secretary of Defense.
- 7) The Striker Brigade Combat Team is formed as a light unit so that it can be deployed everywhere in the world promptly by C-130 transport aircraft and other transportation means. Unlike heavily armed conventional mechanized divisions, the team is equipped with “Striker,” 8-wheel-drive armored vehicles that are loaded with 105 mm guns and other weapons and are characterized by strike assets and mobility.
- 8) Russia is opposed to the deployment of the MD system, insisting that it will give negative impact on the country’s nuclear deterrent capability. The United States, however, explains that the target of the MD system is not Russia: it will be deployed to protect Europe and other allies from missile threats posed by Iran.
- 9) In September 2004, Admiral Fargo, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command stated that U.S. forces were considering additional stationing of a Carrier Battle Group in the Pacific region.
- 10) According to the congressional testimony in September 2004 of Admiral Fargo, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, U. S. forces deployed bombers in Guam by rotation.

- 11) White House Fact Sheet (August 16, 2004)
- 12) Egypt, however, would remain under the direct responsibility of U.S. Central Command.
- 13) As for non-strategic nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture Review announced by the Clinton Administration in September 1994 states as follows: 1) Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable aircraft; 2) Eliminate the option to carry nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM/N) on surface ships; 3) Retain the option to deploy TLAM/N on attack submarines; and 4) Retain the current commitment of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and Continental United States (CONUS) and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.
- 14) In the organizational reform of the U.S. Army, its conventional pyramid structure (army, corps, divisions, and brigades) will be reorganized into the headquarters with command and control functions and self-sufficient combat units (in the size of brigade) so that it can respond to various situations promptly and flexibly by combining headquarters and working units according to the purpose and scale of the mission.
- 15) Its headquarters is located at Camp Lejuene in North Carolina. As the Marine Corps Special Operation Command was created, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was deactivated.
- 16) The United States aims to increase Army permanent end strength by 65,000 personnel and Marine Corps permanent end strength by 27,000 personnel over the next five years. In detail, the temporary 30,000-person increase and 5,000-person increase in the Army and the Marine Corps, respectively will be made permanent. Army permanent end strength will grow by 7,000 personnel annually to reach 547,000 and Marine Corps permanent end strength by 5,000 annually to reach 202,000.
- 17) C-17 is a large cargo aircraft with excellent takeoff-and-landing capabilities that can transport about 70 tons of goods to a front-line base located more than 4,000 km away. C-5 with a cargo load of about 120 tons can fly approximately 4,000 km, offload, and fly to a second base another 900 km away from the original destination.
- 18) Joint editorial of the Korean Workers' Party's journals "Rodong Shinmun" and "Workers" (June 16, 1999)
- 19) The approximate percentage of active servicepersons in total population is 0.2% in Japan, 0.5% in the United States, and 0.7% in Russia.
- 20) Generally, missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system are considered to be militarily superior to those based on a liquid propellant system because they are capable of immediate launch as fuel is stored in an airframe beforehand and they are easy to store and handle.
- 21) For example, in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2007, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated as follows: "North Korea remains committed to selling missiles and related technologies. Although sales have declined to most customers due to its increasing international isolation, North Korea's relationship with Iran and Syria remain strong and of principal concern."
- 22) On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as our own careful examination of the U.S. and the ROK analyses, the Japanese government has judged that the probability that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test was extremely high.
- 23) A nuclear reactor that uses graphite as a moderator
- 24) In this framework, measures that the United States and North Korea should take are shown, including North Korea remaining as a member of NPT.
- 25) Nuclear fuel rods used in the operation of nuclear reactors contain plutonium. This plutonium can be extracted by reprocessing the fuel rods.
- 26) The second and third rounds of Six-Party Talks were held in February and June 2004 respectively, the fourth round held from July to August and in September 2005, and the fifth round in November 2005, December 2006, and February 2007. The sixth round was held in March 2007 but then suspended.

- 27) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2007, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated as follows: “North Korea’s resources include a biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of various biological warfare agents. DIA believes North Korea has had a longstanding chemical weapons stockpile of nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents.” Also, the Defense White Paper of the ROK published in December 2006 pointed out as follows: “It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of a variety of agents, including nerve agents, remain stored in a number of facilities scattered around the country and that North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, small pox and cholera.”
- 28) The ranges of Scud-B and -C missiles are estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively.
- 29) North Korea admits that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central New Agency (KCNA) on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korea’s foreign ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002 and reported by the KCNA on the same day)
- 30) In his statement to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2007, General Burwell B. Bell, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated as follows: “North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile, which it last successfully test-fired in March 2006. Once operational, this missile will be more mobile, more rapidly deployable, and more capable of being launched on shorter notice than current systems. North Korea is also developing an intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of targeting U.S. forces as far away as Guam and possibly Alaska.”
- 31) For example, a two-stage missile may be converted into a three-stage missile by installing a propulsion device at the warhead.
- 32) In his statement to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2007, General Burwell B. Bell, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated as follows regarding the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea in July 2006: “These launches marked the highest number of missiles ever fired by North Korea in a 24-hour period. ... Some were fired in the hours of darkness? a first for the North Koreans. These launches validated the operational status of North Korea’s inventory of about 800 theater ballistic missiles targeting the Republic of Korea and Japan.” Also, the Commander pointed as follows at the Security Forum held at the National Assembly of the ROK: “North Korea was able to launch a salvo of six Scud and Nodong missiles of varying types and capabilities, by far the largest number of Theater Ballistic Missiles ever launched by the north in a single day. By all accounts, all six of these missiles worked, ... And they appeared to be accurate.”
- 33) In December 2002, a North Korean vessel carrying Scud missiles to Yemen was intercepted and inspected. It was pointed out that North Korea test-launched missiles in Iran and Pakistan after it exported the missiles and subsequently utilized the data from said tests.
- 34) Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962.
- 35) In North Korea, it seems that various military decisions are made by the National Defense Commission (Chairman Kim Jong Il), which has the ultimate military authority, and the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (corresponding to the Ministry of Defense in other countries) is controlled not by the cabinet but by the National Defense Commission.
- 36) Reportedly, North Korea has two types of special operation forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers’ Party. For example, the operations department of the Party is said to be in charge of transporting agents.
- 37) Covert operations by dispersed small units to infiltrate an enemy’s territory
- 38) The Supreme People’s Assembly is a decision-making organization composed of representatives selected in an election. The Constitution of North Korea refers to the Supreme People’s Assembly as the “highest organ of state power.” The assembly corresponds to Japan’s Diet.

- 39) For example, in April 2007, a large-scale military parade including the march of a missile unit was held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army with attendance of Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission.
- 40) In April 2007, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that North Korea's production of crop would be 4.07 million tons, approximately 0.1 million tons smaller than that of the previous year and that North Korea would need to import as much as 0.96 million tons.
- 41) Due to the implementation of these new measures, it is pointed out that the following problems are occurring or signs of such problems are observed in some areas: inflation accelerates due to the simultaneous raising of wages and commodity prices despite the unsolved shortage of commodities, the income gap widens, and dissatisfaction with the government increases as the people learn about the actual situation.
- 42) According to the Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 published in April 2007. The report states that the United States agreed to begin the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a state-sponsor of terrorism.
- 43) The previous treaty contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) was attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means. This provision, however, was excluded from the new treaty.
- 44) The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.-ROK joint defense system to deter wars in the Korean Peninsular and to perform effective joint operations in case of emergency. Under the U.S.-ROK joint defense system, the operational control authority over ROK forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in wartime.
- 45) The ROK dispatched a vessel to a joint search and rescue exercise conducted by the Russian Pacific Fleet in August 2003, which was a part of multilateral joint military exercise. The exercise performed in February 2004, therefore, was the first search and rescue exercise conducted jointly by the vessels of the ROK and Russia.
- 46) The Defense White Paper 2006 described North Korea as follows: "North Korea's conventional military capabilities, nuclear tests, weapons of mass destruction, and forward military deployment pose serious threats to our national security."
- 47) In January 2001, the ROK and the United States reached an agreement, and as a result, the upper limit of the range of the ROK's missiles was extended from 180 km, which had been fixed based on a former agreement between the two countries, to 300 km based on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The government of the ROK then announced new guidelines for its own missile development, production, and possession, and joined the MTCR in March 2001.
- 48) Although the "Foal Eagle" exercise used to take place every fall, it has been conducted in conjunction with "RSOI" since 2002.
- 49) Building of a harmonious society is said to be a process to solve social contradiction on a continuous basis. In October 2006, at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, the Resolution on Some Major Issues regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society was adopted.
- 50) The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)(published in February 2006)
- 51) The term "responsible stakeholder," since it was first used by then Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick in his speech made in New York in September 2005, has been frequently quoted in a variety of documents published by the U.S. government. For example, in the U.S. Department of State's Fact Sheet

- dated April 18, 2006, it is stated that “Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick has called on China to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community, working with the United States and other major nations to support the international system that has been such an instrumental part of China’s success.
- 52) Testimony of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission held in February 2007
 - 53) The Treaty states that both countries shall advance military confidence-building measures and reduction of forces in border areas; promote technical cooperation in military fields; and hold contacts and consultations when either of them recognizes a threat to peace.
 - 54) China, Russia, and four central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) established the SCO in June 2001. The organization aims at encouraging mutual cooperation in not only security but also politics, culture, energy, and other broad areas. Since the establishment of this organization, summit-level meetings have been held on a regular basis and the organization’s structure and functions have been enhanced by such measures as establishing a secretariat and the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS).
 - 55) Recent military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian countries include joint search and rescue exercise conducted for the first time by the Chinese and Thai Navies in December 2005, joint patrol conducted for the first time by the vessels of the Chinese and Vietnamese Navies in the Gulf of Tonkin in April 2006, and Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan’s visits to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore in April 2006.
 - 56) The leaders participating in the fifth SCO summit meeting held in July 2005 issued a statement that a deadline should be clearly set for the withdrawal of foreign forces stationed in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz.
 - 57) China traditionally adopted the strategy of “People’s War” based on the recognition that there was a possibility of world-scale war in the future. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla warfare using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place on a long-term basis, China has come to place importance on local wars over its territories and territorial waters since the first half of the 1980s. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, it started to implement measures to improve its ability of military operations, in order to win local wars under hi-tech conditions. In recent years, it upholds as its strategic objective to establish informationalized armed forces and win informationalized wars.
 - 58) For example, in China’s National Defense in 2006 published in December 2006, “opposing and containing the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan Dependence’ and their activities” is included in the country’s national defense policy.
 - 59) Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence published in the United States in January 2007 states as follows: “Beijing continues its rapid rate of military modernization, initiated in 1999. We assess that China’s aspirations for great power status, threat perceptions, and security strategy would drive this modernization effort even if the Taiwan problem were resolved.”
 - 60) China pursues modernization of its armed forces “in accordance with the state’s overall plan to realize modernization” and aims to modernize the country and its armed forces step by step by around 2020, which falls on the centenary of the Communist Party of China and by around 2050, which falls on the centenary of People’s Republic of China. China, for the modernization of the country, plans to “bring China into a well-off society of a higher level to the benefit of well over one billion people” and for the modernization of the armed forces, plans to “(lay a foundation by 2010 and) make major progress around 2020.” Also, China states that it will “bring the per capita GDP up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in the main” by around 2050 and “to basically reach the strategic goal

of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars.” (Constitution of the Communist Party of China revised in 2002 and China’s National Defense in 2006)

- 61) Simple conversion of national defense expenditures of countries into foreign currencies based on the market exchange rates does not always reflect the value in light of the country’s level of prices. If, however, China’s FY 2007 national defense budget is converted at one yuan = 15 yen into yen, the amount is equivalent to approximately 5208.5 billion yen, exceeding Japan’s national defense-related expenditures for FY 2007 (approximately 4781.8 billion yen).
- 62) The U.S. Defense Department’s Annual Report on Chinese Military Power (May 2007) estimates that China’s actual military-related spending for 2007 could be \$85 billion to \$125 billion, although its official defense budget for 2007 is approximately \$45 billion. The report points out as follows: “China’s published defense budget does not include large categories of expenditure, including expense for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military-related research and development, and China’s paramilitary forces.”
- 63) The People’s Armed Police Force is responsible for protecting facilities of the Party and the state, border patrol, maintaining security, implementing joint government-citizen projects, and conducting firefighting activities. According to China’s National Defense in 2002, these troops are to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defensive operations.
- 64) Responsible for economic construction in peacetime, and for combat support in time of war. China’s National Defense in 2002 states as follows: “Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in emergency rescue and disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.”
- 65) Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence published in the United States in January 2006 states as follows: “The Chinese are developing more capable long-range conventional strike systems and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads able to attack US carriers and airbases.
- 66) Since the 1980s, China has been purchasing aircraft carriers nominally for recycling scraps of iron and for using them at leisure facilities, specifically decommissioned Majestic-class aircraft carrier Melbourne made in the United Kingdom and Kiev-class aircraft carriers Minsk and Kiev made in the former Soviet Union. Subsequently in 2000, China purchased an uncompleted Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag from Ukraine and reportedly has been repairing it, including repainting. Also in 2006, it was reported that China was negotiating about the purchase of Russian-made Su-33 ship-based aircraft, which can be operated on board a Kuznetsov-class carrier.
- 67) The Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, which was published by the U.S. Department of Defense in May 2006, points out that the goal of the Chinese Air Force is “to develop a mobile, all-weather, day-night, low-altitude, over-water force that is capable and flexible enough to quickly perform multiple operational tasks and to project power beyond “first island chain.”
- 68) On September 9, 2005, a P-3C surveillance aircraft of the MSDF confirmed that five vessels in total, including one Sovremenny-class destroyer operated near the Kashi (Tianwaitian in Chinese) gas field in the East China Sea, and some of these vessels (a total of three including a Sovremenny-class destroyer) circled around the drilling facilities of the said gas field.
- 69) A US official presented the view that China has assumed a more confident and increasingly assertive posture” than before, and the anti-satellite weapon test in January 2007 and the Chinese Song-class submarine incident in October 2006 can be viewed in this context. (According to the testimony of Deputy

Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission held on February 1, 2007)

- 70) According to the national defense report published by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan in 2006
- 71) The economic growth rate was 6.7% in 2006.
- 72) The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, formulated in 1997, was revised in January 2000. This revision was made in response to changed circumstances, including NATO enlargement, air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO's announcement of its New Strategic Concept, and the emergence of Islamic extremist groups in and around Russia.
- 73) A change can be seen in the Russian stance on NATO enlargement since the National Security Concept was first developed. In recent years, President Putin and other high government officials have emphasized the importance of promoting a cooperative relationship with NATO, while repeatedly expressing concerns over NATO enlargement. In April 2005, Russia and NATO signed a status of forces agreement allowing the transit of troops through each other's territory.
- 74) The following issues are pointed out as additional threats to Russia: attempts to weaken Russia's position as a core nation in a multipolar world, moves to weaken the integration process of the CIS, and demands for Russian territory.
- 75) The following operations are listed as other peacetime operations: preventing or intercepting subversive acts, maintaining and using the readiness of nuclear deterrent capabilities, conducting peacemaking operations under the mandate of the United Nations or CIS, and preventing emergencies and recovering the damage.
- 76) Troops with high degree of combat readiness. Troops were reorganized in the reduction of military strength after the launch of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, and military personnel were concentrated in the troops so that they can immediately take action as combat-ready troops in the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a small conflict.
- 77) In November 2005, then Defense Minister Ivanov said that Russia would decrease the number of military personnel from 1,134,800 to 1,100,000 by 2011. Subsequently in May 2006, President Putin said that Russia would aim to reduce the number to an appropriate level of one million through spontaneous retirement of military personnel.
- 78) In accordance with the 1997 presidential decree, the Missile-Space Defense Unit of the Air Defense Force responsible for operating anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and the Space Force responsible for the launch and control of space flight objects were integrated into the Strategic Missile Force, a military service in charge of ICBMs. However, a presidential decree in 2002 established a new Space Force and a new Strategic Force to launch ICBMs as branches of the military by integrating the former Military Space Force and the former Missile-Space Defense Unit in the Strategic Missile Force by the end of May 2002. As a result, the Russian armed forces have three services: ground, naval, and air; as well as three independent strategic branches: missile, space, and airborne branches.
- 79) In April 2007, President Putin said that professional servicemen would account for two-thirds of the armed force in his annual presidential message.
- 80) The national defense budget for FY 2007 increased by approximately 23% over the previous fiscal year on a nominal basis.
- 81) Military cooperation between the two countries, which started with confidence building, has been developing into a state that envisages actual joint actions. For example, command post exercises codenamed "Torgau 2004" were started between the U.S. ground forces stationed in Europe and Russian ground forces in 2004, and "Torgau 2005," which included field training, was also launched in 2005.

- 82) The United States, in its Quadrennial Defense Review published in February 2006, states “The United States remains concerned about the erosion of democracy in Russia, the curtailment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and freedom of the press, the centralization of political powers and limits on economic freedom.” President Putin, on the other hand, criticized the U.S. diplomatic attitude for imposing its policies on other nations at the Munich Security Conference held by a private organization in February 2007.
- 83) Some CIS countries want to maintain their distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova formed a regional alliance named GUAM by combining the initial letters of the member countries, and have been following pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia.(Uzbekistan joined the GUAM in 1999 after withdrawing from the CIS Collective Security Treaty, but withdrew from the alliance in 2005.)
- 84) In August 2001, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan provided one troop (battalion or smaller unit) each to form the Collective Rapid Deployment Force that was 1,000 to 1,300 strong. The command is located in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyz. In May 2004, Tajikistan provided another two troops and Russia and Kazakhstan provided one more each. As a result, there are now nine battalions with 4,500 personnel.
- 85) The United States and others have been using the Manas base for antiterrorism operations, which is located in the vicinity of Kant Air Base.
- 86) The following nine items have been named as common interests: (1) the fight against terrorism, (2) crisis management, (3) the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their conveyance, (4) measures to increase arms control and confidence, (5) theater missile defense, (6) search and rescue at sea, (7) military cooperation and defense reform, (8) responses to civilian emergency situations, and (9) new threats and challenges.
- 87) President Putin has expressed Russia’s intention to join the East Asia Summit as an official member.
- 88) Russian Foreign Policy Concept (published in July 2000)
- 89) From 2003 to 2004, Russia concluded contracts with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam to sell its Su-27 and Su-30 jet fighters. In addition, Russia signed a contract in January 2004 to sell its aircraft carrier to India. In 2006, the country concluded agreements to sell its Su-30 jet fighters with Algeria and Venezuela, and some were already sold to the countries. It seems that Russia is promoting export to countries other than its traditional trade partners.
- 90) At the Kananaskis Summit held in June 2002, the G8 countries decided to provide up to \$20 billion over next ten years to assist Russia in disposing of chemical weapons, dismantling decommissioned submarines, and fissionable materials.
- 91) Some divisions and brigades are designated as permanent combat-ready troops. Others are through to be extremely deficient in the number of staff, although they have sufficient equipment.
- 92) In 2000, the nuclear submarine Kursk of the Northern Fleet sank in the Barents Sea in an accident. In 2005, a small submersible vessel became incapable of surfacing off the coast of Kamchatka Peninsula. Also, aircraft and helicopter accidents often took place.
- 93) Estimated number of military personnel within the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Districts
- 94) For the recent examples of increasing air force capabilities, Vietnam introduced Su-30 fighters and Indonesia introduced Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2004. Singapore signed a contract with the United States in 2005 to purchase F-15 fighters. Furthermore, Malaysia plans to introduce Su-30 fighters within 2007. To develop naval force capabilities for example, Malaysia, which had not possessed any submarines, signed a contract to purchase Scorpene-class submarines with France in 2002 and Singapore signed a contract to purchase Vastergotland-class submarines with Sweden in 2005.

- 95) The ReCAAP is designed to enhance cooperation among maritime security agencies of the countries involved through the establishment of a piracy-related information sharing system and a cooperation network among the countries. Among 16 countries that participated in the negotiations, there are 14 signatories (Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, China, Republic of Korea, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) except Indonesia and Malaysia (as of November 2006).
- 96) Thailand, the United States, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and 9 additional countries participated in this exercise conducted in May 2007.
- 97) Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), which was a status based on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nunn Amendment of 1987, allows designated countries to receive benefits in military areas such as eligibility to have U.S.-owned military equipment. A status of MNNA also represents significant implications that the United States places importance on its close military cooperation with MNNA countries.
- 98) IMET, started in 1976, provides military personnel of U.S. allies and friends with opportunities to study and receive training at U.S. military education facilities. The United States has suspended IMET to Indonesia since 1999 as sanction measures against the suppression by the Indonesian authorities of the East Timor independence movement.
- 99) As of March 2007, the strength of UNMIT is 1588 personnel in total, including 33 military observers and 1555 police. In addition, 1161 personnel such as civilians are deployed.
- 100) The draft of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was proposed at an ASEAN-China officials meeting discussion in 1999 and consultations have been continued at working level meetings since then. The draft, however, has yet to be adopted because there is a great difference in the countries' opinions on the details.
- 101) The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea clarifies general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea. However, this declaration contains political targets only and is not legally binding. Therefore, it is mentioned in the declaration that the parties concerned will continue the efforts to develop the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which will provide detailed activities and be legally binding.
- 102) The country has Islamic population exceeding 100 million, which is estimated to be the world's second largest next to Indonesia.
- 103) President Bush called India a natural partner of the United States.
- 104) In cooperation with India, the United States intends to provide India with capabilities and technologies required for the country to improve its defense capabilities to the appropriate level, including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighters.
- 105) The U.S. and Indian air forces conducted joint exercises in November 2005 and the U.S. and Indian ground forces carried out joint exercises in January 2006. Also, the Indian air forces participated in a multilateral joint exercise organized by the U.S. air force in July 2004. Furthermore, the joint naval exercise Malabar 07-1 was carried out off the coast of Okinawa in the East China Sea in April 2007.
- 106) For the solution of the pending border issue, the countries agreed to each appoint a special representative. Also, in the declaration, India recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.
- 107) In the agreement, China admits that Sikkim belongs to India. Also, the two countries agreed to continue efforts for the early settlement of the pending border issue.
- 108) Both countries agreed to hold regular summit meetings and established the target of doubling the bilateral trade amount to \$40 billion by 2010. They also signed an agreement on such issues as investment protection and mutual establishment of new Consulates General.

- 109) In November 2004, India conducted a test launch of the missile on board.
- 110) The Indian Prime Minister's special envoy, Shyam Saran referred to President Putin's expression of intention to cooperation in civilian nuclear activities that implementation would be after the revision of the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
- 111) It is estimated that weapons from the former Soviet Union or Russia account for about 70 percent of those possessed by India.
- 112) The two countries signed the document concerning the joint development project of mid-size multipurpose transport aircraft and the fifth generation fighter. Also, study was made on the proposal to provide India with additional T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighters, and Mil-17 helicopters within the framework of the agreement already concluded. It was confirmed to enhance the production capabilities of the Brahmos cruise missiles now under development jointly by the two countries as well as to aim to develop the air launch version of the missile. An intergovernmental agreement was concluded concerning the contract for licensed production of engines for MiG-29 fighters. It was also agreed that the two countries conduct joint antiterrorism military exercises in Russian territory in April and September 2007.
- 113) The joint exercise Indra has been conducted every other year since 2003.
- 114) At the same time, India signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN and the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.
- 115) In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Pakistan to meet with President Musharraf and both agreed to strengthen the military and strategic cooperation and expand the economic cooperation including the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). President Hu Jintao expressed the intention to continue cooperation in civilian nuclear activities. The two countries also agreed on the joint development of air force aircraft including the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).
- 116) Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out operations to mop out terrorists in the border areas of Afghanistan. Also, it started to dispatch warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. Appreciating these supports from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a major non-NATO ally.
- 117) At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India's nuclear test were lifted.
- 118) Regarding the possibility of extending cooperation to Pakistan in the nuclear energy issue, President Bush only referred to the differences between Pakistan and India in terms of energy needs and history. In response, Pakistan stated that it was important for the United States to treat India and Pakistan equally in order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.
- 119) In September 2005, President Musharraf reportedly demonstrated his recognition that the Kahn network had probably exported a dozen of ultracentrifuges to North Korea.
- 120) In March 2006, some including a U.S. diplomat were killed in a suicide car bombing targeting the U.S. Consulate General in Karachi.
- 121) The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir territorial issue. India's territorial claim over Kashmir is based on the document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through the referendum in accordance with the 1948 U.N. resolution.
- 122) Also, in August 2005, the two countries agreed on the prior notification of ballistic missile testing and on the establishment of a hotline between their Vice Foreign Ministers.

- 123) India and Pakistan have said that they will make efforts to reach a national consensus to sign the CTBT.
- 124) Following the nuclear test, India expressed concern about the nuclear environment in India's neighborhood. On the other hand, Pakistan gave the reason of the nuclear test as India's nuclear threat.
- 125) Pakistan conducted the test-launch of the Babur (Hataf VII) cruise missile also in March 2007.
- 126) Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who observed the launch of the Ghauri missile, stated that Pakistan can be justifiably proud of its defence capability and the reliability of its nuclear deterrence.
- 127) Trilateral security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. However, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand's non-nuclear policy.
- 128) This consultation has been held every year since the United States suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand in 1986.
- 129) The participation in the Joint Strike Fighter Program was decided in June 2002. The expansion and improvement the U.S.-Australia joint training facilities were agreed upon in Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations in July 2004.
- 130) Joint exercises between the two countries had been suspended from September 1999 until April 2005 due to differences in their response to the East Timor issue.
- 131) Referred to as non-Article 5 operations.
- 132) In the NATO Summit, the enhancement of the ISAF was an issue of discussion and it was pointed out that there were split opinions on matters such as the increase of military force and the restriction of the areas of deployment imposed on by the respective countries. Also, a policy was launched to strengthen cooperation with non-NATO countries on a case by case basis.
- 133) The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 made a decision enabling access to NATO's assets and capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union (WEU). Most of the WEU's roles and duties were thereafter handed over to the EU. Accordingly, the NATO Washington Summit Meeting in April 1999 again decided to give the EU access to NATO's assets and capabilities. The decision is called Berlin Plus. In December 2002, a permanent arrangement on the said decision was made between NATO and the EU.
- 134) These are termed Petersburg operations, and comprise combat unit missions in crisis management, including (1) humanitarian support and rescue/relief, (2) peacekeeping, and (3) peace building.
- 135) The tactical and strategic forces of Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic were consolidated into a single force (Allied Command Operations), and Allied Command Transformation was created to oversee reform of NATO's military capabilities and improvement to interoperability.
- 136) NATO concluded a cooperation treaty with East European countries and other non-NATO countries of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to build confidence and maintain interoperability.
- 137) The United Kingdom defines the capability to perform operations as that to perform a total of three operations at the same time: one large scale operation under the United States leadership as in the Gulf War, and two small to medium operations under NATO leadership as in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.
- 138) Since Vanguard class nuclear-powered submarines now in operation are expected to decommission starting in the early 2020s, the British government studied on whether or not to maintain nuclear deterrent and consequently published this white paper. In March 2007, the House of Commons adopted the motion submitted by the government to support the policy of the white paper.
- 139) The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well organized military formations in intensive operations, which are implemented multilaterally by NATO combat readiness troops or EU Battle group units, with

the goal of providing foundation to peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that have a certain level of military formations and perform peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the target areas, including the management of command, educational, and training organizations.

- 140) France is now operating one nuclear-powered submarine.
- 141) NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) member countries as of 1990
- 142) Several problems must be resolved before it goes into effect, including the fact that the three new Baltic members of NATO have not concluded the CFE Treaty.
- 143) Efforts are made to disclose military intelligence, restrict certain military operations, and promote military communication in order to prevent accidental armed conflicts and build confidence between states. In general, these are referred to as confidence building measures.
- 144) Later, the Vienna Document 1999 was adopted in 1999, adding the following to the former documents: promotion of multilateral and bilateral measures for regional confidence building; provision of information on military exchanges; and restriction on the implementation of exercises based on the number of armored infantry combat vehicles and the scale of artillery units.
- 145) Aerial inspections are conducted by unarmed aircraft equipped with predefined types of sensors, in accordance with flight plans proposed by the inspecting nation and accepted by the country being inspected. Any signatory can access data collected through the inspections.
- 146) The number of U.N. personnel killed in operations such as PKOs was 104 in 2006, and the total thus far has reached 2,355 (at the end of March 2007); it is desired that measures to ensure the safety of personnel engaged in such activities as PKOs be taken promptly.

Part II

The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy



Prime Minister Abe delivers a speech at the ceremony in commemorating the transition to a ministry



The first Defense Minister Kyuma receives salute of the guards of honor



Ceremony to present a certificate of appreciation to the designer of the logo



Sign of the Defense Ministry on the gate post of the head offices in Ichigaya

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

Chapter 1
Issues in the International
Community

Chapter 2
National Defense Policies of
Countries

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Defense Policy

[Main Points]

- Measures to ensure Japan's security
- The constitution and the right of self-defense
- The basics of Japan's defense policy

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-Up of Defense Capability

[Main Points]

- Basic concepts for formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines
- Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines
- Defense Build-Up Program for FY 2007
- Mid-Term Defense Program
- Defense-related expenditures

Chapter 3 Transition to Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation Activities as SDF's Primary Mission

[Main Points]

- History of the MOD/SDF – expansion of the duties/roles required of the MOD/SDF
- Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission
- Organization of the MOD/SDF

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Efforts by Japan

Chapter 1
Operations of Self-Defense
Forces for Defense of Japan,
Disaster Relief and Civil
Protection

Cooperation with Allies

Chapter 2
Strengthening of the Japan-
U.S. Security Arrangements

Cooperation with International Community

Chapter 3
Improvement of the
International Security
Environment

Ties with Japanese Citizens

Chapter 4
Citizens of Japan, and the Ministry
of Defense and the SDF

Chapter 1

The Basic Concepts on Japan's Defense Policy

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security

Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy



Prime Minister Abe replies to salute from the unit displaying a fleet review

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security

Peace and security are indispensable for the prosperity of a nation and its people. A country also requires independence in order to determine its own political, economic, and social directions, and to preserve its culture, traditions, and values.

Peace, security, and independence do not happen of their own accord. As countries become increasingly interdependent on one another, attaining peace, security and independence requires a comprehensive approach that includes diplomatic measures, cooperation with allies, as well as the nation's own defense system. As Japan is heavily dependent on other countries for many resources and its development and prosperity depends on free trade, sustained peace and cooperation with the international community is of vital importance.

Japan is pursuing both regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and global cooperation through organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.), while strengthening bilateral cooperation with other countries through such measures as the Japan-U.S. Alliance¹. Japan is thus working to prevent and resolve disputes and hostilities, encourage economic development, promote arms control and disarmament, and increase mutual understanding and trust.

Japan has also been making the country itself more secure, by making society more stable, fostering a willingness to defend the country, and through various economic and educational measures. The objective is to avoid being unguarded that could lead to foreign aggression.

In today's world, however, such measures may not deter real aggression by an outside force, and in the worst case, might not be sufficient to repel an attack on Japan. It is indeed difficult to guarantee national security purely by non-military means.

Defense capability is in itself an expression of a nation's will and ability to repel aggression. It provides the ultimate guarantee of a country's security, and cannot easily be replaced by other means. Therefore, the Government has been building its defense capabilities and upholds the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, thereby improving the credibility of such arrangements and bolstering its defense measures. In addition to protecting Japan, defense capabilities have become increasingly important for peacekeeping activities, reconstruction assistance, and other efforts to improve international security.

Recognizing the important role played by its defense capabilities, Japan will continue to do its utmost to protect the nation's security, while working to achieve security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.



Prime Minister Abe delivers a speech at the 2006 commencement ceremony of the National Defense Academy

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

National Security Council (NSC)

In his General Policy Speech to the 165th extraordinary session of the Diet on September 29 last year, Prime Minister Abe declared his intention to develop a system for strengthening the headquarters function of the Prime Minister's Office with regard to diplomacy and security.

Under this policy, the government organized the Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the Prime Minister's Office Regarding National Security in November last year, whose members include the Prime Minister (Chairman), Chief Cabinet Secretary, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security Issues, and experts from outside the government, and began to discuss specific measures.

The council compiled and submitted a report in February this year, and based on this report, the Bill to Amend the Security Council Establishment Law was drawn up mainly to review the current Security Council of Japan radically and establish the National Security Council (Japanese version of the U.S. National Security Council). The bill was adopted at the Cabinet meeting held on April 4, and submitted to the Diet.

The major proposals of the bill are as follows:

- 1 Change of the name of the council
 - The name of the council will be changed from the "Security Council of Japan" to the "National Security Council."
- 2 Review of the scope of deliberation
 - The scope of deliberation will be expanded to include basic diplomatic and defense policies for enhancing Japan's national security.
 - However, the matters for which consultation with the current Security Council of Japan is obligatory will be maintained without any change.
- 3 Review of the deliberation method
 - A new framework in which the four ministers—Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, and Chief Cabinet Secretary—will discuss matters related to national security will be developed.
 - Any matter for which consultation with the current Security Council of Japan is obligatory will be discussed, as in the Security Council of Japan, by the nine member ministers.
 - The Chairman (Prime Minister) can decide at his/her sole discretion to allow other Cabinet members than the four/nine ministers of the council to participate in a deliberation.
- 4 Establishment of the expert meeting system
 - A new system in which a related Cabinet member will investigate and deliberate a particular national security matter will be established.
- 5 Special Advisor to the Prime Minister
 - New provisions regarding the participation of the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister in deliberations will be added.
- 6 Secretariat
 - A secretariat responsible for administrative work of the National Security Council will be established, and Secretary General and other personnel will be positioned.

The National Security Council is expected to provide a system to consolidate the government's security efforts even more efficiently.

Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Since the end of World War II, Japan has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation far from the miseries of war. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 renounces war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerence by the state. Nonetheless, for Japan to remain an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan's inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. (See Reference 8)

Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, the Government, as part of its exclusively national defense oriented policy under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

2. The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1. The Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability.

The specific limit may vary with the prevailing international situation, the technologies available, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided according to annual budgets and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a "war potential" that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan's overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level and so are not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2. Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense

The Government has long interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions are met:

- 1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
- 2) When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right; and
- 3) When the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level.

3. Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised

The use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense.

4. The Right of Collective Self-Defense

International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit of self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible. (See Reference 9)

5. The Right of Belligerence

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerence of the State shall not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerence” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory.

On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon an enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerence, even though the actual actions appear to be no different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and so is not permissible.



Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Kimura performs an inspection march at the ceremony for his arrival to the post

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security

Prime Minister Abe has been advocating the need to reconstruct a legal basis for security that befits the current situations and proves feasible at a time of major changes faced by Japan’s security environment.

As part of efforts to meet this need, it was announced on April 25 this year that the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security would be organized with the purpose of examining and studying on the basis of typified, individual, specific cases how to organize the relationship between Japan’s security policy and the Constitution, including the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The first meeting of the council was held on May 18 this year.

The council will compile the results of the study in a report by around autumn this year, and submit it to Prime Minister Abe.

Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy

1. National Defense Policy

Under the Constitution, Japan has adhered to its National Defense Policy, which was adopted by the National Defense Council² and approved by the Cabinet in 1957. (See Reference 10)

The National Defense Policy defines policies to establish the foundation of security through international harmonization and peace activities, as well as ensuring the stability of society, and then to establish efficient defense capabilities and to maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

2. Other Basic Policies

Under the National Defense Policy, Japan has been building a modest defense capability under the Constitution purely for defense purposes without becoming a military power that could threaten other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

1. Exclusively Defense Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense oriented policy means that Japan will not employ defensive force unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such a case, only the minimum force necessary to defend itself may be used. Furthermore, only the minimum defense forces necessary for self-defense should be retained and used. This exclusively defense-oriented policy is a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.

2. Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the term “military power.” For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten the security of other countries means that Japan will not possess more military force than is necessary for self-defense and that could pose a threat to other countries.

3. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are that Japan: will not possess nuclear weapons, will not produce nuclear weapons, and will not allow nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed national policy.

Japan is prohibited from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons also under the Atomic Energy Basic Law³. In addition, Japan ratified the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, is not permitted to produce or acquire nuclear weapons⁴.

4. Ensuring Civilian Control

Civilian control of the military means the precedence of political will over the military in a democratic state, and hence democratic political control over the military.

Learning lessons from World War II, Japan has adopted the following systems of uncompromising civilian control that are entirely different from those under the former Constitution⁵. Civilian control ensures that the SDF is operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Japanese people are represented in the Diet, which makes legislative and budgetary decisions on matters such as the authorized number of SDF Regular Personnel and principal institutions of the SDF. It also approves defense operations.

As part of its general administrative functions, the Cabinet has entire authority related to defense. The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the Cabinet to be civilians. The Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, is the supreme commander of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control over SDF activities. The Security Council of Japan⁶ within the Cabinet discusses important defense matters. (See Reference 64 • 67)

At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is in charge of administrative work related to national defense and controls the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in planning political measures and administration by the Senior Vice-Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries⁷.

As mentioned above, the military is under civilian control. The success of the system depends on ongoing political and administrative efforts, as well as a keen interest among Japanese citizens in defense issues.



Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kitagawa (on left) meets with Secretary of State for National Defense and Sea Affairs of Portugal Gomes

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Strengthening Intelligent Capabilities of the Prime Minister's Office

The close collaboration between the policy-side and the intelligence-side is essential to strengthen the Prime Minister's Office capability regarding national security.

Based on this understanding, the Study Group on Intelligence Function Enhancement was established last December with the Chief Cabinet Secretary as the head of the group, and "the Basic Concepts for Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities of the Prime Minister's Office" was announced on February 28 this year after discussions within the government.

The government is planning to determine specific measures based on the concepts within about the next six months.

"The Basic Concepts for Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities of the Prime Minister's Office" can be summarized as follows:

- While the separation of policy and intelligence will be maintained, the Cabinet Intelligence Committee meeting, the Director of Cabinet Intelligence, and each intelligence services will collaborate with each other to organically connect policy and intelligence.
- Technical and organized means, methods and setup for external human intelligence will be studied and realized as soon as possible.
- The current Joint Intelligence Committee meetings will be upgraded functionally to serve as the place where the intelligence community combines their wisdom. The intelligence community will carry out all source analysis at these meetings and other occasions to provide information needed by the policy-making function, and promote information sharing.
- Information analysis experts (Cabinet Information Analyst (tentative name)) will be positioned at the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office to draft intelligence assessment reports.
- Information protection measures, including the establishment of a security clearance system and other unified government standards, need to be taken.

○ There is also a need to discuss new legislation for the protection of classified information.

The Ministry of Defense, which plays an important role in the intelligence community, continues to actively provide the Prime Minister's office with information necessary for security in close collaboration with other government agencies.

Notes

- 1) The Japan-U.S. Alliance means the relationship between Japan and the United States in which they, as nations that share fundamental values and interests, work closely with each other on political, economic, and security issues, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
- 2) The function of this Council was taken over by the Security Council of Japan in 1986.
- 3) Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.”
- 4) Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes ... not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”
- 5) The Cabinet’s control over military matters was limited.
- 6) Members of the Security Council are the Prime Minister (chairman); Minister designated pursuant to Article 9 of the Cabinet Law (Minister of State pre-designated to perform duties of the Prime Minister temporarily when the Prime Minister is absent, involved in an accident, or in a similar situation); Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of Defense; the Chief Cabinet Secretary; and Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission. See Fig. III-1-1-2.
- 7) In addition, to help the Minister of Defense to successfully handle administrative work related to national defense and to reliably manage the SDF, a system to assist the Minister has been established. See Chapter 3, Section 3 for the organization of the SDF, including assistance to the Minister.

Chapter 2

The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-Up of Defense Capability

Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating National Defense Program Guidelines

Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines

Section 3. Mid-Term Defense Program

Section 4. Defense Build-Up Program for FY 2007

Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures



Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating National Defense Program Guidelines

The National Defense Program Guidelines show basic principles of Japan's security policy and the basic guidelines of Japan's defense capability in the future including significance and roles of the defense capability as well as the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major defense equipment to be built up that are based on these principles and the guidelines.

The National Defense Program Guidelines were formulated twice in the past, once in FY 1976 as the National Defense Program Guidelines in after FY 1977¹ (NDPG 1976) and another in 1995 as the National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 1996² (NDPG 1995). The current guidelines were formulated in 2004 as the National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2005 (NDPG 2004) in order to respond adequately to the international security climate after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. This section will explain about the background, circumstances and the basic concepts of formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines. (See Reference 11)

1. Background of Formulating the NDPG

1. Changes in International Situation and Diversifying Roles of Military Capability

After the end of the Cold War, interdependence of states has been deepened and expanded, and with the advancement of international coordination and cooperation, the likelihood of a global armed conflict has become slimmer even in comparison with that at the time of formulating NDPG 1995.


On the other hand, complex and diversified regional conflicts have occurred due to territorial, religious and ethnic issues. Furthermore, responses to new threats and diverse contingencies have become an urgent task for respective nations and the international community including illegal activities and emergency situations such as international terrorism as observed in the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (the 9/11 terrorist attacks), proliferation and transfer of weapons of mass destructions and ballistic missiles, and piracy.

Against these backgrounds, to prevent inter-state conflicts, it remains to be important to maintain a conventional form of deterrence. However, against non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations, the approach of keeping a conventional form of deterrence does not necessarily work effectively.

In addition, it has become more difficult for a single country to resolve security environment issues, and stabilizing the international security environment has become a common interest for every country. Therefore, each country has been making a broad range of efforts to resolve those issues by utilizing various means including military capabilities, thorough coordination of various measures and with international collaboration. In this context, the roles of military capabilities have become diversified to include prevention of conflicts and assistance of reconstruction in addition to their traditional role of deterrence and response to armed conflicts.

Under such circumstances, the United States has been engaged in a variety of activities such as war on terror and activities to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction while giving consideration to international collaboration. Depending on the nature of these activities, there have been some instances in which international cooperative frameworks have been established in the form of "Coalition" that differ from traditional alliance relations. (See Fig. II-2-1-1)

Fig. II-2-1-1 Characteristics of New Security Environment



In the midst of these global changes, the countries in areas surrounding Japan are characterized by diversity in ethnic groups, religions, political systems, and economic strength; the area also features several major countries having a complex structure of tangled interests as well as disputes over unification, territorial issues, and maritime interests. Many countries are also modernizing and improving their military capabilities. In particular, North Korea is engaged in the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and maintenance and reinforcement of its asymmetric military capabilities (large-scale special forces, and others). In addition, China continues to grow steadily as a major power in the region both politically and economically. In the military sphere, the country has been modernizing its nuclear/missile forces as well as its naval/air military capabilities, and seeking to promote space development and expand the scope of its activities at sea. Continued attention must also be paid to these trends in the future.

2. Remarkable Developments of Scientific Technologies

Technological advancements led by the information and communications technologies have not simply sparked spectacular improvements in combat capabilities, but brought about fundamental transformation of military powers and have had considerable impact on the defense strategies of each country.

3. Expansion of the SDF Activities and the Improvement of Japan's Emergency Response Mechanism

The SDF's activities have been diversifying and expanding to include responses to the incidents with suspicious boats, nuclear accidents, various natural disasters, illegal acts, emergency situations, and international activities including not only U.N. peacekeeping operations but also cooperation in the international efforts for preventing and eradicating international terrorism as well as the effort for reconstructing the nation of Iraq. Through the activities being undertaken in response to these situations, the coordination with relevant agencies such as police and local communities has been reinforced.

4. Characteristics of Japan

Close to major powers of the Eurasian continent, Japan is located at a strategically important position for the maritime traffic extending from the northeastern part of the continent to the Pacific Ocean. Its territory consists of a long and thin crescent-shaped archipelago with long coast lines and numerous small islands. Japan's large population is confined to a vary narrow territory, its industries and population are concentrated mainly in urban areas, and a large number of important facilities essential to economic development are in coastal areas, all of which can be considered in terms of topology as vulnerabilities. Due to the geographical, geological and climate conditions, Japan is also prone to natural disasters of various kinds.

In addition, stability in the international security environment is essential for Japan's stability and development which are based on a market-based economic system and free trade. Above all, Japan depends on imports for many resources it uses as the country relies on the Middle East for nearly 90% of crude oil it consumes, and the maintenance of the security of sea traffic, and stable utilization of the seas are extremely important for the country.

2. Circumstances for Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines

In light of the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan as described above, the current National Defense Program Guidelines were formulated in December 2004. Circumstances for formulating the current National Defense Program Guidelines are shown in Fig. II-2-1-2.

Fig. II-2-1-2 Major Study Made before Formulation of National Defense Program Guidelines

<p>Study made within Defense Agency (then) (Defense Posture Review Board) (Sept. 2001–Dec. 2004)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Based on changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, the Defense Posture Review Board was set up under the Minister of State for Defense. The board studied matters related to how Japan's defense capability should be in the future from wider viewpoints. ○ Based on that study, the Government at its Cabinet meeting in December 2003 approved a policy "on Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures." The policy explicitly called for Japan to review its defense capability in the future so that the country can effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies¹ and can proactively and on its own initiative undertake activities aimed at bringing about peace and stability in the international community. ○ At the Cabinet meeting on the same day, the Government decided to formulate new National Defense Program Guidelines by the end of 2004².
<p>Study made at the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (Apr. 2004–Oct. 2004)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities was set up under the Prime Minister to study from wider viewpoints and comprehensively how the Government as a whole should do in regard to Japan's national security and defense capabilities. The council was designed to collect views and opinions from experts on security, economic and other fields. ○ In its report³, the council specified an Integrated Security Strategy, an idea which calls for appropriately combining three approaches ((1) Japan's own efforts (2) collaboration with allies (3) collaboration with the international community) in order to achieve two objectives set for Japan's national security ((1) defense of Japan (2) prevention of threats through the improvement of the international security environment). ○ On Japan's defense capabilities in the future, the council proposed the country pursue "Multi-Functional and Flexible Defense Force," a defense capability in which various defense functions (response to terrorism, response to ballistic-missile attacks and international collaboration) become possible through flexible use of defense capabilities.
<p>Study made at the Security Council of Japan (Oct. 2004–Dec. 2004)</p> <p>Based on a Cabinet approval on "on Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" and a report compiled by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, the Security Council of Japan discussed from wider viewpoints and comprehensively how Japan's defense capabilities should be. On December 10, 2004, the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet approved new National Defense Program Guidelines.</p>

Notes: 1. Under the Cabinet approval, new threats and diverse contingencies are defined as "increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, new threats including activities by international terrorist organizations and others, and diverse situations in which peace and security are affected."

2. (See document)

3. Report by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (Chairman: Hiroshi Araki, adviser of Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampbouei/dai13/13siryou.pdf>

3. The Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Two Objectives and Three Approaches

The purpose of Japan's security is to protect peace, independence and the territory of Japan, to maintain the national system based on the freedom and democracy, and to protect the lives and property of the nation.

With the establishment of the trend toward attaching importance to collaboration and cooperation in the international community and also from a Japanese standpoint of playing a suitable role for the position of our country to gain the trust of the international community, Japan must independently and proactively make its own efforts for peace and stability of the international community, which are a prerequisite for Japan's peace and independence.

On that occasion, because security threats today are unpredictable, complicated and diverse, it is important for the government to make swift and appropriate response through systematic collaboration of the security-related measures such as those of public security, economy and intelligence, in addition to the promotion of diplomatic efforts in peace time and effective operation of defense capabilities, to cooperate with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement and to promote cooperation with the relevant countries and international organizations such as the United Nations.

Based on the perception as mentioned above, the National Defense Program Guidelines define the following two objectives for security:

- 1) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage, and
- 2) to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place.

In order to achieve the two objectives listed above, three approaches—"Japan's own efforts," "cooperation with alliance partners" and "cooperation with the international community"—are to be combined in an integrated manner. (See Fig. II-2-1-3)

Fig. II-2-1-3 Relations between Two Objectives and Three Approaches

○ Two objectives for Japan's security


1. To prevent or repel threats from directly reaching Japan
 2. To prevent threats from reaching Japan by improving the international security environment



○ Three approaches for achieving the objectives



Integrated combination



Against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and at the same time will play an active role in the efforts for disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons, and missiles.

2. New Concept for Defense Capability (Shifting emphasis from “deterrent effects” to “response capability”)

(1) Reviewing the Basic Defense Force Concept

With regard to Japan’s defense capability, NDPG 1976 presented the Basic Defense Force Concept. This concept is designed to enable Japan to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capability as an independent state lest it turns into a power vacuum and becomes a destabilizing factor in the region surrounding Japan rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat. NDPG 1995 basically followed this concept.

The Basic Defense Force Concept was reviewed for the following two reasons in line with changes in the security environment surrounding Japan.

a. Effective Response to Contingencies

Under the Basic Defense Force Concept, a focus is placed on the idea of preventing invasion by possessing an adequate scale of defense capability in addition to relying on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Behind the idea is deterrent effect being generated due to a country having defense capability. However, the new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and can occur unexpectedly, and conventional deterrent effects, which derive from the presence of defense force, do not necessarily work effectively. Therefore, the defense capabilities in the future are strongly expected to have ability meant to prevent such threats from surfacing, and to have ability to enable effective response to various contingencies and to minimize damage when such events occur.

b. Proactive Efforts, on Japan’s Own Initiative, for International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Basic Defense Force Concept is based on the assumption that while it is internationally recognized that the efforts for stable international relationship will continue in spite of the existence of unpredictable and uncertain elements, Japan will not turn into a power vacuum and become a destabilizing factor for the surrounding region. Meanwhile, mutually cooperative and interdependent relationship among nations has been advancing in the current international community, and the new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult for one nation to resolve.

Under these circumstances, Japan, in order to ensure its security, must proactively participate in international collaborative activities for the improvement of the international security environment (international peace cooperation activities) on its own initiative by utilizing its defense capabilities.

In other words, it has become difficult to build defense capabilities based solely on Japan’s Basic Defense Force Concept that focuses on the defense of Japan by not turning into a power vacuum and becoming a destabilizing factor for the surrounding region.

(2) Multifunctional, Flexible and Effective Defense Capabilities

With regard to the future defense capabilities, the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the effective portion of the Basic Defense Force Concept shall be succeeded³ under the new security environment, and with these capabilities Japan shall be able to respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies effectively while proactively participating in the international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative.

While expected roles of the defense capability are becoming diverse, decline of young population with dwindling child birthrates and dramatic increase of severity in Japan’s fiscal conditions need to be considered as we plan to build the future defense capabilities.

Based on this viewpoint, Japan's future defense capability needs to be equipped with high responsiveness, mobility, flexibility and multi-purpose functionality, and supported by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the trend of military technology standard, so that it can become "multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities" that can effectively respond to various contingencies through flexible operation of SDF units and defense equipment with multi-functionalities.

Thus Japan's defense capability is required to shift its emphasis from pursuing conventional deterrence effects to acquiring abilities to respond to various contingencies at home and abroad.

Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines

This section will explain about Japan's basic security policy, its vision for the future defense capability and specific mechanisms for its defense capabilities that are stipulated under the National Defense Program Guidelines.

1. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

As described earlier, there are two objectives for Japan's security: to prevent any threats from reaching Japan or repel them; and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan.

Japan will achieve these objectives by combining "Japan's own efforts," "cooperation with alliance partners" and "cooperation with the international community" in an integrated manner.

1. Japan's Own Efforts

Japan's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts. Based on this recognition, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will make its utmost efforts, by utilizing all available means, to prevent any threat from reaching the country directly. The guidelines state that in the event that these efforts failed to prevent the threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan would take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them cooperate adequately. This is based on the recognition that it is important to mobilize the total national power by collecting the capabilities of relevant organizations such as the SDF, police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the safety of the nation and the people. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems to respond to various emergency situations, and the central and local governments will work closely together to establish adequate systems.

At the same time, Japan will engage in its own diplomatic activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving international security environment.

The guidelines say that Japan's defense capabilities, which are the ultimate guarantee of the national security, shall be multi-functional, flexible, and effective, and the improvement of efficiency and rationalization are necessary in order to realize such capabilities.

2. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security, and the presence of the U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the progress made in Japan-U.S. cooperation in dealing with global issues as exemplified in the fight against terrorism, close Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship plays a significant role in the effective promotion of the international efforts to prevent and respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies.

The function of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements is not granted by simply having the agreement called the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In order to make the agreement effective, it is essential to make restless efforts in peacetime. Based on this viewpoint, the National Defense Program Guidelines clearly specify the following efforts.

(1) Implementation of Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the United States (strategic objectives, role-sharing, and military posture)

Based on the posture of Japan's security and defense capabilities clarified in the National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogues with the United States on wide-ranging

security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and military posture while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives⁴. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden on local communities which host U.S. military facilities and areas, while maintaining the deterrent capabilities that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

(2) Various Efforts for Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements shall be enhanced through active promotion of measures including information sharing, various operational cooperation, and collaboration on ballistic missile defense (BMD).

3. Cooperation with the International Community

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that in order to improve the international security environment as part of cooperation with the international community and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is also stated in the guidelines that based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the regions spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is crucial to Japan. Thus, the Government of Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting cooperative efforts, in conjunction with other countries concerned, to deal with common security challenges. And Japan will actively engage in the U.S. reform, and also promote the efforts for multilateral frameworks for security in the Asia-Pacific region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

2. Vision for the Future Defense Capability

1. Role of the Defense Capability

In recognition of new security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines defines the role of the defense capability as;

- 1) effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies
- 2) preparation to deal with full-scale invasion
- 3) proactive efforts, on Japan's own initiative, to improve the international security environment

The guidelines say that Japan will efficiently maintain the SDF posture which is deemed necessary to effectively carry out missions in each area.

NDPG 1995 clearly states the maintenance of defense posture of each SDF. But the current National Defense Program Guidelines adopts the idea that a new SDF posture should be formed in the process of joint operation being conducted to respond to each contingency. Based on the idea, the guidelines, under "the Role of the Defense Capabilities," specify the role and response to be fulfilled in each contingency and the concept of SDF posture in a comprehensive manner.

(1) Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The idea behind responses to new threats and diverse contingencies presented in the National Defense Program Guidelines is as follows.

As new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and have potential for sudden outbreak, Japan will cope effectively with them by forming and deploying highly ready and mobile defense force units

capable of responding properly to the characteristics of each situation in accordance with the characteristics of the units and Japan's geographical characteristics. When contingencies actually happen, the defense force will act quickly and appropriately to seamlessly respond to the situations in smooth and close collaboration with the police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations in accordance with the circumstances and the need for division of labor.

Major responses to new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows.

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan has started the development of a BMD system, for which introduction was approved in December 2003. The country will establish a system to counter missile attacks, including one approved in 2003, at an early date in order to deal effectively with such attacks.

Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats with efforts to build the BMD system as well as relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1)

b. Response to Attacks by Guerrillas or Special Operations Forces

Guerrillas and special forces attacks are difficult to predict, and we need to be prepared to deal with such attacks without delay and to prevent the expansion of such attacks. Therefore, Japan will maintain necessary defense force structure to effectively respond to the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner including swift and concentrated deployment of the units. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2)



Troops of GSD's First Infantry Regiment (based in Tokyo) conducting combat exercise in U.S. state of Hawaii

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

Because of Japan's geographical characteristic featuring many offshore islands, invasion of such islands is envisioned as a form of armed attacks against Japan.

In order to respond to such invasion, it is necessary for Japan to maintain a defense structure which is capable of effectively dealing with precise-guidance attacks by transporting SDF units by sea and air in a flexible manner. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3)

d. Patrol and Surveillance in Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Spy Ships and Other Vessels

In order to effectively respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies, detecting the signal at an early stage is extremely important for preventing the unwanted event as well as preventing the expansion of such event when it occurs. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remain an important role of the SDF, and thus Japan will maintain the defense structure that consists of warships, aircraft and other necessary equipment.

Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly and adequately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning North Korean armed spy vessels and the submerged navigation within Japan's territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will take adequate actions

against such spy ships in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in Japan's territorial waters. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4)

e. Response to Large-Scale and Special-Type Disasters

Japan is under the conditions that are prone to natural disasters such as earthquake, typhoon, and volcanic eruption, and in the event of unconventional disasters such as nuclear disasters and terrorism, utilization of the SDF capabilities may become necessary.

In such circumstances, ensuring the security of the people is extremely important, and Japan will maintain an adequate force structure consisting of defense force units and people with specialized capabilities and expertise who can conduct disaster-relief operations in any part of Japan in order to deal swiftly with large-scale disasters and special-type disasters, where protection of life and property is needed. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5)

(2) Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion

While likelihood of full-scale invasion is declining, the new defense capabilities are required for Japan to effectively respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies as well as proactive engagement on its own initiative aimed at improving the international security environment.

In recognition of such security environment, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will depart from its defense build-up concept that emphasizes so-called Cold War-type counter-armor warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will make a sweeping review of its defense equipment and personnel earmarked for coping with full-scale invasion with an eye toward reducing them.

At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense capability is to respond to full-scale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up cannot be achieved in a short time, Japan will secure the most fundamental part of its defense capability in order to prepare for full-scale invasion. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3)

(3) Proactive Efforts on Japan's Own Initiative to Improve the International Security Environment

a. Proactive Engagement on its Own Initiative in International Peace Cooperation Activities

In NDPG 1995, "contributing to the development of stable security environment" was defined as one of the roles of defense capabilities and the SDF has participated in various international peace cooperation activities.

It is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative, with the objective of further ensuring peace and security of Japan, rather than simply making "contribution."

The scope of international peace cooperation activities is very wide and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner with diplomacy as part of the country's unified diplomatic efforts that involve not only the SDF but also civilian activities. Within the framework of the Government's total policy, the SDF must be engaged in international peace cooperation activities appropriately using its self-sufficiency ability and organizational capabilities, and for that reason, the SDF plans to establish necessary



ASDF C-130H transport plane engaging in international peace cooperation activity

infrastructure to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, maintaining highly ready force posture for relevant units and improving transport and other required capabilities.

In order for Japan to appropriately participate in international peace cooperation activities, it was determined that necessary arrangements would be made including the effort to properly put these activities within the SDF mission priorities. (See Chapter 3, Section 2-3)

b. Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges

Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in view of the changes in the international security environment and in recognition of the fact that such efforts effectively contribute to an effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, the activities to contribute to peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the areas of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations including the United Nations. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 • Section 3)

2. Fundamental Elements for Japan's Defense Capabilities

Following are fundamental elements of Japan's defense capabilities that are included in the National Defense Program Guidelines in order to fulfill defense missions described above.

(1) Enhancement of Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to execute its missions swiftly and effectively by responding to the new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture that enables all SDF services to be operated in a unified manner from the beginning of the outbreak of such situations.

For the transition into such joint operational posture, establishment of the Joint Staff Office as an organization to assist the then Director-General of the SDF who was responsible for its operations was incorporated in the National Defense Program Guidelines. As well as enhancing the effectiveness of the Joint Staff Office, the infrastructure for the SDF's joint operations is to be established in such areas as education and training, and information and communications. In strengthening its joint operation capabilities, the SDF is to reexamine its existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-5)

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order for the defense capability to function effectively with multiple functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government of Japan to retain and utilize advanced intelligent capabilities including the ability to detect signs of a contingency at an early time and to collect, analyze and share intelligence promptly and accurately.

Intelligence capabilities are not a simple auxiliary element, but should be positioned as one essential element in the defense system. For this reason, Japan will strengthen its advanced and diversified intelligence-collection capability and enhance its comprehensive analysis and assessment capabilities, keeping in mind the dangers in the security environment and technological trends. Japan will also strengthen the intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that is to play a role of supporting such capabilities. In this way, Japan will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress of Science and Technology in Japan's Defense Capabilities

In order to realize multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations due to the progress of information and science technology should also be reflected adequately.

In particular, advance command and communications systems, and information communications network shall be established to develop reliable command and control systems as well as speedy intelligence-sharing systems, which are indispensable for the SDF's joint operations described earlier, in tune with advanced information and communication technologies available at home and abroad.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to achieve greater outcome with limited human resources, it is necessary to recruit human resources with high potential, and train and educate them in order for the SDF to adequately cope with diversification and internationalization of SDF missions, and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech defense equipment.

Research and education on security issues are to be promoted and the foundation of manpower for promoting such research is to be reinforced⁵.


3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability

An attached table of the National Defense Program Guidelines clarifies a specific posture for defense capabilities to fulfill the missions described above. The following is its outline.

1. Ground Self-Defense Force

(1) Formation and Deployment of Basic Strategic Unit Responding to the New Security Environment

Fig. II-2-2-1 Deployment of Divisions and Brigades and Its Concept under the National Defense Program Guidelines




As regionally deployed units (basic strategic units), eight divisions and six brigades featuring responsiveness and high mobility are formed in preparation for effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies, which requires timely actions but are difficult to predict the occurrence, and eight divisions and six brigades will be placed in each of the 14 sections created with consideration given to Japan’s geographical characteristics featuring mountains, rivers and straits. (See Fig. II-2-2-1)

(2) Securing Personnel Resources (Manpower)

- a. Departing from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept, “personnel (manpower)”-oriented system will be built to enhance the response to the new threats and diverse contingencies such as attacks by guerrillas and special operations forces and large-scale disasters, as well as to the need for international peace cooperation activities.
- b. To secure effective response capability, the number of regular defense officers will be increased from 145,000 in NDPG 1995 to 148,000.
- c. On the other hand, the number of primary equipment—tanks and artilleries—will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicles for artillery. (See Fig. II-2-2-2)

Fig. II-2-2-2 Changes in Number of SDF Personnel and Main Defense Equipment



(3) New Formation of Central Readiness Force and International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit

In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies when they occur, the Central Readiness Force will be newly organized, consisting of Mobile Operation Units and various specialized units. Within this force, the

International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit will be newly organized for proactive engagement on its own initiative in international peace cooperation activities. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2)

2. Maritime Self-Defense Force

(1) Posture of New Destroyer Units for More Effective Response

In order to secure as many well-trained destroyers as possible within a limited number of vessels and to enable prompt response to diverse contingencies, destroyer units will be formed in accordance with the level of training rather than the conventional fixed formation.

Mobile Operation Units will be integrated into eight divisions (One division consisting of four vessels) to enable swift and continuous response to contingencies. The formation of Regional District Units will be transformed so that one unit is deployed in a five patrol district in view of the current security environment. (See Section 4, Fig. II-2-4-2)

(2) Formation of Submarine Units Focusing on Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

Submarine units will continue to retain a total of 16 submarines (Units are to be integrated from six divisions (two or three vessels for each division) to four divisions (four vessels for each division). The new formation of submarines, to be deployed in important maritime traffic points in East China Sea and the Sea of Japan in order to gather information, is intended to detect signs of new threats and diverse contingencies at the earliest possible time for taking flexible actions.

(3) Improving the Efficiency of Combat Aircraft Unit

While ensuring the surveillance system for surrounding sea, responsiveness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft (including patrol aircraft, minesweeping and transportation helicopters) will be reduced from approximately 170 to 150 due to the units' integration and efficiency improvement.

For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, P-3C successor aircraft (P-X) with improved performance will be introduced, and the current eight squadrons will be integrated into four squadrons for better efficiency. The patrol helicopter units will be integrated from eight squadrons into five squadrons by changing operations of all the helicopters basically vessel-based, from the viewpoint of achieving efficient operation. (See Section 4, Fig. II-2-4-3)


3. Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units

Fighter Aircraft Units will remain as major units in order to take appropriate actions in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, but the number of fighter aircraft will be changed from approximately 300 to 260 through the improvement of operational efficiency in light of the declined possibility of full-scale invasion of Japan.

The number of combat aircraft including fighters will be changed from approximately 400 to 350 in line with, for example, the downsizing of Air Reconnaissance Unit. (See Fig. II-2-2-3)

Fig. II-2-2-3 Deployment of Fighter Units



(2) Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities

In order for Japan to effectively respond to the invasion of its offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established, and the next transport aircraft (C-X) with transport and aviation performance superior to the current aircraft will be prepared. (See Fig. II-2-2-4)

(3) Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups

The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized into two groups from one group planned under NDPO 1995 through functional separation into E-767 and E-2C units.

4. Major Equipment and Major Units that can be also Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)



MSDF Aegis system-equipped ship Chokai enhances defense ability with addition of BMD function

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the posture of the SDF must be capable of taking on various roles to deal with diverse tasks. In particular, it was judged to be important for Japan to try to attain understanding for the BMD system both inside and outside of Japan by clarifying the system as specific as possible and ensuring its transparency. To that end, the guidelines, in its attached table, specify “major equipment and major units that can be also available for ballistic missile defense.”⁶ (See Fig. II-2-2-5)

Fig. II-2-2-4 Future Posture of Air Carrier Unit




Fig. II-2-5 Comparison of NDPO Attachments and Posture at the Time of Completion of Mid-Term Defense Program

Classification		NDPO 1976	NDPO 1995	NDPG	At the time of completion of Mid-Term Defense Program	
GSDF	Authorized number of SDF personnel	180,000	160,000	155,000	about 161,000	
	Regular personnel		145,000	148,000	(Note) about 152,000	
	Ready reserve personnel		15,000	7,000	about 8,000	
	Major Units	Regionally deployed units for peacetime	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile Operation Units	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	1 armored division Central Readiness Force
Major Equipment	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	
MSDF	Major Units	Destroyer Units (for mobile operations)	4 escort flotillas	4 escort flotillas	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions)	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions)
		Destroyer Units (regional district units)	10 (district) divisions	7 (district) divisions	5 divisions	6 divisions
		Submarine Units	6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions	5 divisions
		Minesweeper Units	2 minesweeper flotillas	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla
		Patrol Aircraft Units	16 (ground) divisions	13 (ground) divisions	9 divisions	9 divisions
Major Equipment	Destroyers	about 60 vessels	about 50 vessels	47 vessels	48 vessels	
	Submarines	16 vessels	16 vessels	16 vessels	16 vessels	
	Combat Aircraft	about 220 planes	about 170 planes	about 150 planes	about 160 planes	
ASDF	Major Units	Fighter Aircraft Units	28 warning groups — 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 Airborne Early Warning Group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 Airborne Early Warning Group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons
		Fighter Aircraft Units	—	—	—	—
		Interceptor Units	10 squadrons	9 squadrons	—	—
		Support Fighter Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	—	—
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
	Aerial Refueling/Transport Units	—	—	1 squadron	1 squadron	
Major Equipment	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	
	Combat Aircraft	about 430 planes	about 400 planes	about 350 planes	about 350 planes	
	Fighters (included among combat aircraft)	about 350 planes	about 300 planes	about 260 planes	about 260 planes	
Major units and major equipment that can be used as defense against ballistic missile attacks	Aegis-Equipped Destroyers	—	—	4 vessels	4 vessels	
	Aircraft Warning and Control Units	—	—	7 warning groups	7 warning groups	
	Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	—	—	4 warning squadrons 3 groups	4 warning squadrons 3 groups	

Note: Under the Mid-Term Defense Program, the Defense Ministry calls for the number of regular personnel of the SDF to be kept at the current level in view of the need for Japan to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies and to commit itself to international peace cooperation activities proactively and on its own initiative. Specifically, the program says that the number of such personnel should be roughly about 146,000.

4. Additional Elements for Consideration

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the following elements will be taken into consideration in building up, maintaining and operating defense capability.

1. Fiscal Conditions, Procurement of Defense Equipment and Maintenance and Operation of Defense Facilities

Given severe fiscal conditions, defense expenditures need to be curbed by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces, and the overall defense capability needs to function smoothly and sufficiently by making its operations harmonious with other measures taken by the Government.

In addition, the Government will make following efforts: promotion of measures to curb the life-cycle cost⁷ in procuring defense equipment, implementation of effective and efficient research and development activities, as well as the allocation of limited resources to core technological fields for the establishment of a truly necessary defense production system and technological foundation.

In order to efficiently maintain and upgrade Japan's defense-related facilities, the Government will take various measures to make these facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.

2. Timeframe for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review

While NDPG 1976 and NDPG 1995 do not specify the timing for achieving the objectives of defense capability, the National Defense Program Guidelines provides the clear vision for Japan's defense capability for the next decade, based on the idea that it is important to show concrete timing for achieving the goals of defense capability more clearly.

It is desirable for Japan to review its defense vision on a regular basis in line with the security environment and technological trends. Based on this idea, the National Defense Program Guidelines will be reviewed and, if necessary, will be revised after five years or in case that there is a significant change in the security environment, taking into consideration such change in the environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

5. Three Principles on Arms Exports

A statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released at the time of the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines addressed issues on arms export control. It stated that given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) would contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and from the viewpoint of contributing to the security of Japan, the Government would exempt items related to BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Export and related provisions, on the condition that those items would come under strict export control⁸. (See Reference 13 • Reference 44)

In addition, with regard to cases of joint development and production with the United States as well as cases seen as contributing to counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions were raised through the process of developing the National Defense Program Guidelines, it mentioned that the Government would decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether to take any actions in the future, taking into consideration the basic principle, as a peace-loving nation, of avoiding exacerbation of international conflicts⁹.

The statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary clarified that Japan would continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing carefully with arms exports control in light of the country's basic philosophy as a peaceful country, which is the basis for the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.

Section 3. Mid-Term Defense Program

National defense is a basis of the existence of the country. Therefore, defense built-up is ultimately made based on the budget of each fiscal year. But defense should be built up continuously, systematically and steadily based on the security environment surrounding Japan and the role of defense capability, and also in line with a concrete medium-term outlook, because research and development of defense equipment, its adoption, improvement of facilities, education of defense personnel, and training of SDF units cannot be realized in a short term.

Therefore, the Government of Japan has devised mid-term defense programs, each covering five years, since FY 1986, and has built up the nation's defense on such programs compiled for every fiscal year.

The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009)" is a plan which defines Japan's policy regarding build-up of its defense capabilities and main projects for five years to realize new defense capabilities specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines. The program was approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2004. (See Reference 12)

This section will explain policies envisaged under the Mid-Term Defense Program, organizational reviews of the Defense Ministry and the SDF, main projects related to the SDF's capability and measures meant to reinforce the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

1. Policies for the Program

In line with the National Defense Program Guidelines, the Mid-Term Defense Program has shifted its priority from "deterrence by presence" to "effective response" and has placed an emphasis on the improvement of readiness and mobility, an integrated operation of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF through their joint operations and the acquirement of new capabilities in line with technological development. Six policies, listed below, are the basis of the program intended to build up Japan's defense capability appropriately.

- 1) Establishment of multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities
- 2) Organizational reviews of the Defense Ministry and the SDF
- 3) Enhancement of fundamental defense capabilities through joint operations and strengthening of intelligence functions
- 4) Promotion of various measures that support defense capabilities, such as rational and efficient procurement of defense equipment
- 5) Further strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
- 6) Efforts to make defense capabilities efficient and streamlined

2. Review of Organizations of Defense Ministry and SDF

The Mid-Term Defense Program calls for organizational reviews of the Defense Ministry and the SDF, as shown below, as a means of swiftly and efficiently transforming their structure into one in which new defense capabilities envisaged under the National Defense Program Guidelines can be acquired.

- 1) Ideal structure of internal bureaus will be studied in order to improve and strengthen organizations in charge of administrative defense policies, and necessary measures will be taken.
- 2) The Joint Staff Office will be newly established while the existing Staff Offices of the three SDF services will be reorganized, both to reinforce the joint operations posture. Based on the achievements of joint operations, how to make such operations effective will be studied, and necessary measures will be taken.

The Defense Intelligence Headquarters will be placed under the direct control of the then Director-General of the Defense Agency. (See Chapter 3, Section 3)

3) The GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF will shift to the structure shown in Fig. II-2-2-5 under the previous section, when the Mid-Term Defense Program is concluded.

3. Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF

Concerning the SDF's defense capabilities, the Mid-Term Defense Program calls for effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies, preparations against full-scale invasion of Japan, proactive efforts, on Japan's own initiative, to help improve the international security environment, and promotion of fundamental defense capabilities and various measures that support such capabilities. Under the program, main projects as shown in Figure II-2-3-1 will be implemented in order to achieve these goals.



Mobile combat vehicle (concept)

4. Measures to Strengthen Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Under the new security environment, following measures will be taken in order to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and close relationship with the United States backed by the arrangements.

- 1) Exchange of information and views on the international situation will be enhanced, and strategic dialogue on the general security situation will be continued.
- 2) Efforts will be made to establish an effective cooperative framework in the field of defense operations. In addition, joint exercises and training will be enhanced.
- 3) Cooperation in the field of ballistic missile defense (BMD) will be promoted further.
- 4) Efforts will be made to promote wide-ranging mutual exchanges in the fields of defense equipment and technologies.
- 5) Measures will be taken to make stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smooth and effective.
- 6) Japan will proactively participate in international security efforts and will take measures to enable close collaboration with the United States.

5. Scale of Build-Up and Necessary Budget

1. Scale of Build-Up

The following table shows specific scale of build-up of main defense equipment that is part of equipment needed for main projects being undertaken to improve the SDF's defense capability. (See Fig. II-2-3-2)

2. Necessary Budget

The total amount of defense-related expenditures required for the implementation of the Mid-Term Defense Program shall not exceed about ¥24.24 trillion under FY 2004 prices. Defense-related spending earmarked for each year is to be determined within the framework of the sum listed above while further efforts are to be made to promote efficient and streamlined defense operations in harmony with other measures taken by the Government of Japan. In addition, an extra budget of up to ¥100 billion can be allotted if such budgeting is deemed necessary in order to address various conditions including the need to respond to unpredictable events that may happen in the future and such budget is approved by the Security Council.

The Mid-Term Defense Program will be reviewed three years later if such review is found necessary after taking into account various developments both at home and abroad, including the international situation, trends

of technological advancement and fiscal conditions. The program would be reviewed within the total amount of expenditures set aside for its implementation. (See Figs. II-2-3-3 • 4)

Fig. II-2-3-1 Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF under Mid-Term Defense Program

Classification		Main Projects
Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies	Response to ballistic missile attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To enhance the ability of Aegis system-equipped destroyers ○ To enhance the ability of surface-to-air guided missiles (Patriot) ○ To improve a warning and control radar system ○ To modify an automatic warning and control radar system to attach the function of countering incoming ballistic missiles
	Response to attacks by guerrillas and special operations force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To increase the per-squad number of personnel at the rifle platoon and newly create a "sniper section" in each Infantry Company, both in order to strengthen the ability of infantry units, which constitute the core of human combat capabilities ○ To increase readiness and mobility by improving light armored vehicles, multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J) and combat helicopters (AH-64D) ○ To increase ability to respond to attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons
	Response to attacks on islands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To enhance transport and deployment abilities by improving a successor of the C-1 transport plane and transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J) ○ To increase air and maritime interdiction ability by improving aerial refueling and transport planes (KC-767) and fighters (F-2) ○ To enhance rescue operation capability by enabling transport planes (C-130H) to have the function of refueling rescue helicopters (UH-60J) in the air
	Warning and surveillance in surrounding sea and air, and response to aerial invasion and armed special operations vessels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To introduce successors of the DDH and DD destroyers, the SH-60K patrol helicopter, the MCH-101 minesweeping and transport helicopter and the P-3C fixed-wing patrol plane ○ To improve early warning aircraft (E-2C) and early warning and control aircraft (E-767) ○ To modernize and upgrade fighters (F-15), and introducing a successor of the F-4 fighter while considering budget situations
	Response to large-scale disasters and special disasters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To improve rescue amphibians (US-2) and rescue helicopters (UH-60H)
Preparation against full-scale invasion	To secure the most fundamental defense capability by continuing to improve the ability of tanks, artillery, medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol planes and fighters while curbing spending on defense improvement for a period covered by the Mid-Term Defense Program in line with reductions of sizes of defense equipment envisaged under the National Defense Program Guidelines	
Proactive and independent efforts to improve international security environment	Appropriate efforts for international peace cooperation activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To place International Activities School and Central Readiness Regiment (tentatively named) under the Central Readiness Force ○ To secure defense equipment that can contribute to international peace cooperation activities, such as transport planes, helicopters and light armored vehicles
	Enhancement of security dialogue with other countries, defense exchanges and joint exercises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To implement measures aimed at promoting bilateral and multilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges ○ To support the United Nations and other international organizations in their activities in arms control and disarmament
Basic tasks for defense capability	Strengthening of joint operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Establishment of Joint Staff Office ○ Reform of Joint Staff College, holding of joint exercises and sharing of intelligence and communications infrastructure
	Strengthening of intelligence function	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To strengthen intelligence-related divisions, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters of the SDF, by promoting the recruitment of highly talented personnel, and their education and training ○ To improve various information-gathering devices and equipment ○ To embark on a project to modify the F-15 fighter on a trial basis so as to divert it into a reconnaissance plane ○ To study an unmanned flight plane and take necessary steps if necessary
	Response to advancement of science and technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To strengthen command and communication capability (concentration and relaying of information via the chain of command, information sharing among units, enhancement of ability to respond to cyber attacks, information sharing with concerned organizations, and the establishment of an advanced command, control and communication system and an advanced information and communication network) ○ Promotion of research and development activities (development of a successor of the P-3C fixed-wing patrol plane, a successor of the C-1 transport plane, tanks to replace existing ones and mobile fighting vehicles, and research and development on various command and control systems and unmanned defense equipment)
	Effective use of human resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improvement of measures on personnel management, education and training ○ Promotion of research and education on security issues
Promotion of various measures to underpin defense capability	Making procurement of defense equipment rational and efficient	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To curb life-cycle costs, establish a system for efficient supply and procurement of defense equipment and to promote reform of the overall defense procurement system such as establishing infrastructure in production of defense equipment and defense technology
	Promotion of cooperation with concerned organizations and regional communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To strengthen cooperation with police, firefighters and Japan Coast Guard, proceed with cooperation with municipal governments and regional communities based on the Civil Protection Law, and promote measures to alleviate the plight of people who live near U.S. bases in Japan.

Fig. II-2-3-2 Scale of Plans to Improve Major Defense Equipment under Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005–2009) and Their Progress

Major Equipment		FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	Improvement achievements for FY 2005–2007/Introduction planned under Mid-Term Defense Program
GSDF	Tanks	12 vehicles	11 vehicles	9 vehicles			32/49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortars)	7 vehicles	7 vehicles	8 vehicles			22/38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	16 vehicles	23 vehicles	18 vehicles			57/104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	2 units	1 unit	1 unit			4/7 units
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	1 unit	1 unit	1 unit			3/11 units
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	2 Companies	1 Company	1 Company			4/8 Companies
MSDF	Enhancement of ability of Aegis system-equipped destroyers	1 vessel		1 vessel		1 vessel	3/3 vessels
	Destroyers	1 vessel	1 vessel				2/5 vessels
	Submarines	1 vessel	1 vessel		1 vessel		3/4 vessels
	New fixed-wing patrol planes						0/4 planes
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	7 units	3 units	5 units			15/23 units
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)						0/3 units
ASDF	Enhancement of ability of the Patriot surface-to-air guided missile	1 group (used for education)		1 group		1 group	12/14 FU ¹
	Modernizing of fighters (F-15)	4 planes	2 planes				6/26 planes
	Fighters (F-2)	5 planes	5 planes		8 planes		18/22 (18) planes ²
	New fighters						0/7 planes
	New transport planes						0/8 planes
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	1 unit		1 unit			2/4 units
	Aerial refueling and transport planes (KC-767)				1 plane		1/1 plane

Notes: 1. Of 14 fire units (FU) whose improvement is envisaged under the Mid-Term Defense Program, 12 units were improved. The remaining two are ones that are reserved for use during regular checkups of other units. FU (Fire Unit) is a minimum unit within a surface-to-air guided missile unit.

2. The number of the F-2 fighter to be procured by Japan during the period covered by the Mid-Term Defense Program was revised to 18 planes from the initially set 22 planes as such a change was approved by the Cabinet on December 24, 2006.

Fig. II-2-3-3 Necessary Expenses

Classification	Previous MTDP (FY 2001–FY 2005) [FY 2000 prices]	MTDP (FY 2005–FY 2009) [FY 2004 prices]
Total Value	¥25.01 trillion	¥24.24 trillion
Personnel and Provisions Expenses	¥11.11 trillion	¥10.61 trillion
Nonpersonnel Expenses	¥13.90 trillion	¥13.63 trillion
Others*	¥150 billion*	¥100 billion*

Note: In view of the need for the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) to show a ceiling on the amount of defense-related expenses for a period covered by the program, necessary expenses under the program are shown on a spending basis, which covers expenditures both for already concluded contracts and fresh contracts for the period.

* If it is deemed necessary for Japan to respond to unpredictable situations in the future, response actions against such situations can be budgeted after an approval by the Security Council of Japan.

Fig. II-2-3-4 Amount of Contracts Concluded for Nonpersonnel Expenses

Previous MTDP (FY 2001–FY 2005) [FY 2000 prices]	MTDP (FY 2005–FY 2009) [FY 2004 prices]
¥14.19 trillion	¥13.65 trillion

Note: Contract amounts shown above indicate expenses for contracts being newly concluded for the procurement of defense equipment that is to be introduced for a period covered by the MTDP.

Section 4. Defense Build-Up Program for FY 2007

In FY 2007, build-up of Japan's defense capability will be promoted more efficiently by strengthening its policy-formulating function and establishing a defense organization that can respond to challenges in a new era. In addition, defense build-up being planned for the year will also emphasize how to respond to new threats and various other contingent situations, including the improvement of a counter-missile capability, information-gathering ability and patrol and surveillance ability, all of them responding in the wake of a ballistic missile launch and a nuclear test by North Korea, and countering attacks being launched by terrorists, guerrillas and special-operations units.

Major items being planned for the FY 2007 defense built-up program are shown in Figure II-2-4-1. (See Reference14-15)

Fig. II-2-4-1 Main Items for FY 2007 Defense Built-Up

Classification		Main Projects
Organizational Reform of Defense Ministry and SDF	Disbanding of Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its integration into Defense Ministry main body, and reorganization of Internal Bureaus See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Defense Facilities Administration Agency is to be dissolved and is to be integrated into the main body of the Defense Ministry based on bid-rigging of public works projects involving agency officials. ○ The Defense Ministry's Internal Bureaus are to be reorganized in order for the ministry to respond to policy challenges of the new era. ○ The Defense Ministry's regional structures are to be reorganized so as to set up regional outposts for the ministry's defense policy. ○ A highly independent auditing organization in charge of promoting strict checkups is to be newly created to ensure observance of accounting business and ministry personnel to law.
	Change of Division #11 into brigade and reorganization of GSDF Central Readiness Force (See Fig. II-2-2-1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Division #11 is to be reorganized into Brigade #11 (Modernized Comprehensive Division) while Brigade #13 is to be reorganized into Modernized Readiness Brigade. ○ Central Readiness Regiment (tentatively named) is to be newly created in order for Japan to further reinforce a framework in which it can effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies, and participate in international peace cooperation activities proactively and on its own initiative. ○ Central NBC Protection Unit and NBC Medical Treatment Unit are to be newly set up in order for Japan to effectively deal with damage being made from the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons against the country.
	Reorganization of MSDF units following its shift to a new structure (See Fig. II-2-4-2, 3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Units under Fleet Escort Force (for mobile operations) are to be streamlined from 12 divisions to eight divisions. Destroyer Units of Regional District Units (six divisions) are to be integrated into Fleet Escort Force. ○ Fixed-wing patrol aircraft units are to be streamlined from eight divisions to four divisions. Patrol helicopter units, including air squadrons of Regional District Units, are to be streamlined from nine squadrons to five squadrons all of which are to be integrated into the Fleet Air Force. ○ Maritime Training Assistance Unit #1 is to be newly formed.
Matters Related to Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies	Response to attacks by ballistic missiles See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Enhancement of ability of Aegis system-equipped destroyer (one vessel), Acquisition and test-firing of SM-3 missiles ○ Upgrading of ability of Patriot system (one group), acquisition of PAC-3 missile ○ Introduction of new warning and control radar (FPS-5) and upgrading of ability of the modified FPS-3 ○ Addition of BMD function to automatic warning and control system and establishment of TDS strategic data-exchange system ○ Japan-U.S. joint development on capacity enhancement-type interceptor missile ○ Upgrading of EP-3 data-gathering aircraft in electronic warfare and promotion of research on advanced infrared-ray sensor for detection of ballistic missiles
	Response to attacks by terrorists, guerrillas and special operations units	Establishment of movable surveillance radar, conducting of coastal surveillance exercises, securing of mobile patrol personnel in charge of base patrolling, and conducting of urban-battle exercises, field exercises in the United States and joint exercises with police
	Response to attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons	Securing of resources necessary for prevention, detection, identification, protection, diagnosis, treatment and decontamination
	Response to submarines and armed special operations vessels in waters surrounding Japan	Strengthening of ability to detect, identify and track down submarines, maintenance and enhancement of ability to respond to submarines in shallow waters, improvement of firing ability against small-sized water vessels, and maintenance and reinforcement of high readiness of Special Boarding Unit
	Response to large-scale and unconventional disasters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improvement of rescue amphibian (US-2) ○ Conducting of anti-disaster training
	Efforts for peace and stability of international community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ New formation of highly responsive unit (Tentatively named as Central Readiness Regiment) and utilization of the unit for international peace cooperation activities ○ Promotion of defense exchanges

Classification	Main Projects
<p>Efforts to realign U.S. Forces in Japan</p> <p>See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (p.276)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Measures aimed at reviewing the composition of U.S. Forces in Japan (various surveys, transfer of training sites, upgrading of facilities) are to be implemented to alleviate the burden of local municipalities hosting the bases while maintaining deterrent. ○ Measures included under the final SACO report are to be implemented steadily.
<p>Measures for efficient build-up of defense capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ As part of efforts to review total personnel costs, consignment of relevant works to the private sector is to be promoted while the SDF's youth cadet system is to be reviewed. ○ Efficient procurements such as packaged buying of equipment (F-2 fighter, UH-1J multi-purpose helicopter). ○ The comprehensive reform of defense-equipment procurement is to be promoted. ○ Reduction in costs by reviewing the contract method.
<p>Improvement of personnel, sanitary and research-promotion measures</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Human aspects of defense capability are to be reformed drastically in response to the rapid fall in child birthrates. ○ Various measures are to be taken to prevent early retirement of medical officers while steps are to be taken to make National Defense Medical College become an independent administrative corporation. ○ Measures aimed at promoting war-history research are to be taken to make long-term contribution to policy formulation.
<p>Enhancement of joint operation capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A standing joint unit is to be newly formed as a way to establish a system aimed at supporting the SDF's joint operations on the intelligence and communications front. ○ Various joint exercises are to be conducted while a way to simulate the assessment of joint defense capabilities is to be established.
<p>Establishment of more advanced intelligence system and intelligence and communication system</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ As a means of strengthening the SDF's intelligence function, personnel resources at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters are to be boosted, and equipment and devices aimed at collecting intelligence-related information are to be upgraded. ○ A survey on overseas operations of an unmanned flight plane is to be promoted along with study on sensors being installed on such plane. ○ Capability to respond to cyber attacks and an assessment function are to be strengthened as a way to build a more advanced intelligence and communication system.
<p>Response to advancement of military-related science and technology</p>	<p>Effective and efficient research and development are to be promoted with resources being allocated to priority fields based on the trend concerning the advancement of military-related science and technology. (Study of elements that constitute a high-precision firepower battle system, study of technology relating to a portable device to detect chemical agents, study of a passive-type radio wave-guiding formula, development of a new outdoor communication system)</p>
<p>Promotion of measures to reduce burden of local communities hosting U.S. bases</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Measures to reduce the burden of local people living near U.S. bases are to be taken continuously in order to further promote harmony between defense facilities of the bases and their surrounding areas. ○ Measures are to be taken to make the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan smooth and effective.

Fig. II-2-4-2 Organizational Changes of MSDF Units Due to Its Shift to New Structure (destroyer units)





Fig. II-2-4-3 Organizational Changes of MSDF Units Due to Its Shift to New Structure (aircraft units)



MSDF EP-3 plane for gathering electronic-warfare data improves ability



F-2 fighter being increasingly introduced by ASDF

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Organization of the Self-Defense Forces Command and Communication Unit (Tentative Name)


After the Self-Defense Forces was transferred to a new joint operations structure in March last year, SDF realized, while operating forces in Japan and abroad, the importance of not only the “static” part of the information communication functions of SDF, such as the development and maintenance of information systems and networks, but also the “dynamic” functions that are more directly related to the operation of forces. Such “dynamic” functions include speedy coordination between the headquarters and local forces and between forces in a wide area.

With this as a background, it has been decided that the “static” functions performed by the Joint Staff Office, such as the maintenance of the Central Command Post (CCP), SDF’s commanding center, and the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), SDF’s backbone network, as well as the protection against cyber attacks, will be reorganized and placed under the control of a new unit. Since the unit (tentatively named “SDF Command and Communication Unit”) will support activities of all the Ground, Marine and Air Self-Defense Forces, it will become SDF’s first permanent joint operation unit in charge of supporting information communication.

In addition to taking over the maintenance operations of CCP and DII from the Joint Staff Office, the SDF Command and Communication Unit will also build a common communication system that suits the circumstances of the time by organically combining the communication infrastructures of the Ground, Marine and Air Self-Defense Forces, recover communication quickly and sufficiently at the time of a cyber attack, and play other important roles.

Since there had been no framework for permanent joint units across more than two self-defense forces, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended to newly establish the framework for “Joint Units” that is similar to the existing framework for “Joint Organizations¹⁾,” considering the need to realize new smoother joint operations.

New formation of SDF Command and Communication Squadron



1) The Self-Defense Forces Law (Article 24, Paragraph 6) allows the Ground, Marine and Air Self-Defense Forces to jointly establish organizations such as hospitals and schools.

New Equipment (New Destroyer)


The Marine Self-Defense Force will add a 5,000 ton-class destroyer to its fleet under the FY 2007 budget as a substitute for a destroyer that is expected to withdraw in FY 2011.

According to the future plan outlined by the National Defense Program Guidelines, MSDF is required to possess eight destroyer units for mobile operations, each consisting of four vessels. The guidelines also require that four of these eight units consist of one Aegis guided missile destroyer (DDG) and three multi-mission destroyers (DD) with the DDG playing the core part of each formation to focus on air defense capabilities including ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations.

The destroyer planned to be added during FY 2007 (19 DD) will join one of these four units in accordance with the air defense plan of the Mid-term Defense Program, and its major mission is to guard the DDG against possible air attacks (Local Area Defense) while the DDG is engaged in BMD operations. In addition to defending the DDG, the new destroyer is also planned to be fully equipped with anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capabilities so that it can effectively respond to the newly emerging threats and diverse contingencies and even resist an attempt of a full-scale invasion.

The specific equipment to be mounted on the new destroyer includes (1) surface-to-air Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), (2) the most advanced anti-aircraft Active Phased Array Radar (the enhanced version of FCS-3, the fire control system to be mounted on helicopter destroyers (DDH) commissioned in 2004 and 2006), which can be upgraded according to the future development of semiconductor technology, and (3) the upper structure designed to be as stealthy as possible.

Defense equipment (new destroyer) to be newly procured in 2007



Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures

Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhood of defense facilities, supporting U.S. forces stationed in Japan and managing the Security Council.

Defense-related budget for FY 2007 was significantly curbed with spending items in general becoming subject to reduction, as the fiscal year marked the first year of the Government's initiative to streamline expenditures and revenues in a unified manner. As a result, such budget for the year decreased for five years in a row on an expenditure basis, by ¥8.8 billion or 0.2% from the preceding fiscal year, excluding costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and costs associated with measures to reduce the burden of local communities hosting U.S. forces stationed in Japan as part of a plan to realign such forces. But the FY 2007 defense budget earmarks necessary spending items, including establishing a necessary framework for effectively responding to new threats and diverse contingencies such as countering ballistic-missile attacks against Japan, and the budget is intended to further promote efficient procurement of defense equipment¹⁰.

Including ¥12.6 billion in SACO-related expenses and ¥7.2 billion in expenses related to realignments of U.S. Forces (portion meant to reduce burden of local communities¹¹), Japan's total defense-related expenditures for FY 2007 amount to ¥4,801.6 billion, representing a decrease of 0.3% or ¥12.3 billion from the preceding fiscal year. (See Fig. II-2-5-1) (See Reference 20-21)

Fig. II-2-5-1 Outline of Defense-Related Expenditures

Classification	FY 2007 Defense-Related Expenditures						
Defense-related expenditures (in case of including SACO-related expenses and U.S. forces realignment-related expenses)	¥4,781.8 billion (¥4,801.6 billion)						
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>Growth from previous fiscal year</td> <td>-0.2% (-0.3%)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ratio against GDP</td> <td>0.916% (0.920%)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Ratio against general account spending</td> <td>5.8% (5.8%)</td> </tr> </table>	Growth from previous fiscal year	-0.2% (-0.3%)	Ratio against GDP	0.916% (0.920%)	Ratio against general account spending	5.8% (5.8%)	
Growth from previous fiscal year	-0.2% (-0.3%)						
Ratio against GDP	0.916% (0.920%)						
Ratio against general account spending	5.8% (5.8%)						
Expenses carried over to following fiscal years	¥2,992.9 billion						
<table border="1"> <tr> <td>· New contracts</td> <td>¥1,771.1 billion</td> </tr> <tr> <td>· Previously contracted</td> <td>¥1,221.8 billion</td> </tr> </table>	· New contracts	¥1,771.1 billion	· Previously contracted	¥1,221.8 billion			
· New contracts	¥1,771.1 billion						
· Previously contracted	¥1,221.8 billion						

1. Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

1. Breakdown by Expenses


Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into "personnel and provisions expenses," which cover such items as pay and meals for SDF personnel, and "material expenses," which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel, and the procurement of equipment and others. Material expenses are further classified into "obligatory outlay expenses,"¹² which are paid under contracts concluded in past fiscal years, and "general material expenses," which are paid under current-year contracts. (See Fig. II-2-5-2)

The Defense Ministry terms this classification method as "classification by expenses." A breakdown of FY 2007 defense-related expenditures based on this method is shown in Fig. II-2-5-3.

Personnel and provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% or more of the total defense-related budget. A breakdown of general material expenses show


that lasting or mandatory costs account for a significant portion of the total, such as the repair of equipment, education and training of SDF personnel, the cost of hosting U.S. forces stationed in Japan and expenses¹³ related to measures to alleviate the burden of local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan.

Fig. II-2-5-2 Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures



Notes: 1. Obligatory outlay expenses are expenses for past contracts whose payments are to be made for the current fiscal year.
 2. General material expenses are divided into two types; one involves contracts and payments being made in the current fiscal year and the other involves contracts being made in the current fiscal year with payments divided over several years, including advance payment in the current year.

Fig. II-2-5-3 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (expense-by-expense breakdown)




Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are budgeted amounts. Unit: ¥100 million
 2. Diagram does not include ¥12.6 billion in SACO-related expenses and U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (measures to ease the burden of local municipalities hosting the forces)

Personnel and provisions expenses for FY 2007 decreased by ¥31.9 billion or 1.5% from the previous fiscal year, reflecting smaller payments of retirement allowance due to a decline in the number of retiring personnel. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased by ¥22.3 billion or 1.3% from the previous year and general material expenses also rose by ¥800 million or 0.1% from the previous year.

2. Breakdown by Organization and by Use


FY 2007 defense-related expenditures classified by organization, such as the GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and also by use, such as personnel and provisions expenses, and expenses for purchasing defense equipment, are shown in a diagram below. (See Figs. II-2-5-4 • 5) (See Reference 22)

Fig. II-2-5-4 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (broken down by three SDF services and others)



- Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are budgeted amounts. Unit: ¥100 million
 2. Diagram does not include ¥12.6 billion in SACO-related expenses and U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (measures to ease the burden of local municipalities hosting the forces)

Fig. II-2-5-5 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (broken down by use)



Note: Diagram does not include SACO-related expenses and U.S. forces realignment-related expenses

Personnel and provisions expenses:	Pay for personnel, food expenses
Maintenance expenses:	Expenses for education and training, expenses for repair of equipment and others
Expenses for purchasing equipment:	Purchases of tanks, warships, aircraft and others
Base countermeasure expenses:	Expenses for measures around bases, expenses related to hosting U.S. forces stationed in Japan and others
Facilities improvement expenses:	expenses for maintenance of airfields, barracks and others
Research and development expenses:	R&D for equipment and others

2. Comparison with Other Countries


Understanding defense expenditures of each country using one standard is not possible in view of differences from one country to another in their socioeconomic systems and differences of their budget systems. In the absence of an internationally unified definition, breakdowns of defense expenditures are unclear in many countries, although they are publicly disclosed. (See Reference 23)

Defense expenditures of one country are generally compared with those of other countries by converting the value of spending measured in each country's currency into the dollar-termed value. But defense spending measured based on this method does not necessarily reflect the precise value that would result from counting each country's price levels.

Therefore, making simple comparison between Japan's defense-related expenditures shown in dollar terms and those of other countries also shown in dollar terms does not make much sense.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) makes comparison between one country and others of their ability to purchase goods and services by publishing each country's purchasing-power parity, a gauge meant to measure such ability by taking into account each country's price levels. A following table lists defense expenditures of each country shown in dollar terms using OECD data of purchasing-power parity. (The table excludes Russia and China for which there are no OECD data on purchasing-power parity) (See Fig. II-2-5-6)

Fig. II-2-5-6 Defense Expenditures of Major Countries (FY 2005)



- Notes: 1. Defense expenditures are compiled from statistics released by each country with conversion into dollar-termed figures based on purchasing-power parity publicized by the OECD.
 \$1 = ¥128 = 0.619 pound = 0.883 euro (Germany) = 0.901 euro (France)
2. Population used to calculate per-capita defense spending is based on a world population white paper compiled by the United Nations. GDP is based on major economic indicators of foreign countries compiled by the Finance Ministry.
3. For local currency-quoted defense expenditures of other countries such as China and Russia, see document 23.

Notes

- 1) See <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1977/w1977_9110.html>
- 2) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/dp96j.htm>>
- 3) (1) Not designed to directly counter military threats (2) The concept's portion stating Japan will maintain defense capabilities based on strategic environments and geographical characteristics in order to prevent invasion is deemed to remain effective and thus will be succeeded under the new security environment.
- 4) Regarding the contents of talks Japan held with the United States based on ideas shown in the National Defense Program Guidelines, see Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2
- 5) The Mid-Term Defense Program stipulates that the GOJ will improve research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies, a think tank-like institute of the Japan Defense Ministry, regarding security policy.
- 6) Major equipment of the MSDF (Aegis-equipped destroyers: four vessels) and major units of the ASDF (Air-warning and control units: seven warning groups and four warning squadrons; Surface-to-air guided missile units: three groups)
For development of BMD system, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2
- 7) Total costs of defense equipment that becomes necessary during its entire life cycle-brain-storming sessions, development process, mass production, operation (including maintenance and repair costs) and equipment scrapping
- 8) Based on this statement, it was decided on December 24, 2005 by the Security Council and the Cabinet that the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based midcourse system of the BMD would be succeeded by the joint Japan-U.S. development in fiscal 2006. In a statement issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the same day, it was stated that "weapons that need to be provided to the United States for the purpose of this joint Japan-U.S. development shall be provided under strict control and also upon coordination with the United States regarding a framework for provision of weapons." Following this statement, "the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies" was concluded by the Japanese and the U.S. Governments in June last year. The exchange provides a framework for enabling the transfer of weapons and weapons technologies designed for the Japan-U.S. joint BMD development as well as weapon technologies that were subject to transfer under the previous "Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies." (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 • Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3-5)
- 9) In June 2006, Japan decided to provide patrol vessels, which fall under the category of weapons and others under the Three Principles on Arms Export, to Indonesia as grant aid meant to support the country in its efforts to control and prevent terrorism and piracy. A statement issued at that time by the Chief Cabinet Secretary said the transfer of the patrol vessels were exempted from the Arms Export Three Principles on the condition that an international agreement is concluded with the recipient country to ensure that the vessels are not used for purposes other than controlling and preventing terrorism and piracy and that the country does not transfer the vessels to a third party without Japan's prior consent.
- 10) As part of their efforts to restore sound fiscal standing, the Government and the ruling coalition parties conducted discussions and studies on the proposed unified reform of the nation's spending and revenue structures. As a result, specific measures to reform defense-related expenditures were laid out in the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform. (Cabinet endorsement on July 7, 2006)
- 11) In the compilation of the FY 2007 state budget, the cost for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan was budgeted under a separately earmarked new category to have it differentiated from other projects from the viewpoint of ensuring accountability to people.

- 12) Procurement of some main frontal defense equipment, such as vessels and aircraft, and construction of accommodations for SDF personnel, take multiple years. Budgeting for procurement of such equipment and construction of these accommodations is made to allow execution of contracts basically within five years. A contract being concluded based on such budgeting stipulates that payments to contractors are to be made at a specified time in the future. The total budget amount for the contract will be then split into several portions over years for which the contract was made in order to decide the amount of budget being paid annually to the contractor. Expenses budgeted in the fiscal year when their payment to the contractor becomes necessary several years after the conclusion of the contract are called “obligatory outlay expenses” while expenses whose payment period has yet to come are called “expenses carried over to the following fiscal years.”
- 13) One of the most typical costs under this category is expenses for setting up a sound-proof system at residential houses located near U.S. bases.

Chapter 3

Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

A new organization for defense

—Building an organization more capable of coping with crises and better able to contribute to world peace—

Section 1. History of the MOD/SDF—Expansion of the Duties/Roles Required of the MOD/SDF—

Section 2. Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

Section 3. Organization of the MOD/SDF



Unveiling ceremony for new ministry nameplate at the main entrance

A new organization for defense

—Building an organization more capable of coping with crises and better able to contribute to world peace—

The defense of Japan means protecting the peace and security of our national territory, culture, liberty, democracy, and the stability and prosperity of our nation's livelihood. Our national territory was home to our predecessors and will be home to our descendants as well. Proud as we are of our long history and our unique culture and tradition, our land is the stage for the future that must be fostered to thrive. We take pride in being Japanese and feel a strong affection to this land.

We have inherited from ancestors over a long time not only our land but also our language and customs, our lifestyles, our history and traditions, our literature, our arts and our attitudes. This national legacy was built by the dedicated effort of our ancestors who lived here and left to us as their posterity. This handiwork was produced over a long history through the efforts of Japanese people of every era, and it will undoubtedly go on in the future. This heritage passes from the past to the present and from the present to the future, gaining depth each and every time.

Today's security and prosperity were built on the foundation of this national legacy formed by our forefathers' endeavors. We must maintain this security and prosperity in independence and peace not merely for our own era but for those of our children, grandchildren, and so on for eternity.

Defending the country is the responsibility of each and every one of us, and we cannot be said to have fulfilled our duty if we do not accumulate the fruits of our efforts and pass them on to the next generation.

Since the foundation of its predecessor the Defense Agency, the Ministry of Defense has had responsibility for the defense of Japan in living up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese public. More than 1,700 members of the Self Defense Force have died, their life's ambitions cut short, in the course of performing their duties. The defense of our country is a noble national mission with direct relevance to people's lives. To carry out this assignment, each and every one of approximately 270,000 members of the SDF must undertake their day-to-day duties with a strong sense of their difficult mission to pass down today's prosperity to their descendants for all eternity.

National defense has never lost such significance.

The international security environment has changed greatly since the Defense Agency was established. Today's security environment features increasingly diverse and complex threats, and it has become increasingly difficult to predict when and where these threats will arise. International terrorist organizations and other non-state entities have skillfully utilized the progressing globalization of society through development in the field of information and communication technologies and transportation to carry out indiscriminate attacks against persons and property regardless of national borders. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missiles and other delivery systems for WMDs has also become a major threat. Serious concerns have arisen that such weapons might fall into the hands of international terrorist organizations.

Changes in the security environment have made changes in the roles demanded of military forces, and many countries are pursuing reform of their military organization. The tremendous progress made in information technology (IT) in recent years has stimulated the United States and other countries to undertake military technology research. These movements have made advancements in biotechnology, cyber security, cutting-edge technology such as space weapons, precision guidance technology and unmanned technology. Efforts are also being made to upgrade intelligence gathering, special operations, and other capabilities.

Substantial economic, social, technological and other changes are emerging in today's world. Advances in information and communication technologies allow information to pass across national borders and be conveyed around the world instantly. More sophisticated means of transportation allow people and goods to

pass back and forth frequently across national borders. Knowledge from all over the world is linked to generate a synergistic effect that produces new knowledge, which in turn sparks a variety of changes. The speed of communication is accelerating these changes.

These diverse changes have had an impact on states and on the security environment, and changes in the security environment leads defense to change its stance and role.

These changes in the security environment means that we no longer live in an age in which defense capabilities are designed only around deterring invasions. Instead, we live in an era requiring that we confront a variety of problems arising both inside and outside Japan, protect the lives and property of the Japanese people, and act for the sake of world peace in cooperation with other countries. Globalization has stripped traditional meaning from national borders, and Japan's responsibilities today include utilizing its defense capabilities as a Japanese national public property for international peace cooperation activities and contributing positively to the establishment of world peace.

To meet the needs of the times and the expectations of the Japanese people in this context, the Ministry of Defense needs to ensure that it appropriately transforms its stances and roles through changes in the security environment. It is especially important today to ensure that defense capabilities function properly when they are needed.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defense must further strengthen its crisis management system so that it can deal more quickly and accurately with a variety of emergency situations and ensure the safety and security of the nation. To respond more suitably to changing circumstances, the Ministry must bolster its policy-making/planning functions and present a variety of policy options; to deal effectively with the policy issues of a new era, the Ministry must also continually conduct reviews to make sure that its organizations are suited to the times.

At the same time, some aspects should be maintained without change. The Ministry of Defense is a key organization responsible for national defense as the state's most fundamental role, and defense administration is based on the support and trust of the people. Grounded on the significance of defense, the Ministry of Defense firmly holds to an exclusively defense-oriented policy and a repudiation of any ambition to become a major military power as the foundations of defense policy, and must strive to fulfill its duties to satisfy the public's trust under a framework of civilian control of the military, characterized by Diet and Cabinet control over the SDF. In implementing measures, the Ministry of Defense must continue to remain accountable for both inside and outside Japan so as to earn the understanding and support of the nation.

The transition to the Ministry of Defense, the stipulation of international peace cooperation as a primary mission, and the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense are all efforts to this end. The Ministry of Defense is seeking through these measures to become a more robust organization in crises that can also contribute to world peace.

Section 1 of this chapter will present the history of the Ministry of Defense and the Self Defense Forces, and will describe the defense posture that has taken on greater importance in national administration by showing actual examples of the activities of today's Ministry of Defense and SDF. Section 2 will explain the transition to ministry status and the stipulation of international peace cooperation as SDF's primary mission as measures toward creating a new organization responsible for defense, and Section 3 will discuss the Ministry of Defense's organization.

Section 1. History of the MOD/SDF

—Expansion of the Duties/Roles Required of the MOD/SDF—

The Defense Agency and the SDF were established in 1954, and in their 52nd year were transitioned to the MOD. With the turning point marked by the end of the Cold War spurring significant changes to the security environment, the duties and roles required for the MOD/SDF have expanded to include responding to large-scale natural disasters inside and outside the country and participating in international peace cooperation activities. The importance of defense has increased, and the nation's expectations of the MOD/SDF are rising. These changes make it imperative that the MOD enhance its policy-making/planning functions and carry out more effective defense administration.

This section will outline the MOD/SDF's history and offer actual examples of the activities of today's MOD/SDF.

1. The History of the MOD/SDF

1. From the Establishment of the Defense Agency/SDF to the End of the Cold War

In August 1945, Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and agreed to implement its conditions. Under Allied occupation, Japan dismantled its former army and navy and continued its efforts to rebuild the country and restore its sovereignty. Against the backdrop of an East-West Cold War emerging between the United States and the USSR (and their respective allies), the partition of the Korean Peninsula and the conclusion of a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance between China and the Soviet Union, the Korean War erupted in 1950. With the mainstay of U.S. forces in Japan expected to be deployed to the Korean Peninsula as part of a U.N. force, the Japanese government established the National Police Reserve in August 1950 to maintain domestic order.

In 1951 the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were signed, and April 28, 1952 saw the restoration of Japan's sovereignty and its return to the international community as an independent state. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty nevertheless permitted U.S. military forces to be stationed in Japan for national defense purposes, with Japan to rely on the U.S. military for defense against direct invasion. In August 1952, three months after the restoration of sovereignty, the National Police Reserve and the Maritime Guard (created as an organization of the Japan Coast Guard in April of that year) were combined to form a National Safety Agency whose purpose was similar to that of the National Police Reserve, i.e., to supplement general police capabilities for maintaining domestic order. However, Japan did not go so far as to establish an organization responsible for national defense.

In May 1953, it became clear that the United States was considering economic and military aid to Japan based on the Mutual Security Act (MSA). Although the Japanese government chose to accept this MSA, it conditioned its approval of the MSA agreement on efforts by Japan for its own defense; increases to the National Safety Force thus became a focus of Japan-U.S. negotiations. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (President of the Liberal Party) and Mamoru Shigemitsu, President of the Reform Party (then an opposition party), met for talks on this issue in September 1953, and came to agreement on developing a long-term program to establish defense capabilities, revising the National Safety Agency Law, transforming the National Safety Force into the Self-Defense Force, and assigning to the SDF the mission of defending Japan against direct invasion.

Following this political decision, the Japanese government dispatched a special envoy (Hayato Ikeda, Chairman of the Liberal Party's Policy Research Committee) to the United States, where he engaged in discussions with Assistant Secretary of State Robertson (Ikeda-Robertson Talks). The negotiations on Japan's



Ceremony for commemoration of the establishment of Defense Agency (1954)



Armored vehicles on parade in Ginza after SDF Central Review (1958)



Establishment of SDF flag/SDF naval ensign (1954)



First ASDF Blue Impulse team in flight with former (initial) markings (1960)



Demonstrators opposed to Japan-US Security Treaty congregate in front of Diet Building (1960)

defense capabilities faced problems (Japan insisted on a force of 180,000 personnel, the United States on a 325,000-strong force), but the U.S. side also acknowledged the restrictions faced by Japan in increasing its defense capabilities. The MSA Agreement was finally signed in March 1954.

The Yoshida-Shigemitsu talks prompted three conservative parties (Liberal Party, Progressive Party, Japan Liberal Party) to meet for a series of negotiations. In March 1954 two defense bills—the Defense Agency Establishment Bill and the Self Defense Forces Law—were approved by the Cabinet, passed by the Diet on June 2, and went into force in July 1 of that year. Thus was born the first organization in the post-war period that had as its mission the defense of Japan against an armed attack.

As a consequence of this establishment process, the Defense Agency was initially a small organization, provided or loaned almost all of its equipment by the United States. Its primary mission was to build up from scratch and maintain the country's defense capabilities and to manage defense personnel.

The very existence of the SDF was of significance in the sense of serving as a deterrent against the contingency of an invasion during the Cold War. Until the Cold War drew to a close, the Defense Agency focused more attention on building the SDF as a deterrent than on actually deploying the SDF.

Although the constitutionality of the SDF was still the object of debate between the ruling and opposition parties in the Diet, SDF members enthusiastically embraced their mission and conscientiously continued



Badge System data screen (1969)



Soviet MIG-25 fighter after forcing a landing at Hakodate Airport (1976)



US President Reagan reviewing honor guard (1983)



GSDF KV-107II helicopter on relief activities following airplane crash

Fig. II-3-1-2 Post-Cold War Measures/Activities Regarding the MOD (Defense Agency)/SDF

(As of March 2007)

	Revisions to Laws (41)	Conclusion of Treaties (12)	Cabinet Decisions (9)
1991			● Cabinet Order on Provisional Measures for Transportation of Refugees during Gulf Crisis
1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Passage of International Peace Cooperation Law ● Revision of Law Concerning Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams (development of framework for SDF participation) 		
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Passage of Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Regulation of Specific Chemicals ● Revision of Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and SDF Law (addition of authority to ensure passage of emergency SDF vehicles during disaster relief operations) ● Passage of Dispatched Defense Agency Officials Working Conditions Law ● Revision of Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and SDF Law (authority added for emergency government funding for disaster relief missions, for designation of warning zones, and for work orders) 		● National Defense Program Outline in and after 1996
1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of Defense Agency Establishment Law (establishment of new Intelligence Headquarters) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Diet approval of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement ● Final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) 	● Cabinet decision on dealing with foreign submarines passing submerged through Japanese territorial/inland waters
1997		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation 	
1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law (addition of provisions covering the use of weapons on the order of a superior officer) 		
1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of SDF Law (addition of ships to the methods available for transporting expatriate Japanese nationals) ● Passage of Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan ● Revision of Special Law on Nuclear Disasters Countermeasures and SDF Law (addition of provisions on nuclear disaster dispatches) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Diet approval of revisions to Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (addition of provisions covering situations in areas surrounding Japan) 	● Manual on joint responses to suspicious vessels
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Passage of Ship Inspection Operations Law 		
2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of SDF Law (greater authority granted for the use of weapons during maritime security operations) ● Revision of SDF Law (authority added for collection of intelligence prior to receipt of orders for internal security operations, for guarding mobilization, and for use of weapons during peacetime to safeguard facilities) ● Revision of SDF Law (addition of guarding operations for US military bases) ● Revision of SDF Law (stricter penalties to protect security) ● Passage of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law ● Revision of Dispatched Defense Agency Officials Working Conditions Law (addition of UN PKO Department to dispatch destinations for SDF officers) ● Revision of International Peace Cooperation Law (lifting of freeze on core PKF operations) 		

	Revisions to Laws (41)	Conclusion of Treaties (12)	Cabinet Decisions (9)
2002		● "2+2" Joint Declaration (Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee)	
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Passage of Armed Attack Situation Response Law ● Revision of Security Council Establishment Law ● Revision of SDF Law (facilitation of SDF operations) ● Passage of Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq ● Revision of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (two-year extension of effective term) 		● Cabinet decision on establishment of a ballistic missile defense system
2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Passage of Civil Protection Law ● Passage of Prisoners of War Law ● Passage of Law concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law ● Passage of Maritime Transport Restriction Law ● Revision of SDF Law (establishment of fundamental ACSA provisions) ● Passage of U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law ● Passage of Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Diet approval of Protocol I to Geneva Conventions ● Diet approval of Protocol II to Geneva Conventions ● Diet approval of revisions to Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (maintenance in line with passage of legislation on responses to armed attacks) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Counterterrorism guidelines for SDF and police ● National Defense Program Outline in and after 2005
2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of SDF Law (ballistic missile countermeasures) ● Revision of SDF Law (transition to joint operation structure) ● Revision to Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (validity extended by one year) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● "2+2" Joint Declaration (Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee) ● Transformation and restructuring of Japan-U.S. alliance 	
2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of Defense Agency Establishment Law (policy proposal functions strengthened by restructuring of internal bureaus) ● Revision of Public Office Election Law (creation of absentee voting system for SDF members dispatched overseas) ● One-year extension of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law ● Revision of Defense Ministry/Agency Establishment Law (transition to Ministry of Defense) ● Revision of SDF Law (stipulation of international peace cooperation of primary mission) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation ● "The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century" (joint statement) 	● Cabinet decision on government approaches to reviewing USFJ force structure
2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Revision of Law related to U.S. military realignment ● Revision of Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition/consolidation of Defense Facilities Administration Agency) 		● Emergency response procedures for the destruction of ballistic missiles

Note: Revisions to Law: Establishment/revision of laws
Conclusion of Treaties: Conclusion of treaties, intergovernmental agreements
Cabinet Decisions: Cabinet decisions and other intragovernmental agreements

Total of 62 measures

(1) Expansion of the Missions and Roles of the MOD/SDF

The drafts and plans of important policies drawn up by the MOD have increased sharply in the new security environment. Between the conclusion of the Cold War and the end of last year, more than 60 key defense-related measures were taken by the Japanese government: 41 laws (including emergency legislation) were passed or revised, a total of 12 treaties and joint statements were concluded and made with foreign governments, and nine Cabinet decisions were issued. (See Fig. II-3-1-2)

(2) Increase in Activities Inside and Outside Japan

a. Activities within Japan

The SDF has responded to a variety of disasters—the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the eruption of Mt. Unzen-Fugen, the subway sarin incident, the eruption of Mt. Usu, the Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake, and torrential rainfall—and to the appearance of suspicious vessels in Japanese waters. From the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake to the end of last year, domestic disaster response activities—including dispatches to areas stricken by the October 2004 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake and the March 2007 Noto Peninsula Earthquake—numbered about 10,000 and involved a total of about 2.75 million SDF members.

The appearance of a suspicious vessel off the coast of the Noto Peninsula in 1999 prompted the Japanese government to order the first maritime security operations since the SDF was established. The second maritime security operations were carried out in 2004 when a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine made a submerged passage through Japanese waters.

In the wake of the 1998 launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea, the government began developing a ballistic missile defense system to counter the emerging threat of ballistic missiles.

b. Activities Overseas

Partial revisions to the International Peace Cooperation Law and the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams were passed in 1992 and, since the dispatch of SDF units to Cambodia, the SDF has been engaged in international peace cooperation activities around the world in such places as Mozambique, Zaire, the Golan Heights, and East Timor. The SDF's international peace cooperation activities have particularly expanded in recent years – among these being international disaster relief activities, Iraq humanitarian and recovery assistance activities in line with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and activities in the Indian Ocean based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law as well as peacekeeping operations – and a total of about 30,000 SDF members have been dispatched in 20 or so deployments as of the end of last year. (See Fig. II-3-1-3)

c. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation


Defense cooperation between Japan and the United States has become more effective and the Japan-U.S. security arrangements more reliable with the formulation of the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security and the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan-U.S. cooperation has also progressed internationally in the fight against terrorism since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. In addition, defense cooperation between Japan and the United States has been strengthened and expanded through Japan-U.S. talks on the realignment of U.S. forces. (See Part III, Chapter 2)

d. Security Dialogue and Defense Exchange

In recognition of the importance to the security environment of deepening relations of mutual trust, bilateral and multilateral security dialogue and defense exchange have been actively conducted in recent years, with 18 countries/organizations in Asia engaged in regular discussions. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2)

Fig. II-3-1-3 Broadening International Peace Cooperation Activities by the SDF

- Participation in about 20 international activities in such areas as Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Central America
- Approximately 30,000 SDF members in total have been dispatched



92	International peace cooperation operations in Cambodia (Sep. 1992–Sep. 1993)		
93	International peace cooperation operations in Mozambique (May 1993–Jan. 1995)		
94	Refugee relief and international peace cooperation operations in Rwanda (Sep. 1994–Dec. 1994)		
95			
96	International peace cooperation operations in Golan Heights (From Feb. 1996)		
97	Dispatch of transport aircraft for transportation of Japanese nationals (Cambodia)		
98	Dispatch of transport aircraft for transportation of Japanese nationals (Indonesia) International disaster relief operations in Honduras (Nov. 1998–Dec. 1998)		
99	International disaster relief operations in Turkey (Sep. 1999–Nov. 1999) Refugee relief and international peace cooperation operations in East Timor (Nov. 1999–Feb. 2000)		
00			
01	International disaster relief operations in India (Feb. 2001) Refugee relief and international peace cooperation operations in Afghanistan (Oct. 2001) Cooperation and support activities in accordance with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Dec. 2001–present)		
02	International peace cooperation operations in East Timor (Feb. 2002–Jun. 2004) Refugee relief and international peace cooperation operations in Iraq (Mar. 2003–Apr. 2003) Iraqi war victims relief and international peace cooperation operations in Afghanistan (Jul. 2003–Aug. 2003)		
03	Response measures in accordance with Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Dec. 2003–present) International disaster relief activities in Iran (Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004)		
04	International disaster relief activities in Thailand (Dec. 2004–Jan. 2005)		
05	International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (Jan. 2005–Mar. 2005) International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (Oct. 2005–Dec. 2005) International disaster relief activities offshore Kamchatka Peninsula, Russian Federation (Aug. 2005)		(Ongoing)
06	International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (Jun. 2006)		
07	International peace cooperation operations in Nepal (Mar. 2007–present)		

(3) Expansion of Support and Understanding of MOD/SDF Activities

The efforts of countless SDF members have garnered public understanding and support for the MOD/SDF, and the MOD/SDF are viewed both in Japan and overseas in a considerably different light now than when they were created 52 years ago. A public opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Office last year showed that about 85% of the Japanese public had a favorable impression of the SDF. The overseas activities of the SDF have also earned the praise and heightened the expectations of the international community. (See Figs. II-3-1-4 • 5) (See Reference 61)

Fig. II-3-1-4 Assessment of SDF at Home and Abroad




Fig. II-3-1-5 Assessment of the SDF



* Survey by Yomiuri Shimbun (November 2004, November 2005). Other figures are from "Public Opinion Survey on SDF and Defense Issues" (February 2006)

2. MOD/SDF Activities Today

Today's changing security environment necessitates discussions with other countries, relevant ministries/agencies and local governments as well as expansion of the missions and roles of the MOD/SDF in dealing with terrorism and suspicious vessels, countering ballistic missiles, supporting U.S. military realignment, engaging in international peace cooperation activities, and providing public protection and disaster prevention.

Specifically, the MOD/SDF is increasingly involved in 1) discussions with the United States and other countries, 2) negotiations with relevant ministries/agencies on the SDF's international peace cooperation activities, community development for local governments hosting bases, transfer costs for U.S. military facilities, and such matters, and 3) discussions and collaboration with local governments in public protection, disaster prevention drills, and military base issues. These discussions and negotiations are directly tied to the defense of Japan and the safety of the Japanese people.

Even as the MOD concerns itself with policy-making/planning, overseeing the SDF, and conducting discussions with other countries, relevant ministries/agencies and local governments, it is transforming into an organization providing various forms of assistance to SDF members carrying out their missions heedless of danger and to their families back at home.

In these circumstances, the MOD has responsibility and authority for the nation's defense under the control of the Minister of Defense, whose exclusive responsibility is the defense of the country. Accordingly the MOD needs to engage in defense-related discussions with other countries, relevant ministries/agencies and local governments and take other steps beneficial to the peace, safety, and future of Japan.

This section will cite specific examples of the current activities of the MOD/SDF – such as efforts to address Iraq humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, ballistic missile defense, and issues surrounding U.S. military facilities/areas in Japan – to provide a sample of MOD/SDF activities.

1. Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities

The international community has worked in concert to assist in the recovery and reconstruction of Iraq by the Iraqi people themselves. To build a peaceful and stable society in Iraq for the future, serious efforts by both the Iraqi people and the entire international community are needed, and numerous approaches by Japan and the rest of the international community are necessary. Japan, as a responsible member of the international community and in consideration of its own national interest, has been involved for about three and a half years in activities for the reconstruction of Iraq.

The government began in early 2004 dispatching GSDF units assigned humanitarian and reconstruction assistance duties in accordance with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and later withdrew these units after determining that they had accomplished their objective of laying the minimum groundwork necessary for Iraqis in Musanna Province themselves to carry on the reconstruction. In response to a request from the United Nations, ASDF units continue to provide assistance to the United Nations and the multinational forces by, for instance, airlift operations Baghdad and Irbil.



SDF troops in Samawah camp bid farewell to departing units

The MOD/SDF have implemented a wide range of efforts and measures to effectively carry out the SDF's Iraq humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities, and the following are seen as the key factors for GSDF's successful mission in Iraq

a. Selection of Dispatch Destinations

Following passage of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in the Diet, a government survey team and a specialist research team principally comprised of SDF officials were dispatched to study detailed local requirements for SDF activities.

The survey results provided by the specialist research team mostly made up of SDF officials made it clear that in southeastern Iraq 1) the locals had high hopes that medical equipment would be provided and hospital facilities repaired, 2) restoring elementary schools (e.g., improving school grounds and painting school buildings) would be an effective means of building good relations with the local residents, and 3) the supply of water for day-to-day use in Musanna Province was both qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate due to poor water infrastructure. Also, the same team confirmed that the security environment was relatively stable in the area.



GSD member distributing writing materials at Al Nahiru Elementary School



Water truck provided to Iraq through ODA

As a result of the research and the comprehensive analysis of relevant information, it became clear that Japan was expected to provide reconstruction assistance in Iraq and that there were certain activities that the SDF could perform safely. Hence the Japanese government determined that Japan, as a responsible member of the international community, should engage in the activities and dispatched the SDF units to Iraq.

b. Connection with Official Development Assistance (ODA)

The GSDF's activities in Iraq in conjunction with ODA assistance under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to the reconstruction of Iraq just like a car is smoothly driven by its four wheels. The concerted functioning of ODA and the SDF's humanitarian cooperation in medical assistance activities—for example, the use of medical equipment provided through ODA and guidance in medical technology offered by the SDF—made possible seamless assistance in both the “hardware” and “software” aspects of enhancing Samawa's medical system, and produced major accomplishments. In addition, Japan was also able to generate visible successes in Iraq reconstruction assistance by improving/restoring water supply and public facilities as a result of cooperation between the SDF and ODA by effectively carrying out reconstruction assistance activities.

c. Measures to Deal with Harsh Environments

The SDF conducted its activities in Iraq under a harsh and trying environment, so the former Defense Agency from the outset placed great emphasis on ensuring that dispatched SDF members would be able to maintain good physical and mental health and execute their duties without problem. Welfare facilities outfitted with training gyms and rooms for contacting family members were set up in the camps of dispatched units so that SDF members could maintain high morale and concentrate with peace of mind on their duties even in such difficult working conditions.

Together with securing communications channels (international telephone, video-phone, and e-mail) that permit dispatched members and their families to converse directly, the MOD also endeavored to sustain the bonds between SDF members and their family members back home by organizing video letters between SDF members and their families in Japan so they could keep each other up-to-date on their situations. The MOD also opened a family support center and provided assistance to families back at home so that they could concentrate on their duties without anxiety.



Families speaking by videophone with SDF member

As mentioned previously, the MOD also implemented mental health care measures, offering courses that provided SDF members the knowledge necessary to reduce stress prior to dispatch and training certain SDF members to serve as counselors at the camps; these steps all point to the consideration given by the MOD to the psychological care of SDF members engaged in professional duties under harsh conditions. In addition, the MOD assigned medical officers to the dispatched units, sent medical officers with specialist knowledge from Japan if necessary, and provided repatriation treatment.

d. Exchange with Local Residents

Good relations with local residents were essential to the dispatched GSDF units in carrying out their activities. With this in mind, SDF members taught origami to the local people, presented musical concerts, and otherwise made efforts to engage in exchange with the local people while providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The local children responded warmly, staging theatrical performances and making paintings for the SDF members.

Positive ties were established with the local residents through these exchanges and, on February 26, 2005, about 150 people joined together in a show of support for the GSDF troops held in front of the GSDF camp; such an expression of support was unprecedented among the multinational coalition. During their activities and during transit, members of the GSDF units were regularly greeted with smiles and waves by the local residents.

e. Friendly Relations with the Defense Organizations of Other Countries

Even before the GSDF units arrived, the Dutch military was in charge of maintaining public order in Musanna Province. The Dutch military assisted the GSDF in numerous ways by aiding the surveys conducted prior to the dispatch of GSDF units, supporting the deployment of these units, and helping the GSDF units once their activities were underway. The Dutch military began its withdrawal in February 2005, handing over responsibility for maintaining security in Musanna Province to the British military on March 7, 2005; in May the Australian military was dispatched to Samawa, and British and Australian units were deployed in the area

from May until the pullout of the GSDF units. Although Samawa could be said to be more secure than other regions, the hazard of possible terrorist activity made collaboration with the multinational forces critical for the GSDF units. Consequently, the GSDF units cooperated closely with other forces, assigning liaison personnel mutually and seeking regular opportunities to share views, cultural exchange, and other interaction. Security intelligence obtained through close exchanges of views with British and Australian units proved useful to the protection of SDF in force.

The MOD/SDF have thus accumulated experience by formulating and planning measures to address a range of issues that enabled the SDF to carry out their humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities effectively. The establishment of a basis for the SDF to play leading and active roles in future international peace cooperation activities via this experience can be deemed a major achievement for the MOD/SDF. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1)



GSDF member interacting with children in front of Al Asmail Elementary School



GSDF member teaching Japanese calligraphy to multinational force soldiers

2. Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) Introduction

Although Japan decided to introduce a ballistic missile defense system in December 2003, serious discussions took place within the government before the system was actually introduced.

The MOD's analysis of the new security environment determined that ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction constituted a practical threat for Japan.

Nevertheless, ballistic missile defense is said to be several orders more difficult than hitting a bullet with a bullet, requiring extremely advanced radar technology and intercept missile guidance technology. The United States also found the development of a ballistic missile defense system a task fraught with difficulties. After spending more than 20 years from the Reagan administration and as much as 10 trillion yen to realize ballistic missile defense, the United States at last obtained the capability of intercepting ballistic missiles and was able to deploy SM-3 Aegis-borne interceptor missiles and the Patriot PAC-3, a ground-based interception system.

Given these issues, the MOD and other organizations in Japan carried out in-depth studies on whether Japan should introduce a ballistic missile defense system.

There also remained a variety of unresolved issues between Japan and the United States: whether the ballistic missile defense capabilities could even be deployed in Japan given the limitations of U.S. production capabilities, and what approaches should be taken between Japan and the United States toward sharing intelligence, as well as what joint operational initiatives should be adopted by Japan and the United States.

The conclusions reached in discussions between Japan and the United States, including those between the MOD and the U.S. Department of Defense were that the United States would deploy the ballistic missile

defense capabilities in Japan, that information would be shared as much as possible, and that Japan would consider establishing its own ballistic missile defense system while also pursuing joint Japan-U.S. BMD to double ensure the safety of Japan.

The internal government discussions lasted about six months, and the government approved BMD introduction at the end of 2003.

(2) Moving up the Deployment Program

The MOD has heretofore made a number of studies regarding early deployment of a ballistic missile defense system to ensure the safety and security of the Japanese people from the threat of ballistic missiles. In light of recent circumstances such as North Korea's ballistic missile launches in July 2006, further investigations show that the 16 Patriot PAC-3 air defense units scheduled to be fully operational at the end of March 2011 could in fact be ready by mid-2010.



Patriot PAC-3 missile launch



SM-3 launch (US DOD)

Refitting of the first SM-3-equipped Aegis vessels for BMD purposes (*Kongo*) was to be completed around March 2008, but coordination with the United States has enabled this target date to be moved up to December 2007. Further discussions are being held with the United States on the deployment of other SM-3-equipped Aegis vessels in the hope of working out a concrete deployment schedule. The MOD will continue to examine the feasibility of early deployment of BMD systems.

(3) Deployment of U.S. Army PAC-3 and Related Systems

The prompt deployment to Japan of U.S. military units having some ability to counter ballistic missiles would be an effective defensive measure for Japan. To ensure the safety of the public from ballistic missile attacks, Japan has for some time committedly pursued ballistic missile defense cooperation with the United States. As a result, a U.S. military mobile BMD radar (AN/TPY-2, i.e., "X-Band Radar") was deployed in June 2006 to the ASDF Shariki Sub-base in Aomori Prefecture, the BMD-capable Aegis vessel "Shiloh" entered Yokosuka Port at the end of August, and U.S. PAC-3 systems were deployed to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa and other sites beginning that September.

Japan will continue to devote its full efforts to acquiring, as early as possible, the capabilities to protect itself against ballistic missiles and will maintain its close cooperation with the United States.

3. Issues Involving U.S. Military Facilities/Areas in Japan

Tricky negotiations between Japan and the United States over a three-and-a-half-year period reached a final conclusion on May 1, 2006, on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in the form of the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” In view of the recent changes in the security environment and the evolution of defense/security policies in both countries, this extremely important step in improving the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. security arrangements by maintaining deterrence capabilities and reducing the burdens on local communities is of great significance.

The facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) will play a vital role in the prompt implementation of a joint Japan-U.S. response to an armed attack on Japan. USFJ also functions as a deterrent to prevent armed attacks against Japan, and thus have an extremely important responsibility in ensuring Japan’s safety. This U.S. military presence serves as the foundation for U.S. military engagement in the region, and is essential to maintaining regional peace and stability.

In order for the USFJ facilities and areas to fulfill their functions adequately, the understanding and cooperation of the local communities in which they are located are essential. At the same time, progressing urbanization over the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty have brought USFJ facilities and areas adjacent to urban areas and industrial zones, and in a number of cases they have come to have a major impact on the living environment of residents and community development. The social environment of surrounding areas has thus greatly changed. The impact of these facilities and areas must be reduced as much as possible, taking into account changes in the social environment of surrounding areas, if USFJ facilities and areas are to fulfill their functions adequately and gain genuine public acceptance and support. Accordingly, in the realignment of the USFJ, the Japanese government has been implementing measures to reduce the burdens imposed on local communities surrounding the USFJ facilities and areas, thereby ensuring the stable use of these facilities and areas.

In order to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities where the USFJ facilities and areas are located, there must be someone who will share the burdens with the communities, and so the government has been examining regional promotion and other measures for the municipalities that will newly assume the burdens following the realignment of the USFJ.

For the realignment of the USFJ, it is basically necessary for the national government to formulate coherent policies by consulting with the United States, coordinating opinions within the government, and discussing with local governments.

The internal bureaus of the Ministry of Defense played a central role in discussions with the United States while the Defense Facilities Administration Agency primarily coordinated with local public authorities, but the Defense Facilities Administration Agency will be abolished and consolidated into the Ministry of Defense this fiscal year to create a system whereby talks with the United States, relevant ministries/agencies and local governments as well as policy proposals can be carried out more efficiently, smoothly, and effectively.

Given its responsibility and authority for defense matters, the MOD will need to actively address issues involving U.S. military facilities/areas in Japan in the future to earn the trust of the public and local residents. (See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2)

Section 2. Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

A bill on the transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry was submitted to the Diet last year, and passed by more than 90% of votes in favor in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors. The Defense Agency thus became the MOD on January 9, 2007.

The MOD/SDF is an organization that bears the role of securing the peace and independence of Japan, the most fundamental role to the nation's existence. With the importance of defense increasing and the public's expectations of the MOD and SDF on the rise, how to address security issues and crisis management has become a key issue of national administration.

The two major steps of making the transition to the MOD and stipulation of international peace cooperation activities as the primary mission of the SDF were carried out in order to more precisely address these issues.

This section discusses these steps.



Former Prime Minister Nakasone giving a speech at the ceremony for commemoration of the transition to a ministry

1. Basic Concepts in Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

1. Background

The background of the transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry is changes in the security environment surrounding Japan. The principal changes are described below.

(1) Japan's Response to Emergency Situations

In areas surrounding Japan, there exist concerns over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and over issues of territorial rights, while inside Japan, large-scale natural disasters occur almost every year. Today we live in a world where rapid and proper management of such diverse risks is needed in order to protect the lives and property of the people.

(2) Changes in the International Environment

Responses to new threats and diverse contingencies that have emerged since the end of the Cold War, such as international terrorism and increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have become issues in today's world. In addition, with interdependence among countries deepening, the peace and security of one country has become closely related to the peace and security of the international community as a whole.

Therefore, active efforts to improve the international security environment on Japan's own initiative become an important issue from the viewpoint of the peace and security of Japan.

(3) Changes in the Roles of Defense Forces in the International Community

Given the present international and domestic circumstances, the roles of defense forces are expanding beyond preventive measures and responses to full-scale invasions against Japan, to a wide range of endeavors,

including responses to diverse contingencies such as terrorism, the United Nations and other peace keeping operations, support for nation-building, disaster relief dispatches both at home and abroad, and improvements to Japan's credibility in the security aspect of its relations with other countries.

2. Necessity of Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

As mentioned above, in the changing security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF has been accumulating experience in various operations, including U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, international disaster relief operations, and disaster dispatches, for over 50 years since its establishment, and such operations are gaining wider public acceptance. Furthermore, there are increasing expectations and requests from the international community for the SDF's performance as apparent from the praise given the SDF's performance thus far, and these expectations must be fulfilled.

In these situations, it is important 1) to improve defense policy-making/planning functions, 2) to enhance and strengthen responses to emergency situations; and 3) to develop a structure that allows for proactive efforts for the peace and stability of the international community.

In developing such a structure, it was necessary to give the Defense Agency the status of a ministry within the organization of the Government of Japan and to place a minister exclusively in charge of national defense so that it can appropriately fulfill the significant roles discussed above. In addition, it was necessary to review the primary mission of the SDF, and to such activities as international peace cooperation.

2. Significance of Transition to a Ministry

1. Significance of Transition to a Ministry

The Cabinet is responsible for the Government, and each of the 11 office and ministries has its own exclusive chief, or a minister in charge. For instance, the Finance Minister exclusively in charge of financial affairs, and the Foreign Minister in charge of foreign affairs. On the other hand, the Prime Minister, as the head of the Cabinet Office, who is responsible for administrative affairs such as gender equality, the Northern Territories issue and finance, also served as the minister in charge of national defense.


In Japan, organizations responsible for important policies are given ministry status, while the Defense Agency had remained an agency.

The Defense Agency/SDF had assumed a fundamental role for a state, which is to safeguard the peace and independence of Japan. On top of that, in order to fulfill the responsibilities now required of the Defense Agency/SDF, to be touched upon later in this section, it was necessary to add activities such as international peace cooperation operations to the primary missions of the SDF.

In light of these circumstances, the transition to a ministry entailed putting in place a minister in charge to serve as a chief of national defense, the importance of which has increased in governmental affairs. The transition to a ministry also gives the Defense Agency the same status of a ministry as other organizations responsible for important policies. Because the minister responsible for national defense following this transition will be the Minister of Defense, supervision and control responsibilities as the minister in charge of defense will fall not to the Prime Minister as head of the Cabinet Office but to the Minister of Defense. (See Fig. II-3-2-1)

As mentioned earlier, the transition to the MOD was designed 1) to bolster defense policy-making/planning functions, 2) to enhance and strengthen responses to emergency situations, and 3) to enable Japan on its own initiative to work proactively for the peace and stability of the international community.

Fig. II-3-2-1 Central Government Structure



The transition to the MOD will also likely have a positive impact on the morale among SDF members and public opinion as well.

Below are presented more specific explications on the significance of the aforementioned.

(1) Bolstering the Defense Policy Making/Planning System

The primary reason for the designation of the MOD as the Defense Agency hitherto has been that management of the SDF was considered its primary mission.

The Defense Agency’s primary role was rather management of the SDF, i.e., the enhancement of defense capabilities and the administration of personnel affairs, than policy-making/planning.

With the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan in recent years, the SDF’s mission has expanded and diversified from the defense of Japan to incorporate disaster relief activities both at home and abroad and activities for international peace with the fact that its actual number of operations have increased.

The Defense Agency had already been transformed into an organization qualified for ministry status such as policy-making/planning and control of the SDF by the important defense-related bills passed by the Diet almost every year in recent years.

The operational priorities of the Defense Agency have thus shifted from management of the SDF to policy making/planning and, in line with this change, circumstances emerged that were favorable to its repositioning as a ministry and an organization primarily responsible for policy-making/planning functions.

This transition to a ministry created a minister with exclusive responsibility for national defense and, the Minister of Defense has been granted responsibility and authority appropriate to a policy organ that enables the MOD to respond to changing circumstances and present a variety of policy options, including the drafting of bills and deployment of the SDF. This bolstered its policy-making/planning functions and implementation capabilities.

(2) Rapid and Appropriate Responses to Diverse Emergency Situations

In the midst of the changing security environment, it is necessary to ensure people’s safety and provide reassurances against diverse emergency situations, including terrorism, suspicious boat incidents, and natural disasters. In meeting the important responsibility of responding to emergency situations, the MOD/SDF needs to devise a framework for rapid and accurate responses to all contingencies through coordination with relevant

governmental organizations as well as local governments and utilization of the personnel, organization and equipment of the SDF.

While the Defense Agency was still an external-ministerial bureau of the Cabinet Office, the Director General of the Defense Agency was unable to request Cabinet meetings for the establishment of laws and regulations relevant to the work of the Agency and for the conduct of important SDF activities, which were instead proposed by the head of the Cabinet Office, i.e., the Prime Minister. The Director-General of the Defense Agency was also unable to directly submit budget and disbursement requests to the Minister of Finance.


Transition to a ministry will provide a more reliable emergency-management system as described below.

- a. The Minister of State for Defense will be called the Minister of Defense as the minister exclusively responsible for national defense just like ministers in charge of other ministries. This will clarify the line of responsibility for national defense.
 - b. The efforts in undertaking national crisis management will demonstrate clearly to its nationals and other countries.
 - c. The head of the ministry, not the prime minister, will, as the minister in charge, be able to directly exercise his or her duties, which will further enhance and strengthen the crisis management and enable more rapid and precise response to a variety of emergency situations.
- 1) Requests to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet meetings for enactment and an amendment of laws and ministry ordinances concerning security and the SDF
 - 2) Requests to the Finance Minister regarding budget requests and implementation; acquisition of government properties such as training areas
 - 3) Requests to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet meetings to make decisions on implementation of important activities to protect the lives and property of the public, such as maritime security operations

The authority of the Prime Minister as the head of the Cabinet, such as the authority of supreme commander of the SDF and the authority to order the SDF to possess defense operations and public security operations, which are traditionally held by the Prime Minister as the chief of the Cabinet Office, shall continue to be preserved by the Prime Minister without change.

- 4) Requests to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet meetings for approving personnel appointments to major positions at the Ministry of Defense/SDF. (See Fig. II-3-2-2)

Fig. II-3-2-2 Simplification of Administrative Procedures by Transition to Ministry



[COLUMN]

Q&A


Will the transition of the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry facilitate the Self-Defense Forces to respond quickly to diverse emergency situations?

The security environment surrounding Japan is dramatically changing due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as well as to the intensification of international terrorism. When the Self-Defense Forces takes necessary action, such as defense operations, against those new threats and diverse contingencies, they can do so only after the order is given by the Prime Minister upon approval of the Cabinet or after the order of the Minister of State for Defense (currently Minister of Defense) is approved by the Prime Minister.

Under this system, since the Minister of State for Defense was not a “competent minister” (although the Minister of State for Defense was in effect in charge of administrative affairs concerning defense), he had no right to call for a Cabinet meeting by himself, and had to request the Prime Minister, who is the competent minister for the Cabinet Office, to call for a Cabinet meeting.

The transition of the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry is believed to accelerate response of SDF by shortening the time it takes for the government to make necessary decisions in the face of a serious crisis. By enabling the Minister of Defense to directly call for a Cabinet meeting, the new system is expected to make operations of SDF more timely and appropriate.

Practical Advantages of the Transition to a Ministry



(3) Development of a Structure to Engage in Proactive Efforts toward the Peace and Stability of the International Community on Japan's Own Initiative

In order to engage in proactive efforts to improve the international security environment by Japan's own initiative, the SDF needs more than ever to take advantage of the capabilities it possesses. To that end, it is critical that the Defense Agency be transformed into an organization that gives greater importance to international peace keeping operations via the SDF as well as security dialogues and defense exchanges.

Transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry, together with stipulation of international peace cooperation as the SDF's primary mission, which will be mentioned later, will clarify both at home and abroad Japan's posture on national defense and the realization of peace in the international community.


Furthermore, as seen in the recent transformation of U.S. forces in Japan and elsewhere, the importance of policy consultations on security and defense affairs the United States as Japan's ally has been increasing. In addition, security talks with other countries have frequently been held to promote confidence-building and cooperation in international peace cooperation.

Government organizations in charge of national defense around the world are designated either a "Ministry" or a "Department," and only Japan had given responsibility for national defense to an "Agency." Both in the United States and the United Kingdom, "Agency" refers to an organization that implements specific given tasks sitting below a "Ministry" or "Department," which is responsible for policy-making/planning.

This "agency" status potentially invited misunderstandings by other parties during defense talks, international dialogue and the SDF activities conducted overseas in cooperation with other countries because the Defense Agency may not have been deemed an administrative organ equivalent to those in charge of national defense in other countries.

Making the transition to a ministry equivalent to the administrative organizations in other countries responsible for national defense will correct such misunderstandings in the future. The minister in charge of national defense will be able to engage in discussions with defense of other countries as an equal governmental chief both in name and reality, which will deepen confidence-building and cooperative relations further. (See Fig. II-3-2-3)

Fig. II-3-2-3 Previous Format for Discussions with Other Countries



[COLUMN]

Q&A

How has the transition to a ministry been accepted by other countries?

Many countries celebrated the transition and expressed their high expectations for the newly established Ministry of Defense. Southeast Asian countries including the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,

Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar, Western countries including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine, and many other countries including Australia, New Zealand, Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Africa and Mauritania announced that they welcome the establishment of the Ministry of Defense.

Philippine President Arroyo, for example, stated at the summit meeting with Prime Minister Abe on December 9, 2006, that it is important to promote a dialog between the two countries concerning politics and security, and that she welcomes the transition of the Japan Defense Ministry to the Ministry of Defense and expects the transition to help to accelerate their cooperation. China and the Republic of Korea sent comments through their diplomatic authorities that they expect Japan to maintain its pacifism.

The major objective of making the transition from the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry is to change the positioning of the administrative organization and develop a system in which Japan can perform crisis management and international peace cooperation activities even more efficiently, and therefore the transition will not cause the enhancement of Japan's defense capability in terms of both quantity and quality or the change in the exclusively defense oriented policy and other basic defense policies currently maintained by the government. This objective has been explained to other countries through security dialogs and defense exchanges at all levels including the Minister of Defense (Minister of State for Defense before the transition).

In addition, administrative organizations responsible for defense in neighboring and other countries are all positioned as either a ministry or a department.

Furthermore, the defense policies of Japan and activities of the Self-Defense Forces have been explained in annual "Defense of Japan" whitepapers as well as through security dialogs and defense exchanges with other countries, and the international understanding toward those Japanese policies and activities has been deepened.

It is therefore the government's belief that the transition to a ministry is generally accepted favorably by the neighboring and other countries as described above.

The Ministry of Defense will continue to explain the objective of the transition to other countries.

2. Adherence to the Fundamentals of Defense Policies

The purpose of the transition to the MOD is to prepare a structure suitable for an organization taking on the important function of defense policy-making/planning, including responses to emergency situations and Japanese initiatives for the peace and stability of the international community, in accordance with both international and domestic security environments.


Hence, transition to a ministry has not brought about any changes in the following fundamental aspects of Japan's defense policy—1) an exclusively defense-oriented policy, 2) a policy of not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, 3) the three non-nuclear principles, 4) civilian control of the military, and 5) building of a modest



Former Defense Agency Director-General Kawara giving a speech at the ceremony for commemoration of the transition to a ministry

defense capacity—let alone the SDF’s relation to the Constitution of Japan (see Chapter 1, Section 3 for a description of these principles). (See Fig. II-3-2-4)

Fig. II-3-2-4 No Change in Basic Defense Policies after Transition to Ministry



[COLUMN]

Q&A

Has the transition to a ministry affected civilian control of the Self-Defense Forces in any way?

When the transition from the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry was made, it was decided to maintain the basic civilian control framework including the following:

- The laws concerning and budgets for the Self-Defense Forces are placed under the democratic control of the Diet.
- The civilian Prime Minister holds the authority of supreme commander over SDF on behalf of the Cabinet, and the civilian Minister of State for Defense (Minister of Defense after the transition) controls SDF operations.
- The Security Council of Japan is established within the Cabinet to discuss important matters concerning security.

The civilian control thus continues to be strictly maintained.

In addition, the Act on the Transition to the Ministry of Defense states expressly that international peace cooperation activities and response to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consulted with the Security Council of Japan to enhance civilian control over those matters.

Transferring administrative affairs concerning national defense, which had been handled by the Prime Minister, the chief of the Cabinet Office, to the exclusive hands of the competent minister, while the framework of civilian control by the Prime Minister who serves as the head of the Cabinet as well as the commander in chief is maintained as explained above, is expected to further clarify who is responsible for and authorized to control the Self-Defense Forces, and thereby lead to even stricter civil control.

Therefore, the transition to the Ministry of Defense is a move to further enhance, and never compromise, civilian control.

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Why was the ministry named “*Boei-sho* (Ministry of Defense)” rather than “*Kokubo-sho* (Ministry of National Defense)”?

The word “*Boei* (defense)” had been used for *Boei-cho* (former Japan Defense Agency) for more than 50 years and is already familiar among the Japanese people. *Boei* is also used as a part of many legal terms, and established in Japan, where the exclusively defense oriented policy is maintained, as a word to express “defense” as in *Boei Keikaku no Taiko* (National Defense Program Outline) and *Boei-ryoku Seibi Keikaku* (Defense Build-up Plan).

Although there were some who argued that the name should be “*Kokubo-sho*” when the bill to make the transition from the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry was submitted, it was decided that “*Boei-sho*” is more appropriate as “*Boei*” has been used by the public for 50 years and is more natural. The name “*Boei-sho*” was also used during the deliberation by the ruling parties, and the bill was approved and passed in the Diet under the name of “*Boei-sho*.”

3. History of the Transition to a Ministry

The Defense Agency was established as an external ministerial bureau in the Prime Minister’s office in 1954 when the National Safety Agency was abolished. The discussion over transition from an agency to a ministry is not a new one, but has been repeatedly raised in the political arena since the inception of the Defense Agency.

In 1964, when the First Defense Build-up Program was completed and the framework of Japan’s defense capability was tentatively developed, a bill for the transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry was once even approved by the Cabinet, though the bill stopped short of being submitted to the Diet¹.

In 1981 the issue was taken up again at the Second Ad Hoc Commission on the Public Administrative Reform which was held to review government organization as a whole.

In 1997, the issue of transition to a ministry was raised at the Administrative Reform Conference. Though its final report recommended that the current Defense Agency be continued, it also stated that the fundamental issues of Japan’s national defense under new international circumstances should be separately discussed in the political arena. Political discussions continued for the next eight years. During that period, the Legislative Bill concerning the draft Defense Ministry Establishment Law was submitted to the Diet as lawmaker-initiated legislation in 2001, and in December 2002, a consensus was reached among three ruling parties—the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Komei Party and the New Conservative Party—to put the issue of transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry before everything on the agenda once the emergency legislation was enacted. However, in October 2003, the said legislative bill was abandoned with the dissolution of the House of Representatives.

Reforms have been subsequently carried out to create an organization worthy of ministry status. For instance, emergency legislation was enacted in 2003 and 2004, and with the establishment of the Joint Staff Office, joint operations functions were enhanced in March 2006. The July 2006 large-scale overhaul of the Internal Bureaus of the Defense Agency also strengthened its policy-making/planning functions. The bid-rigging scandal at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency that came to light in January 2006 was regarded as one of the incidents that severely damaged public confidence. Efforts were made to take preventive measures against the recurrence of such incidents and to restore public trust. On the basis of such circumstances, discussions over the issue of transition to a ministry have continued in the political arena. (See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3)

Specifically, the administrative reform promotion headquarters of the LDP (Chief of headquarters: Mr. Seishiro Eto) on November 22, 2005, endorsed the submission of a bill concerning transition to a ministry to the Diet with the aim of enactment, triggering a debate on this matter within the ruling parties.

Since then, members of the ruling parties have been engaged in lively discussions in the relevant committees of the LDP and the Komei Party, with the security project team of the ruling parties (Chairman: Mr. Taku Yamasaki) at the core.

In the course of such discussions, the following directions emerged: 1) a related bill was to be submitted by the Cabinet, 2) incorporating in the bill the stipulation of activities such as international peace cooperation as a primary mission of the SDF, 3) incorporating in the bill explicit provisions that important matters concerning activities like international peace cooperation should be items on which the Prime Minister seeks advice of the Security Council, 4) calling the new ministry “the Ministry of Defense,” and 5) incorporating in the bills the implementation of such measures as the abolishment and merger of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in FY 2007.

After such discussions in the political arena, both of the ruling parties approved in June 2006 the submission of the relevant bill to the Diet by the Cabinet (on June 6 to 8), the “Bill concerning Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law and Other Laws” was approved by the Cabinet, and the bill was introduced to last year’s ordinary Diet session (on June 9). At the conclusion of the ordinary Diet session, however, this bill was selected for continued deliberation.

In the autumn 2006 extraordinary Diet session, a briefing on the bill and a question-and-answer session were held on October 27 in the House of Representatives plenary session, after which the bill was submitted to the House of Representatives’ Security Committee for deliberation. The bill was approved by the Committee on November 30, then passed that same day by the House of Representatives in its plenary session with more than 90% of votes in favor.

A briefing on the bill and a question-and-answer session were subsequently held on December 6 in the House of Councilors plenary session, after which the bill was sent to the House of Councilors’ Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee for further deliberation. The bill was approved by the Committee on December 14, then passed the following day with the original language of the bill by the House of Councilors in its plenary session with more than 90% of the votes in favor. The law was promulgated on December 22, 2006, and went into effect from January 9, 2007.

3. Significance of Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as SDF’s Primary Mission

1. Traditional Concepts

The first priority mission of the SDF is defense of the country against direct and indirect invasions. In addition, the SDF shall be engaged in missions on an as-needed basis, such as civil protection dispatches, public security operations, guarding operations, maritime security operations, interception and destruction of ballistic missiles and others, disaster dispatches, earthquake dispatches, nuclear disaster dispatches, and countermeasures against violations of Japanese airspace. These missions are called second priority missions. The primary missions of the SDF thus comprise the first priority mission and second priority missions².

The SDF has participated in a variety of international peace cooperation activities. Such activities were not given the status as a primary mission, instead they are positioned as supplementary missions that Chapter 8 (miscellaneous provision) or the supplementary provision of the SDF Law provide for, in line with a concept of utilizing the SDF’s capacity developed for the defense of Japan under normal circumstances.

In the meantime, the SDF has been engaged in the operations based on the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, as well as minesweeping and evacuation of Japanese people who live abroad; however, such operations were considered supplementary.

2. Review on Positioning of Missions

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) call for proactive efforts to promote peace and stability in the international community for the sake of ensuring Japan's own peace and security and, to that end, international peace cooperation operations have been positioned as one of the roles of the defense forces. It is also stated in the NPDG that necessary arrangements should be made to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities in an appropriate manner, including appropriately positioning international peace cooperation activities within the SDF missions as priorities.

Situations in areas surrounding Japan, if left unaddressed, could eventually lead to armed attacks against Japan; from the standpoint of ensuring the peace and security of Japan, therefore, they are issues of significance. Furthermore, disposal of mines abandoned during the Second World War as well as minesweeping activities for the safe navigation of ships are important operations for ensuring the safety of the Japanese people. Given that many Japanese people visit or reside in overseas locations, the evacuation of Japanese people who live abroad at a time of conflict or other situation is also considered an important activity to ensure public safety.

A structure is needed so that the MOD can appropriately fulfill these roles required of defense forces in the new security environment. As part of the abovementioned development of a structure, these operations shall be upgraded from the traditional position of supplementary missions to primary missions of the SDF.

For the SDF to proactively undertake international peace cooperation activities, progress will be needed in setting up education/training and other systems, in the area of improving the readiness of necessary units, and enhancing transport capabilities. In order for this to happen, it would be appropriate to review the place of international peace cooperation among the SDF's missions and stipulate them as a primary mission.

Making Japan's efforts for international peace cooperation as the primary mission will send a message not only to the Japanese public but also to the international community. This will also enable SDF members active in a challenging environment to focus on their duties with greater self-awareness and pride.

Stipulation of international peace cooperation as the primary mission simply revises the place of international peace cooperation activities already set out within the SDF Law and does not assign new missions to the SDF. Nor does it alter the nature (e.g., scope and authority) of SDF activities such as international peace cooperation activities and international emergency relief activities specified in the current law; these activities will continue to be implemented within a constitutional framework in accordance with the provisions of the laws on which these activities are based.

3. Operations Newly Stipulated as Primary Missions

Among those operations historically positioned as supplementary missions, the following were stipulated as primary missions.

- 1) Activities that contribute to maintaining the peace and security of the international community including Japan, including international disaster relief operations, international peace cooperation operations, operations based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and operations based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq³
- 2) Activities conducive to ensuring the peace and security of Japan in situations arising in areas surrounding Japan, such as rear area support and other activities based on the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the

Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and ship inspection operations based on the Ship Inspection Operations Law

- 3) Activities to ensure the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese people, such as minesweeping and the evacuation of Japanese nationals abroad

In stipulation of these operations as part of the primary missions of the SDF, substantial matters associated with international peace cooperation operations of the SDF as well as responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan were incorporated into the Security Council Establishment Law as matters for deliberation at the Security Council, an advisory body to the Prime Minister, in order to enhance civilian control of the military. (See Fig. II-3-2-5)

[COLUMN]

Q&A

How has the Self-Defense Forces Law been amended to upgrade international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces?

Article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, which defines the mission of the Self-Defense Forces, has been amended as shown below:

[Article 3 before amendment]

Article 3

1. The primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces shall be to defend Japan from a direct or indirect invasion, and if deemed necessary, the Self-Defense Forces shall ensure to maintain public order.
2. Omitted



[Article 3 after amendment]

Article 3


1. The first priority mission of the Self-Defense Forces shall be to defend Japan from a direct or indirect invasion in order to protect peace and independence and maintain security of Japan, and if deemed necessary, the Self-Defense Forces shall ensure to maintain public order.
2. In addition to the mission prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the Self-Defense Forces shall perform activities that fall under either of the following and that the Self-Defense Forces are permitted separately by an act to conduct as its mission within the limit that does not hinder the performance of the first priority mission defined in the preceding paragraph and to the extent that the activity does not involve the threat or use of force.
 - i. Activities that are determined to be instrumental in securing peace and security of Japan, and performed to deal with a situation occurring in areas surrounding Japan that may severely affect peace and security of Japan
 - ii. Activities that are determined to be instrumental in maintaining peace and security of the international society including Japan, and performed as a contribution to operations for international peace organized mainly by the United Nations and to promote other international cooperation activities.
3. Omitted.

The activities performed to deal with a situation that “may severely affect peace and security of Japan” as provided in Article 3 Paragraph 2 Item i are specifically the activities based on the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law.

The activities that are “determined to be instrumental in maintaining peace and security of the international society including Japan” as provided in Article 3 Paragraph 2 Item ii are specifically the activities based on the International Peace Cooperation Law, the International Disaster Relief Law, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. The purpose of this item is to make activities by the International Disaster Relief Teams and support activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, as well as “operations for international peace organized mainly by the United Nations,” primary missions of the SDF.

Activities to protect lives and property of the people, such as minesweeping and evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad in an emergency situation, are considered part of activities to “ensure to maintain public order” as set forth in Article 3 Paragraph 1, and have also become a primary mission of the SDF.

Fig. II-3-2-5 Duties and Activities of the SDF Framework for SDF Missions Following Upgrade of International Peace Cooperation Activities to a Primary Mission



[COLUMN]

Q&A

International peace cooperation activities have been upgraded to a primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces. Does this mean that the SDF now can perform any activity without limits in foreign countries?

Newly added Article 3 Paragraph 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law sets out that the Self-Defense Forces performs activities that are “permitted separately by an act to conduct as its mission.”

As this provision indicates, activities do not become a mission of the SDF unless permitted by other act to conduct. The SDF cannot perform any new activities abroad on the grounds of Article 3 Paragraph 2 alone.

The intention behind the upgrading of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the SDF is to modify the positioning of international peace cooperation activities (which are already regulated by other act) in the Self-Defense Forces Law, and not to add new missions to the SDF. The scope of activities that the SDF is allowed to perform, as well as the authority held by the SDF, during peacekeeping operations (PKO) and international disaster relief operations are as defined by the current applicable law without any change, and these activities continue to be conducted in accordance with their respective act and within the framework of the Constitution as they have been.

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Why have activities to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan been upgraded to a primary mission?

These activities are performed when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan unless no countermeasures are taken, or when other situations that may severely affect peace and security of Japan occur in areas surrounding Japan. The activities are therefore closely connected with peace and security of Japan.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defense is of the view that it is appropriate to upgrade—along with international peace cooperation activities—these activities to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan to a primary mission as well.

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Why have minesweeping and evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad in emergency situations been upgraded to a primary mission?

Minesweeping is an activity to secure safety for vessels navigating in Japan's territorial waters as well as for Japanese vessels in high seas. The evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad in emergency situations is an activity to save their life and secure their safety. These activities are therefore important for the purpose of ensuring to maintain public order, including to protect life and property of the people.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defense is of the view that it is appropriate to upgrade—along with international peace cooperation activities—these activities, including the evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad, to a primary mission as well.

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Why have activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq been upgraded to a primary mission?

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law defines measures implemented by Japan as a contribution to activities of forces of other countries performed, by eliminating threats posed by the 9/11 attacks, to fulfill the objectives of the United Nations Charter. The Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was enacted to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Iraq based on the Security Council resolution No. 1483 by joining international efforts to rebuild Iraq.

The activities in accordance with these laws are “instrumental in maintaining peace and security of the international society including Japan” through promoting international cooperation, and, in this sense, share the purpose with peacekeeping operations (PKO). For this reason, and from the viewpoint of boosting morale of SDF personnel already involved in these activities, it is appropriate to upgrade the activities to a primary mission.

4. Development of a Legal Structure Related to Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

As mentioned earlier, the transition to the MOD and the stipulation of international peace cooperation as an SDF's primary mission are steps in the development of a structure to 1) strengthen defense policy-making/planning functions, 2) enhance and strengthen the systems of the response to emergency situations, and 3) engage in proactive efforts for the peace and stability of the international community.

In order to take measures for the aforementioned purposes, the government submitted a bill concerning partial amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law on June 9, 2006. This same bill was passed on December 15, 2006 (see Item 3, “3 Circumstances Surrounding the Transition to a Ministry” for more details on the process).

This bill collectively addresses issues of transition to a ministry, stipulation of international peace cooperation as the primary mission of the SDF, and addition of international peace cooperation operations and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan to the agenda for deliberation by the Security Council. The following is an outline of the bill.

(1) Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law

The Defense Agency Establishment Law shall be amended and changed to the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law, which stipulates the missions, jurisdictional functions, and organization of the Ministry of Defense.

- Name of the organization: “The Defense Agency” will be changed to “the Ministry of Defense.”
- Name of the minister: “The Director-General of the Defense Agency/Minister of State for Defense” will be changed to “the Minister of Defense.”
- Name of the ordinance: “The Cabinet Office ordinance” will be changed to “the Ministry of Defense ordinance.”

With respect to the missions, jurisdictional functions, and organization of the Ministry of Defense, the provisions stipulated by the existing Defense Agency Establishment Law will basically remain unchanged except for minimum amendments required.

(2) Partial Amendment of the SDF Law

a. Matters Related to Transition to a Ministry

- There is no change having any impact on the authority of the Prime Minister as the chief of the Cabinet, which is the fundamental framework of civilian control of the military (e.g., authority as the supreme commander of the SDF (Article 7); defense operation orders (Article 76); public security operation orders (Article 78 and 81); and approval of maritime security operations (Article 82)).
- Necessary amendments will be made, including those to the effect that the authority of the Prime Minister as the minister in charge of defense affairs in his/her capacity as Cabinet Office chief shall be transferred to the Minister of Defense as the new minister in charge of defense affairs (e.g., supervisory responsibilities over the Director-General of the Defense Agency (Article 8); provision of operational materiel prior to defense operations orders (Article 77-3); Rear-Area Support (Article 84-4-1, 84-4-2-1/2); ACSA (Article 100-6, 7); and notification of areas for expropriation of goods during defense operations (Article 103)).

b. Matters Related to Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

The following activities shall be deemed primary missions as stipulated in Article 3 of the SDF Law.

- International disaster relief operations (Article 84-4-2-3 of the SDF Law, and the International Disaster Relief Law)
- International peace cooperation operations (Article 84-4-2-4 of the SDF Law, and the International Peace Cooperation Law)
- Activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Paragraphs 7-1 and 8-1 of the Supplementary Provisions to the SDF Law, and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law)
- Activities based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Paragraphs 7-2 and 8-2 of the Supplementary Provisions to the SDF Law, and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq)
- Minesweeping (Article 84-2 of the SDF Law)
- Evacuation of Japanese nationals abroad (Article 84-3 of the SDF Law)
- Rear area support in situations in areas surrounding Japan (Article 84-4-1, 84-4-2-1/2 of the SDF Law, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and the Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) (See Fig. II-3-2-6)

(3) Partial Amendment of the Security Council Establishment Law

The Security Council Establishment Law shall be partially amended to incorporate important items concerning international peace cooperation operations and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan into items for deliberation by the Security Council.

(4) Amendments in Supplementary Provisions and Others

- There shall be a clear statement that the Defense Facilities Administration Agency is to be abolished and merged into the main body of the Ministry of Defense in FY 2007, which, together with other measures, will create a structure that allows for more appropriate and efficient functioning⁴.
- Transitional measures accompanying the transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry shall be stipulated.
- Necessary amendments shall be made to 70 laws concerned, such as changing the Defense Agency, an extra-ministerial bureau to the Cabinet Office pursuant to the Cabinet Office Establishment Law, into a Ministry based on the National Government Organization Law, and changing “the Defense Agency” to the “Ministry of Defense” in the texts of the laws.

Fig. II-3-2-6 Duties and Activities of the SDF (After Revision)

Main Duties (Duties stipulated in Article 3 of the SDF Law)

⇒ Stipulated in Chapter 6 (activities of the SDF) of the SDF Law (Cooperation and assistance activities in accordance with Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in accordance with Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq are stipulated in Supplementary Provisions.)

○ Primary duties (Paragraph 1) (“to protect the nation from direct or indirect invasion”)

Defense operations (Article 76)

○ Secondary duties stipulated in Paragraph 1 (“as necessary, to maintain public order”)

Civil protection operations (Article 77-4)
 Public security operations (Articles 78 and 81)
 Guarding operations (Article 81-2)
 Maritime security operations (Article 82)
 Measures for destruction of ballistic missiles (Article 82-2)
 Measures against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84)
 Disaster dispatch (Article 83)
 Earthquake disaster dispatch (Article 83-2)
 Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3)

Minesweeping and incidental operations (Article 84-2) [Moved from Supplementary Provisions of Chapter 8]

Transportation of expatriate Japanese nationals (Article 84-3) [Moved from Supplementary Provisions of Chapter 8]

○ Secondary duties stipulated in Paragraph 2 (implement missions assigned the SDF “separately by law,” “to the extent that these missions do not interfere with fulfillment of the primary duties”)

Rear-area support in accordance with Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (Article 84-4, Paragraph 1, Paragraph 2, Items 1 and 2)

[Addition]
 [Moved from Supplementary Provisions of Chapter 8]

International emergency relief activities (Article 84-4, Paragraph 2, Item 3) [Moved from Supplementary Provisions of Chapter 8]

International peace cooperation operations (Article 84-4, Paragraph 2, Item 4) [Moved from Supplementary Provisions of Chapter 8]

Cooperation and assistance activities in accordance with Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (Supplementary Provisions, Paragraph 7, Item 1, Paragraph 8, Item 1)

[Remains in the Supplementary Provisions; positioned as missions stipulated in Article 3]

Humanitarian and reconstruction activities in accordance with Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Supplementary Provisions, Paragraph 7, Item 2, Paragraph 8, Item 2)

[Remains in the Supplementary Provisions; positioned as missions stipulated in Article 3]

Secondary Operations

⇒ Stipulated in Chapter 8 (Supplementary Provisions) of the SDF Law

Undertaking of civil engineering works (Article 100)
 Undertaking of education and training (Article 100-2)
 Cooperation in athletic competitions and other events (Article 100-3)
 Support of antarctic exploration (Article 100-4)
 Transportation of national guests (Article 100-5)
 Removal of unexploded bombs (Supplementary Provisions, Paragraph 4; Before revision: Supplementary Provisions, Paragraph 14)

How has the government been explaining the transition to a ministry to the people of Japan?

It is extremely important for the government to obtain understanding and support of the people of Japan as regards making the transition from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense, and therefore the government has been carrying out extensive PR activities.

Prior to the transition, the government issued 290,000 copies of pamphlet titled “Making the Transition from the Japan Defense Agency to a Ministry” with the aim of giving answers to why the transition is necessary and other questions the people may have. The pamphlets were distributed, and explanations as to the transition were given, widely to local governments and the public via the SDF units and local organizations throughout the country.

After the transition, the government issued and distributed 65,000 copies of pamphlet titled “For the Creation of Peace,” and explanations as to the transition were given, widely to local governments and the public via the SDF units and local organizations throughout the country.

The series of regional meetings to explain the significance and details of the transition were also held in five cities: Tokyo, Nagoya, Nagasaki, Asahikawa, and Osaka.

The Ministry of Defense has been providing a detailed explanation of the transition in the “Defense of Japan” whitepapers. The Ministry has also actively been disclosing such information on its website and in PR magazines as well as responding to questioning in Diet sessions and receiving interviews from various media.

The Ministry of Defense will continue to actively perform PR activities at every possible opportunity to explain the transition to related local governments in order to obtain understanding from more people, and thereby fulfill its accountability.

Will the transition to a ministry lead to an increase in defense spending?

The transition of the Japan Defense Agency to a ministry is a change in the positioning of an administrative organization, and therefore does not require any additional budget measures nor cause an increase in defense-related spending in the future.

Under the current severe financial situation, the Japanese government is vigorously promoting the reduction and rationalization of spending. The Ministry of Defense is also working hard to radically rationalize and enhance efficiency of defense-related spending in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines, the Mid-Term Defense Program and other plans decided at the Cabinet meetings, while maintaining harmony with other policies of the government.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

The Road to the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense

Takahiro Yoshida
Senior Staff, Planning Office,
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The Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to a ministry on January 9 of this year. Many inside and outside Japan welcomed this transfer, expressing high expectations for the ministry, but its process was not easy at all.

As the ruling parties began earnest discussion on the transfer in January last year, a team dedicated for the transfer was formed within the Administrative Coordination Division of Minister's Secretariat, which is responsible for organization administration and legislation. However, soon after the team was established, serious problems occurred—the bid-rigging scandal of the Defense Facilities Administration



Senior Staff Yoshida at work

Agency and the divulgence of confidential information caused by Winny. The discussion by the ruling parties was suspended, and it seemed that the transfer to a ministry was almost hopeless. Many media reported that the bill would be put on the back burner. However, all the staff at the Defense Agency was united and intensively discussed countermeasures, and these efforts resulted in the announcement of the measures to prevent recurrence of similar problems as early as in late March.

The ruling parties resumed discussion. The name of the ministry, the framework of the bill, reasons why the transfer should be implemented now, and other matters were actively discussed between the ruling parties and within the government for many days. After overcoming a number of difficulties, the ruling parties finally reached agreement, and submitted the bill to the Diet on June 9 nearly at the end of the ordinary Diet session as a Cabinet-sponsored bill already agreed by all the government agencies. It is very rare for the ruling parties and the government to submit a bill at the last moment like this, and the bill was the last bill submitted under the Koizumi administration.

However, there was an even higher barrier to overcome in the extraordinary Diet session in autumn. The Diet needed to deliberate the defense ministry bill as well as other important bills such as the amendment of the Fundamental Law on Education during the short session. The bill was facing rough going. The opposition parties refused to discuss with the government many times, and we had to spend many hard days with lingering fear that the bill may be rejected. However, the considerable efforts of many people again opened up a way to overcome these difficulties, and the bill was passed in the House of Representative on November 30 by winning approval of more than 90% of the legislators. It was about two months after the session opened on September 26, and only two week before it will close. The bill was passed barely in time.

Severe debates continued in a tense atmosphere in the House of Councilors as well, and there was a fear that the bill will run out of time if anything goes wrong. However, these difficulties were also

overcome, and the bill was passed in the House of Councilors on December 15 at the almost end of the extraordinary session by, again, winning approval of more than 90% of the legislators.

The team I belonged to undertook a wide range of operations under these political movements. We solved every issue related to the bill in a very detailed manner while preparing the bill, such as the framework of civilian control, authority of the Minister of Defense, enactment of the law within the same fiscal year, abolition and integration of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and influence on other laws. We also created Q&A pamphlets and other literature, as well as explained at meetings held in various locations, in an as easy-to-understand manner as possible. The road to the establishment of the ministry was so hard that we all felt greatly rewarded when the bill was passed.

One of the largest purposes of the transfer to a ministry is to encourage us at the ministry to undertake even greater responsibility for security and national defense, become even more active in planning policies, and produce more favorable results. The transfer to a ministry was realized through enthusiasm and efforts of supporters and as a reflection of high expectations of people toward the ministry and the Self-Defense Forces. I believe that the ministry must prove itself as valuable for the country in the future by meeting those expectations.

Section 3. Organization of the MOD/SDF

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the core of Japan's defense capability, is a specialist organization that plays the most essential role in the continuous survival of the country, that is, national defense. The SDF consists of a full range of units and services that provide the functions required to fulfill that responsibility.

The MOD/SDF must conduct regular reviews to ensure that their organizations are suited to the times so that they can properly address the policy issues of a new age. To this end, the MOD has just in the previous fiscal year carried out an organizational restructuring to strengthen its policy-planning functions and its system for cooperation with local governments, and further restructuring is to be done this fiscal year to ensure more appropriate and effective execution of its assigned tasks.

This section looks at the organization of the MOD/SDF and the restructuring thereof.

1. Organization of the MOD/SDF

1. Organization of the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF consist of a number of organs that center on the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), enabling them to fulfill their mission of defending Japan as armed organizations, and other number of organs including the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Equipment Procurement Office, and Defense Facilities Administration Agency. (See Figs. II-3-3-1 • 2)

2. System to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense, in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law, is in charge of the SDF, and supported by the Senior Vice Minister of Defense and two Parliamentary Secretaries of Defense. The Minister of Defense is supported by the Administrative Vice Minister of Defense in supervising administrative work, and the Defense Counselors in setting up basic policies, respectively.

Moreover, the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office (GSDF Staff, MSDF Staff, ASDF Staff) support the Minister of Defense. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Director-General of the Secretariat and Director-Generals of Bureaus, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense when the Minister of Defense gives instructions and authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff Office (Chief of Joint Staff), and Chief of Ground Staff (GSDF Chief of Staff), Chief of Maritime Staff (MSDF Chief of Staff) and Chief of Air Staff (ASDF Staff). The Joint Staff Office is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning SDF operations. The Chief of Joint Staff Office supports the Minister of Defense by providing unified military expert advice on SDF operations. The Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office and Air Staff Office are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services (excluding operations), with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert advisors to the Minister of Defense.

Fig. II-3-3-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense

(as of end of FY 2006)





Fig. II-3-3-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense Organization

Organization	Outline
GSDF (see Location of Principal SDF Units at the back of the book)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Regional Armies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of multiple divisions, brigades and other directly controlled units (such as the Engineer Brigade and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group) • There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of its own region. ○ Divisions and Brigades <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of combat units' logistics units that support the combat units and others
MSDF (see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Self-Defense Fleets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (including fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and others) and the Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of the sea areas around Japan primarily through mobile operations. ○ Regional Districts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are five regional districts that primarily guard their assigned districts and support the Self-Defense Fleet
ASDF (see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Air Defense Command <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of key units such as three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division • Primarily responsible for general air defense ○ Air Division <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of key units such as Air Wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units) and the Air Defense Missile Group (including surface-to-air guided missile units)
National Defense Academy (located in Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Organization for the cultivation of future SDF officers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts education and training for the cultivation of future SDF officers (including education that conforms to the same university chartering criteria that apply to general universities) ○ Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to a master's and doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master's degree <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts education and training in order to impart a high ability of knowledge and research capability
National Defense Medical College (located in Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Organization for the cultivation of SDF medical officers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education and training for future SDF officers who will serve as medical doctors (including university-level education) ○ Offers a medical course equivalent to a doctoral degree from a university <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts education and training in order to impart a high level of knowledge and research capability
National Institute for Defense Studies (located in Meguro Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Organization that functions as a "think tank" for the Ministry of Defense <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF* • Conducts research and compiles data on military history • Educates SDF officers and other senior officials • The Institute's library houses books and documents of historical importance.
Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo and other locations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central intelligence organization for the Ministry of Defense that collects and analyzes military intelligence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collects various military intelligence, including signal intelligence, image information, and information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to organizations within the ministry • Consists of the headquarter and the six communication sites
Technical Research and Development Institute (located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central organization that conducts equipment-related research and development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts R&D in response to the operational needs of each service of the SDF • Conducts R&D in a wide range of fields, from firearms, vehicles, ships and aircraft used by each service of the SDF to food and clothing
Equipment Procurement Office (Located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central organization for handling affairs related to procurement of equipment required by the SDF to accomplish its duties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The necessary equipment includes firearms, ammunition, fuel, guided weapons, ships, aircraft, and vehicles • Pursues more robust life-cycle management of equipment through effective cost control ○ Composed of a head office and 5 district offices
Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Agency to deal process administrative jobs such as acquisition of SDF facilities and USFJ facilities and areas, asset management, administrative work for construction and taking measures for communities in nearby area, labour management for the people who work for the USFJ, and to compensating the damages caused by illegal acts of USFJ ○ Composed of the Agency and 8 Regional Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus

2. Restructuring of the Defense Agency (previous fiscal year)

In August 2004, (then) Director-General of the Defense Agency issued Director-General instructions on examining the Agency's organization to allow it to appropriately address policy issues in a new security environment and to enhance and strengthen the assistant system for (then) Defense Agency's Director-General. This initiated broad-ranging studies within the Agency and, after submission of the final report on these examinations in August 2005, the FY 2006 budget was allocated and the necessary revisions to laws made. In July 2006 a review of the Advisory Structure by Civilian DGs and a restructuring of internal bureaus, local organizations and acquisition organizations were carried out. An overview of the restructuring is shown in Fig. II-3-3-3.


Fig. II-3-3-3 Outline of Organization after the Reorganization in Fiscal 2006 (before the transition to a ministry)



3. Restructuring of the MOD (current fiscal year)

Even after the restructuring of the previous fiscal year, the MOD continued to pursue reforms from a variety of perspectives—preventing bid-rigging and other such problems, enhancing policy-planning functions and crisis management capabilities as a ministry, developing a system emphasizing interaction with the general public, and exploring organizational approaches that could help smooth U.S. force realignment—and decided to carry out large-scale restructuring this fiscal year. Below are an explanation of the process of examination and an overview of the new organization. (See Fig. II-3-3-4)

Fig. II-3-3-4 Outline of Organization after the Reorganization in Fiscal 2007 (Plan)



1. Examination Process

On January 30, 2006, senior officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and other persons were arrested on the suspicion of interfering with competitive bidding in relation to construction work on charges of having interrupted construction biddings for defense facilities. The former Defense Agency reacted by establishing an “Investigative Committee on Matters Pertaining to Defense Facilities Administration Agency Bidding Collusion” and a “Study Group on Fundamental Measures to Prevent Defense Facilities Administration Agency Bidding Collusion,” conducted a thorough investigation into the facts of the matter and considered measures to prevent recurrences. This investigation determined that steps should be taken to 1) dismantle the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and integrate its functions into the Defense Agency, 2) strengthen mutual supervision functions with regard to order placement procedures for construction work, and 3) enhance agency-wide audit and inspection functions.

In March 2006 recommendations were forthcoming from ruling parties. The Liberal Democratic Party project team under the National Defense Division offered recommendations that included creating a robust

internal audit system directly responsible to the minister, segregating contract and integration organizations and having them exercise mutual oversight functions, and substantially restructuring internal bureaus and local organizations. The Security Study Group of the New Komeito Party submitted to the (then) Defense Agency a proposal on carrying out substantial reorganization by transferring the functions of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency to the Defense Agency, reinforcing mutual check functions, and strengthening audit functions.

As these recommendations emerged, it became necessary by the end of August to organize the different points of discussion, establish organizational details, and prepare a preliminary budget request. The Committee to Study a New Defense Organization after Dissolution of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency headed by (then) Defense Agency Director-General Nukaga was set up on April 7, 2006, for these purposes, and the Committee conducted an organizational study toward preparing a budget request.

Once this study was brought to a conclusion, a budget request was submitted at the end of August 2006, after the necessary matters coordinated within the government, the budget examined by the Diet and the new organization then incorporated into this fiscal year's budget. The new organization is scheduled to be restructured during this year; the key elements in this restructuring are described below.

2. Abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and Consolidation into the Ministry of Defense

The abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the consolidation of its functions into the MOD emphasize 1) development of a system for administering facilities more suitably and efficiently, 2) maintenance and expansion of relations with local communities that previously had been assigned to Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and 3) construction of a structure for cooperation with local governments on the full range of defense-related matters, including facility administration.

To suitably address the policy issues of a new age, among these being the smooth realignment of U.S. forces and effective responses to a variety of situations, it has become all the more important that the MOD establish close relations with communities, especially local governments and local residents.

From this perspective, functions such as local coordination, measures pertaining to communities in the vicinity of Defense facilities, acquisition/management/return of facilities, constructing of facilities for provision to U.S. forces stationed in Japan, procurement of goods and services, and labor management that previously had been assigned to the Defense Facilities Administration Agency's Facilities Department and Support Department will be transferred to the Internal Bureau, with new offices to be set up within the Internal Bureau to serve as liaison points with communities on facilities administration and other matters. In addition to facility administration, responsibility for tasks relating to securing the understanding and cooperation of local governments and local residents will be clearly indicated.

Of the functions covering construction work previously assigned to the Defense Facilities Administration Agency's Construction Division, those tasks related to standards for bidding and contracting will be assigned to an internal bureau (Bureau of Finance and Equipment), while all other tasks concerning implementation (e.g., preparation of technical standards and screening of plans) will be given to the Equipment and Facilities Headquarters. A system will be developed to further ensure fairness and transparency in tasks concerning construction work.

Following this restructuring, MOD policy-making/planning will be carried out by internal bureaus, and practical implementation of these policies as well as the procurement of equipment will be under the charge of the Equipment and Facilities Headquarters. This arrangement will make possible more effective policies and facility installation.

3. Restructuring of Internal Bureaus

The MOD must utilize the opportunity presented by its transformation into a ministry to meet the expectations and trust of the public as a policy organ. To prove itself worthy of these expectations and trust, the MOD must suitably address the policy issues of the new age, including effectively dealing with U.S. force realignment and other circumstances that may arise. Accordingly, the MOD will restructure its internal bureaus so that it can propose a variety of policy options and implement them as a policy organ. More specifically, the MOD will newly create the following organizations:

- 1) a Planning and Evaluation Division (tentative name) in the Minister's Secretariat and a Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division (tentative name) in the Bureau of Defense Policy to bolster policy-planning functions so that the MOD can respond suitably to new issues and circumstances, and
- 2) a Defense Councilor and its aide—a U.S. Force Realignment Coordination Officer (tentative title)—to ensure smooth and steady realignment of U.S. forces.

The MOD will also enhance its international functions in order to more strategically engage in defense exchanges and confidence building with other countries (tentative name: International Policy Division) and its policy-making/planning functions pertaining to the service discipline of MOD personnel (new Service Management Officer [tentative title] to be appointed).

4. Creation of the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance, MOD

In addition to incidents such as the bid-rigging case at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, incidents involving leaks of information and drug use and others gravely injurious to public trust have made it necessary for the MOD to establish a rigorous ministry-wide inspection system to prevent the recurrence of such incidents and to ensure that MOD personnel comply with all relevant laws and standards of professional conduct in the execution of their duties. To that end, the Inspector General's Office of legal compliance, MOD, headed by the Inspector General will be established.

This special organization will report directly to the Minister of Defense and will have high degree of independence; the Inspector General will conduct ministry-wide inspections on the orders of the Minister. The Inspector General will be of assistant administrative vice-minister rank, and the necessary personnel, including appointed outside personnel, are to be assigned to the Inspector General's Office of legal compliance, MOD, and their expertise utilized. The Inspector General's Office of legal compliance, MOD, will carry out inspections and establish overlapping audit and inspection systems, in particular with respect to compliance with laws and regulations.

5. Creation of New Local Defense Bureaus

Relations between the MOD and local communities are of growing importance. Therefore, the Defense Facility Administration Bureaus (local branches of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency) and the local offices of the Equipment Procurement Office will be integrated when abolishing/consolidating the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and Local Defense Bureaus will be created to serve as local bureaus for the MOD in overseeing the full gamut of defense administration functions at the local level, including coordination and discussions with communities on defense policies.

The Local Defense Bureaus will have comprehensive responsibility for defense administration in their territories, including:

- 1) tasks connected with facility administration at the local level that have been performed by the Defense Facility Administration Bureaus;
- 2) tasks connected with equipment procurement that have been carried out by the local offices of the Equipment Procurement Office; and
- 3) tasks connected with securing the understanding and cooperation of local governments and local residents in order to smoothly and effectively implement tasks assigned by the MOD.

Notes

- 1) On June 20, 1964, (then) Defense Agency Director-General Fukuda explained to the House of Representatives' Cabinet Committee why the bill had not been submitted to the Diet: "We believed that upgrading to ministry status was appropriate from all perspectives, and we still feel strongly that this is necessary. Unfortunately, however, time constraints led to a variety of delays and, given the extremely short time left in the term of the current Diet session, we regrettably concluded that the prospects of submitting to this Diet session were not good."
- 2) On the primary missions (prior to revision of the SDF Law) of the Self-Defense Forces, Article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law stipulates that "the first priority mission of the SDF shall be to defend Japan against direct or indirect invasion, and if necessary the SDF shall ensure to maintain public order."
- 3) See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1 on the stipulation of the international peace cooperation as SDF's primary mission.
- 4) It was pointed out in the discussions among the ruling parties on the transition to a ministry that the connection between the abolition/merge of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in FY 2007 following the bid-rigging incident at the Agency and other incidents, and the bill for the transition to a ministry is unclear, although both are related to the organization of the Defense Agency. The abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency has therefore been clearly stipulated in the supplementary provisions.
- 5) The MOD and the SDF are the same administrative authority responsible for defense. The term "Ministry of Defense," however, is used to describe the administrative entity that carries out the work of management and administration of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, whereas the term "SDF" refers to the armed services themselves, whose duty is to defend the country through the activities of their units.

Part III

Measures for Defense of Japan



Guarding drill at a base



Bilateral training with the U.S. forces



Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Australia's Prime Minister John Winston Howard announcing the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation



JMSDF band participating in a local festival

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

Chapter 1
Issues in the International
Community

Chapter 2
National Defense Policies of
Countries

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 1
The Basic Concepts of
Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 2
The National Defense
Program Guidelines and
Build-Up of Defense
Capability

Chapter 3
Transition to Ministry and
Stipulation of the
International Peace
Cooperation as SDF's
Primary Mission

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Efforts by Japan

**Chapter 1
Operations of Self-Defense
Forces for Defense of
Japan, Disaster Relief and
Civil Protection**

[Main Points]

- Defense of Japan
- Ballistic missile defense
- Disaster relief dispatches, etc.
- Preparation against full-scale aggression

Cooperation with Allies

**Chapter 2
Strengthening of the Japan-
U.S. Security Arrangements**

[Main Points]

- The significance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements
- Consultations with regard to realignment of U.S. forces
- Efforts to promote realignment

Cooperation with International Community

**Chapter 3
Improvement of the
International Security
Environment**

[Main Points]

- Efforts to support international peace cooperation activities
- Security dialogue and defense exchanges
- Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

Ties with Japanese Citizens

**Chapter 4
Citizens of Japan, and the
Ministry of Defense and the SDF**

[Main Points]

- Basis to sustain defense capability
- Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the local community & the Japanese people
- Efforts to gain the trust of the Japanese people

Chapter 1

Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief and Civil Protection

Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression



Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a basic system to deal with the most serious situations for the peace and security of the country and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. In particular, it is naturally essential to establish the legislation to facilitate the operations of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. forces to terminate armed attack situations¹, as well as the legislation to protect the lives and properties of the people, which constitutes a base of existence of the nation. The national government has long sought after the establishment of these legislations.

These laws and the establishment of an SDF operational structure, etc., provide the foundation for SDF activities, enable the SDF to effectively respond to armed attacks, and contribute to deterring armed attacks against Japan (hereinafter the term “armed attack situations” refers to armed attack situations and situation where an armed attack is anticipated²). They are also important, in terms of ensuring civilian control during armed attack situations.

This section will outline the framework of Japan’s responses in the occurrence of armed attack situations and an SDF operational structure based on the framework.

1. The Basic Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

1. The Background to Laws for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

In 1954 the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law were enacted in order to establish the Defense Agency and the SDF as organizations to defend the peace and independence of Japan, as well as to maintain the national security, based on which the framework of the legal structure for the responses to armed attacks against Japan was developed. Yet, matters that requiring further development remained.


In 1977, at the Defense Agency, too, the then Director-General Mihara received the approval of the then Prime Minister Fukuda, and directed the commencement of the study on so-called “emergency legislations,” with a purpose of identification of the issues associated with the remaining inadequacy of the legal structure. Then, for almost a quarter century, the study continued.

In February 2002, the then Prime Minister Koizumi clearly mentioned in the administrative policy speech at the 154th ordinary session of the Diet that the Japanese government would seek the concrete development of legal systems, “so as to advance building of a nation that is strong in emergencies.” In light of this, as the legislation needed for responding to armed attacks on Japan and other situations (legislation for responses to situations), the three laws related to responses to armed attack situation, including the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, the seven laws including the Civil Protection Law³ as the legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2004, three related treaties were also ratified, and the legal foundation known as emergency legislation⁴ was established. (See Fig. III-1-1-1)

2. Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law⁵ serves as the basic law for responses to armed attack situations, and provides for the fundamental principles regarding responses to armed attack situations, and the responsibilities and roles to be shared by the national and local governments, as well as a basic plan regarding responses to armed attack situations (basic response plan). The law has established a framework under which related organizations (designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions⁶) may take their response measures in cooperation with each other based on individual emergency legislations for responses to situation, including the Civil Protection Law and the nation as a whole may take all possible measures to respond to armed attack situations.

Fig. III-1-1-1 Relationship between Three Laws Related to Emergency Legislation and Seven Laws Related to Emergency Legislation, and Related Treaties



(1) Fundamental Principles of Responses to Armed Attack Situations

- a. In responding to armed attack situations, the national government, local governments and designated public institutions must take all possible measures in mutual collaboration, while obtaining cooperation from the people.
- b. In situation where an armed attack is anticipated, any and all measures must be taken so as to avoid the occurrence of such an attack.
- c. Under an armed attack situation, preparations must be made against an armed attack. In the event that an armed attack actually breaks out, such an attack must be repelled, and an attempt for prompt termination of the situation must be implemented. However, the use of armed forces in eliminating an attack must be


limited to the extent determined as reasonably necessary under the situation, if an armed attack actually breaks out.

- d. In responding to armed attack situations, people’s freedom and rights guaranteed by the Constitution must be respected, and restrictions on them, if any, must be the minimum necessary for responding to the situation, and such restrictions must be according to fair and appropriate procedures.
- e. Under armed attack situations, the situation and responses to it must be notified to the people in a timely and appropriate manner.
- f. In responding to armed attack situations, efforts must be made to secure the understanding and cooperation from the international community such as the United Nations, while cooperating closely with the United States in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

(2) Systems and Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations

If armed attack situations break out, the government must follow the procedure in Figure III-1-1-2 for responding to the situation in normal cases. (See Fig. III-1-1-3)

Fig. III-1-1-2 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations



Note: The task force placed within the Cabinet for comprehensive promotion of response measures against armed attack situations

Fig. III-1-1-3 Examples of Items Provided by Basic Response Plan

Basic Response Plan	
Armed Attack Situation	Situation where an armed attack is anticipated
	Recognition of armed attack situation or situation where an armed attack is anticipated, and the facts that constituted the base of the recognition
	Overall plan for the response to the armed attack situations
	Important items regarding response measures
	Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch of a defense call-up order for SDF reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel for defense operations
	Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch of defense operation alert order
	Approval for the Minister of Defense to order defense facility construction
	Approval for the Minister of Defense to order the offer of service as action related measures provided in the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law
	Approval for the Minister of Defense to order detention inspections and cruising as provided in the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law
Request for the Diet approval on issuing a defense operations order	
Ordering defense operations (When there is no time to receive the Diet approval in advance due to the urgency)	

* The contents of the examples of the basic response plan indicated above are subject to change in accordance with the condition of the concerned armed attack situations.

(3) Response Measures

In responding to armed attack situations, designated government institutions, local governments or designated public institutions must take the following response measures as response measures in accordance with the provisions of laws during the period between the formulation and termination of a Basic Response Plan.

a. Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations to be Implemented Depending on the Progress of the Situations:

- 1) Use of forces, deployment of units, etc., and other activities to be conducted by the SDF;
- 2) Provision of materials, facilities and services, and other measures that make operations of the SDF and U.S. forces efficient and effective; and
- 3) Diplomatic and other measures, other than those mentioned in 1) and 2).

b. Measures to Protect Lives, Bodies and Properties of the People, and to Minimize the Effects on People's Livelihoods and the Economy:

- 1) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures; and
- 2) Price stabilization and distribution of goods required for people's daily life, and other measures.

The Prime Minister, when response measures are no longer needed or when the Diet determines the termination of such measures, must request the Cabinet to make a decision on the repeal of the Basic Response Plan.

(4) Responsibilities and Role of the National and Local Governments

a. Responsibilities and Role of the National Government

In responding to armed attack situations, the national government as a whole must take any and all prudent measures, including the response measures, by mobilizing all of its organizations and functions in line with the fundamental principles.

b. Responsibilities and Role of Local Governments

Local governments, which are obligated to protect the local area and the lives, bodies and properties of their residents, must take all necessary measures in close cooperation with the national government, other local governments, and other institutions.

c. Responsibilities and Role of Designated Public Institutions

The designated public institutions must take all necessary measures in their respective services in close cooperation with the national government, local governments and other institutions.

d. Cooperation of the People

The people, taking into account the importance of maintaining the security of the nation and its people, are expected to extend all necessary cooperation when the response measures are taken.

(5) Authority of the Prime Minister over Response Measures

When a basic response plan is established to implement the response measures in a comprehensive manner, a task force for armed attack situations (the Task Force) is established within the Cabinet with the Prime Minister being the Task Force Chief. The Deputy Chief and other posts of the Task Force will be filled by other Ministers of State.

The Prime Minister may instruct heads of relevant local governments to implement necessary measures when particular needs are recognized but necessary measures based on comprehensive coordination are not implemented, and when the protection of people's lives, bodies or properties, or the repelling of an armed attack is being hindered.

The Prime Minister may implement the response measures that should be implemented by local governments or the designated public institutions by giving direct order or by orchestrating relevant Ministers of State to implement such response measures in accordance with the urgency, after notifying the head of local governments, and when necessary response measures are not implemented as instructed, and when such lacking of actions is causing problem in protecting people's lives, bodies or properties, or hindering the repelling of an armed attack.

(6) Report to the U.N. Security Council

The national government must immediately report the measures it has taken to repel an armed attack to the U.N. Security Council, in accordance with the relevant provisions, including Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. (See Reference 76)

3. Responses to Emergency Response Situations⁷ other than Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides that the Japanese government must respond rapidly and appropriately to emergency response situations⁸ other than armed attack situations, in order to ensure the peace and independence of the nation, and to maintain the security of the nation and its people.

In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan, including incidence of armed suspicious boats and occurrences of mass terrorism, measures shall be promptly taken including the following:

1) development of the systems for assembly of information, and analysis and evaluation of situations; 2) preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations; and 3) enhancement of the coordination of the SDF with the police and the Japan Coast Guard.

(1) Emergency Response Situation Response Plan, etc.

If an emergency response situation has broken out, the Cabinet shall decide on the Emergency Response Situation Basic Response Plan providing the following matters, and submit the plan to the Diet for approval. When the Emergency Situation Basic Response Plan has been finalized, the Headquarters for the Emergency Response Situation shall be temporarily established within the Cabinet :

- 1) Acknowledgement of an emergency response situation and the facts supporting the acknowledgement;
- 2) General plan for responses;
- 3) Important matters regarding emergency response measures.

(2) Emergency Response Measures

The designated government institutions, local governments or the designated public institutions must conduct the following measures as emergency response measures, in accordance with the provisions of laws during the period between the formulation and termination of an Emergency Response Situation Response Plan:

- 1) Measures to prevent or suppress attacks, or other measures that are implemented to terminate the emergency response situation depending on the progress of the situation.
- 2) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures that are implemented to protect the lives, bodies and properties of the people from attacks under the emergency response situation, or to minimize the effects on people's livelihoods and the economy that are caused by attacks under the emergency response situation, depending on progress of the situation.

2. Measures based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and other Relevant Laws

Based on the framework presented in the legal structure, the Armed Attack Situation Response Law enacted in June 2003 provides that individual emergency legislations for responses to situations should be established in the future so that measures to protect lives of the people and so on, measures to minimize the effects caused by an armed attack on daily lives of the people, and measures to facilitate effective operations of the SDF and the U.S. forces that are needed to repel armed attacks must be taken. The law further provides that these individual emergency legislations for responses to situations should guarantee the appropriate implementation of the International Humanitarian Law.


In March 2004, the national government submitted seven bills concerning emergencies and three treaties related to responses to situations to the Diet for approval. In June 2004, the seven bills and ratification of the three treaties were approved by the Diet. As a result, a framework of measures to be taken under armed attack situations has been established. The outline of the framework is as follows: (See Fig. III-1-1-4)

1. Measures to Protect the Lives of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People

The Civil Protection Law was enacted. The Law provides for the responsibilities of the national and local governments, the cooperation of the people, measures to evacuate residents, measures to support displaced residents, measures to respond to disasters caused by armed attacks, and other measures that should be performed or implemented to protect the lives of the people and to minimize the effects on the daily lives of the

people. The Civil Protection Law provides that similar measures may be taken under emergency response situations.

Fig. III-1-1-4 Overview of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations and Other Situations



2. Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations

(1) Facilitation of Operations of the SDF

The Maritime Transportation Restriction Law⁹ was enacted. The Law provides that the measures to restrict maritime transportation of foreign military supplies (including weapons) in the territorial waters of Japan and high seas surrounding the territorial waters of Japan may be taken if an armed attack situation breaks out.

(2) Facilitation of Operations of U.S. Forces

- a. The U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law¹⁰ was enacted. The law provides that measures to facilitate effective operations of U.S. forces necessary to repel an armed attack pursuant to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty may be taken in armed attack situations.
- b. The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA) (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)¹¹ was partially amended, and the amended ACSA provides that the scope of its application is enlarged to include responses to armed attack situations, efforts of the international community to contribute to international peace and security, and activities to respond to disasters. The Self-Defense Forces Law was partially amended so that the SDF may provide the U.S. forces implementing the aforesaid operations with supplies and services. (See Chapter 2, Section 3)

(3) Others (Coordination of the Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads, and Others)

The Specific Public Facilities Use Law¹² was enacted. The law provides that the use of specific public facilities (facilities of ports and airfields, roads, waters, airspace and radio frequencies) shall be coordinated in a comprehensive manner under armed attack situations, for the purpose of proper and rapid implementation of measures such as operations of the SDF and U.S. forces and measures to protect the people.

3. Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of the International Humanitarian Laws

- (1) The Prisoners of War Law¹³ was enacted and the system was established to ensure that prisoners are always treated humanely under an armed attack situation, and the life, body, health and honor of the prisoners shall be respected, and always protected from any violations of, or threats to, their rights.
- (2) The Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Laws¹⁴ was enacted. The law provides that “grave breaches” of the International Humanitarian Laws, which are applied for international armed conflicts, must be properly penalized.
- (3) In addition, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention¹⁵ of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts¹⁶ (Protocol I) and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts¹⁷ (Protocol II), which are the main international humanitarian laws, were ratified. The domestic implementation of these of protocols was thus guaranteed by the enactment of individual laws for responses to situations as mentioned above.

4. High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations

Upon the enactment of the emergency legislation, the legal ground was established. However, consistent efforts are required to ensure the effectiveness of legislations and to improve the operational posture in accordance with the legislations, in order to respond to the constantly changing security environment.

Therefore, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning¹⁸ established under the Security Council is currently conducting studies on responses to armed attack situations or emergency situations, including terrorist attacks and the emergence of suspicious boats. Designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions that are expected to implement response measures in armed attack situations have begun to establish plans to suit their roles and reflect their roles in actual policies and services.

Even in a normal situation, the Japanese government needs to make efforts to enlighten the people at large, through various opportunities, about the importance of various measures to be taken for the protection of the lives, bodies and properties of the people from armed attacks against Japan, regarding responses to situations, and to improve the measures while verifying the effectiveness of the operational posture via exercises.

3. Measures for Protection of Civilians

1. Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Measures)

In case of armed attack situations, the Japanese government shall respond to such situations to protect the lives, bodies and property of the people, and to take measures to minimize the adverse effects of such an armed attack on people's livelihood and the national economy. The government shall, pursuant to basic response plan of the armed attack situation response law and its already formulated basic guidelines for the protection of people, mobilize all of its organizations and functions to exert every possible effort in self-implementation of measures for protection of the civilian populations, and shall support civil protection measures implemented by local governments and designated public institutions, so that the whole nation can adequately cope with those situations.

In addition, local governments, under the policy of the government, shall implement their respective civil protection measures and comprehensively facilitate civil protection measures of designated local public institutions in their jurisdictions. (See Fig. III-1-1-5)

2. The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection

In March 2005, the Japanese government formulated the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter referred as the "Basic Guidelines"¹⁹⁾ based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. In the Basic Guidelines, anticipated armed attack situations are classified into the following four types, landing invasion, guerrillas and special operations force attacks, ballistic missiles attacks, and aerial intrusion. Additional elements for consideration are provided for each type in the implementation of civil protection measures. Furthermore, the Basic Guidelines provide the contents of measures implemented and roles played by the national government, prefectures, municipalities, and designated public institutions within the possible scope for civil protection measures in terms of evacuation, relief and disaster responses.

The Ministry of Defense and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, which are the designated government institutions, have formulated the Civil Protection Plan of the Defense Ministry and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines. (See Reference 33 • 34)


3. Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection

(1) The SDF and Protection of the People

In the case of armed attack situations, it is important for the SDF to promptly repel such an attack to minimize the damage to civilians. The SDF will endeavor to pursue the aforementioned duty, which can only be implemented by the SDF.

Therefore, in contrast to responses to natural disasters (such as disaster relief operations) where the SDF can focus its ability on lifesaving and recovery assistance alone, the SDF is to implement measures to protect civilians, such as the guidance of evacuated residents, relief of evacuated residents and others, responses to armed attack disasters, and emergency recovery, as much as it can without interfering with its duty to repel armed attacks, depending on the scale and type of armed attack situations.

Fig. III-1-1-5 Mechanism for Protecting Civilians in Armed Attack Situations



(2) Civilian Protection Dispatches


Along with the enactment of the Civil Protection Law, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended to allow the SDF to implement the civil protection measures, and Civilian Protection Dispatch was newly established as operations of the SDF.

The details of the operations are not different from the disaster relief operations in natural disasters, but since they are operations under the circumstances of armed attack situations, provisions have been established regarding the use of weapons and the approval of the Prime Minister. (See Fig. III-1-1-6)

Where a defense operation is ordered in an armed attack situation or an internal security operation is ordered as countermeasures against an emergency response situation, the civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures will be implemented as part of the defense operation or internal security operation without ordering any civilian protection operation.

An outline of the provisions regarding the civil protection operation is as follows:

Fig. III-1-1-6 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches
 (Applicable to both Armed Attack Situation and Emergency Response Situation)



*1 Cases where no request is made from the prefectural governor

*2 (Web page of the Prime Minister's Office) http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo_s.html

a. Dispatch Procedure

The Minister of Defense, when requested by a prefectural governor and the situation is considered unavoidable, or when requested by the Task Force Chief²⁰, shall order units for civilian protection dispatch and implementation of civil protection measures after receiving the approval of the Prime Minister.

b. Authorities Similar to Those of Policemen

The SDF personnel ordered for civilian protection dispatch may, only in cases when police officers are not on the scene, exercise authority over evacuation measures, prevention and restriction of crimes, access, and use of weapons pursuant to the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officers.

c. Authorities Similar to Those of Municipal Mayors

The SDF personnel ordered for civilian protection dispatch may, only in cases when municipal mayors are not on the scene, exercise authority over instructions on evacuation, public contributions concerning emergencies, establishment of caution areas, and requests to local residents for cooperation pursuant to the Citizen's Protection Law.

d. Temporary Organization of Units

For civilian protection dispatches, temporary special units can be organized as needed, and the SDF ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel may be called up accordingly.

e. Emergency Response Protection Measures

Similar provisions shall be stipulated for measures for emergency response situations.

(3) Civilian Protection Measures by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

The Ministry of Defense and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, which are designated administrative agencies, formulated the Civil Protection Plan²¹ in October 2005 based on Article 33-1 of the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines. The plan states that the SDF shall implement its primary duty of repelling armed attack with its full power, and also execute measures to protect civilians, such as evacuation and relief of residents, and the implementation of responses to armed attack disasters, as much as possible, within the scope possible while not interfering with its main duty.



GSDf's 14th Infantry regiment (Ishikawa prefecture) guiding evacuees in civilian protection exercise

The SDF shall conduct the following measures.

a. Evacuation of Residents

The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, when asked by local government heads for passage through SDF bases for evacuating residents, it must promptly make adjustments and take procedures to this end.

b. Relief of Evacuated Residents

The SDF implements lifesaving measures (search and rescue, provision of first aid, and others), such as medical assistance (transportation of the injured) in response to requests from the task force director and others, and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (preparation of hot meals, water supply, and transportation of aid supply). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of relief.

c. Responses to Armed Attack Disasters

The SDF checks on the damage (monitoring support, and other activities), lifesaving (search and rescue, provision of first aid, and others), prevention of amplification of the damage (evacuation support of peripheral people, fire fighting, and others), removal of hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, and so on. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of living-related facilities (instruction/advice, personnel dispatches, and so on).

d. Emergency Recovery

The SDF is engaged in emergency recovery of facilities and equipment over which the Ministry of Defense holds jurisdiction, and upon request from prefectural governors, it provides assistance to removal of dangerous rubble and emergency repair of roads and runways.

e. Responses to Emergency Response Situations

Implementation procedures and contents based on measures for civil protection shall be implemented for measures in emergency response situation.

4. Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

1. Participation in Training for Civil Protection

With the establishment of the emergency legislation, the legal foundation for measures necessary to repel and terminate armed attacks as well as implementation of measures for protecting the people including evacuation measures of residents have been completed for the responses to the most critical situations for peace and safety of the country and its people, including armed attacks against Japan. In addition, the formulation of the Civil Protection Plan based on the Civil Protection Law made the responses of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF clear in terms of their implementation of civil protection measures. Hereafter, for adequate and expeditious implementation of measures to protect the people in armed attack situations, it will be important to arrange coordination procedures related to implementation of measures for protecting the people in collaboration with each of the ministries, agencies, and local authorities.

From this perspective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been actively participating in and cooperating with civil protection training conducted by the relevant agencies such as the Cabinet Office, prefectural governments, and local public organizations. By continuing these efforts, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will make stronger coordination with related organizations. (See Fig. III-1-1-7)

Fig. III-1-1-7 Participation in Civil Protection Related Exercises (Since August 2006)

Date	Location	SDF Units	Format
Aug 9, 06	Tottori	GSDf's 13th Brigade Headquarters, 8th Infantry Regiment, MSDF's Headquarters Maizuru District, Tottori Provincial Cooperation Office	Table-top exercise
Aug 25, 06	Hokkaido	GSDf's Northern Army, MSDF's Ominato District, ASDf's 2nd Air Wing	Field training exercise
Sept 29, 06	Ibaraki	GSDf's 1st Engineer Brigade, 1st Aviation and others, Ibaraki Provincial Cooperation Office	Field training exercise
Oct 16, 06	Fukuoka	GSDf's Western Army, MSDF's Headquarters Sasebo District, ASDf's Western Air Defense Force, Fukuoka Provincial Cooperation Office, Fukuoka Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, Internal Bureau, JSC	Table-top exercise
Oct 20, 06	Fukui	GSDf's 14th Infantry Regiment, MSDF's Headquarters Maizuru District	Table-top exercise
Oct 26, 06	Saitama	GSDf's Eastern Army, ASDf's Central Air Defense Force	Table-top exercise
Nov 10, 06	Tokyo	GSDf's 1st Division Headquarters, 1st Chemical	Table-top exercise (Partially field training exercise)
Nov 26, 06	Tottori	GSDf's Central Army Headquarters, 13th Brigade Headquarters, 13th Chemical Platoon/13th Brigade Headquarters Service Unit, 8th Infantry Regiment, 13th Medical/13th Logistics Support Regiment, 13th Aviation, 1st Helicopter Brigade, MSDF's Headquarters Maizuru District, ASDf's 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing, Miho Air Traffic Control Service Squadron, Miho Weather Service Squadron, Tottori Provincial Cooperation Office, Internal Bureau, JSC	Field training exercise
Feb 7, 07	Ehime	GSDf's 14th Brigade Headquarters, 14th Artillery Unit, MSDF's Headquarters Kure District, Ehime Provincial Cooperation Office	Table-top exercise
Feb 8, 07	Saga	GSDf's 4th Artillery Regiment, Kyushu Depot, Saga Provincial Cooperation Office	Table-top exercise

* Provincial Cooperation Office is officially SDF Provincial Cooperation Office. However, only Provincial Cooperation Office is used here.

2. Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

In order to establish a close coordination with local governments in peacetime and to make civil protection measures effective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF newly established the Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division in the GSDF Army Headquarters. In order to strengthen the functions related to coordination and cooperation with local authorities, the post of Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Coordinator was newly placed within the SDF Provincial Liaison Office, and its name was changed to the Provincial Cooperation Office. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in a Joint Field Exercise for Civil Protection: Having Participated in the Tottori Prefecture Civil Protection Field Exercise

1st Lieutenant Keiji Inoue
Medical Unit, 13th Logistics Support Regiment,
GSDF

The Medical Unit of the 13th Logistics Support Regiment stationed in Kaitaichi, Hiroshima Prefecture, as well as the 8th Infantry Regiment stationed in Yonago City, Tottori Prefecture, participated in a civil protection field exercise organized jointly by the Cabinet Secretariat and the Tottori Prefectural Government in November last year.

It was the first exercise for us to be conducted for a terrorist attack using chemicals and other weapons. Partly because of the Tokyo subway sarin attack that occurred in March 1995, the exercise attracted great attention of the press, and was conducted in a very tense atmosphere.

We wore a protective mask and chemical protection clothes, and treated people who were injured by chemicals and others and carried to us one after another. Because of the mask, gloves and other protective equipment, we had difficulties in moving smoothly to undertake delicate treatment, and could not even freely speak with each other. At the same time, however, we could not afford to waste even one moment in the treatment of the injured. Despite these extremely difficult conditions, we managed to treat them appropriately thanks to the training we had been regularly receiving.

This exercise provided us with an opportunity to perform a medical assistance operation through coordination with the local governments, police, fire departments and other organizations, as well as to share information with private medical institutions regarding treatment of the injured. The exercise was therefore very significant as it allowed us to strengthen the collaboration of all those concerned in the field.

I could feel the diversity of our mission through this exercise. I could also recognize anew how important regular training is to fulfill our mission. I will continue to work hard to develop skills of my own as well as of the unit so that we can meet the expectations of the people.



Members of the Medical Unit, 13th Logistics Support Regiment treating a person injured by chemicals during the Tottori Prefecture Civil Protection Field Exercise

5. The Operation of the Self-Defense Forces

On March 27, 2006, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF shifted to a joint operations posture, in which the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Joint Chief of Staff) solely assists the Ministry of Defense on SDF operations matters from the stand point of military experts. This prepared the SDF for unified operations with the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF), including peacetime, and enables the SDF to effectively respond to its diversifying roles in a timely manner.

1. Outline of Joint Operations Posture

(1) Basic Concept

- a. Joint Chief of Staff develops a concept regarding unified operations for the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and solely assists the Minister of Defense on SDF operations with military expert's viewpoint.
- b. The Minister of Defense commands SDF operations through the Joint Chief of Staff, and the Joint Chief of Staff executes the orders for SDF operations.

(2) Establishment of Central Organization Required for Joint Operations

To establish the joint operations posture, the Joint Staff Council Office and Staff Offices of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF were reviewed in order to improve their efficiency, and the Joint Staff Office was newly created. As a result, the structure for assisting the Minister of Defense by the Joint Chief of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF has been formed as follows:

a. Sole Assistance by Joint Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense on SDF Operations with Military Expert's Views, and the Responsibility of Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF for Building up their Respective Units

The Joint Staff Office, which was created in place of the conventional Joint Staff Council Office, performs functions concerning SDF operations that were transferred and consolidated from the Staff Offices of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and each of the Staff Offices is maintaining such functions as personnel service, defense build-up, and education/training. In other words, the Joint Chief of Staff is responsible for operating units, while each Chief of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF is responsible for building up units.


In addition, the Joint Chief of Staff clarifies what is needed for smooth execution of joint operations missions in view of the functions performed by the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. Each Chief of Staff, based on these needs, takes various measures to ensure the effectiveness of joint operations. (See Fig. III-1-1-8)

The intelligence required for SDF operations shall be provided to the Joint Staff Office and units by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters via the Department of Current & Crisis Intelligence.

b. Execution of the Minister's Orders for SDF Operations by the Joint Chief of Staff

The Joint Chief of Staff executes the Minister's orders for all operations of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, including defense operations, public security operations, and international disaster relief operations. The Minister's commands executed by the Joint Chief of Staff include situation where "Joint Task Forces²²⁾" are organized, and where only an SDF unit is mobilized (for example, only a unit of the GSDF is mobilized) to respond to the situation. (See Fig. III-1-1-9)


Fig. III-1-1-8 Roles of the Joint Chief of Staff, and Chiefs of Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF



- Notes: 1. The Joint Chief of Staff is responsible for joint training.
 2. With respect to forces affairs other than operation in regards to the joint task force, command responsibilities of the Minister

Fig. III-1-1-9 The Operation System of the SDF

Fundamental principle	Joint operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Joint Chief of Staff solely assists the Minister of Defense on the SDF operations with military expert's views ○ The Minister of Defense's command over the SDF is exercised through the Joint Chief of Staff ○ The Minister of Defense's order to the SDF are executed by the Joint Chief of Staff



2. Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operations Posture

In order for the SDF to respond to emerging new threats and a wide variety of situations with the joint operations posture, it is essential for the SDF to establish a reliable system for communicating command orders and sharing intelligence instantly between the Joint Staff Office and individual SDF units. For this purpose, the SDF Command and Communication Squadron (tentative name) will be newly established in this fiscal year to enhance the communication function that is directly linked to the operations of units. And, establishment of broad-based and mobile intelligence and communication infrastructures is required with domestic and foreign excellent information technology. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4)

At the unit level as well, commanders of a major units²³, who may potentially take command of a “joint task force,” must develop plans to prepare for such occasions during normal conditions as well as maintain a posture capable of executing missions through exercises and others. Staff from other SDF units is to be stationed at major command headquarters during normal conditions to enhance the coordination by overcoming barriers among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF with additional staff to be allocated, when necessary, in the case of taking measures against various situations in joint operations.

As we approach one year since the transition to the joint operations posture, the Ministry of Defense continues to study the enhancement of education/training activities by conducting joint exercises, the organizational structure of SDF commands, developing human resources appropriate for joint operations, and the necessity of standardizing equipment to pursue effective and efficient operations posture based on actual performance, and the necessary measures to be taken.

3. Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under the Direct Command of the Minister of Defense

Along with the transition to joint operations posture, the status and roles of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) was clarified as “the central intelligence service for the Ministry of Defense” in March 2006. Before the transition, DIH was placed under the Joint Staff Council, and after the transition it was placed under the direct command of the Minister of Defense.

This change enables the intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense to collect extensive information with holistic views, conduct advanced analyses with broad understanding of needs of internal organizations, and enhance its function to make reports to the Minister of Defense rapidly, accurately and directly.

Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) defines the primary role of the defense force to be the effective responses to new threats and diverse contingencies due to consideration of the security environment which has radically changed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and the activities of international terrorist organizations. Among new threats and diverse contingencies the following five are listed with the examples of primary responses and the concept of the SDF structure: 1) responses to ballistic missile attacks, 2) responses to attacks by guerrillas and special operation forces, 3) responses to aggression on offshore islands, 4) warning and surveillance in sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, and responses to the violation of airspace as well as responses to armed special operations vessels, and 5) responses to large-scale and special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological) disasters. These situations can seriously affect Japan's peace and security, and how to provide prompt and adequate responses is a major issue for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

This section describes how the SDF should respond to new threats and diverse contingencies including the five items presented in the NDPG under the joint operations posture as well as the issues on which the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been working.

1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

While various efforts have been made by the international community in recent years for non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation still continues. In July 2006 North Korea launched 7 ballistic missiles, and this incident reconfirmed the reality of the danger of ballistic missile attacks.

With this background, Japan began instituting a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in FY 2004 to further ensure its preparedness to respond to ballistic missile attacks. In 2005 necessary amendments were made to the SDF Law.

In December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced BMD interceptor missiles. (See Fig. III-1-2-1)

Fig. III-1-2-1 The History of Efforts for the BMD Development in Japan

1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved a joint Japan-U.S. technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) aimed for a part of a sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the joint research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2000	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001 - FY 2005) with a decision to continue the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and to take necessary measures after the review of its technical feasibility
2002	Decision by the United States of the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2004	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program, with a decision to take necessary measures after examining possible transition of joint technical research to a development stage, together with continued efforts of buildup to establish a necessary defense posture including development of the BMD system
2005	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved a Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for BMD
2006	North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the sea of Japan
2007	Started the deployment of Patriot PAC-C units

1. Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

(1) Overview of the BMD System Development


a. Basic Concept

The BMD system, which the Japanese government has been developing since the Cabinet decision of December 2003, is based on the concept of a multi-tier defense system, which executes Aegis vessels²⁴ for upper-tier interception and Patriot system (PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3))²⁵ for lower-tier interception, replying on the improvement to the capabilities of Aegis vessels and surface-to-air Patriot systems currently possessed by the SDF.

b. Configuration of the BMD System

Japan's BMD system adopts a multi-tier weapon system that intercepts in-coming ballistic missile by Aegis vessels in the midcourse phase and by the Patriot system in the terminal phase. The entire system consists of the multi-tier system and the sensors to detect and track ballistic missiles flying toward Japan, and the command/control and communication systems that effectively link weapons and sensors to systematically counter ballistic missiles. (See Fig. III-1-2-2)

Fig. III-1-2-2 Concept of BMD Deployment and Operation (Image diagram)



c. Policy for Introducing the BMD System

In introducing the BMD system, the utilization of current equipment will be promoted from the perspective of developing an effective and efficient system while reducing acquisition and maintenance cost. In addition to the above-mentioned improvement in the capabilities of the Aegis vessels and the Patriot system, an improved

type of the current ground radar system will be used in the area of sensors. Also, the newly introduced radar system FPS-5²⁶, which can detect both conventional airborne threats (air planes and others) and ballistic missiles, will be used in combination with the improved ground radar. The same policy applies to the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment as a command/control and communications system.

d. Status of Introducing the BMD System

In March 2007 Patriot PAC-3 was introduced to the 4th Air Missile Defense SQ of 1st Air Missile Defense Group at Iruma Air Base of the ASDF (Saitama prefecture) as Japan's first intercepting method, to form the BMD system, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited to inspect the system on April 13th, 2007. The Ministry of Defense and JSDF plan to continue with the introduction of the BMD system, and the current target is to develop a system FY 2011 that links the command/communication system with four Aegis vessels (with the added BMD capability), sixteen Patriot PAC-3 FUs²⁷ (fire units), four FSP-5 radars, and seven FPS-3 radars (improved type).



Defense Group (Saitama prefecture), and Prime Minister Abe observing this system

In the FY 2006 budget for the BMD system, approximately a total of 157.2 billion yen (on a contract base) was appropriated for 1) improvement in the capability of the Aegis vessels, and the acquisition and launch test of SM-3 missiles, 2) improvement in the capability of the Patriot system and the acquisition of PAC-3 missiles, and 3) the introduction of a new warning and control radar system (FPS-5).

In consideration of the event that North Korean launched ballistic missiles in July 2005, approximately 3.7 billion yen (on a contract base) has been appropriated as an additional measure for enhancing Japan's posture for collecting information, and for warning and surveillance.

In the revised budget for FY 2005, approximately a total of 14.2 billion yen (on a contract base) was appropriated for early acquisition of PAC-3 missiles and the improvement of electronic data gathering aircraft (EP-3).

(2) Future Capability Improvement

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology still continues, and the possibility cannot be denied that ballistic missiles possessed by nations will develop into those with measures for avoiding interception such as using decoy to deceive interception of warheads. It is therefore necessary to continue improving the interception capabilities that matches such advances in ballistic missiles.

Expansion of the defense coverage and improvement in the interception probability are also required to the conventional ballistic missiles, and it is necessary to increase the efficiency and reliability of the BMD system by improving the kinetic energy performance of interceptor missiles.

Based on these perspectives, the Mid-Term Defense Program states that the improvement of Aegis vessels and the Patriot system for the next fiscal year and onward (after achieving the defense capability listed in the schedule of the NDPG) shall be studied and then necessary measures shall be taken with consideration of the status of BMD technology development in the United States. As for the Japan-U.S. joint technical research that began in 1999, joint development started in 2006 based on research outcomes obtained so far. Furthermore, efforts to improve future capabilities have been made, such as Japan-U.S. joint development to improve the capabilities of radar and combat command systems. (See Figs. III-1-2-3 • 4)

Fig. III-1-2-3 Future Measures to Avoid Intercepting Ballistic Missiles





Fig. III-1-2-4 Images of Expanding Protection Areas through Future Improvement in Capabilities of BMD Missiles



2. Improvement in Legislations and Operations


(1) Legal Measures regarding Responses to Ballistic Missiles

In cases when ballistic missiles and other objects²⁸ are launched toward Japan as armed attacks, defense operations for armed attack situations will be ordered and the missiles will be intercepted.

On the other hand, when ballistic missiles are bound for Japan but no armed attack situation is acknowledged and no defense operations are ordered, the SDF is allowed to take the following actions by fully taking into account 1) the taking of prompt and appropriate actions, and 2) the ensuring of civilian control. (See Reference 70)

- a. When the Minister of Defense recognizes that there is sufficient possibility that ballistic missiles and the like fly toward Japan based on pre-indications, he or she may order SDF units to take measures for destroying the missiles with the approval of the Prime Minister. Possible actions taken by the SDF in such situations include deploying the Patriot system of the ASDF and the Aegis vessels of the MSDF under the order of the Minister to prepare for incoming ballistic missiles, and destroying the missiles under the previously issued order when the missiles actually fly toward Japan.
- b. In addition to a) above, there may be cases where situations suddenly change, such as when almost no information is available on missile launches or when missiles are launched mistakenly or accidentally, and there is no time for the Minister of Defense to obtain the Prime Minister's approval. In preparation for such occasions, the Minister of Defense can prepare emergency response procedures and have them approved by the Prime Minister under normal circumstances, and in order to protect lives and properties within the territory of Japan the Minister of Defense can issue an advanced order to SDF units for a given period of time, in accordance with the emergency response procedures, to destroy ballistic missiles with Aegis vessels when they actually fly toward Japan. (See Fig. III-1-2-5)

Fig. III-1-2-5 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles



(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of Military

Responses against ballistic missiles and the like require not only responses by the SDF but also actions by the government as a whole, such as alerting and evacuating the people for protection, taking diplomatic activities, gathering of information by the departments concerned, and strengthening preparedness for emergencies. When ballistic missiles are actually flying toward Japan, the destruction of such missiles is necessary using interceptor missiles. Also, the Japanese government needs to make a judgment on the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific condition and international situations.

In view of the importance of such incidents and the necessity of actions taken by the Japanese government as a whole, the approval of the Prime Minister (Cabinet decision) and individual orders of the Minister of Defense are required so that they can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities. In addition, the involvement of the Diet is clarified by having clear statement in the law on ex post facto reporting to the Diet.

In March 2007 the Minister of Defense drafted and the Prime Minister approved an emergency response procedure defining how SDF units should respond to emergencies and cooperate with relevant government agencies where ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and there is no time to obtain an approval from the Prime Minister due to sudden changes in situations. With this approval, Japan now has its own system necessary for conducting timely and adequate responses, including emergency events. (See Reference 30)

(3) Operational Efforts

a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations

The destruction of incoming ballistic missiles and the like shall be performed by integrating MSDF's Aegis vessels, ASDF's radars, the Patriot system, and the command/control and communications system. As for the operation of the BMD system, effective responses are being studied including unified operations led by the Commander of Air Defense Command as an example, and various postures are being developed. The GSDF will play the main role in dealing with the damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

b. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Responding to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Further cooperation with the U.S. forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is required for the efficient and effective operations of the BMD system. Related measures were agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in October 2005, in May 2006, and May 2007 presenting the direction for Japan-U.S. security cooperation. (See Chapter 2, Section 2 • Chapter 2, Section 3)


3. Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States aims to develop multi-tier missile defense system in which interception systems suitable for 1) the boost phase, 2) midcourse phase, and 3) terminal phase of the flights, and they are combined and complement each other to defend against missiles. These systems will be introduced as they become available²⁹. (See Fig. III-1-2-6)

In June 2006, the United States Forces in Japan introduced transportable radar for BMD in the Shariki Subbase of the ASDF (Aomori prefecture). In September 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were placed in Kadena Air Base. In addition, Aegis vessels with BMD capabilities are being forward-deployed in Japan and the surrounding area since August 2006.

Fig. III-1-2-6 Example of U.S. Multi-Tier Defenses Against Ballistic Missiles




(2) Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Improved Missiles

In 1999 the government decided to start Japan-U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system (the current sea-based midcourse defense system) with the approval of the Security Council of Japan in 1998.

This joint technical research carries out design, prototype and necessary tests of interceptor missiles with higher capabilities than the sea-based midcourse defense system that Japan is currently introducing. So far, the design, prototypes and necessary tests of four major components³⁰ have been carried out.

The Japan-U.S. joint technical research has completed the verification of elemental technologies and obtained the prospects for solving technical issues. In December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided on transitioning to joint development, using the outcomes of the Japan-U.S. joint research as a technological foundation for the development of interceptor missiles with improved capabilities. In June 2006, the Japanese and U.S. governments reached an official agreement on this matter. In FY 2006 approximately 21.7 billion yen was appropriated for the joint development of future BMD system. (See Fig. III-1-2-7) (See Reference 29)

Fig. III-1-2-7 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Advanced Interceptor Missiles for BMD



(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports

Japan's BMD program is structured by improving the capabilities of the Aegis vessels and Patriot system currently possessed in Japan, and it does not conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

However, the Japan-U.S. joint technical development of BMD systems for future improvement involves the necessity of exporting BMD-related arms to the United States as part of the development. When the decision was made in December 2005 on transition to the joint developments, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply under the condition that strict control is maintained and a framework for the provision of arms required to be exported to the U.S. would be developed through coordination with the United States, in accordance with Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement made in December 2004.

In June 2006, letters concerning the provision of arms and arms related technology to the United States were exchanged, and that established a framework to provide arms and arms-related technology under tight control, for example prohibiting use for purposes to which Japan had not agreed in advance, and prohibiting transfer to third countries. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

(4) Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Cooperation on BMD

Since the decision was made to introduce BMD systems to Japan, efforts have been continuously made to strengthen the Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation.

The Mid-Term Defense Program indicates the measures for strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as the government of Japan will strengthen Japan-U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense capabilities and to promote cooperation with the United States in the areas of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology. Furthermore, the Cabinet decided to exchange letters concerning

BMD cooperation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Following the Cabinet decision, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on BMD cooperation was signed between Japan Defense Agency (then) and the U.S. Department of Defense in 2004.

Additionally, in June 2006 the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan exchanged a letter concerning BMD cooperation, including Japan-U.S. joint development.

4. North Korea's Ballistic Missiles Launch and Japan's Response


(1) The Incident of Ballistic Missile Launch

On July 5 last year North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan.

From Kittaeryon in the southeast coast region of North Korea, six ballistic missiles, which were suspected to be Nodong or Scud, were launched and impacted on the Sea of Japan. The circumstance of this round of missile launches is considered to have the characteristics of actual aggression, and implies that North Korea has been improving the operation capability of ballistic missiles.

Out of seven missiles, the third missile was suspected to be a Taepodong-2, and was launched from the Taepodong district on the east coast region of North Korea. However, it was disintegrated in mid-air and dropped in the area near the launch area, and is assumed to have failed the launch. (See Fig. III-1-2-8) (See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2)

Fig. III-1-2-8 Locations of North Korea's Missile Launch



(2) Response of the Japanese Government

In response to the missile launch by North Korea, the Japanese government set up a response office in the Prime Minister's Office and held the Security Council to discuss the responsive actions of Japan. At 8:20a.m., a statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary was announced. It strictly protested against North Korea and expressed its regrets. The Japanese government reminded North Korea of the moratorium on the launching of ballistic missiles stated in the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration³¹, and strongly required the country to act in accordance with the declaration and to return to the Six-Party Talk quickly without conditions. On the same day, the Japanese government also took specific actions including prohibiting port entrance by Man Gyong Bong 92, prohibiting the entry of North Korean officials in principle, and postponing trips to North Korea by Japanese civil servants in principle.

In addition, the Japanese government decided to take various response actions as part of coordination with the international community such as close coordination with the United States, and approaching the U.N. Security Council³².

Responding to the actions by the Japanese government, the resolution 1695³³ of the United Nations Security Council was adopted on July 16, 2005 (on July 15 in New York time), regarding the missile launch by North Korea.

(3) Responses of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

a. Postures prior to Missile Launch

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been collecting information regarding missile related activities by North Korea in peace time, and had captured events which could be seen as an indication of this round of launch. In addition, Japan and the United States have been exchanging necessary intelligence in peace time in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.



FPS-5 radar under an operation study (Chiba prefecture)
(SDF personnel at the center bottom of the photo)

Based on comprehensive evaluation of information gathered from various sources regarding this missile launch, Japan's warning and surveillance posture had been reinforced since the end of May under the command of the Minister of State for Defense (then) by deploying Aegis equipped vessels, electronic data gathering aircraft EP-3 in the MSDF, and FPS-3 improved radar (advanced capabilities), FPS-5 radar under the operation study, electronic measuring aircraft YS-11EB, and E-767 airborne early warning and control aircraft in the ASDF.

b. Responses of the Defense Agency (then) and the SDF after the Missile Launch

Responding to the ballistic missile launch by North Korea, the Minister of State for Defense Nukaga (then) immediately issued an instruction by the Minister of State for Defense ("Immediate Response to the Event of Flying Object Launch by North Korea"), and instructed to take thorough actions for the following while closely coordinating with relevant organizations in Japan as well as with concerned countries including the United States:

- 1) searching for the flying objects by relevant units and analyzing of related information by the leadership of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and finding facts on this event in detail;
- 2) continuing the strengthening of the posture of collecting information on future actions of North Korea by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and concerned units; and

3) continuing the enhancing of the warning posture by concerned units in preparation for potential ballistic missile launches.

Furthermore, the “Headquarters of Countermeasures against North Korea’s Flying Object Launch”⁷³⁴ as set up, in order for the then Defense Agency to make assurance doubly sure in future collection of intelligence and responses.

The SDF units dispatched naval vessels and aircraft to the waters where the ballistic missiles might have dropped to search for fallen objects while enhancing the warning and surveillance postures, and placed liaison offices in preparation for potential damages.

(4) Lessons Learned and Issues

The Ministry of Defense has strengthened and improved its preparedness for information collection, analysis and communications, as those items were noted as lessons learned in the event of ballistic missile launch by North Korea in 1998. Due to such improvement and reinforcement, the Ministry of Defense was able to execute information collection, analysis and reporting promptly and appropriately in the event of this round of ballistic missile launch by North Korea.

For example, with information collection activities throughout the stages of capturing indications of potential missile launch and the stage of actual launch the Minister of State for Defense (then) was able to hold a press conference and quickly announced information on the missile types, times of launch, estimated impact points of the missiles, and other items shortly after the launch. These actions contributed to the Japanese government’s fast initial response after the launch.

Examining the overall cooperation with the U.S. forces, the coordination between Japan and the United States was good in terms of communication network, information sharing, and response procedure, as a result of the two nations having carried on close collaboration work for information sharing as well as for responses prior to the occurrence of the event.

However, some issues still need to be resolved such as early development of BMD system for directly intercepting ballistic missiles, and improvement and enhancement of the posture of intelligence collection and analysis.

(5) Measures taken by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF with Consideration of Missile Launch Incidents

Regarding the issue of North Korea’s missile launch, Japan needs to promote diplomatic efforts while coordinating with the international community, and to construct the BMD system quickly along with enhancing the alliance between Japan and the United States and the operational posture between the two countries, and the establishment of an information sharing posture.

While the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are developing BMD system in accordance with the plan, new measures have been added in response to the recent missile launch such as to improve electronic data gathering aircraft EP-3 to continuously and constantly obtain more advanced intelligence collection and analysis capability, and to promote the research on advanced infrared sensor for detecting ballistic missiles.

In consideration of the needs for strengthening the capability of faster missile interception, efforts have been made to reinforce response capabilities by acquiring Patriot missile systems (PAC-3) earlier than timing in the original plan.

In order to establish a better operational mechanism for the BMD system introduced, deeper study has been taking place with a greater intensity as Japan proceeds with independent study while participating in operational consultations with the U.S. forces.

2. Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

As Japan is highly urbanized, relatively small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat to the peace and security of the country. Such attacks take various forms, including illegal actions by infiltrating armed agents³⁵, which are to be dealt with primarily by the police, and armed attacks such as destructive actions by guerrillas and special operations forces, which are a form of aggression on the territory of Japan.

1. Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

(1) Basic Concept

Armed attacks on Japan by guerrillas and special operations forces will be responded to by defense operations. Forms of armed attacks on Japan include 1) destruction of facilities and attacks on people by irregular forces such as guerrillas, and 2) subversive activities, assassination of important figures and raids on operations centers by regular forces such as special operations forces.

(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

In operations to respond to attacks by guerrillas and special operations forces, a posture for information gathering is promptly established to discover and capture or destroy them at the earliest possible time. While conducting such operations, it is important to quickly gain control of the situation, to minimize damage from the assault.

a. Discovery and Prevention of Approach of Various Types of Ships

Efforts will be made to identify ships and submarines transporting guerrillas and special operations forces at the earliest possible timing to prevent them from advancing in the water by using destroyers, submarines, and aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF.

b. Search and Discovery of Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

When the possibility of infiltration into the territory of Japan by guerrillas or special operations forces is suspected, the GSDF's patrol units will be engaged in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas.




GSDF's 34th Infantry regiment (Shizuoka prefecture) training for countering attacks by guerrillas or special operations forces

When infiltration actually occurs, the patrol and air units will search for and find the guerrillas or special operations forces. Also, guarding postures will be established as necessary for prompt deployment of guarding units to protect critical facilities.

c. Capturing and Defeating Guerrillas and Special Operation Forces

When guerrillas or special operations forces are found, fighting units will be promptly gathered in the area to besiege and capture or defeat them. (See Fig. III-1-2-9)

Fig. III-1-2-9 Example of Operations for Coping with Guerrillas and Special Forces



2. Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police takes the primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF take actions as shown in Figure III-1-2-10 as a basic, in accordance with the development of the incident occurred.

(2) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Deal with Armed Agents


In 2001, the SDF Law was amended to add the following provisions in order to allow prompt and effective responses to armed agents.

a. Information Gathering Prior to the Order for Public Security Operations

When there is anticipation of dispatching an order for public security operations and illegal activities by persons armed with powerful weapons such as rifles and machine guns, and when a special need is identified for gathering information to help clarify the situation of the incident, the Minister of Defense may order, upon the consultation with the National Public Safety Commission and with the approval of the Prime Minister, armed SDF units to gather information on such persons in places where they are likely be found.

The SDF regular personnel engaged in intelligence activities are allowed to use weapons within the limitations considered reasonably necessary depending on the incident, provided that they have adequate and

Fig. III-1-2-10 Basic Concept for Responding to Armed Agents



legitimate reasons for using weapons to protect their lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel engaged in the activity. However, they must not harm persons for reasons other than self-defense or emergency evacuation purpose.

b. Use of Weapons in Public Security Operations

SDF personnel engaged in the public security operations are allowed to use weapons to the extent reasonably judged necessary in light of the circumstances, and when such use resulted to harm a person, it is legally assessed as a lawful act as provided in the Self-Defense Forces Law prior to the amendment as follows:

- 1) abating violence or intrusion against people, facilities, and properties which the SDF personnel should protect as their duties, and
- 2) suppressing or preventing mass violence or intimidation.

In addition, the amendment includes,

- 3) suppressing or preventing violence or intimidation by a person who possesses or is reasonably suspected to possess weapons such as rifles, machine guns (including machine pistols), artillery, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.

(3) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police

a. Establishing the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation

For the SDF to deal with armed agents, it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the JDA (then) and the National Public Safety Commission to provide for cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised so that it can be applied to illegal activities by armed agents³⁶. In addition, Local Agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.

Furthermore, guidelines for joint actions in the events involving armed agents at the time of public security operations were created jointly with the National Police Agency in 2004 with the aim of adequately implementing joint actions on sight between the SDF and police force for the situation of public security operations due to armed agents.

b. Joint Exercises with the Police

By July 2005, the GSDF divisions/brigades and the prefectural police forces, which are parties to the Local Agreements, conducted joint table-top exercises to strengthen cooperation at the local level in preparation for responding to armed agents. Through the exercises, the SDF divisions and the police forces share an understanding of measures to deal with armed agents, and the examination of the procedures for cooperation between them was deepened based on outcomes of the exercises.

In October 2005, the Northern GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conducted the first joint field exercise, and that was followed by the joint field exercise between the 14th Brigade and all prefectural polices in Shikoku, between the 4th Division and Fukuoka Prefectural Police, between the 1st Division and the prefectural police of Saitama and Ibaraki, between the 3rd Brigade and all prefectural polices of Osaka, Nara and Wakayama, and between the 2nd Division and Asahikawa Area Office of Hokkaido Policy in FY 2006 to confirm the cooperation at the time of a public security operation. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)



GSDF's 15th Infantry regiment (Kagawa prefecture) participating in a joint exercise with the police

3. Response to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons

In recent years, there has been a strong recognition of the danger of the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means for delivering such weapons, as well related equipments and materials, to terrorists and rogue countries. Because the use of such weapons of mass destruction could result in indiscriminately mass murder or extensive environmental contamination, preventing the proliferation of such weapons is a major issue for the peace and stability of the international community including Japan. The sarin gas attack on subways in Tokyo in 1995³⁷ and the incidents of mail containing anthrax in the United States in 2001³⁸ are proof of the fact that these weapons have already been transferred and proliferated.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of a so-called NBC terrorist attack on Japan, and when it is regarded as an armed attack on Japan from outside, the SDF will conduct defense operations and take necessary actions to defend the country and

save victims. Also, in the event of an NBC terrorist attack which does not fall under an armed attack from outside but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the terrorists and assist victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the subject to defense operations or public security operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief activities for rescuing victims and preventing the expansion of damages, and support the related agencies in conducting information gathering about damage caused, decontamination activities, transporting the injured and sick, and medical activities led by the chemical protection units of the GSDF and the medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF.

(2) Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Response to NBC Weapons

The Mid-Term Defense Program provides that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF shall improve the capability for responding to attacks using NBC weapons. Particularly for responses to biological weapons, it provides that various necessary functions should be improved in the areas of personnel and equipment, including detection, identification, protection, prevention, diagnosis and treatment, decontamination, and human resources development.

Specifically, the GSDF, which will play a central role in various scenes, has increased the personnel assigned to chemical units, and has acquired protective equipment and materials such as biological weapon detection vehicles, chemical protection vehicles, decontamination devices, protective gear for individual use, and chemical protective clothing. In addition, the GSDF is developing NBC detection vehicles. Furthermore, the GSDF designated personnel who take initial actions in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within about one hour. The MSDF and ASDF also have acquired protecting equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3)

(3) Response to Substances Related to Nuclear and Radiological Weapons³⁹

Substances related to nuclear weapons have various effects on the health of those exposed to them, even if they do not directly cause damage to the human body. Therefore, appropriate protection and exposure control is required, taking into consideration of the characteristics of such substances.

To a certain degree, internal exposure⁴⁰ from inhaling radioactive substances can be prevented by the use of protective masks and clothing, and external exposure⁴¹ from radiation can be prevented by the use of chemical protection vehicles. The chemical protection units equipped with these protective devices may conduct operations with certain limitations.

(4) Response to Biological Weapons

a. Disaster Relief Dispatches in the Event of Biological Terrorism

Biological agents have certain incubation periods, and it is difficult to determine whether the disease is caused by a biological agent based only on initial symptoms. When biological agents are dispersed secretly, an anthropogenic cause may be suspected only after damage has actually occurred and spread. Therefore, it may be extremely difficult to detect biological terrorism before damage is actually caused by it.


In the event of damage caused by biological agents, medical institutions take the primary



GSDF's Chemical Protection unit (Tokyo) conducting decontamination training

responsibility for responding to the situation, and the SDF will be responsible mainly for decontamination, transporting patients, and medical activities. (See Fig. III-1-2-11)

Fig. III-1-2-11 Image of Future Response to Biological Weapons



b. Initiatives for Biological Weapons Countermeasures

Based on the report⁴² provided by the Panel on Biological Weapons Countermeasures comprising external experts in April 2001, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF published the Principles of Defense against Biological Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the Principles of Biodefense) in January 2002 to present the overall picture of measures to cope with the biological weapons from the basic operational concept. They also established the Biological Countermeasures Committee and conducting various actions. As part these efforts, seminars on how to deal with biological weapons have been held to improve the ability to counter these weapons through operational studies.

In order to minimize the damage by biological weapons, NBC Medical Treatment Unit will be newly formed in this fiscal year as a unit directly under the command of the Minister of Defense who makes the decisions on early diagnosis and treatment policy by utilizing the biological agent medical laboratory units and quarantining and accommodating the patients suspected for infections.

(5) Response to Chemical Weapons

Unlike biological agents chemical agents generally produce damage immediately, and it is extremely important to take prompt actions at the initial stage of the damage.

The chemical units of the GSDF can deal with chemical agents through the use of their chemical protective clothing and vehicles. The chemical units and medical units of the GSDF dispatched for disaster relief operations will detect the chemical agents using detective devices, transport and treat victims, and conduct decontamination activities, and medical activities in the contaminated areas. Even when the situation does not require the SDF dispatch, the SDF will, as needed, lend chemical protective clothing and dispatch chemical unit personnel as liaison officials to relevant agencies.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Central Readiness Force

The Central Readiness Force was newly organized within the Ground Self-Defense Force on March 28 this year.

The force was established in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines, which requires that highly responsive and mobile ground units are to be organized and deployed according to the geography and other characteristics of Japan in order to effectively deal with new threats and diverse contingencies such as guerrillas and special operations force attacks and large-scale natural disasters.

The Central Readiness Force is trained regularly to effectively counter guerrillas and special operations force attacks and other events, and when an emergency situation occurs, its subordinate units are combined to perform their optimum capacity in accordance with the situation and dispatched promptly.

Its subordinate units also include the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (Komakado), which is responsible for regularly providing training and education necessary for international peace cooperation activities, and through such training and education, the posture for prompt and continuous dispatch of the units for international peace cooperation activities will be further strengthened.


The Central Readiness Force is scheduled to be reorganized as described below during this fiscal year to further enhance its responsiveness and mobility.

- (1) The Central Readiness Regiment (tentative name) will be newly organized to strengthen the posture for defense and security of Japan as well as for international peace cooperation activities.
- (2) The 101 NBC Protection Unit will be abolished, and the Central NBC Protection Unit (tentative name) will be newly organized to strengthen the current posture for NBC protection¹ so that operations of the units can be performed throughout the country.

The posture of the Ground Self Defense Forces is to be further strengthened for the purpose of making more effective reaction to new threats and diverse contingencies as well as making independent and practical efforts in international peace cooperation activities.



Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the organization of the Central Readiness Force (AsaKa) (left)
General Yamaguchi, the first Commander of the Central Readiness Force, at the press conference (right)



3. Response to Aggression on Islands

In the NDPG Japan's geographical features are considered vulnerable from the security point of view as they are narrow with long coastlines and many islands. Particularly, because of the geographical feature of having many islands, the enemy may invade these islands as one form of armed attack on Japan.

Operations to Respond to Aggression on Islands

In order to respond to aggression on islands, it is important to detect signs of aggression at the earliest possible time through activities routinely conducted by the SDF, such as warning and surveillance, and military information gathering. Operations to respond to aggression on islands have much in common with the form of full-scale post-landing operations. However, if any signs of aggression are detected in advance, operations will be conducted to prevent the aggression by the enemy's units. When no signs of aggressions are detected in advance and the islands in question are occupied, operations will be conducted to defeat the enemy.



GSDF's 12th Infantry regiment (Kagoshima prefecture) training for response to aggression on islands

In carrying out these operations, agile transportation and deployment of units through joint operations are essential. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF shall cooperate with each other and concentrate their units quickly to prevent and destroy invading enemy troops.

4. Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas and Airspace surrounding Japan, and Responses to Violation of Airspace and Armed Special-Operations Vessels

In order to respond quickly to not only full-scale aggression but also new threats or diverse contingencies, it is extremely important to conduct, on a routine basis, warning and surveillance activities in Japan's territorial waters and airspace and in the surrounding airspace and sea area under normal circumstances, as well as to gather and process information required for defense. For this purpose, the SDF is engaged in various activities directly related to ensuring the peace and security of Japan.

1. Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas surrounding Japan



ASDF staff at the air defense command post, Central Air Defense Force (Saitama prefecture) taking actions against aerial invasion

The MSDF patrols the sea areas surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea once a day as standard, using P-3C patrol aircraft. Warning and surveillance is also undertaken by destroyers and aircraft in a flexible manner as needed, for example, when surveillance is required for possible missile launches. Thus, the preparedness to promptly respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan is maintained.

Additionally, GSDF coastal surveillance units and MSDF security posts on major straits conduct 24-hour warning and surveillance activities.


2. Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (scrambles) in Preparation against Violation of Territorial Airspace



Pilots of ASDF's 302th Squadron getting on F-4 fighter for scramble

The ASDF conducts daily 24-hour surveillance of the country's territorial and adjacent airspace, using radar sites throughout the country, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft. Furthermore, a number of fighter aircraft are always on standby for immediate takeoff (scramble). When any aircraft suspected of violating Japan's territorial airspace are detected, scrambled fighters will approach them to assess the situation, and monitor the aircraft as necessary. When the aircraft is actually violating the territorial airspace, they will issue a warning to leave. (See Fig. III-1-2-12)

Fig. III-1-2-12 Number of Scrambles in the Last Decade



3. Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial Waters⁴³

(1) Basic Concept

As for foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters, an order for maritime security operations⁴⁴ will be issued under the Cabinet decision in 1996⁴⁵, and the SDF will request the submarine to navigate on the surface of water and to show its flag. When the submarine does not respond to the request, the SDF will request it to leave the territorial waters.

(2) Measures in Relation to the Submerged Chinese Nuclear Submarine Operating in Japan's Territorial Waters

In November 2004, a Chinese submarine navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters surrounding the Sakishima Islands was found. An order for maritime security operations was issued according to Article 82 of the SDF Law and the procedures based on the Cabinet decision of 1996, and MSDF vessels and aircraft tracked the submarine continuously until it reached the high seas. However, it took a considerable amount of time for the Japanese government to issue an order for maritime security operations after receiving information on the submarine's entering territorial waters. Based on the lessons learned from this event, the government has newly set out the following response plan.



MSDF's SH-60K patrol helicopter training for anti-submarine warfare using a sonar

a. Response Plan

- (a) As for a submarine submerged in territorial waters, actions shall be taken, in principle, in maritime security operations, such as to request to appear on the sea surface and to request to leave from the territorial waters.
- (b) When an incident occurs, the Minister of Defense shall promptly issue an order for maritime security operations, following the required procedures.
 - For this purpose, when information is obtained on submarines approaching the territorial waters of Japan, it shall be shared within the government at the earliest timing.
 - When the submarine enters the territorial waters of Japan, an order for maritime security operations shall be immediately issued, unless there is any particular reason to the contrary.
- (c) Even after the submarine leaves the territorial waters of Japan, maritime security operations shall be continued for actions such as determining the possibility of reentry, and for identifying the submarine's nationality.
- (d) Relevant nations shall be contacted, while necessary measures are taken.
- (e) The status of the submarine navigating underwater in territorial waters and the actions taken by the government shall be explained to the public in an appropriate and timely manner, including the announcement of issuing an order for maritime security operations, while taking into consideration of security aspects.

(f) To ensure that the above plan will be implemented, necessary manuals (response procedures) shall be shared by relevant ministries and agencies.

b. Enhancement and Improvement of Equipments for Responding to Submarines Navigating underwater in Territorial Waters

The MSDF is enhancing and improving the capabilities for detecting, identifying and tracking foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan as well as for making the intension of the Japanese government clear to the submarines. It also is maintaining and improving the capabilities for responding to submarines in shallow water areas.

4. Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard is primarily responsible for responding to unidentified vessels. However, when it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to the situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued in a timely manner, and the SDF will take actions in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

Taking into consideration of the lessons learned from and the reflection of the unidentified vessel incident off the Noto Peninsula in 1999⁴⁶, and the unidentified vessel incident in southwest Kyushu in 2001⁴⁷, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, and the government has taken the best possible necessary actions, in order to allow effective and safe countermeasures to be taken against unidentified vessels.

(2) Amending the Self-Defense Forces Law to Respond to Unidentified Vessels

Legislative reviews were conducted, focusing on the authorization for weapon usage in stopping unidentified vessels. Following the reviews, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended in 2001 to add following provisions for the use of weapons in maritime security operations.

Despite repeated orders to stop the vessel for required inspection in maritime security operations, the crew of the vessel may refuse to follow the order or attempt to flee. In such a case and when the Minister of Defense determines that the incident meets certain requirements⁴⁸, MSDF personnel engaged in such operations are allowed to use weapons within limitations considered reasonably necessary depending on the incident, provided that they have adequate and legitimate reasons to believe that they have no other means but to use weapons to stop the boat. This use of weapons will be considered to be a lawful act even when it results in injury to the crew of the boat.

(3) Enhancing Equipments for Responding to Unidentified Vessels

The MSDF took the following actions: 1) increased the speed of new-type missile crafts⁴⁹; 2) newly organized a special boarding unit⁵⁰; 3) equipped destroyers with machine guns; 4) furnished forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)⁵¹; and 5) improved the fill rate of necessary ship crews.

(4) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

a. Developing the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation

In 1999, the Defense Agency (then) and the Japan Coast Guard jointly developed the Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels, and provided the liaison system, procedure for initial response, division of roles (joint response procedure), and other around the time of an order for maritime security operations.

b. Joint Exercises with the Japan Coast Guard

The Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard conduct periodical mutual learning sessions, information exchange and joint exercises. Also, according to the manual, the MSDF conducts joint exercises with the Japan Coast Guard, regarding communications and the procedures to trace and capture unidentified vessels in order to strengthen their cooperation.

On March 12 this year, a joint field exercise was conducted in the off shore of Sasebo. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

5. Response to Large-Scale and Special-Type Disasters

The SDF conducts a variety of disaster relief activities when such a disaster occurs, including search and rescue for accident victims and ships or aircraft in distress, flood control, medical treatment, epidemic prevention, water supply, and transportation of personnel and goods. The expectations of the Japanese people toward SDF disaster relief operations has been increasing considerably, particularly after SDF units were dispatched for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake⁵² in 1995. In subsequent years, the SDF also played major roles in responding not only to natural disasters but also to various other disasters, such as the nuclear criticality accident in 1999 in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture, and the accidental sinking of the training boat, Ehime Maru of the Ehime Prefectural Uwajima Fisheries High School in 2001.



GSDF's 12th Infantry regiment (Kagoshima prefecture) rescuing isolated residents in Satsuma-cho, Kagoshima

1. Mechanism of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Types of Disaster Relief Dispatches

a. Disaster Relief Dispatch

(a) Dispatches upon Request (General form of disaster relief dispatch)

In principle, the SDF dispatches its units for disaster relief upon request of prefectural governors and other officials under Article 83 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. This is because prefectural governors and other officials assume primary responsibility for disaster control measures, and are in the position to grasp the overall condition of the disaster, and therefore it is considered most appropriate for such dispatches to be made upon request by them. Also, when a disaster has occurred or is expected to occur soon, and when it is deemed necessary to take emergency measures, mayors of municipalities can ask the governors to request disaster relief dispatches by the SDF. Furthermore, when the mayors are not able to make such a request to the governors, they can inform the condition of the disaster to the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister, in accordance with Article 68-1 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act.

(b) Discretionary Dispatch

The Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may dispatch SDF units without a request, in exceptional circumstances when the situations are particularly urgent, and there is no time to wait for a request.

In order to render these discretionary dispatches even more effective, the Defense Agency Disaster Prevention Plan (then)⁵³ was revised in 1995 to specify that SDF unit commanders or other officials may order discretionary dispatches in following cases:

- 1) when information gathering is necessary in order to provide the information to concerned organizations;
- 2) when urgent relief measures are required, but the prefectural governors or other such officials are deemed unable to make a request for relief dispatch; and
- 3) when such relief dispatches are required to save lives.

In addition, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, when a fire or other disaster occurred in or near the facilities of the Ministry of Defense.

b. Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch

When an alert⁵⁴ is issued based on the Law Concerning Special Measures for Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster prevention dispatch upon the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister), even prior to the occurrence of the earthquake.


c. Nuclear Disaster Dispatch

When a nuclear emergency alert is issued based on the Special Law on Nuclear Disasters Countermeasures, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon the request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

(2) Flow of the Request to the Withdrawal of Disaster Dispatch

Figure III-1-2-13 shows the flow of SDF operations in the event of a disaster dispatch.

Fig. III-1-2-13 Flow of Events from the Point of Request, to the Dispatch and to the Withdrawal



Notes: 1. Dispatched units may include ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel summoned by a disaster order
 2. Units are all withdrawn together

(3) Authority of Self-Defense Force Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

The Self-Defense Forces Law and other legislations provide SDF personnel ordered for a disaster relief dispatch, earthquake disaster prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster dispatch with the authority shown in Figure III-1-2-14 in order to allow them to effectively conduct disaster relief activities.

Fig. III-1-2-14 Authority of Self-Defense Forces Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

1. SDF officers may issue necessary warnings to people in the vicinity, and in extremely imminent situation, may by themselves, or ask people concerned to take measures that are deemed generally necessary to hold or to evacuate people who may be in danger at the site in order to avoid harm, provided that no police officers are on the scene.
2. Where danger is imminent, SDF officers may trespass into private land or buildings, if they deem it reasonably necessary under the circumstances, in order to protect people's lives or property from harm, prevent greater damage and to rescue victims, provided that no police officers are on the scene.
3. SDF Officer may remove unattended vehicles from streets in order to secure passage of emergency SDF vehicles, provided that no police officers are on the scene, in areas to which access of vehicles other than emergency ones is prohibited or limited (excluding earthquake disaster prevention dispatches).
4. SDF officers may take the following additional actions, provided that neither the mayor of the city, town or village involved, nor police officers nor Japan Coast Guard Officials authorized under his or her proxy are on the scene (excluding earthquake disaster prevention dispatches):
 - (1) Set up a warning zone where there is a high risk of the collapse of buildings, landslides or other such occurrences, and issuing orders to restrict or prohibit entry or to evacuate people;
 - (2) Use land and buildings to secure bases for relief operations and communication relay stations required for the airlifting of emergency patients;
 - (3) Move or clear away buildings or other structures standing in the way, in order to, for example, rescue people trapped in collapsing houses; or
 - (4) Have residents or people on hand engage in rescue, flood prevention and other activities, when there are insufficient SDF personnel on the scene.
 (See Article 94, 94-3, and 94-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law as well as the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law.)

2. Initial Operations Postures and Implementation Status of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Initial Responses to the Disaster

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF have assigned designated units to take immediate initial actions to ensure prompt disaster relief dispatches. As of May this year, the GSDF designated approximately 2,700 persons, 410 vehicles, and 30 helicopters throughout the country as units that can be immediately dispatched for disaster relief activities. The MSDF keeps designated vessels in each base to be available for emergency operations, and is prepared with a standby system for aircraft. The ASDF is prepared with a standby system for aircraft.

The SDF has established a system to dispatch aircraft on a discretionary basis in order to gather information and communicate it to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet when its units are informed of the occurrence of an earthquake of level 5-weak on the Japanese seismic scale. Also, depending on the situation, the SDF will dispatch liaison officers to concerned local governments for information gathering.

Life-saving activities can also be conducted, using equipments of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF.

The ASDF has newly formed an aeromedical evacuation squadron in October 2006 in the process of developing a system for transporting patients in a serious condition to a distant location for providing adequate treatment without delay in a event of large-scale disasters.

(2) Implementation Status of Disaster Dispatches

a. Transporting Emergency Patients



ASDF's Chitose Rescue unit (Hokkaido) transporting an emergency patient from Rishiri island (Two persons on the left)

Conventionally, the SDF has been using its aircraft to transport emergency patients living on isolated islands where medical facilities are not sufficiently available. In FY 2006, 579 out of the total of 812 disaster relief dispatches were for transporting emergency patients, and 543 were for southwest islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima prefectures) and Goto islands (Nagasaki prefecture) to mark a high number.

The breakdown information shows that elderly emergency patient was the most common case for such transport, and there were some childbirth and accidents. The SDF also transports emergency patients on ships navigating in sea area far from the mainland,

when aircraft of other organizations are not available due to their short flight range.

b. Firefighting Support

In FY 2006, 117 cases of dispatches were for supporting firefighting activities, and this was the second highest number following emergency transport of patients. Dispatches for proximity firefighting were the highest in number with 104 cases in FY 2006. SDF units deployed throughout the country are actively involved in proximity firefighting to contribute to ensuring the security of the livelihood of local residents.

For places where firefighting operations are difficult, such as islands and mountain areas, the SDF conducted aerial firefighting activities upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches. (See Figs. III-1-2-15 • 16)

Fig. III-1-2-15 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Last Five Years)




Fig. III-1-2-16 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY 2006)

	Description	Number of dispatches	Persons	Vehicles	Aircraft	Vessels
Record of FY 2006	Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters	24	7,114	1,718	148	
	Transporting emergency patients	579	2,563	2	599	
	Search and rescue	46	3,205	480	85	
	Assisting fire fighting	117	3,249	333	99	1
	Other	46	8,144	1,597	78	85
	Total	812	24,275	4,130	1,009	86

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY


Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron

The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces organized the Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron in the Air Self-Defense Force Komaki Base in October last year to improve a system that enables severely injured people to be transported promptly to a safe distant place for appropriate treatment at the time of a large-scale disaster. The system is the one that the Ministry of Defense had been considering indispensable from the lesson of the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

The specific mission of the squadron is to carry two aeromedical transport compartments in the cargo area of C-130H as well as a medical team consisting of a medical officer, paramedic, nurse and supervisor (transport coordinator), and transport the severely injured to a distant medical institution and other facilities while first aid is given onboard if necessary.



ASDF personnel receiving training in an aeromedical transport compartment



* C-130H can carry up to two compartments.

The squadron allows air medical services to be provided during disaster relief missions and the transport of injured SDF personnel. This makes it possible to transport the severely injured over a long distance while emergency stabilization medical treatment is given, making the treatment process seamless from initial to final treatment.

c. Response to Natural Disasters

In FY 2006 Japan was hit by natural disasters including nationwide floods due to heavy rain in July 2006, disrupted water supply resulted by rocks falling in water supply tunnel in Hiroshima, and the Noto Peninsula Earthquake in March 2007. Major dispatches for such natural disasters were as follows:

(a) Disaster Dispatches for the Heavy Rain in July 2006

In late July 2006, the seasonal rain front brought concentrated heavy rain in Kyushu and Chubu regions, and caused the destruction of river, floods and mud slides. A disaster dispatch was requested by individual prefectural governors of Fukui, Nagano, Kyoto, Kagoshima, Miyazaki and Kumamoto, and approximately 2,600 (cumulative) persons, 450 vehicles and 50 aircraft were dispatched for searching missing people, rescuing the victims of landslides, supporting the evacuation of isolated residents, taking preventive measures for the destruction of banks (sandbagging banks), and transporting materials.

(b) Disaster Dispatch for Assisting Water Supply Work in Kure and Edajima in Hiroshima prefecture

On August 25, 2006, the rock bed in the prefectural water supply tunnel for Kaitacho, Akigun and Akiku, Hiroshima in Hiroshima prefecture fell off, and water supply was disrupted in a wide area around Kure and Edajima Cities. Upon the request by the governor of Hiroshima prefecture for a disaster dispatch, approximately 6,790 persons (cumulative), 1,400 vehicles, 40 ships and 6 aircraft were dispatched for assisting in water supply activities and bath services.

(c) Disaster Dispatches for the Earthquake in the Noto Peninsula in 2007

On March 25, 2007, an earthquake (M6.9) occurred with the epicenter at the off shore of the Noto Peninsula, and caused damages including the destruction of houses, landslides, disruption of water supply, and others in a wide area around Wajima. Kanazawa upon the request by the governor of Ishikawa prefecture, approximately 2,730 persons (cumulative), 1,050 vehicles, and 60 aircraft were dispatched for assisting in water supply activities and food services.



GSF's water supply vehicle being connected to a MSDF's transport vessel at the disaster dispatch (water supply work) for Kure and Etajima in Hiroshima prefecture



GSF's 14th Infantry regiment (Ishikawa prefecture) assisting water supply work in Monzen-machi, Wajima in the disaster dispatch for the earthquake in the Noto Peninsula in 2007

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Relief Mission to Support Water Supply in Kure and Etajima

Sergeant Hiroharu Matsui
The 13th Anti-tank Company, GSDF

A duct used for supplying drinking and industrial water to the Kure and Etajima cities collapsed in August last year, and water supply was suspended in the region.

I had never participated in disaster relief missions since I joined the Self-Defense Forces nine years before, but after seeing the news about the accident on TV, I decided to take part in the mission to supply water to the residents. It was because I genuinely wanted to help the people in trouble in the stricken area.

When we entered Kure City, children waved their hands, men and women were rejoiced and welcomed us with a clapping of hands, and there were even old women who put their hands together and prayed to us. It was a very moving moment.

When we parked the vehicle in a parking lot, people had already been in a line for water. The vehicle carried only one ton of water, so it was emptied almost instantly. We kept carrying water from the water refilling point to water supply points every day, encouraged by smiles of and words of thanks expressed by the residents who came to receive water.

We could complete the around-the-clock water supply mission thanks to the training we had regularly received and the cooperation of the local people who helped us at the water refilling point. The one-week disaster relief mission provided me with a precious opportunity to realize the importance of the ties between people.



GSDF personnel supplying water on the reclaimed land of the Kakiura Port in Etajima City, Hiroshima Prefecture

Ensign Junji Nakashita
Kure Area Guard Group Support Unit, MSDF

The Kure Area Guard Group stationed in Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture, took part in a disaster relief mission in August last year upon request from the Hiroshima Prefectural Government to supply water to Kure and Etajima cities after water supply facilities for the cities collapsed. I was assigned to carry water to Etajima City as a commander for two fresh water tankers.

On the first day of the mission, we realized that fire engine pumps were necessary to send water from the tankers alongside a pier to a water purification plant located about 500 m away from the pier. We therefore needed to work in cooperation with fire fighters, but because such joint work was for the first time for us as well as for the fire fighters, we could supply only about 250 tons during six hours.



The fresh water tankers of the Kure Area Guard alongside a pier to supply water

From this lesson of the first day we realized the importance of detailed coordination, and on the following day, coordinated activities with the fire fighters more effectively to obtain more hoses, higher-performance pumps, and other equipment. Thanks to these efforts, we could supply about 1,000 tons of water from the two tankers. This gave us confidence to successfully continue with the mission, and, considering the hardships experienced by the residents of Etajima City, everyone shared the same determination to carry as much water as possible.

This mission provided us with a very precious opportunity to work with fire departments and waterworks authorities, which are usually not associated with the MSDF, to help the people of Etajima City.

3. Efforts Made in Peace Time in Preparation for Disaster Relief

(1) Cooperation with Local Governments

In order to conduct disaster relief activities promptly and appropriately, it is important for the SDF to strengthen cooperation with local governments in peace time. For example, the SDF needs to enhance communication systems, coordinate their disaster prevention plans with those of local governments, and actively participate in disaster prevention exercises conducted by local governments.

In July 2006, a new function for communicating with local governments on disaster related matters was added to provincial liaison offices in prefectures, and the post of the Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Coordinator was newly established. Then, the name of the liaison office was changed to the Provincial Cooperation Office. Through these efforts, the SDF is developing closer cooperation with local governments. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

Also, in view of the importance of cooperation with local governments in human resources, the SDF recommends retired SDF personnel with particular experience in relevant fields to local governments on a request basis in order to provide the knowledge and experience of SDF personnel for disaster prevention activities of local governments. As of April 30, 2007, the number of retired SDF personnel serving as staff responsible for disaster prevention is 126 persons in 43 prefectures and municipalities.

Also, current SDF personnel temporarily serve as staff in the Disaster Prevention Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. (See Fig. III-1-2-17)

Furthermore, while the collaboration with the SDF at the time of disaster occurrence is provided in the regional disaster prevent plan made by prefectural governments, local governments should actively take the following actions as this is important for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to conduct disaster relief activities effectively.

a. Securing Assembly Areas

Dispatched SDF units need an assembly area at the disaster site as a base for their activities to secure a command post, lodging, parking, and accumulating necessary materials. Parks and play fields near the disaster site are suitable for the assembly area. For example, a GSDF unit with the size of a regiment requires approximately 15,000 m² (area about 1/3 of the Tokyo Dome), and a division will need over 140,000 m² (area about 3 Tokyo Domes) to stay and conduct relief operations.

b. Securing Heliports

In the event of a disaster, it is likely that vehicle usage will be restricted, and therefore, setting up a heliport within the devastated area or in its vicinity becomes necessary for transporting emergency patients and

Fig. III-1-2-17 Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of April 30, 2007)

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government	
Hokkaido	Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government	Obihiro City Government	
			Chitose City Government	
			Bibai City Government	
			Sapporo City Government (two persons)	
			Hakodate City Government	
			Bihoro Town Government	
			Tomakomai City Government	
			Hokuto City Government	
			Iwamizawa City Government	
			Asahikawa City Government	
			Engaru Town Government	
Eniwa City Government				
Tohoku	Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government	Hachinohe City Government Aomori City Government Hirosaki City Government	
	Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government	Takizawa Village Office	
	Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government	Sendai City Government (two persons) Ishinomaki City Government	
	Akita	Akita Prefectural Government		
	Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government	Higashine City Government	
	Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government		
Kanto	Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government		
	Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government	Utsunomiya City Government	
	Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government		
	Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government	Soka City Government	
	Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government	Urayasu City Government Ichikawa City Government	
	Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (three persons)	Itabashi Ward Office Arakawa Ward Office Adachi Ward Office	
	Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government	Yokohama City Government	
	Chubu	Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government	Joetsu City Government
Toyama		Toyama Prefectural Government	Toyama City Government	
Ishikawa		Ishikawa Prefectural Government	Wajima City Government	
Fukui		Fukui Prefectural Government	Fukui City Government	
Yamanashi		Yamanashi Prefectural Government	Kofu City Government	
Nagano		Nagano Prefectural Government	Ina City Government	
Gifu		Gifu Prefectural Government		
Shizuoka		Shizuoka Prefectural Government (two persons)	Ito City Government	
Aichi		Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government	Miyoshi Town Government
				Seto City Government
Kinki	Mie		Ise City Government Kameyama City Government	
	Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government	Kusatsu City Government Takashima City Government	
	Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government		
	Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government	Sakai City Government Ikeda City Government Osaka City Government Kawachinagano City Government	
	Hyogo		Akashi City Government Toyooka City Government	
	Nara	Nara Prefectural Government	Kashihara City Government	
	Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government	Wakayama City Government	
	Chugoku	Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government	Tottori City Government
		Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government	Matsue City Government
		Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government	Kurashiki City Government
		Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government (three persons)	
Yamaguchi		Yamaguchi Prefectural Government	Iwakuni City Government Shimonoseki City Government	
Shikoku	Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons)	Komatsushima City Government Anan City Government	
	Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government		
	Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government (two persons)		
	Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government		
	Kyushu	Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government	Iizuka City Government Tagawa City Government Nogata City Government
Saga		Saga Prefectural Government (two persons)	Karatsu City Government	
Nagasaki		Nagasaki Prefectural Government (four persons)	Sasebo City Government	
Kumamoto		Kumamoto Prefectural Government		
Oita		Oita Prefectural Government	Oita City Government	
Miyazaki		Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons)	Nobeoka City Government Saito City Government	
Kagoshima		Kagoshima Prefectural Government (two persons)	Satsuma-Sendai City Government Kirishima City Government Tarumizu City Governmen	
Okinawa				

* Part-time personnel included

materials, and conducting firefighting activities using helicopters. To ensure smooth landing and takeoff of helicopters, it is necessary to clearly separate refuge areas from the heliports, and the locations of heliports and refuge areas should be well-notified to local residents in advance in peace time. While required area for a heliport varies depending upon the type of helicopters and activities, an area with 50 to 100 m on each side of the square is necessary per a helicopter as rough measure.

c. Displaying Building Numbers

In order for aircraft to gather information and transport people and material efficiently, it is useful to have an identification number displayed on the roof of important buildings for disaster prevention activities, such as prefectural offices and schools, so that airplanes can easily acknowledge those buildings. Such identification numbers enable the SDF to take actions for disaster relief dispatch quickly using aircraft because of easy confirmation of buildings.

d. Securing Facilities for Coordination and Communications

It is also essential for prefectural governments to set up facilities in their offices for coordination and communications with the SDF, including a temporary office for communications, a standby station for liaison officers and parking facilities. In addition, it is necessary to develop a disaster prevention map indicating the locations of refuge areas and heliports for common use among various disaster prevention agencies. Furthermore, fire extinguishing materials should be prepared for aerial firefighting activities by helicopters, and arrangement should be made in peace time for securing reservoirs such as cisterns.

(2) Development of a Response Manual for Various Disasters

In order to respond more promptly and appropriately to disasters appeared in various forms, it is effective to clarify the basic measures and to make all concerned parties aware of them. To this end, based on lessons learned from past disaster relief dispatches and disaster prevention exercises, the then Defense Agency and the SDF developed a response manual for various types of disasters in November 2000, which lists issues to be noted for each type of disasters⁵⁵.

In this manual, expected disasters are classified into four types: 1) disasters in urban areas, 2) disasters in hilly and mountainous areas, 3) disasters on islands, and 4) special-type disasters. For each type, the manual defines a response plan, conditions of possible damages, essential activities required, and issues to be noted. The manual has already been distributed to related agencies and local governments. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF are making efforts to improve their disaster relief activities based on the Defense Ministry Disaster Prevention Plan and this manual.

(3) Response to Nuclear Disasters

Based on lessons learned from the criticality accident that occurred at a uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999, the Special Law on Nuclear Disasters Countermeasures was enacted in the same year in order to significantly strengthen response measures for nuclear disaster. The law provides that the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister) may request the Minister of State for Defense (then) to provide SDF assistance in order to appropriately and promptly take emergency response measures, and this resulted a partial amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law⁵⁶.

After the critical nuclear accident in Tokaimura, the GSDF, ASDF and MSDF have been providing transport support, assistance for evacuating residents, and monitoring airborne and seaborne radiation levels in the comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercise, which has been carried out since 2000 under the initiative of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and confirming the procedures for cooperating with other ministries and local governments in nuclear disasters.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Relief Mission for the Rainstorm Disaster in the Hokuriku Region

Staff Sergeant Hirokazu Osada
The 35th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron,
Middle Aircraft Control and Warning Wing ASDF

The intense rainstorm hit the Sea of Japan side of the country in July last year, and a large-scale landslide destroyed a house and buried two people alive. Since there had been a cemetery on the fallen slope of the mountain, the site was covered with the large volume of earth and many tombstones. Furthermore, the soil was clayey and soaked with a large amount of rainwater, and we even did not know where in the house the two people had been at the time when the landslide had occurred. All these conditions made the relief mission extremely difficult.



Staff Sergeant Osada (far right) engaged in rescue operations

The 35th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron to which I belong was dispatched to the site upon request from the Governor of Kyoto prefecture. The three squads were formed with each consisting of about 45 members, and began to search the two people as soon as they arrived at the site. We collected and shared information promptly, and looked for the two people in a tense atmosphere we had never experienced before, under the command of the mission commander at the site.

I did not feel any anxiety. All I had in mind was the determination to save them as soon as possible. We removed broken pieces of the house one by one almost manually, and a while later, finally found the two people in a gap under the collapsed house. I was involved in all the rescue work to bring them safe out of the gap, and could successfully end my first field mission.

This disaster relief mission provided me with a precious opportunity to recognize anew the role of SDF personnel to protect life and property of the people and thereby meet their trust, as well as the importance of being well aware of the role.

My squadron is responsible for surveillance over the Sea of Japan side of the country using air defense radars. Our major mission is to monitor aerial invasion around the clock by watching the screen of a radar system, and different from disaster relief missions in terms of activities involved. However, although the activities are different, I think that the mission of the squadron and disaster relief missions share the same purpose to protect Japan. I like running a marathon and muscle strengthening, and have always trying to maintain mental and physical strength through those exercises. But from the disaster relief mission I realized that the most important thing for each member to complete their missions—both aerial invasion surveillance and disaster rescues—is not just to keep up mental and physical strength of each member but also to be well aware of the importance of their role in protecting Japan.

The experiences of the disaster relief mission gave me confidence that I can challenge even the most difficult missions in the future. I continue to work hard in training with the lessons from the disaster relief mission in mind so that I can promptly perform various missions.

The enhancement of the chemical protection units has been included in the budget for FY 2007 to allow response to nuclear disasters⁵⁷ as well as to special-type disasters.

6. Response to Other Events


1. Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities

While the police agency has the primary responsibility in dealing with the incidents of terrorism, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended to allow SDF units to be called upon to guard the facilities and sites of the SDF and the USFJ, and to use weapons as necessary in regular guarding missions for SDF facilities, in order to improve preparedness for large-scale terrorist attacks like those in the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001.

(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities (Guarding Operations)

When there is a possibility of large-scale terrorist attacks on the facilities and sites of the SDF and USFJ within Japan and the needs for preventing damage to these facilities are recognized, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard the facilities and sites of the SDF and USFJ. Part of the authorities given to the police officials under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials may be given to the SDF personnel ordered to carry out guarding operations⁵⁸. Also, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel may be given the authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this law. (See Fig. III-1-2-18)

Fig. III-1-2-18 Outline of Guarding Operations



* Limited to cases where no police officers are present

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF exchange opinions about guarding operations with the police and the Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of guarding operations, which are new duties for the SDF. In addition, exercises for guarding operations have been conducted at USFJ facilities and sites throughout Japan since 2003.

(2) Use of Weapons to Guard SDF Facilities in Normal Circumstances

The amended Self-Defense Forces Law gives SDF personnel the authority to use weapons as necessary in order to guard SDF facilities on duty within Japan that have installations for storing, accommodating or maintaining weapons, ammunition, explosives, vessels, aircraft, vehicles, wired electronic communication equipments,

radio equipments, or liquid fuel, and those that have accommodations and installations related to quarters, ports or airports⁵⁹.

2. Preparing for Transporting Expatriates of Japanese Nationality

(1) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law

When disasters, riots or other emergencies occurred overseas, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF transported, with the government's aircraft or the ASDF's transport aircraft, expatriate Japanese nationals who need protection for their lives and bodies upon the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Article 100-8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (then).

In 1999 the amendment was made to the Self-Defense Forces Law to add SDF ships and the helicopters on board as a means to transport expatriates of Japanese nationality. Also, SDF personnel are authorized to use minimum amount of weapons necessary to protect the lives and bodies of SDF personnel and Japanese nationals. Thus, the preparedness for transporting the Japanese expatriates has been enhanced. Today many Japanese nationals are visiting and staying overseas, and transporting such Japanese nationals in the event of conflicts in overseas has become an important activity for the security of citizens. As the Defense Agency was promoted to the Ministry of Defense in January 2007, such transporting operations was redefined as a primary mission in Article 84-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, which was previously a secondary task, and the authority in such operations was provided in Article 94-5 in the same law. (See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2)



ASDF personnel exercising for non-combatant evacuation

(2) Postures of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF

In order to receive Japanese nationals from overseas legations and safely transport them to local airports and harbors, the GSDF maintains designated dispatch personnel for helicopter units and guidance units⁶⁰, while the MSDF keeps designated transport ships and air units, and the ASDF maintains designated air carrier units.

Missions to transport expatriated Japanese nationals are carried out in close cooperation between the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF, and therefore an integrated coordination is required. To meet this requirement, they have improved their capability to fulfill such missions through integrated exercises using transport aircraft and ships.

(3) Actual Experience in Transporting Expatriated Japanese Nationals

On April 15, 2004, 10 Japanese journalists stayed in Samawah, Iraq, to report the activities of the GSDF dispatched under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq were transported from Talil Airport in Iraq to Mubarak Air Force Base in Kuwait by a C-130H transportation aircraft as the first transport of Japanese nationals under Article 84-3 (Article 100-8 then) of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

3. Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The National Defense Program Guidelines states that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements shall be

strengthened by actively promoting measures such as various operational cooperation efforts, including cooperation in the situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Prior to the transition to a ministry in January 2007, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF provided supplies and services as rear area support stipulated in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law, and were involved in rear area search and rescue activities and ship inspection operations to the extent such activities do not hinder the execution of the SDF's tasks based on Article 100-9 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

Responses to the situations in areas surrounding Japan significantly affect the peace and security of Japan. In order to ensure peace and security in Japan, the positioning of such tasks was reviewed and changed from a secondary task to a primary task upon the shift from an agency to an ministry in January 2007, and provided in Article 84-4 in the Self-Defense Forces Law. (See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2)

4. Collecting Military Information

While security issues are becoming more diversified and complex, and effective preparation for new threats and diversified situations has become an urgent issue, it has become necessary more than ever before to detect any indication of contingencies at the earliest possible timing, and gather, analyze and share information promptly and appropriately for the purpose of responding adequately to such situations. And, in the view of national security of Japan, broader scope and comprehensive intelligence capabilities are now required.

Therefore, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF analyze and assess a variety of information comprehensively, and have diversified the means of collecting information. The activities of information collection include: 1) collecting, processing and analyzing radio waves concerning military communications and radio waves emitted from electronic weapons bound for Japan from abroad; 2) collecting and analyzing high-resolution commercial satellite imagery data; 3) warning and surveillance by ships and aircraft; 4) collecting and organizing variety of published information; 5) exchanging information with defense authorities of other nations; and 6) intelligence activities⁶¹ by defense attachés⁶².

In order to enhance the capabilities of collecting a variety of information, and comprehensively analyzing and assessing information with consideration the security environment and technical trends, the Ministry of Defense/the SDF will improve equipments and devices for information gathering, and also will enhance the intelligence system, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which supports such capabilities.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of an SDF Officer Working as the Defense Attaché in Belgium

**Colonel Jun Nagashima, ASDF
Defense Attaché**

The Kingdom of Belgium is a small country with an area of less than 30,000 km² (about 1.5 times as large as Shikoku Island), but because the country is situated at the center of Europe, it was considered a point of strategic importance and ruled by the surrounding countries until it finally won independence in 1830. Brussels, the capital of the country, is known as the city where EU and NATO headquarters are located, and the number of diplomats based in this city, including those working for embassies and international organizations, is said to be the largest in the world. The city has thus established the position as the center of European politics and security.



Colonel Nagashima at the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Brussels on February 12, 2007 (left in the back row)

Because of these characteristics of Belgium, the most important mission of the Defense Attaché in the country is to collect and analyze information on, not only Belgium in bilateral terms, but also on NATO, which is the backbone of European security, EU and other international organizations located in the country. In Europe, while threats of full-scale armed invasion have disappeared, regional conflicts international terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and other new threats have become important new security issues, and the scope of military activities has been expanding rapidly to deal with those issues. NATO, for example, has sent a force of about 52,300 soldiers to Afghanistan, Kosovo, Darfur and other locations spanning three continents for the purposes of reconstruction assistance, preservation of public order, and training for security forces.

In the meantime, Japan is also involved in many international peace cooperation activities, and the operations of the Self-Defense Forces are attracting great attention in Europe. As the Japan Defense Agency has been upgraded to a ministry, and overseas activities have become a primary mission of the SDF, Japan and Europe can cooperate beyond the geographical boundaries for global peace in the increasing number of areas in the future. However, the interest of European countries in the Asian region in terms of security is still low in comparison with their interest in Asian economy, and it is indispensable for Japan and Europe to correctly understand their respective circumstances and defense policy to further enhance security cooperation. To this end, in addition to comprehensively collecting and analyzing information on Belgium as a provider of force to NATO and EU, as well as on NATO and EU themselves, I, as the Defense Attaché working in Brussels, am explaining the security environment and defense policy of Japan and the activities of the SDF at every opportunity—from such contact occasions as receptions with military officers or representatives of other countries to more personal family-to-family communication—and exploring specific ways Japan and Europe can cooperate in terms of security. It is my firm belief that all these steady efforts in this country in the regular operations of the Defense Attaché will have a cumulative effect in ultimately bringing about the stability and prosperity of the distant East Asia region.

Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression

Since the possibility of full-scale aggression to Japan in the foreseeable future is seemed to be decreasing, the National Defense Program Guidelines indicates the shift from so-called Cold-War type defense build-up concept and to reduce equipments and persons prepared for full-scale aggression. However, the most basic part will be maintained with consideration of the fact that the original role of the defense force is to respond to full-scale aggression and such force cannot be build up in a short period of time. Even today, unclear and uncertain factors remain in areas surrounding Japan. Considering the devastating loss of people's lives and properties that armed aggression could cause, readiness for full-scale aggression is essential.

In the event of full-scale aggression to Japan, the GSDF, ASDF and MSDF will respond promptly and effectively by acting in an organized and integrated manner in the joint operations posture. Operations to be employed for full-scale aggression are classified as follows by function: 1) operations for air defense, 2) operations for guarding waters surrounding Japan, 3) operations for guarding the territory of Japan, and 4) operations for securing safety of maritime transportation. In conducting such operations, the U.S. forces will support the operations employed by the SDF in accordance with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and conduct operations to complement the capability of the SDF, which may include operations with striking force.

This section will explain the outline of typical operations that may be conducted by the SDF to defend the nation when a full-scale aggression took place. (See Chapter 2, Section 3)

1. Air Defense Operations



ASDF's F-15 fighter on duty

In the event of armed attacks on Japan, such attacks are likely to begin with surprise air attacks using aircraft and missiles, and the air attacks will be repeated because of the geographical characteristics of Japan, which is surrounded by waters, and because of the trends of modern warfare⁶³.

Operations for air defense are characterized by the invading party having an advantage in choosing the time, locations, and methods for attack, and that the adequateness of initial response has a significant impact on over all operations. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a prompt response posture in

peace time, collect relevant information continuously, and exhibit combat power promptly and comprehensively from the initial stage of the operations.


Operations for air defense can be divided into overall operations led by the ASDF, and local air defense operations conducted by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, in defending their respective bases and units.

In overall air defense, efforts will be made to cope promptly with the aerial intrusion by enemy aircraft in order to intercept them in airspace as distant from Japanese territory as possible to keep them from gaining air superiority⁶⁴, prevent damage to the people as well as the national land, and inflict heavy damage on the enemy. Thus, the SDF endeavors to impede the enemy's efforts to continue serial assaults. (See Fig. III-1-3-1)

(1) Detecting Intruding Enemy Aircraft

Using the radars of the air warning and control units as well as early warning and control aircraft, the entire airspace of areas surrounding Japan shall be kept under surveillance, and intruding enemy aircraft shall be detected as quickly as possible.

Fig. III-1-3-1 Example of Air Defense Operations



Notes: 1. Aircraft with representative control capability in the warning and control organization and with early warning and control function in distant sea from the national land.

2. Keeping armed fighters standing-by to be able to immediately respond to the approach by enemy aircraft.

(2) Identifying the Detected Aircraft

Using the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE)⁶⁵ System, detected aircraft shall be identified as friend or enemy.

(3) Interception and Destruction of the Enemy's Aircraft


When the detected aircraft are deemed to be enemies, the air warning and control organization assigns destruction targets to fighters standing by on the ground or in the air as well as to the surface-to-air guided units of the GSDF or ASDF, and the controlled and guided fighters and surface-to-air guided missiles will destroy the enemy aircraft.

2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas

Armed attacks on Japan can be made by vessels as well as by aircraft due to Japan's nature as an island nation.

Operations for defending the sea areas surrounding Japan will be led by the MSDF in cooperation with the GSDF and the ASDF, and execute various strategies in combination, including anti-surface ships, anti-submarines, and air defense warfare (local). The cumulative effect of these strategies will make it possible to successfully defend the surrounding sea areas, by obstructing the advance of enemy forces and reducing their military strength. (See Fig. III-1-3-2)

Fig. III-1-3-2 Strategy for Defense in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan



(1) Defense on the Sea

In the surrounding sea areas, the MSDF patrols⁶⁶ vast sea areas using patrol aircraft and navigation areas using destroyers. In the event that a surface ship or submarine of enemies is found to be attacking Japanese ships or other vessels, the MSDF will attack the enemy using its destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations). As the situation requires, the MSDF will receive support from fighters.



MSDF's destroyer launching an anti-submarine rocket (ASROC) missile

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas

Using its destroyers, patrol aircraft, and minesweepers, the MSDF patrols the main ports and harbors for the early detection of enemy attacks and ensure the safety of ships and coastal areas.

In the event of attacks by enemy's surface ships and submarines, the MSDF will destroy these ships and submarines using destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations). The MSDF receives support from the fighters and GSDF's surface-to-ship guided missile units when the situation requires. When the enemy places mines, the MSDF will remove them, using minesweepers (anti-mine operations).

(3) Defense in Main Straits

When the situation requires, mines will be laid in main sea areas using minesweeping mother ships, submarines, and aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF (mine-laying operations). When enemy's surface vessels and submarines attempt to pass the sea areas, the MSDF will destroy them using its destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations).

(4) Air-Defense in the Surrounding Waters

Air-defense for ships in water surrounding Japan will be performed by destroyers, and will receive support from fighters as necessary.

3. Operations for Defending Japan's Territory (Response to Landing of Invading Forces)

When a country attempts invade Japan's territory, the enemy's force first acquires air and sea superiority on invading fronts, and then land its troops on Japan's territory by ship or aircraft, Japan being an island country.

Invading ground troops will be unable to exert full fighting capability during sea or air maneuvers and will be vulnerable and incapable of exerting their full organized fighting capability immediately before or after landing. Taking advantage of such operational weakness, the operations to respond to the invading forces need to counter and destroy the enemy troops at as early a stage as possible between the sea and coast, as well as at landing sites. (See Fig. III-1-3-3)



GSD's type-90 tanker in firing

(1) Defense in Nearshore Waters

The ASDF, GSD and MSDF will make efforts to destroy as many enemy ships transporting ground troops as possible at sea, using destroyers, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighters, and surface-to-ship guided missiles, to force the enemy to abandon its intention of landing, or to reduce its strength.

Also, the fighters and surface-to-air guided missiles of the ASDF and GSD will make efforts to destroy as many enemy aircraft transporting ground troops as possible in the air.

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas


The MSDF, using minesweeping mother ships, will lay sea mines, and the GSD, using coastal mine-laying equipment, will lay coastal mines to obstruct and counter the landing of invading forces.

Against the troops that attempt to make landing, the GSD will play the primary role in preventing the landing of enemy ground troops in coastal areas by concentrating the use of tanks, antitank and special artillery of the units⁶⁷ deployed on and around beaches. When enemy troops have already started landing, the GSD will hinder and destroy the invading troops using mobile striking power mainly supplied by special artillery, and anti-tank guided missiles and tanks. During these operations, the ASDF will support the GSD using fighters.

Airborne assaults⁶⁸ and helicopter borne assaults⁶⁹ made by the enemy in combination with the landing of the ground troops will be repelled in early stage, mainly using special artillery and the mobile striking power.

The GSD units conduct air defense (local) using to-air firepower such as surface-to-air guided missiles.

Fig. III-1-3-3 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces



(3) Inland Defense

When the SDF fails to destroy enemy troops before or immediately after their landing, the units will deploy in advance blocking of the advancement of the enemy with support of fighters (holding actions). In the meantime, as many units as possible will be gathered from other areas to launch counter attacks to eliminate the invading ground troops.

(4) Countermeasures to be Implemented throughout the Stages of Operations

Throughout the stages of these operations, the MSDF, using destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft, and the ASDF, using fighters, will make efforts to block the enemy's surface transportation for adding ground troops and to shut down maritime logistical support lines.

In addition, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will conduct the necessary air defense, information collection, transporting units and supplies throughout the overall operations to counter landing of invading forces.

4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic

Maritime traffic is indispensable for Japan, and operations for ensuring the safety of maritime traffic is important not only for sustaining the country's fighting capability and ensuring Japan's foundation for survival, but also for enabling U.S. forces to come to support the SDF.

The MSDF ensures the safety of maritime traffic through patrol, escorting ships, and preparing straits and harbors for defense operations by combining various operations such as anti-surface ship operations, anti-

submarine operations, air defense (local) and minesweeping operations in the waters to the distance of several hundreds miles surrounding Japan, or in waters of approximately 1,000 nautical miles in the case of establishing sea lanes⁷⁰.

Operations conducted in waters surrounding Japan will be almost the same as those for defending the waters surrounding Japan as described before.

When a sea lane is established in preparation for operation, the sea lane will be patrolled continuously and interference by enemies' surface vessels and submarines will be detected and responded to quickly. In addition, Japan's ships will be escorted as necessary.

Destroyers will be used for air defense of Japanese ships in maritime traffic with the support of fighters as necessary within the possible range.

Notes

- 1) A situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged.
- 2) A situation where an armed attack is yet to emerge, but things are growing strained and an armed attack is expected.
- 3) The law concerning measures for protecting civilians in armed attack situations
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo.html>>
- 4) Emergency legislation does not have a well-established concept, and is used in multiple meanings as an emergency legislation study conducted on legislations relating to the activities of the SDF operations defense operations was ordered, in accordance with Article 76, the Self-Defense Forces Law. However, the term emergency legislation used in this white paper refers to the legislation for responses to situations enacted in 2003 and later.⁵⁾
- 5) The Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc.
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/jitai_h.html>
- 6) Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, Nippon Hoso Kyokai, and other public agencies, and corporations operating electric power, gas, transportation, and other public works, as prescribed in ordinance.
- 7) Contingency situations other than armed attack situations including emergency response situations and other situations that may seriously affect the security of Japan and its people.
- 8) Situations where an emergency response by the state is required urgently due to the emergence of heavy casualties, by using means similar to the ones employed for armed attacks, or to the clear recognition of the imminent danger of such situation.
- 9) The Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc., in Armed Attack Situations
See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/law/yuji/houritu/002b.htm>>
- 10) The Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc.
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/beigun.html>>
- 11) The Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Reciprocal Provision of Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA)
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/acsa/acsa_gaiyo.html>
- 12) The Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities, etc.
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/koukyou.html>>
- 13) The Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_4.pdf>
- 14) The Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_5.pdf>
- 15) The Geneva Convention consists of 1) the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (convention I), 2) the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (convention II), 3) the Geneva Convention relative to the

- Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (convention III), and 4) the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (convention IV).
- 16) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/treaty159_11a.pdf>
 - 17) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/k_jindo/pdfs/giteisho_02.pdf>
 - 18) On decision making by the Japanese government and coordination with relevant organizations
See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/dai9/9siryou1.pdf>>
 - 19) See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/050325shishin.pdf>>
 - 20) The Task Force Chief and the Prime Minister are essentially the same person, but are specified as legally separate entities.
 - 21) Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/kokumin_hogo.pdf>
 - 22) This refers to a case where, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 22 of the SDF Law, a special unit is formed to carry out a specific assignment, or a unit is placed under the command of a commander other than the commander to which it is originally assigned, and these units are made up of SDF units from two or more of the groups from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF.
 - 23) GSDF Commanding General of Army; MSDF Commander of Self-Defense Fleet and Commandant Regional District; ASDF Commander of Air Defense Command, Commander of Air Support Command and Commander of Air Defense Force, ASDF, and so on.
 - 24) Vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems that automatically process a series of activities including target search, detection, identification/classification and attack using high performance computers.
 - 25) The Patriot system PAC-3 is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type anti-aircraft PAC-2, which was mainly targeting the interception of aircraft, PAC-3 is a system designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
 - 26) It enables detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, and the development began in FY 1999 (Previously called FPS-XX).
 - 27) Fire unit (the minimum fire unit of the surface-to-air fire troops)
 - 28) These refer to objects other than aircraft that are recognized to cause grave damages to human lives and properties when they fall down.
 - 29) The United States is steadily enhancing its missile defense systems through R&D while deploying systems as they become technically feasible in what is called as the evolutionary spiral development method.
 - 30) The four components are the nose cone, the second-stage rocket motor, the kinetic warhead, and the infrared seeker.
 - 31) The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/n_korea_02/sengen.html>
 - 32) On Japan's immediate response to the event of North Korea's ballistic missile launch
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2006/07/05_a.html>
 - 33) On the adoption of the U.N. Security Council resolution 1695, regarding the missile launch by North Korea
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/danwa/18/das_0716.html>

- 34) Later the name was changed to the “Headquarters of Countermeasures against North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launch.”
- 35) Persons engage in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan using weapons with significant killing power, and those cooperating with such persons.
- 36) The official name is the Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, and it was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.
- 37) An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, and took the lives of 12 people. The SDF conducted decontamination operations in the trains and at the stations.
- 38) Starting in September 2001, postal mail with anthrax was delivered to individuals, such as members of the U.S. Senate and others in the American mass media.
- 39) In the critical accident that occurred at the JCO uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999, some employees working in the plant were exposed to radioactive emissions caused by the nuclear criticality and died. In this accident, the GSDF chemical unit was dispatched to the plant for disaster relief activities.
- 40) Radiation sickness caused by inhaling radioactive substances into the body
- 41) Radiation injury caused by being directly exposed to external radioactive substances
- 42) The report, which lists and classifies the necessary measures to be taken when biological weapons are used in Japan, states as follows:
- 1) The Defense Agency (then) and the SDF should actively tackle the following 10 items: building-up of an integrated structure to promote measures; reinforcement of the research and development structure; enhancement of detection devices; human resources development; reinforcement of the information-gathering structure; enhancement of the medical structure such as construction of hospital rooms for infectious diseases; establishment of the emergency response structure; implementation of exercises; coordination with relevant organizations and information disclosure; and public relations.
 - 2) The Establishment of a structure to cope with biological weapons is an important matter that the Japanese government as whole should be tackled. The safety of the people is expected to be ensured by having the Defense Agency and the SDF take an initiative in this effort with understanding of the whole Japanese government’s response.
- See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/delibe/seibutu/houkoku.html>>
- 43) Including territorial waters and inland waters
- 44) Maritime security operations (formal name, Article 82 of the SDF Law), refer to actions to be taken at sea by the SDF with the particular need of protecting the lives and properties of the people or keeping peace and order. This requires approval of the Prime Minister.
- 45) Regarding Response to Foreign Submarines Navigating under Water in the Territorial Waters and Inland Waters of Japan decided at the Security Council and the Cabinet meeting in December 1996
This Cabinet decision has opened the way for SDF units to promptly demand any submarine navigating under water in the territorial waters and inland waters of Japan to appear above water, raise the national flag, and deport, according to the judgment of the Prime Minister by having decided the basic policy and procedure at a Cabinet meeting in advance so that a Cabinet decision is not required in each occurrence of such an incident.
- 46) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) in a surveillance operation found two unidentified vessels suspected to be North Korean spy ships disguised as Japanese fishing boats in Japanese territorial waters, east of the Noto Peninsula and west of Sadogashima Island. Patrol vessels, destroyers, and aircraft pursued the vessels

- around the clock, but the two vessels fled to outside the air defense identification zones (ADIZ) and were supposed to reach a port in the northern part of North Korea.
- 47) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) in a surveillance operation found an unidentified vessel, and tracked and monitored it with patrol vessels and aircraft. The boat did not stop despite the repeated orders given by the Japan Coast Guard. Therefore, the JCG fired warning shots after alerting the boat. The boat, however, continued to run away and made armed attacks on the patrol ship, and the patrol ship fired self-defense shots. The boat subsequently exploded for possible self-destruction and submerged. Based on the facts revealed in the process of investigation, the boat was identified as a North Korean spy ship. Also in 2002, a patrol aircraft (P-3C) in a surveillance operation found an unidentified vessel about 400 km north-northwest off the Noto Peninsula (Beyond the exclusive economic waters of Japan), and patrol vessels of Japan Coast Guard, destroyers, and aircraft tracked and surveiled the boat.
- 48) 1) The vessel in question appears to be of foreign nationality (excluding military vessels and those owned or operated by foreign governments exclusively for noncommercial purpose) and is recognized to be currently engaged in navigation other than innocent passage in the inland or territorial waters of Japan in pursuant to Article 19 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (excluding the cases in which such navigation is justified for a certain reason); 2) Such navigation, if neglected, will probably lead to similar activities in the future; 3) Such navigation is undeniably suspected to be preparation for the committing of serious, violent crimes on Japanese territory; 4) Future serious, violent crimes cannot be prevented unless appropriate actions are taken based on information obtained through the on-site inspection of the halted boat.
- 49) In March 2002, two vessels were commissioned with the following major upgrades: 1) speed was enhanced to approximately 44 knots from 40 knots; 2) they were equipped with a 12.7mm machine guns, 3) bullet proof features were installed on the bridge; and 4) they were equipped with night vision devices.
- 50) A special unit of the MSDF newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance and to disarm and immobilize unidentified vessels in case of conducting on-board inspection under maritime security operations.
- 51) Non-bursting shell shot launched from 76mm artillery equipped on destroyers, and the flat front edge of the shell prevents scattering.
- 52) An earthquake of M7.3 with its epicenter in the southern part of Hyogo Prefecture in 1995 caused devastating damage, including over 6,400 deaths and missed in the Hanshin region.
- 53) The Defense Ministry Disaster Prevention Plan
See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/index.html>>
- 54) The Prime Minister issues an alert concerning the earthquake with the endorsement of the Cabinet, when the prediction of earthquake is reported and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement earthquake disaster prevention emergency measures.
- 55) Manual for measures against disasters in urban areas; disasters in hilly and mountainous areas; disasters on islands; and special disasters
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/sankou_01.pdf>
- 56) 1) SDF units can be dispatched to provide assistance upon the request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters; 2) SDF personnel dispatched for nuclear disaster relief can exercise necessary authorities; 3) Special units can be formed temporarily when necessary for nuclear disaster relief dispatches; and 4) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel can be called up for service in the event of nuclear disaster relief dispatches.
- 57) Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorism and armed attacks using the weapons of mass destructions.

- 58) When no police officials are at the scene, and limited to such circumstances only, SDF personnel on duty is authorized to make inquiries, take evacuation measures, and enter property, in addition to the authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes, and using weapons.
- 59) SDF personnel can use weapons to the extent judged as reasonably necessary in a given situation within the facilities when they consider that such use of weapons is necessary for executing the duties or protecting themselves or others. The use of weapons, however, shall not cause harm to other people, except for cases falling under self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation.
- 60) Units temporarily organized to be dispatched along with transport units (SDF aircraft and ships) to guide and protect overseas Japanese nationals on site.
- 61) As of the end of May 2007, 48 defense attaches (SDF personnel temporarily transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were dispatched to diplomatic establishments abroad in 37 locations. These attaches take advantage of their experience as SDF personnel and are engaged in collecting military information through exchange with defense-related personnel of the country to which they have been dispatched, as well as with military attaches of other nations.
- 62) In order to enhance Japan's capabilities for gathering imagery intelligence, the third and the fourth information-gathering satellite were launched on September 11, 2006 and February 24, 2007, respectively.
- 63) In modern warfare, air operations are an important element to determine the victor and loser, and it is critical to secure air superiority ahead of, or in parallel with, the superiority in ground and marine operations.
- 64) A state in which various strategies can be executed without receiving damage from the opponent as superiority is gained in air operations against the opponent's air operations.
- 65) An automated air warning and control organization with a nationwide command and communication system that delivers and processes commands and tracking information.
- 66) To systematically patrol particular regions with a purpose such as preventing surprise attacks from enemies and collecting information.
- 67) Long-range and large-caliber howitzers and rockets are possessed and will be used to destroy or intercept infantry, light armored vehicles, and facilities.
- 68) Assault units aboard transport aircraft. They will parachute to the ground near important terrain and be engaged in assaults on the ground. These units are specially formed, equipped, and trained, and are able to move quickly by air over long distances.
- 69) Assault units for attacks on the ground after being transported to the land near important terrain by transport helicopters. Compared to the airborne assaults, helicopter-borne assault operations can be prepared and executed more easily.
- 70) Relatively safe routes established in sea areas for the safe passage of ships. The area and width are changed depending upon the type of threat.

Chapter 2

Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements



Japanese and U.S. Ministers appearing for a press interview after the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty¹ are a pillar of the defense of Japan. The Japan-U.S. alliance, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, constitutes a foundation that is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region. The close Japan-U.S. partnership based on the Japan-U.S. alliance plays an important role in effectively responding to many difficult security challenges in the world. Also the Japan-U.S. alliance is becoming increasingly important in promoting the fundamental values shared by Japan and the United States, including basic human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, in the international community. (See Fig. III-2-1-1)

This section explains today's significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements in terms of the security of Japan.

Fig. III-2-1-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation between Japan and the United States

1951	The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed.
1952	The treaty enters into force.
1958	Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)
1960	The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed, and enters into force.
1968	Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan.
1969	Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)
1972	Return of Okinawa to Japan
1976	Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
1978	Establishment of the former Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Former Guidelines)
1991	Collapse of the former USSR and end of the Cold War
1993	North Korea declared withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
1996	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)
	SACO Final Report
1997	Establishment of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the New Guidelines)
2001	Terrorist attacks in the United States
2003	Japan-U.S. Global Alliance (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
2006	Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
	North Korea declared implementation of a nuclear test.

Note: The outline of milestones in Japan-U.S. Security Cooperation is mentioned in the Defense of Japan 2004.
Refer to <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2004/2004/colindex.html>

1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Japan owes its prosperity and development since the end of World War II to the wisdom and hard work of its people, and to the fact that Japan has taken all possible measures to ensure peace and security by conducting defense efforts by itself and by ensuring the effective functioning of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. When restoring independence after the end of World War II, Japan has decided to form an alliance with the United States and become a member of the Free World based on freedom and democracy, as Japan's security strategy. This decision led to the prosperity and development of Japan since then.

The international situation remains full of unpredictable and uncertain elements. A number of destabilizing factors are also prevalent in the Asia-Pacific region, including armed antagonism in the Korean Peninsula, the expansion and modernization of military capabilities by regional countries, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. In addition, as represented by the fight against terrorism since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, security issues have been increasingly globalized. In such environment, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States based on such arrangements play the following roles in Japan's defense and regional peace and stability as well as in the improvement of the international security environment. Japan therefore needs to maintain and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements on a continuous basis.

1. Maintenance of Japan's Security

In today's international community, any country intending to secure peace and independence must build a watertight system of defense strong enough to cope with every contingency, ranging from various types of armed attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons, to threats or intimidation backed up by military force. In today's globalized international community, however, it is impossible even for the United States, a superpower in the world, to ensure its security alone. It is not therefore feasible for Japan to establish and maintain such a defense posture by itself, in view of its population, land, and economy. Also, it would not be an appropriate political stance for Japan to take and would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Therefore, Japan has maintained the alliance with the U.S., which possesses immense military power, shares with Japan the basic values of ideals of democracy, respect for freedom and human rights, and interests in the maintenance of peace and security in the world, has strong economic ties with Japan, and is widely accepted in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan believes that it can build a watertight defense posture to ensure its security by effectively using the deterrent potential realized by the immense military power of the United States and by maintaining an appropriate level of defense forces.

Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides that Japan and the United States will take bilateral actions in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan means that any country attempting an armed attack against Japan would have to contend not only with the SDF but also with the overwhelming military power of the United States. This would surely make potential aggressors hesitate to invade Japan, and therefore act as a deterrent to any such invasion. (See Reference 65)

2. Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides that the United States is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision was made based on the recognition that the maintenance of peace in the Far East is closely related to the maintenance of security of Japan. (See Reference 66)

The close relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, including the presence of U.S. forces in Japan, forms a basis for securing the engagement of the United States necessary for maintaining the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. Together with alliances² and friendly relations between the United States and other countries of this region, the Japan-U.S. alliance continues to play a key role in securing the peace and stability of the region in the post-Cold War era.

3. Improvement of International Security Environment

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements provide the foundation for comprehensive and overall Japan-U.S. friendly and cooperative relations in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society in addition to defense. The Japan-U.S. partnership, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, constitutes a basis for

Japan's foreign policy and helps Japan play a positive role in maintaining the peace and stability of the international community, including the promotion of multilateral security dialogues/cooperation and contributions to U.N. activities.

The international community has been increasingly concerned about new threats and diverse contingencies, such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Under these circumstances, the close partnership between Japan and the United States is essentially important for the international community to effectively implement cooperative activities to improve its security environment.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. forces are making efforts to improve coordination in various fields in normal times. This close coordination forms a basis for effective cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces.

The peace and prosperity of the international community is closely linked with Japan's peace and prosperity. Japan, therefore, can further ensure its peace and prosperity by cooperating with the United States, which has excellent ability to conduct international activities, in implementing measures to improve the international security environment.

2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

1. Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)

The United States stations its forces in Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Article 5 regulates the U.S. obligation to defend Japan, while on the other hand, Article 6 provides that the United States is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East; therefore, obligations of both countries are balanced taken all together. This is the difference from the North Atlantic Treaty which regulates only actions for defense in concert with the other parties.



U.S. forces' nuclear carrier, "George Washington" that is scheduled to be deployed to Japan in 2008 [U.S. Navy]


In addition, if an armed attack against Japan breaks out, the USFJ facilities and areas will play an important role in helping both countries take bilateral actions immediately in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and therefore maintaining stable use of them is extremely important under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

As already mentioned, an opponent will have to directly confront U.S. forces in addition to the SDF. U.S. forces in Japan will therefore act as deterrence to prevent an Armed Attack against Japan.

Furthermore, operations to defend Japan will be made not only by USFJ but also by timely reinforcements. The USFJ will provide bases to such reinforcements of U.S. forces.

The USFJ fulfill these functions and play an extremely important role in ensuring Japan's security. Military presence of U.S. forces provides the basis for U.S. involvement in the region, which is indispensable for maintaining regional peace and stability. (See Fig. III-2-1-2)

Fig. III-2-1-2 USFJ



2. USFJ Facilities and Areas and Local Communities which Host such Facilities and Areas

In order that USFJ facilities and areas fulfill their roles, understandings and cooperation of local communities where such facilities and areas are located are essential. On the other hand, during the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the social environment has greatly changed, including a growth of urban districts, surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. For these facilities and areas to fulfill their roles and to be truly



U.S. forces' F-22 fighter jet that has been temporarily deployed to Kadena Air Base

accepted and supported by Japanese people, it is necessary to minimize the impacts of USFJ facilities and areas on local communities.

As the land of Japan is comparatively small and plain areas are limited, USFJ facilities and areas are adjacent to urban or industrial areas in many communities. In such communities, the presence of USFJ facilities and areas and takeoffs and landings of aircraft impact heavily on the daily lives of local people and regional developments. That is a reason why appropriate efforts for reduction of the burdens on local communities are necessary. (See Chapter4, Section2 • 3)

3. USFJ in Okinawa

Okinawa is located closer to countries in East Asia than U.S. mainland and territories such as Hawaii. Therefore, in case of emergency in this region, U.S. forces in Okinawa may rapidly respond to the situation. Furthermore, Okinawa has a geographic advantage that it is situated at certain distances from countries surrounding Japan. It would appear that U.S. forces, including Marine Corps in charge of primary response to contingencies, are stationed in Okinawa for above-mentioned reasons.

USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa were furnished to U.S. forces as facilities and areas under the Status of Forces Agreement when Okinawa was returned to Japan in May 1972. At present, most of these facilities and areas, including airfields, maneuver areas and logistics support facilities, are located in the prefecture. In terms of space, approximately 74% of the USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa as of January 2007. It is therefore especially important to examine measures to reduce the burdens on Okinawa.

3. Post-Cold War Developments Concerning the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security and Subsequent Developments



Japanese and U.S. leaders appearing for a press interview after the Japan-U.S. summit meeting (in April 2007) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements contributed to the maintenance of security of Japan as a member of the Free World and the maintenance of peace and security of the region surrounding Japan. Since the end of the Cold War era, Japan and the United States have held various types of dialogues depending on changes in the international security environment. The two countries announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which clarifies the direction of bilateral cooperation for the 21st century, at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in Tokyo in April 1996.

The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed that the bilateral security relationship would remain the cornerstone for maintaining stability and prosperity in the region, and indicated those cooperative measures in specific areas that would serve as important pillars to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Based on the Declaration, in September 1997, the two countries established new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the “Guidelines”), and implemented various measures. Through these measures, Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has become more effective, and the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements has further strengthened. (See Reference 35) (See Section 3, 2 • Reference 42)

2. Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia

At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in May 2003, the two countries agreed to enhance “the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Global Context,” including the enhancement of collaboration in responding to global problems in cooperation with the international community. In concrete terms, Japan and the United States have increasingly cooperated with each other in the areas of international activities, including the fight against terrorism, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, assistance to sufferers of the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held between Prime Minister Shinzou Abe and U.S. President George W. Bush in November 2006, the two leaders confirmed that they would work on various challenges of the international community based on the policy of Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia.

The two leaders confirmed that the Japan-U.S. relationship would be further strengthened. President Bush reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the maintenance of deterrence under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The two leaders agreed that Japan-U.S. cooperation in BMD would be further enhanced and accelerated and foreign and defense ministers of both countries would be requested to examine this problem, and that the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan would be steadily implemented.

As for Asian situation, the two leaders agreed on the importance of collaboration with Australia and India, enhancement of relations with ASEAN countries and restoration of Afghanistan, and also agreed on responses to the nuclear problem of North Korea. In addition, the two leaders confirmed that Japan and the United States would respond to various problems, including the nuclear problem of Iran, in close coordination with each other.

The collaboration between Japan and the United States, sharing the same fundamental values and interests in many aspects, is not limited to that under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements but extends to broad-based themes in the world, in addition to those of the Asia-Pacific region.

Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance


The maintenance of peace and security requires the appropriate development of its means depending on changes in the security environment. To make the cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States as Japan's ally based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements effective, the Governments and people of both countries must make constant efforts in developing the alliance depending on changes in the security environment from time to time.

In consideration of the following changes, Japan and the United States have been engaged in consultations on the future Japan-U.S. alliance, including force posture realignment, in recent years.

- Changes in the international security environment, such as emergence of new menaces and globalization of menaces
- Remarkable improvements in military technologies, including improvement of information technology and mobility, and progress in integration of various technologies
- Establishment of Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and transformation and posture realignment of U.S. forces

(See Fig. III-2-2-1)

Fig. III-2-2-1 Background of Japan-U.S. Consultations



As a result, the two countries have reached various epoch-making agreements for further enhancing future Japan-U.S. alliance, including the May 2006 agreement on force posture realignment.

This section explains details of consultations, including the basic stance of the future Japan-U.S. alliance and the realignment of USFJ.

1. Outline of Recent Japan-U.S. Consultations

Based on the understanding that it is important for Japan and the United States to maintain close exchanges in reviewing respective defense and security policies in the new security environment, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee³ (hereafter referred to as the two-plus-two meeting) held in December 2002 confirmed that the bilateral security consultations should be intensified. Since then, working-level consultations have been held.

Those Japan-U.S. consultations have been conducted as part of bilateral strategic dialogues from a viewpoint of how to make the capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security of Japan, more effective in meeting changes of the times. Japan has proactively addressed these consultations for the maintenance of its own security, based on the basic policy to maintain deterrence and capabilities and to reduce burdens on local communities.

Japan's this basic policy reflects the perception that amid changing security environment, in order to remain strong, the Japan-U.S. alliance requires the enhancement of reliability and effectiveness of U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region and broad and firm support of the people of the two countries.

In response to significant changes in the security environment, Japan-U.S. consultations have confirmed strategic objectives common to both countries at first, and then established the direction of Japan-U.S. alliance gradually and comprehensively.

○ Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)

The two countries identified the strategic objectives concerning defense and security that should be achieved by them in cooperation with each other in the region and the world.

○ Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)

The two countries examined the roles, missions and capabilities of the SDF and U.S. forces that would be needed for achieving the strategic objectives identified at the first stage, taking into consideration the developments and achievements of security and defense policies of the two countries in recent years.

This examination was made to clarify how Japan and the United States should cooperate with each other through adequate coordination between the SDF and U.S. forces before the United States will begin force posture realignment.

○ Force Posture Realignment (Realignment of USFJ) (the Third Stage)


The two countries studied the postures of USFJ and the related SDF that would be necessary for performing or demonstrating such roles, missions and capabilities that were examined at the second stage.

The broad overview of Japan-U.S. consultations is as per Fig.III-2-2-2. A joint document was produced at each the two-plus-two meeting held at each stage. Thus, the transparency of consultations was ensured, and the contents of consultations were made known in Japan and abroad at each stage. The contents of these consultations are explained as follows.

2. Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)

The common strategic objectives at the first stage were reconfirmed in the joint statement at the two-plus-two meeting held in February 2005. At this meeting, the two countries agreed that they should intensify consultations on the sharing of the roles, missions and capabilities as examined at the second stage and on force posture realignment as studied at the third stage.

Fig. III-2-2-2 Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations



The outline of the common strategic objectives to be pursued by the two countries, which were specified in the joint statement of the two-plus-two meeting, is as follows.

- Region: maintenance of security in Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the region, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, welcoming China's responsible and constructive roles and development of a cooperative relationship with China, peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, improvement of transparency of China's military affairs, constructive involvement by Russia, assistance to peaceful, stable and vibrant South East Asia
- World: promotion of fundamental values such as democracy in the international community, engagement in international peace cooperation activities, reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to transport these weapons, prevention and eradication of terrorism, and improvement in effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council

At the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reconfirmed their commitments to these common strategic objectives, and highlighted the following strategic objectives (outline) that advance the interests of both countries:

- Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks and fully implementing the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005;
- Achieving swift and full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718;
- Further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions;

- Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the pre-eminent regional economic forum;
- Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia;
- Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense;
- Continuing to build upon partnerships with India;
- Ensuring Afghanistan's successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization;
- Contributing to building a united, democratic Iraq capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, while remaining an ally in the War on Terror;
- Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements; and
- Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation.

3. Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)

1. Outline

At the second stage, the two countries examined how Japan and the United States, especially the SDF and U.S. forces, should cooperate with each other through adequate coordination in achieving the common strategic objectives set out at the first stage and in effectively responding to diverse challenges.

Pursuant to these consultations, the two-plus-two meeting held in October 2005 prepared a joint document titled the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future (hereafter referred to as the SCC document). The SCC document indicates the concrete direction of the roles, missions and capabilities shared by Japan and the United States, and that of posture realignment of USFJ and the relevant units of the SDF. The outline of the SCC document is as follows.

- Basic concepts of roles, missions and capabilities by placing primary emphasis on the following: “defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies” and “efforts to improve the international security environment”
- Examples of operations in broad bilateral security and defense cooperation to be improved in a new security environment
- Essential steps to strengthen posture for bilateral cooperation to respond to diverse challenges. These steps include not only those related to the cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces but also those that should be addressed as government-wide efforts.
- Enhancement and expansion of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation

The particulars of the above-mentioned items are discussed below. Through realization of them, Japan-U.S. alliance will be able to establish the capabilities to respond to diverse challenges effectively along with the realignment of force posture, including that of USFJ.

2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions and Capabilities

The basic concepts on such primary areas indicated in the SCC document as “defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies” and “efforts to improve the international security environment” are shown in Figs. III-2-2-3 and III-2-2-4. In due consideration of the increasing importance of these areas, Japan and the United States will develop their respective defense capabilities and maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

Fig. III-2-2-3 Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Japan's Defense and Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Including Respos to New Threats or Diverse Contingencies





Fig. III-2-2-4 Japan-U.S. Cooperation for Improving the International Security Environment



3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

The SCC document reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened. The document pointed out specific examples of key areas for further enhancement in the current security environment. (See Fig. III-2-2-5)

Fig. III-2-2-5 Examples of Activities to Be Improved in Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

	Example of Area
1	Air defense
2	Ballistic missile defense
3	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other proliferation prevention activities
4	Anti-terrorism measures
5	Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic
6	Search and rescue activities
7	Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and improvement of capabilities and effectiveness of the activities by using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and patrol aircraft
8	Humanitarian relief operations
9	Reconstruction assistance activities
10	Peacekeeping activities and capacity building for other nation's peacekeeping efforts
11	Guarding operations for important infrastructure including USFJ facilities and areas
12	Disposal and decontamination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other measures against WMD attack
13	Mutual logistic support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes enhanced or combined efforts of air and marine transportation (including transportation by high speed vessels (HSVs.))
14	Transportation, use of facilities, medical support and other activities for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)
15	Use of ports, airports, roads, sea, airspace, and frequency bands

But the list of key areas is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation, and other areas of operation not explicitly listed above remain important.

4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

It is important for Japan and the United States to intensify their postures of security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may respond to diverse contingencies in a new security environment. For this purpose, the two countries must implement necessary steps in peacetime. Above-mentioned individual areas of cooperation must be sweepingly and comprehensively addressed not only by the SDF and U.S. forces but also by their Governments as a whole. Some examples of the essential steps specified in the SCC document are listed in Fig. III-2-2-6.

Fig. III-2-2-6 Measures Essential for Enhancing Bilateral Security and Defense Posture

Category	Item	Particulars
Measures to be Addressed by Governments as a Whole	Close and continuous policy and operational coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The close and continuous policy and operational coordination, which is conducted at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States, ranging from tactics of unit level to strategic consultations, is essential for responding to diverse security issues¹. • Improvement of effectiveness of the comprehensive and coordination mechanisms based on the Guidelines by consolidating their functions
	Advancing bilateral contingency planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuance of bilateral defense planning for the armed attack situation in Japan and mutual cooperation planning for the situation in areas surrounding Japan that are conducted under the Guidelines taking account of the changing security environment • Japan's legislation to deal with contingency (providing a strengthened basis for contingency use by the SDF and U.S. forces of facilities, including airports and seaports) in above-mentioned planning • Close coordination relevant government agencies and local authorities, and detailed surveys of airports and seaports
	Enhancing information sharing and intelligence cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancement of sharing and cooperation of information and intelligence ranging from national strategy to unit's tactic levels • Additional measures to protect secret information shared by related ministries and agencies
Measures to be Addressed by the SDF and U.S. Forces	Improving interoperability ² between the SDF and U.S. forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintenance of regular consultations to maintain and enhance interoperability • Enhancement of interoperability between headquarters of the SDF and U.S. Forces
	Expansion of training opportunities in Japan and the United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expansion of bilateral trainings and exercises (including the expansion of mutual use of training facilities and areas in Japan by the SDF and U.S. forces) • Expansion of trainings by the SDF in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii and U.S. mainland
	Shared use of facilities by the SDF and U.S. forces	(To be specified when force posture is realigned)
	Ballistic missile defense (BMD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constant information gathering and sharing, and maintenance of readiness and interoperability • If appropriate, U.S. forces will additionally deploy supplemental capabilities to Japan and its surrounding areas and adjust their operations

Notes: 1. Close policy consultations on security are conducted between officials of the Governments of Japan and the United States through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) of ministerial level (so-called two-plus-two meeting), the defense summit meeting of ministerial level, the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) and others. As for operations, there exist the Comprehensive Mechanism and the Coordination Mechanism under the Guideline. (See Section 3 of this chapter)

2. The term "interoperability" means that tactics, equipment, logistics support and the implementation guidelines for various operations have commonness and duality.

5. Enhancement and Expansion of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

Basic stances on Japan-U.S. defense cooperation are indicated in the Guidelines, under which measures for Japan-U.S. cooperation have been taken. In view of the current security environment, however, bilateral cooperation in those fields that are not specified in the Guidelines, such as international peace cooperation activities and BMD, is also important. In the future, the two countries will strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

As for the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States, the two countries emphasized at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006 that the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation in the field of bilateral contingency planning, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and international peace cooperation activities should be strengthened or improved. Furthermore, the two countries

emphasized the importance of examining security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may solidify the alliance relationship in changing regional and international security environments and improve the alliance's capabilities in responding to various challenges.

In the joint statement made at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with the alliance transformation vision indicated in the October 2005 SCC document, and highlighted as follows:

- The redefinition of the SDF's primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan;
- Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture the forces of the two countries to operate together in a regional crisis;
- Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA);
- Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group;
- Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations; and
- Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

4. Force Posture Realignment, Including USFJ (the Third Stage)

1. Outline

(1) Review from the Viewpoint of the Maintenance of Deterrence and Capabilities and the Reduction of Burdens on Local Communities

The force posture realignment of USFJ is necessary to maintain the stable presence of USFJ, which serves as deterrence and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, to adapt Japan-U.S. alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to a new security environment, and thereby to reinforce the peace of Japan and the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region.

The study on the realignment of USFJ was conducted based on the basic concept of maintaining deterrence and capabilities and reducing burdens on local communities, and based on the examination of such roles, missions and capabilities at the second stage that will be required for achieving the common strategic objectives at the first stage.

As indicated in the SCC document issued in October 2005, the guiding precepts indicated in Fig. III-2-2-7 were established in the study based on the roles, missions and capabilities, and other factors.

Based on the past studies, the SCC document indicated a specific direction of the realignment of postures of USFJ and related units of the SDF³.


(2) Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

At the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006, Japan and the United States finalized the force posture realignment in a document titled the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (hereafter referred to as the Roadmap), which indicated the details for implementing concrete initiatives.


The outline of the Roadmap is shown in Figs. III-2-2-8 • 9.

Fig. III-2-2-8 Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the SDF

1. Realignment in Kanto Area



2. Realignment on Okinawa






Fig. III-2-2-9 Major Realignment Schedule

Time	Implementation Plans for Realignment
May 2006	The U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation was announced.
Summer, 2006	For the deployment of an X-Band Radar system of U.S. forces at JASDF Shariki Base, necessary arrangements and facility modifications were made.
October 2006	Specific portions of Yokota airspace for return will be identified.
2006	Shared use of Camp Hansen that requires no facility improvements will become possible.
March 2007	Consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa will be developed.
Fiscal 2007	Preparation of annual plans for training relocation (preparation of a supplemental plan for Fiscal 2006)
USFY 2008 (Oct. 2007- Sept.2008)	Army headquarters in Japan (Camp Zama) will be transformed.
By September 2008	Portions of Yokota airspace will be returned to Japanese control.
July 2009 (or the earliest possible date thereafter)	Permanent site for field-carrier landing practice will be selected.
Fiscal 2009 (April 2009 -)	Comprehensive study, including conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace, will be completed.
Fiscal 2010 (April 2010 -)	JASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units will relocate to Yokota.
Fiscal 2012 (April 2012 -)	The headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force will relocate to Camp Zama.
2014	Futenma Replacement Facility will be completed. Part of U.S. marine Corps in Okinawa (personnel of III Marine Expeditionary Force and their dependents) will relocate to Guam. Relocation of the U.S. Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni.
Study for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base will be completed within twelve months from commencement.	

* Items written in **boldface** show the implementation of actual measures.

The implementation of these realignment initiatives will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region. The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and, at the same time, to reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa. (See Reference 39)

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan unless otherwise specified in the Roadmap. The U.S. Government will bear the operational costs that arise from the implementation of these initiatives. Since the realignment of USFJ is an important task to reduce burdens on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining deterrence and capabilities of USFJ, it is decided that proper budgetary measures will be taken after having examined the particulars of costs to be borne by Japan.

(3) Steady Implementation of Realignment Initiatives

At the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reviewed the progress made in the past one year with the initiatives described in the May 2006 Roadmap, and reaffirmed the importance of steady implementation of the initiatives in accordance with the Japan-U.S. agreement.

2. Force Posture Realignment in Okinawa

At present, many of USFJ facilities and areas are located in Okinawa.

In particular, U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa with high mobility and readiness play multiple roles in defending Japan, and in maintaining the peace and security of the region, including responses to the earthquake that took place in Java, Indonesia in May 2006.

As part of its global military posture realignment effort, the U.S. is conducting some reviews to strengthen its force structures in the Pacific. Among these reviews are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These reviews will also enable increased security cooperation with countries in the region, thereby improving the overall security environment.

In connection with this realignment, a set of integrated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens on Okinawa are identified as follows.

(1) Futenma Replacement Facility

U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station fulfills the following functions:

- 1) To transport ground units of Marine Corps by helicopters and other means;
- 2) To operate tanker aircraft;
- 3) To accommodate aircraft in case of emergency.

In the meantime, local residents have strongly demanded the early return of Futenma Air Station for their concerns over safety, noise and traffic of the region as it is located in the middle of the residential area. Therefore, the following initiatives will be implemented on the functions of Futenma Air Station, and then the air station will be returned.

a. Function to Transport Ground Units of Marine Corps by Helicopters and Other Means

(a) Status of Basic Plan Based on the SACO Final Report

In the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report prepared in December 1996, the two countries agreed to totally return Futenma Air Station after an adequate replacement facility is completed within five to seven years. (See 6 of this section)

The sequence of events related to the replacement facility for Futenma Air Station (hereafter referred to as the FRF (Futenma Replacement Facility)) after the issuance of the Final Report is shown in Fig.III-2-2-10. In 2002, the Basic Plan of the FRF was finalized. At this stage, more than six years had passed since the agreement of return. After that, although an environmental impact assessment procedure started in 2004, the return was not realized within five to seven years as originally scheduled, and has not been realized yet.

On the other hand, it was expected that it would take another ten years or so to relocate and return Futenma Air Station for the following reasons: the technical site survey as necessary procedure for commencement of construction began in 2003 after the Basic Plan of the FRF had been finalized, but the process did not go smoothly; the environmental impact assessment procedure was expected to take approximately another three years; and the construction of the FRF was expected to take nine and a half years.

In addition, a helicopter accident took place in Ginowan City in August 2004. It became evident that the existence of Futenma Air Station in the middle of the residential area has a potential risk, and therefore it was strongly recognized that the early relocation and return of Futenma Air Station is essential.

In order to drive away a general feeling of unrest among local residents, the two Governments conducted a study again on how to realize early relocation and return of Futenma Air Station during the course of Japan-U.S. consultations on the realignment of USFJ.

Fig. III-2-2-10 Background for the Construction of the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station

Time	Background	Remarks
April 1996	Prime Minister Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the total return of Futenma Air Station was expressed. SACO Interim Report	Until local government expressed their acceptance of the FRF and the plan was approved by the cabinet (three years and eight months)
December	SACO Final Report Construction of a sea-based facility off the eastern coast of main island of Okinawa	
November 1999	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine expressed that the coastal area of Henoko in Nago City was designated as a relocation site.	From the cabinet decision to the development of the Basic Plan (two years and seven months)
December	Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF. "Government Policy on Relocation of Futenma Air Station" (cabinet decision) Construction in the "coastal area of Henoko in Nago City in Camp Schwab Water Area"	
July 2002	Development of the "Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility"	From the development of the Basic Plan to the beginning of the environmental impact assessment (one year and nine months)
April 2004	The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started.	
August September	A helicopter of U.S. forces plunged into the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa. Offshore operation of the boring survey started.	
October 2005	A new plan was agreed in the SCC document. The FRF will be constructed in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the southern shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay.	
April 2006	Memorandums of Basic Agreement were concluded with Nago City and Ginoza Village. Regarding the construction of the FRF, the plan to construct two runways aligned in a "V"-shape was agreed.	
May	The plan for the FRF was finalized in U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. Memorandum of Basic Understanding was concluded between the Defense Agency and Okinawa Prefecture. "GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others" (cabinet decision) Abolition of GOJ Policy decided in 1999	
August	Establishment of the Council on Measures for relocation of Futenma Air Station	

(b) Basic Concept of the FRF

Marine Corps consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, and the interaction of those elements in actual operations is necessary. Therefore, both sides conducted a study based on the recognition that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be located near the other elements with which they train, maneuver and operate on a regular basis.

In the study, both sides considered several factors, including safety of neighboring communities and military personnel, noise impacts on local communities, impacts on the natural environment including seaweed beds, and operational requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.

(c) General Description of the FRF

Based on the aforementioned concept, both sides conducted the study intensively. As a result, in the SCC document prepared in October 2005, the initiative to "locate the FRF in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay" was approved.

Thereafter, as a result of consultation with local municipalities, including Nago City, agreements on the FRF were made with Nago City and Ginoza Village in April 2006 stating that, based on the initiative approved in the SCC document, two runways would be constructed to avoid an air route above the surrounding area pursuant to the request from the local communities, and that the runways should be constructed by paying due

attention to the following points—1) safety of lives of local residents; 2) conservation of the natural environment; and 3) the feasibility of the project. Then, it was decided that the Ministry of Defense, Okinawa Prefecture, Nago City, Ginoza Village and related local municipalities would continue to have consultations on the plan of construction of the FRF in good faith on a continuous basis to reach a conclusion.

Based on the above-mentioned agreement, both countries agreed, in the Roadmap prepared in May 2006, to locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays. This facility includes two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls.


The facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.

As indicated in the SACO Final Report, the FRF will have capabilities to support operations of helicopters now stationed in Futenma Air Station and short-field aircraft operations. There’s no plan to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

Furthermore, it is indicated that, in order to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.

In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill. The construction work is targeted for completion by 2014. It is indicated that relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable. (See Fig. III-2-2-11)

Fig. III-2-2-11 Diagram of Futenma Replacement Facility



In the case of the newly agreed FRF, construction will be made mainly on land and therefore construction work may be started earlier and completed more steadily as compared with the old plan. Thus, earlier relocation becomes possible. In addition, the portion to be constructed in the offshore area will be made as smaller as possible. Thus, full consideration is given to environmental impacts.

Concerning the construction of the FRF, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and the then Minister of State for Defense signed, in May 2006, a Memorandum of Basic Understanding in which both parties agreed to cope with the issue based on the Government plan and paying due attention to: 1) removal of danger of Futenma Air Station; 2) safety of lives of local residents; 3) conservation of the natural environment; and 4) feasibility of the project.

The Government made a cabinet decision on May 30, 2006 to proceed with the construction based on the plan approved at the two-plus-two meeting held on May 1, 2006 and by taking into consideration the positions of the Government, Okinawa Prefecture and the related local municipalities and background of the relocation of Futenma Air Station, and to develop a construction plan immediately. It was also decided that the specific construction plan, safety/environmental measures and local development measures should be addressed through consultations made at a consultative organ, which is established jointly with Okinawa Prefecture and related local municipalities⁵.

Since August 2006, the Council Meetings on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station⁶ have been held as follows.

○ First Council Meeting (on August 29, 2006)

Based on the cabinet decision on May 30, 2006, the Council was established to discuss a specific construction plan for the FRF, safety/environmental measures and local economic promotion measures.

○ Second Council Meeting (on December 25, 2006)

- The second Council Meeting was held with the attendance of the Chief Cabinet Secretary. The newly appointed Ministers in charge and newly elected Governor of Okinawa Nakaima made remarks on the stances of the Government and the Prefecture involved, respectively.
- The members agreed that this Council Meeting would be held continually in the future and they would make efforts to realize early and smooth relocation of Futenma Air Station.

○ Third Council Meeting (on January 19, 2007)

- The contents of the Memorandums of Basic Agreement concluded with the Mayors of Nago City and Ginoza Village and the Memorandum of Basic Understanding concluded with the Governor of Okinawa were reconfirmed, and opinions were exchanged.
- The members agreed that they would make efforts to build a relationship of mutual trust and attend this Council Meeting continually in the future with the aim of realizing early and smooth relocation of Futenma Air Station.



Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma meets with Governor of Okinawa Hirokazu Nakaima (in January 2007)

In addition, the engineering and technical design for the FRF was elaborated, and in April 2007, surveys in the water areas offshore of Camp Schwab were initiated.

b. Function to Operate Tanker Aircraft

With regard to air refueling aircraft KC-130 (12 in total), which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base under the SACO Final Report, the SCC document dated October 2005 states that alternative facilities would be considered with priority consideration given to JMSDF Kanoya Base. As the result of a further study, however, it was finalized in the Roadmap in May 2006 that the aircraft would be relocated to Iwakuni Air Base, the same as the SACO Final Report.

KC-130 aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base and Guam.

c. Base Function to Accommodate Aircraft in Contingencies

Strengthened contingency use of Nyutabaru Air Base (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki Air Base (in Fukuoka Prefecture) of ASDF will be provided for U.S. forces. Facility improvements for this purpose will be made as necessary after conducting site surveys and before Futenma Air Station is returned. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.

Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of Futenma Air Station.

(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, the personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned. Due to this realignment in Okinawa, it is planned that approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity.

Units to relocate include: III MEF Command Element, 3d Marine Division Headquarters, 3d Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area. On the other hand, it is indicated that U.S. Marine Corps forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.

As for costs of relocating U.S. forces to Guam, the Governments of both Japan and the United States held consultations on how both sides should share such costs. At the Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting held in April 2006, both sides agreed on the sharing of costs for providing facilities and infrastructure involved in the relocation of U.S. forces to Guam.

Specifically, of the estimated total cost of \$10.27 billion, Japan will bear \$6.09 billion, including financial contribution and loan for providing recoverable houses for military families and infrastructure, and the total cost will include \$2.8 billion or less in direct fiscal spending. The United States will fund \$4.18 billion, including \$3.18 billion or less in direct fiscal spending. (See 5 of this section)

(3) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

a. Return of Significant Land Area South of Kadena Air Base

The facilities and areas of USFJ are located in densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base (approximately 1,500ha in total). Following the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

In the Roadmap prepared in May 2006, Japan and the United States agreed to develop a detailed consolidation plan for the six candidate facilities (Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1). At present, the plan is under deliberation between both countries. (See Fig. III-2-2-8)

b. Steady Implementation of the SACO Final Report

The steady implementation of the SACO Final Report prepared in 1996 is important because it aims to properly maintain the capabilities and readiness of USFJ and to reduce impacts of operations of U.S. forces on local residents of Okinawa. In the Roadmap prepared in May 2006, Japan and the United States agreed to the possibility that the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.

c. Shared Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urbanized areas with some operational restriction. Therefore, the shared use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the training environment for SDF's units in Okinawa, and facilitate joint training and interoperability between the SDF and U.S. forces. Some of the shared use will improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local residents at a time of disaster.

Based on such concepts, Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(4) Relationships among Realignment Initiatives

Within the overall realignment package in the Roadmap prepared in May 2006, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected. Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena Air Base depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam. The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: 1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF; and 2) Japan's financial contribution to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

3. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capacity

U.S. Army headquarters in Japan at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) will be transformed into a joint-task capable headquarters with high mobility and readiness by U.S. Fiscal Year 2008⁷. This transformation is made based on the global realignment of U.S. Army as part of the overall transformation of U.S. forces. The transformed U.S. Army headquarters in Japan will continue to hold the same core mission to defend Japan and maintain the peace and security of the Far East.

To enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the headquarters of GSDF Central Readiness Force that centrally controls mobile operation units and specialized units will relocate to Camp Zama by Japan Fiscal Year 2012 so that it may strengthen coordination with the transformed U.S. Army headquarters in Japan.

Along with the transformation of U.S. Army headquarters, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD) (in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In relation to this transformation, measures will be implemented for more efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD, including partial returns of these facilities.

4. Yokota Air Base and Airspace

(1) Establishment of the Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)

The enhancement of coordination between headquarters is quite important for ensuring flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and U.S. forces. The headquarters of USFJ located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important position in the various mechanisms⁸ under the Guidelines. Recently, the SDF has adopted a new joint operations structure, while U.S. forces have intensified their joint operations.

Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command as mentioned below, the Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) will be established. Concerning air defense and BMD, the

BJOCC will perform a function to facilitate bilateral actions for the defense of Japan by making close coordination between headquarters of SDF and U.S. forces and improving interoperability, and by enabling Joint Staff Office of the SDF and headquarters of USFJ to share the same information.

(2) Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command

ASDF Air Defense Command located in Fuchu City, Tokyo has an air defense mission, and will have a function of headquarters for BMD in the future. In the case of air defense and BMD, response time is very short. Therefore, it is quite important for the SDF and U.S. forces to immediately share the necessary information. Thus, in Japan Fiscal Year 2010, ASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base where the headquarters of U.S. 5th Air Force is located. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC will enhance coordination between headquarter of the SDF and U.S. forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

(3) Yokota Airspace

At Yokota Air Base, U.S. forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. To facilitate the operation of those civilian airplanes that must deviate from the airspace, however, the following measures are pursued.

- a. Establish a program in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of the existing procedure needed for transiting Yokota airspace.
- b. Develop a procedure in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 for temporary transfer of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required by military purposes.
- c. Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities by September 2008 after having identified the returned portions by October 2006.
- d. Complete a study⁹ of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace by Japan Fiscal Year 2009.

Then, the procedure mentioned in b as above started in September 2006. The themes of 1) identification of the airspace portions to be returned by September 2008 and 2) collocation of U.S. forces and SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility have been examined by the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee established under the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, approved by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, and mutually agreed by the Governments of both countries, in October 2006. Once the airspace portions mentioned in above item 1) is returned to Japan, the airspace portion of the Yokota airspace adjoining the western part of Haneda International Airport will be reduced by approximately 40%. Further in connection with item 2), Japanese Air SDF traffic controllers will be collocated at Yokota Air Base in May 2007.


The lessons learned from experiences with the collocation will be taken into account in the study of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace. (See Fig. III-2-2-12)

(4) Civilian-Military Dual-Use of Yokota Air Base

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, the two countries agreed that the feasibility of a civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base be jointly studied by the Governments of both countries. Then, a Liaison Conference was formed as a panel attended by representatives of ministries and agencies (the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense), the Defense Facilities Administration Agency) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Since then, the meeting of the Liaison Conference has been held as required.

The Governments of Japan and the United States will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from

Fig. III-2-2-12 Yokota Airspace



commencement. The study, which started in October 2006, will be conducted on the shared understanding that the dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base. Based on the outcome of this study, both Governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on the civilian-military dual use.

5. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Base to Iwakuni Air Base

(1) Significance of Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carriers

The presence of U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in maintaining the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, including the safety of its maritime traffic. U.S. aircraft carriers play a core role in the Fleet. At

present, the U.S. aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk, has been deployed in this region and has been visiting Yokosuka (in Kanagawa Prefecture). The homeport for the U.S. aircraft carrier must be provided in Japan to maintain the forward-deployed capabilities of the carrier and its aircraft for a long time.

In October 2005, the U.S. Navy announced that the U.S. aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk, would be decommissioned in 2008 to be replaced by a nuclear aircraft carrier. Then, the U.S. Navy determined and announced that Kitty Hawk would be replaced with the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, George Washington. For this replacement, Japan and the United States agreed in June 2006 that the Government of Japan would carry out dredging work in the restricted water area of Yokosuka Naval Base in order to ensure safe operations of the nuclear aircraft carrier.

Based on this agreement, Defense Facilities Administration Agency completed survey and design works in FY 2006, and finished legal port consultation with Yokosuka City, port manager, on the dredging work in April 2007. The dredging work is scheduled to be completed by May 2008.

(2) Base for Carrier-Based Aircraft

When the U.S. aircraft carrier is deployed at Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Base (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is now used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Base is located in an urban center, noise of landings and takeoffs of carrier jets in particular has caused problems for a long time.

These problems should be resolved as soon as possible in order to stably maintain Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the operations of carriers under the arrangements into the future.

After the completion of the runway relocation project at Iwakuni Air Base, the safe operations of aircraft will be possible with less impact on the living environment of local communities.

In consideration of these matters, Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Base to Iwakuni Air Base. This relocation, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C and C-2 aircraft (59 aircraft in total), will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.

Above-mentioned relocations will be implemented after the runway is relocated offshore to mitigate impacts of increasing operations by the U.S. forces. In addition, such related measures will be taken including the relocation of MSDF's EP-3 and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to Atsugi Air Base, regular deployment of KC-130 aircraft (relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base) to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam on a rotational basis, and the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from Iwakuni Air Base to Guam. It is expected that noise problems in most of the communities around Iwakuni Air Base will be alleviated due to these measures as the first-category area that requires residential noise-abatement work decreases from approximately 1,600ha of present area to 500ha. Furthermore, safety will be improved as the runway will be relocated offshore and approaching and takeoff routes will be established above the water. (See Fig. III-2-2-8)

As for field-carrier landing practice, a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter. In addition, the SCC document confirmed that U.S. forces will continue to conduct field-carrier landing practice at



U.S. forces' Aegis-equipped cruiser with BMD capability, "Shiloh"
[U.S. Navy]

Iwo Jima in accordance with the existing temporary arrangements until a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility is identified.

(3) Commercial airport at Iwakuni Air Base

Considering that the local governments, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, have been unitedly requesting for a commercial airport at Iwakuni Air Base, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have been discussing

within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee to identify such issues as the relationship between commercial aviation resumption and U.S. forces' operations and to examine the feasibility of commercial aviation. As a result, in October 2005, it was mutually agreed at a meeting of the Committee that commercial aviation operations at Iwakuni Air Base of four round trips per day will be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements.

Since then, this issue has been discussed as part of the discussions on the realignment of USFJ. After it was agreed upon in the Roadmap in May 2006 that portions of the future civilian air facility would be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni, locations of the civil airport facility and other related matters have been discussed between the two Governments with the assumption that the realignment of USFJ will be implemented.

6. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

As confirmed in the study on the roles, missions and capabilities, Japan and the United States will continue close coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities.

ASDF Shariki Subbase (in Aomori Prefecture) was designated as the optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar System (AN/TPY-2; hereafter referred to as the X-Band Radar System) with the sophisticated capability to search and track ballistic missiles¹⁰. The data obtained by the X-Band Radar System will be shared by the two countries. Thereby, the capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil protection and consequence management. The X-Band Radar System was deployed at ASDF Shariki Subbase in June 2006.

Also, to ensure defense against missile attacks directed at Japan, U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.

The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 capabilities to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area started in September 2006. These capabilities became partially operational from the end of December 2006. In August 2006, the Aegis-equipped cruiser with BMD capabilities, Shiloh, which is forward-deployed in the Western Pacific region, visited Yokosuka Naval Base.

The deployment of U.S. forces' BMD capabilities to Japan contributes to the improvement of our country's defense against missile attacks, the maintenance of deterrence of USFJ and the safety of Japanese citizens.

7. Training Relocation

Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities, Kadena, Misawa (in Aomori Prefecture) and Iwakuni will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki and Nyutabaru.

In March 2007, U.S. forces conducted relocated training from U.S. Kadena Air Base to ASDF Tsuiki Air Base. As for the training relocation plan for JFY 2007, the outline was announced in January 2007 and U.S. forces conducted relocated training from U.S. Kadena Air Base to ASDF Komatsu Air Base in May 2007.

The Government of Japan will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.

5. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ

1. Basic Policy

The Roadmap prepared by Japan and the United States in May 2006 intends to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, maintain deterrence and capabilities, and contribute to the long-awaited reduction of burdens on local communities where USFJ facilities and areas are located. Therefore, it is important to steadily implement the realignment initiatives specified in the Roadmap.

In this connection, in May 2006, the Cabinet approved the Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others. The outline of the concepts and policies specified in the decision is as follows.

- Local development and other measures will be taken for some local governments which are to bear new burdens in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan, and efforts will be made to facilitate the use of returned sites and to ensure the employment of Japanese employees for USFJ.
- The Government of Japan will share necessary costs to relocate of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and implement the early relocation.
- The Government will take actions needed to implement the specific realignment measures properly and rapidly. The Government experiencing the harsh public finance, however, should rationalize and streamline defense-related expenditures to ensure the efficient defense build-up, while making more efforts to cut on the entire government expenditures.

At a meeting of the Government and Ruling Parties Council on Realignment of U.S. Forces Structure in Japan held in December 2006¹¹, the Government and the Ruling Parties agreed to develop a law for smooth implementation of the realignment of USFJ and to include expenses of new subsidy in the 2007 fiscal year budget. (See Reference 40)

In September 2006, the Ministry of Defense established the HQ for the Implementation of U.S. Force Structure Realignment Project in order to develop a frame work in which the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency will be able to steadily implement realignment-initiatives and promote the studies on the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States.

2. Development of a Law for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ

In response to the above-mentioned basic policy, the Cabinet approved the Special Measures Bill concerning Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces (The Special Measures Bill for the Realignment of USFJ and SDF) on February 9, 2007, and submitted it to the ordinary session of the Diet. The Special Measures Bill for Realignment was passed by the Diet, and became a law, on May 23, 2007. The outline of the law is as follows.

(1) Institutionalization of Provision of New Grants to Local Municipalities (Realignment Grant)

a. Purpose of Realignment Grant

The benefits of the peace and security of a nation are equally enjoyed by its people. The realignment of USFJ contributes to a reduction in U.S. base-related burdens on Japan as a whole. In some local communities,



U.S. force's fighter jets came flying from Kadena Air Base to ASDF's Tsuiki Base (in Fukuoka prefecture) (in March 2007)

however, training and force's relocation will be newly started due to the realignment, and U.S. base-related burdens will be increased. As a result, residents of certain local communities only must bear increased burdens due to the realignment of USFJ.

Although residents of these local communities have pros and cons, all of such local communities are willing to accept such increased burdens for the maintenance of peace and security of Japan.

The realignment grant is one of the measures to be implemented by the Government for those local municipalities that are willing to accept increased burdens in appreciation of their contribution to the maintenance of peace and security of Japan. The realignment grant is needed for facilitating the smooth implementation of the realignment of USFJ.

The realignment grant is a special grant extended in addition to expenses for measures around bases¹² which have been practiced and aims to smoothly carry out the special project to promote the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The grant will be used, not to reduce or alleviate the burden caused by the realignment, but to improve the convenience of lives of residents in the local communities where the realignment is implemented and to contribute to the promotion of local industries, during the period—ten years in principle—including the duration before and after the realignment.

b. Mechanism of Allocation of Realignment Grant

- In connection with the realignment of USFJ¹³, the Minister of Defense designates such local municipalities, the stability of lives of residents of which will be threatened by increased adverse influences due to the existence of defense facilities concerned, and other local municipalities surrounding these municipalities.
- Grants will be allocated to such local municipalities, and used as expenses of the projects that contribute to the improvement of convenience of lives of residents and the promotion of industries¹⁴.
- These grants will be allocated to such local municipalities in consideration of the degree of increase in adverse influences on lives of residents, of the scope of such influences, and depending on the progress of measures for the realignment of USFJ.

Since the amount of grant is determined depending on the progress of realignment measures, this mechanism is appropriate for the policy objective to implement the realignment of USFJ.

(2) Establishment of Exception to the Grant Rate for Public Works Projects, or Other Treatment

a. Necessity of Establishment of Exception to the Grant Rate for Public Works Projects, or of Other Treatment

Among the local municipalities whose burdens will increase, there are some whose burdens are extremely heavy, for example, due to the relocation of units with many aircraft. These municipalities will be required to carry out public works such as roads and ports promptly and, providing special grant-rate measures to such municipalities will contribute to a smooth implementation of the realignment. However, the public works as mentioned above will often be implemented by the national government or prefectures and, in some cases, will be limited to certain municipalities. It is feared that the public works may be infeasible with the realignment grant. Therefore, the Special Measures Law for the Realignment of USFJ and SDF provides measures to promote industrial development for the region consisting of municipalities with heavy burdens and surrounding municipalities¹⁵ (Special Region for Promotion of Realignment-Related Industrial Development). (See Fig. III-2-2-13)

Fig. III-2-2-13 Exception to the Grant Rate for Public Works (examples)

Project Name ¹	Ordinary Grant Rate	Exception to the Grant Rate	
		Mainland	Okinawa
Roads	1/2	5.5/10	Rate provided for by the Special Measures Law for Okinawa (9.5/10 and others)
Harbors	1/2 (4/10) ²	5.5/10 (4.5/10) ²	
Fishing ports	1/2	5.5/10	

Notes: 1. In addition, waterworks, sewage, land improvement, and facilities for compulsory education are treated as exceptions.

2. The figures in parentheses show the examples of grant rates for the construction and improvement of small-scale water facilities, outlying facilities, and berthing facilities specified by the ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, as provided for in Article 42.1 of the Port and Harbor Law.

b. Mechanism of Special Measures for Special Area

- A council chaired by Minister of Defense and consisted of relevant Ministers (Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces¹⁶) will be established under the Ministry of Defense.
- The Governor of a prefecture will apply to Minister of Defense for the designation of Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and submit a development plan (Special Area for Development concerning Realignment-draft), including public works projects for road, port and others.
- Upon receipt of an application from the Governor of a prefecture, the Council will deliberate on the designation of Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and on the decision of Area Development Plan for the area.
- As for public works projects under the Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment have been deliberated and approved at the Council, the percentage of expenses borne by the Government, or grant rate, for those projects of improvement of road, port or others¹⁷ that should be immediately implemented in consideration of the particulars and degree of adverse influences caused by the realignment of USFJ on local communities will be higher than those for ordinary cases.

(3) Special Operations of Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Other Measures

a. Reasons Why Japan Shares Expenses of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

The relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationing in Okinawa to Guam has been strongly desired by the residents of Okinawa Prefecture. Considering the fact that approximately 74% of facilities and areas used by the USFJ are concentrated on Okinawa, which has great impact on the living environment of residents and on regional development, it is important to realize the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam as soon as possible, which enables the reduction of burdens on Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence and capabilities of the USFJ.

Therefore, the Government of Japan has actively approached the United States to negotiate the relocation. As a result, the two countries agreed on the sharing of costs of the relocation.

b. Japan's Stance on Cost Sharing

If the United States alone undertakes the development of necessary facilities and infrastructure in Guam, the task is expected to take very long time, despite the need to realize the relocation at an early date. Therefore, the

Government of Japan decided to support the United States in its development of necessary facilities, including Marine headquarters buildings, barracks and family housing, and infrastructure Japan will bear the cost for the relocation on the basis of actual requirement of facilities and infrastructure. In other words, Japan will not bear the cost based on a certain percentage of the total costs necessary for the relocation, which the United States requested in the negotiation.

The Government of Japan will provide direct cash contribution to develop Marine headquarters buildings, instruction buildings, barracks and quality of life (QOL) facilities, including schools, because in these projects it is difficult to recover project funds from rent or charge for use. On the other hand, the development of family housing and infrastructure, such as electrical power, potable water, and waste water and solid waste disposal, will be funded by private finance initiatives so that the Government of Japan’s financial burden may be reduced as much as possible. The funds for projects that are raised by private finance initiatives will be recovered by rents and service charges paid by the U.S. side in the future.

The agreed amounts of the costs of relocation to Guam to be shared by Japan and the United States are based on the estimation prepared by the U.S. side at the stage of study, and therefore such amounts are only rough estimate. To reduce and rationalize the amount of cost to be borne by Japan, it will be important for the Government of Japan to carefully examine concrete project schemes and the detailed estimate for spending. Therefore, GOJ will take the budgetary measure only after thorough examinations have been made in cooperation with JBIC and all efforts have been made to reduce the amount of costs required. (See Fig. III-2-2-14)

Fig. III-2-2-14 Breakdown of Cost of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

Project		Sources	Amount	
Cost borne by Japan	Marine headquarters buildings, instruction buildings, barracks and QOL facilities including schools	(Direct) fiscal spending	\$2.80 billion (upper limit)	
	Family housing	Equity Investment	\$1.5 billion	\$2.55 billion
		Loan, etc	\$0.63 billion	
		Cost reduction by improved efficiency	\$0.42 billion	
Infrastructure (electricity, potable water and waste water, and disposal of solid waste)	Loan, etc	\$0.74 billion		
Total			\$6.09 billion	
Cost borne by the United States	Helidromes, communication facilities, training support facilities, repair and refilling facilities, fuel and ammunition warehouses, and other base facilities	(Direct) fiscal spending	\$3.18 billion	
	Road (high-standard road)	Loan or (direct) fiscal spending	\$1 billion	
	Total			\$4.18 billion
Grand total			\$10.27 billion	


- Notes: 1. The amounts and schemes are subject to change.
2. Japan is committed to sharing cost not according to the ratio to the total amount but based on the amount required for each of the facilities and infrastructures. The cost will be further examined and upper limits are shown for (direct) fiscal spending.
3. As for family housing, the cost was reduced by \$0.42 billion (by improved efficiency) from \$2.55 billion to \$2.13 billion
4. As for equity investment and loan, the amount spent will be recovered through rents and fees paid by the United States.
5. The cost of moving the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and the cost for the activities of the Corps in Guam are not included in the grand total of \$10.27 billion

c. Outline of Special Financial Operations of JBIC

To properly and stably implement overseas projects for which private finance initiative is utilized for a long period, it will be necessary to employ the capability of JBIC which has expertise and experience in this field.

Therefore, it was decided to authorize the JBIC to consider the Financing Operations for Facilitating the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan as special operations under the Special Measures Law for the Realignment of USFJ and SDF, so that JBIC may make capital investments, loans and other operations that will be needed for projects to facilitate the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam, and to authorize the Government of Japan to take special financial measures for such operations. (See Fig. III-2-2-15)

Fig. III-2-2-15 Image of Project Scheme for Which Private Finance Initiative Is Utilized



Notes: 1. SPE: Special Purpose Entity
 2. \$1 in the U.S. housing privatization project

(4) Measures for USFJ Local Employees

The employment of USFJ local employees may be adversely affected, because defense facilities will be returned, U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will relocate to Guam, and other measures will be taken as a result of the realignment of USFJ.

Therefore, the Government of Japan decided to take measures to maintain the employment of USFJ local employees, including education and skill training.

(5) Validity of the Law

- The law shall be temporary statute with a ten-year life span.
- Despite the validity of the law, measures including special operations of JBIC shall remain effective for a considerable length of time.

6. Various Measures Concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas

Ensuring the stable use of the USFJ facilities and areas is essential for the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Government of Japan has long been implementing measures to harmonize the stable use of these facilities and areas with requirements of the surrounding local communities.

1. USFJ Facilities and Areas Located in Japan, Excluding Okinawa

(1) Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project



Iwakuni Air Base (runway relocation work is under way)

In response to requests of Iwakuni City and other local governments, the Government of Japan has decided to proceed with the project to relocate the runway approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore) in order to ensure the stable use of Iwakuni Air Base by solving problems related to operations, safety and noises. The project is targeted for completion at the end of JFY 2008. (See 4 of this section)

(2) Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

Considering that local governments concerned and other organizations have strongly requested the return of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture, the Government of Japan and the United States held consultations on the ideal state of these facilities and areas. As a result of consultations, the two countries reached a common understanding regarding a basic stance on the release of the six facilities and areas in Yokohama City, including Kamiseya Communication Station, and the construction of approximately 700 units of U.S. family housing in the Yokohama City portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed upon the result of the consultation in October 2004. (See Fig. III-2-2-16)


Of these six facilities and areas, the whole land area of Koshiha POL Depot was returned to Japan in December 2005. As for the remaining five facilities and areas, the Ministry of Defense will be attentive to the requirements of related local governments concerning the use of land, and will ask the United States to return them as soon as possible.



Sobe Communication Site was totally returned to Japan in December 2006. (This photo was taken before the total return.)

The construction of U.S. family housing will: 1) pave the way for the extensive return of six USFJ facilities and areas (approximately 419ha in total) in Kanagawa Prefecture; and 2) solve the current housing shortage problem of U.S. Navy in Japan. In addition, it is essential for achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is making utmost efforts to realize above-mentioned housing construction through coordination with the United States and local governments concerned.

Fig. III-2-2-16 Facilities and Areas Related to the Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture



2. USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

As mentioned above, USFJ facilities and areas are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, and this has caused considerable impact on the lives of the residents in the prefecture. Therefore, issues related to Okinawa, including the realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas, represent one of the most important tasks facing the Cabinet and the Government as a whole. The Ministry of Defense, for its own part, has so far been strongly committed to implementing a number of measures to resolve these issues, while at the same time, harmonizing the achievement of objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with the demands of local communities.

Of these measures, the Ministry of Defense believes that the steady implementation of the proposals set out in the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which was completed by the Governments of Japan and the United States, would be the most reliable way to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts to realize the proper and rapid implementation of such proposals. (See 4 of this section)


(1) Efforts for Realignment, Consolidation and Reduction before the Establishment of SACO

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km² for exclusive use by USFJ under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that regional promotion and development projects are restricted and the lives of residents are seriously affected.

In view of these circumstances, both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, focusing on issues that are strongly voiced by local communities. In light of the items identified by the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan and then President Richard Nixon of the United States in 1972, a plan for the realignment and consolidation of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa was endorsed by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held in 1973, 1974 and 1976. It was agreed at the meeting of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee of 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the release of land, known as the 23 Issues. Meanwhile, under the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Summit of 1995 regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues (the release of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104) strongly demanded by the residents of the prefecture, it was agreed that efforts would be made to resolve the issues. (See Reference 45)

As a result of above steps, as of January 2007, the number of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) stood at 33, covering approximately 229 km², in contrast to approximately 83 (approximately 278 km²) at the time of the reversion of Okinawa. However, in terms of space occupied, approximately 74% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) remain concentrated in Okinawa. USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) occupy approximately 10% of the land in Okinawa Prefecture and approximately 18% of the main island of Okinawa. (See Fig. III-2-2-17)

Fig. III-2-2-17 Changes in Number and Area of USFJ Facilities and Areas (exclusive use) in Okinawa



(2) Circumstances Surrounding the Establishment of SACO and Other Matters

Public interest in Okinawa-related issues heightened across the country in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995 as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land.

In the belief that the burden on the people of Okinawa should be reduced as much as possible and shared by the whole nation, the Government has, for the sake of future development of Okinawa, decided to put even

greater efforts into bringing about steady progress in the realignment, consolidation and relocation of USFJ facilities and areas, and to do its utmost to develop measures for industrial development in Okinawa. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and the United States in 1995.

Since then, intense discussions have been made for about one year, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

(3) Overview of the SACO Final Report and Progress

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land (the total return of six facilities, including Futenma Air Station, and the partial return of five others, such as the Northern Training Area), the adjustment of training and operational procedures (the termination of Artillery Live-Fire Training over Highway 104 and the dispersed implementation of similar live-fire training in maneuver areas on mainland Japan), the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures under the Status of Forces Agreement. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km²) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, exceeding the roughly 43 km² of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report.

The Government has made efforts to materialize the SACO Final Report. As a result, the return of land was realized for the following cases: Aha Training Area, Sobe Communication Site, Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and Senana Communication Station. The northern part (approximately 38ha) of Camp Kuwae was also returned. In addition, efforts are made to realize the return of land for Northern Training Area and Gimbaru Training Area.

It is mentioned in the Roadmap that the return of the following six candidates facilities will be examined: MCAS Futenma, Camp Kuwae, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port and Camp Zukeran (consolidation of housing areas.)

As for cases other than the land return, almost all of them have been realized.

The Ministry of Defense will continue to make its maximum efforts aiming at realizing the SACO Final Report with the understanding and support of local communities. (See Figs. III-2-2-18 • 19)

(4) Efforts for the Use of Returned Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas

On release of the land used for USFJ facilities and areas, the Ministry of Defense has taken measures to restore vacated land to its original state by removing buildings and structures, and to provide benefits to the owner of the land in accordance with the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Release. Under the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development (enforced in 2002,) benefits are provided to the owner of large-scale vacated land or designated vacated land.

Pursuant to the “Policy toward tasks and countermeasures per each activity field related to promotion and facilitation of utilizing returned land used for Futenma Air Station site” formulated in December 2001, related municipalities have been making efforts to establish returned land use plans. In February 2006, Okinawa Prefecture and Ginowan City have established a basic policy for the use of returned land used for Futenma Air Station.

The Ministry of Defense will continue efforts to promote and facilitate the utilization of vacated land in coordination and cooperation with related ministries and prefectural and municipal governments.

Fig. III-2-2-18 Facilities and Areas Relating to the SACO Final Report




Fig. III-2-2-19 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report

[Return of Land]

1. Already Returned

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Totally returned in December 1998 (Cancellation of joint use)
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on land return after the relocation of communication system including communication facilities such as antennas and others to Camp Hansen March 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the release of land to which the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land was applied June 2006: Land to which the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land was applied (approximately 236 m²) returned December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Sobe Communication Site totally returned [approximately 53 ha])
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on land return after the relocation of the Sobe Communications Site May 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on partial land return July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha) December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield totally returned [approximately 191 ha])
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the return of most lands after the relocation of communication system including antennas and others to Torii Communication Station September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61ha excluding the microwave tower portion) October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station

2. Process for Return in Progress

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Northern Training Area (Return of more than half of area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones and others • December 1998-March 2000: environmental survey (past year survey) • November 2002-March 2004: environmental survey (continuous environmental survey) • February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the change of the agreement in April 1999 (Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ): from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m) • February-August 2006: Environmental impact assessment document (draft) was released and examined, and the Governor of Okinawa expressed his opinion about the draft • December 2006-March 2007: the Governor of Okinawa expressed his opinion about the final environmental impact assessment document and the document was released and examined • March 2007: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the construction of HLZs (three out of six)

3. Still under Coordination

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Gimbaru Training Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Still under coordination

4. Specific Measures Stated in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Futenma Air Station (Return of total area) → (Return of total area)*	<p>See Fig. III-2-2-10 "Background for the Construction of the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station"</p> <p>* May 2006: Completion of the replacement facility for Futenma Air Station (having two runways laid out in V shape) by 2014 aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</p>
Camp Kuwae (Return of most area) → (Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • July 2002: Youth center furnished • March 2003: Part of northern side returned (approximately 38 ha) • January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and others • December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the construction of the Naval Hospital • May 2006: Return of total area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area) → (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May 2006: Return of total area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Naha Port Facility (Return of total area) → (Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • November 2001: Three Councils, such as the Consultative Body on the Relocation of Naha Port were established • January 2003: Fourth meeting of the Consultative Body for the Relocation of Naha Port confirmed the site and configuration of the replacement facility • July 2003: Revised plan, including the site and configuration of the replacement facility, agreed upon; the original plan was agreed upon by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in 1995 • At present, consultation is being made at organizations including the Consultative Body for the Relocation of Naha Port • May 2006: Return of total area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area) → (Return of partial area)	<p>(Phase I: Golf Range Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of housing and other facilities • July 2002: Two highrises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished <p>(Phase II: Sada Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of housing and other facilities • September 2005: Two highrises and 38 townhouses were furnished <p>(Phase III: East Chatan Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the housing units and others • At present, construction is being conducted <p>(Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the housing units and others • At present, preparations are being made for construction • May 2006: Return of total area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

Item	State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104 to the Japanese Mainland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland Japan in FY 1997
Parachute Drop Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000

[Implementation of Noise Reduction Initiatives]

1. Already Implemented

Item	State of Progress
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Furnished in July 2000

2. Implementation under Way

Item	State of Progress
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp, Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and improvement of the aircraft rinse facility January 2007: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the construction of the aircraft rinse facility At present, basic study and other activities are being conducted concerning the construction of the facilities at the relocation sites of the Navy Ramp

3. Specific Measures Stated in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

Item	State of Progress
Transfer of KC-130 Aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the squadron would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

It is necessary to make incessant efforts to ensure the continued effectiveness, and enhance the credibility, of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The following section explains about relevant measures other than those mentioned in the preceding section.

1. Japan-U.S. Policy Consultation

1. Major Forums for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (so-called two-plus-two meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) The framework of these consultations is shown in Fig.III-2-3-1.

Fig. III-2-3-1 Major Fora for Japan-U.S. Consultations of Security

Consultative Forum	Participants		Purpose	Legal Basis
	Japanese Side	U.S. Side		
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2+2" Meeting)	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense	U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense ¹	Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security	Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960 in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Security Subcommittee (SSC)	Participants are not specified ²	Participants are not specified ²	Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States	Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) ³	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Operational policy, Ministry of Defense, Representative from Joint Staff Office ⁴	Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representatives from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff Office PACOM	Study and consideration of consultative measures between Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies	Established on July 8, 1976 as a sub-entry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reconstituted on June 28, 1996 in Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (once every two weeks in principle)	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director-General of Defense Facilities Administration Agency and others	Vice Commander of USFJ, Minister and Counselor at the U.S. Embassy and others	Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement	Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement

- Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
 2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice minister or assistant secretary.
 3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
 4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan-U.S. defense summit meetings between the Minister of Defense of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on defense policies of respective governments and defense cooperation.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has held working-level meetings when necessary to exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased as the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced in recent years.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, through further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries.

Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is proactively involved in these activities.

2. Recent Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

The Japan-U.S. policy consultations (ministerial-level) conducted since 2005 are shown in Fig.III-2-3-2. On April 30, 2007, a meeting was held among Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the joint statement titled “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation” was announced. (See Reference 41)

The two countries conduct consultations not only at a ministerial level but also at a working level.

(1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (on April 30, 2007)

The outline of the meeting held between Minister of Defense Kyuma and Secretary of Defense Gates is as follows.

a. Realignment of USFJ

- Based on the shared understanding that Japan and the United States agreed on the realignment of USFJ in order to maintain the stable presence of U.S. forces, which is indispensable to the maintenance of the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the two countries agreed that the steady implementation of the realignment initiatives, specified in the Roadmap announced in May 2006, in a package according to the Japan-U.S. agreement would be important for maintaining and improving the reliability of the Japan-U.S. alliance.
- In view of the above, the two countries exchanged opinions on the progress of relocation and return of Futenma Air Station, relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and the return of land area south of Kadena Air Base, and agreed that the realignment initiatives should be realized as soon as possible in accordance with the Roadmap.

b. Protection of Classified Information

Sharing information is an important element in full disclosure of the case of information leakage in MSDF, prevention of recurrence of a similar case, and enhancement of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The security of shared information would be essential for further promoting information sharing. The two countries exchanged opinions on this issue and agreed to make efforts to enhance information security in the future.

c. F-X

Concerning F-4 successor aircraft (so-called F-X), Minister of Defense Kyuma asked the U.S. side to cooperate with Japan as far as possible in providing information concerning U.S.-made aircraft to be investigated.

Fig. III-2-3-2 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (In and After 2005)

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
February 19, 2005	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting) /Washington	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Foreign Minister Machimura Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shared recognition on the situation of North Korea, and confirmed basic policies towards the peaceful solution of the nuclear issue Agreed on deeper cooperation in terms of information towards effective system management for missile defense Recognized importance of deepening the Japan-U.S. cooperation as part of measures taken by the international community Agreed on the acceleration of consultations for the review of the USFJ's force structure
June 4, 2005	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting /Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exchanged opinions on the roles, missions, and capabilities of the SDF and the U.S. forces as well as on future consultations on USFJ's force structure Thanks expressed by the U.S. side for SDF activities in Iraq and the Indian Ocean Exchanged opinions on the transparency of China's defense budget
October 29, 2005	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting) /Washington	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Foreign Minister Machimura Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exchanged opinions on global security cooperation regarding Iraq and fight against terrorism, and on the regional situations in China and North Korea Creation of document titled "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" as a result of past bilateral talks on the alliance future
January 17, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting /Washington	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreed on the significance and importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements and on the acceleration of activities for successful realignment of the U.S. forces Minister of State for Defense Nukaga referred to future talks on new U.S.-Japan alliance Exchanged opinions on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for Iraq and crimes committed by U.S. military personnel in Japan
April 23, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting /Washington	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Discussed on the cost of transferring the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam
May 1, 2006	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting) /Washington	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Foreign Minister Aso Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirmed the importance of U.S.-Japan alliance, recovery and democracy in Iraq, and importance of international cooperation in fight against terrorism Thanks expressed by the U.S. side for Japan's support including the dispatch of SDF personnel Exchanged opinions on Iran's nuclear issue, situation in North Korea, and situation in China Final agreement on the realignment of the forces, and announcement of the document titled "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"
May 3, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting /Washington	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exchanged opinions on the specific measures to implement the finally agreed realignment plan
June 4, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting /Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirmed the significance of the final agreement on the realignment of the U.S. forces
April 30, 2007	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting /Washington	Defense Minister Kyuma Secretary of Defense Gates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agreed on steadily implementing the respective realignment initiatives, securing information, enhancing operational cooperation in such as information sharing in the BMD area, and continuing to study on the roles, missions, and capabilities.

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
May 1, 2007	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") /Washington	Defense Minister Kyuma Foreign Minister Aso Secretary of Defense Gates Secretary of State Rice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirmed the steady realignment of the U.S. forces according to the Roadmap of May 2006. • Confirmed the enhancement of BMD cooperation, particularly the enhancement of intelligence cooperation and operational cooperation. • Reconfirmed that the commitment of the United States to Japan's defense based on all kinds of the U.S. military capabilities is unchanged. • Disclosed the document titled "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation."

Secretary of Defense Gates replied that the United States would cooperate with Japan as far as possible while conducting bilateral consultations concerning roles, missions and capabilities of Japan.

d. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in the Field of BMD

Based on the instructions made by the leaders of Japan and the United States at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in November 2006, Minister of Defense Kyuma and Secretary of Defense Gates confirmed that the two countries would enhance bilateral cooperation in the field of BMD. In particular, the two countries agreed that both countries would deploy BMD-related equipment in sequence and enhance bilateral cooperation in the field of operation, including information sharing.

e. Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Concerning the new U.S. Iraqi policy announced in January 2007, Japan appreciated it for a reason that the policy indicates a new resolution of the United States for the stabilization and restoration of Iraq, and strongly hoped that it would be successful in the future. As for the bill to revise the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, the Government of Japan said that it would make every effort to pass the bill into law so as to continue SDF's reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq. The U.S. government appreciated Japan's cooperation in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The U.S. side appreciated Japan's cooperation in reconstruction activities in Iraq.

f. War on Terror

Minister of Defense Kyuma said that the basic program concerning activities conducted by MSDF vessels in the Indian Ocean would be extended for another six months on April 24, 2007. The U.S. side appreciated JSDF's cooperation in the past.

g. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

The two countries agreed that studies on roles, missions and capabilities would be continued and deepened in order to ensure the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.

(2) Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Two-Plus-Two Meeting) (on May 1, 2007)

The outline of the two-plus-two meeting attended by four ministers from Japan and the United States is as follows.

a. Realignment of USFJ

- The two countries reviewed the progress made in the past one year with the initiatives described in the Roadmap announced in May 2006, and reaffirmed the importance of steady implementation of them in accordance with the Japan-U.S. agreement.
- For details, the Japanese side commented as follows, and the U.S. side agreed to them.
 - Relocation and return of Futenma Air Station: Surveys in the water areas offshore of Camp Schwab started, and Japan expects to steadily implement this initiative to which both countries had agreed while obtaining the understand of local communities.
 - Integration of facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base: Both countries will continue work to prepare a plan as soon as possible.
 - Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa: Both countries should continue cooperation in order to realize the relocation in 2014.
- The Japanese side explained about the Special Measures Bill concerning Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and related SDF forces that was submitted to the Diet, and other matters.
- The two countries agreed that the study group would continue work to examine possible civil-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base.

b. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in BMD

- Based on the instructions made by the leaders of Japan and the United States at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in November 2006, Japan and the United States officials discussed the past progress and future direction of bilateral cooperation in BMD.
- The improvement of Japan's defense capabilities related to BMD was highly appreciated. The two countries agreed that it would be necessary in the future for both countries to rapidly implement cooperation concerning BMD-related information and BMD operation. Concerning information sharing in particular, the two countries exchanged opinions about the establishment of an information sharing roadmap for BMD and other matters.

c. U.S. Extended deterrence

- The Japanese side commented that under uncertain and untransparent conditions arising from missile launches and nuclear test by North Korea, China's test to destroy artificial satellite, and other matters, the peace and stability of Japan and the region is basically maintained by the deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and therefore commitments related to the deterrence should be timely reconfirmed without any doubt. And the Japanese side welcomed that these points are clearly mentioned in the document concerned.
- The U.S. side commented that it would like to reconfirm its commitments to the defense of Japan based on all kinds of its military capabilities.
- In this connection, the two countries reconfirmed that bilateral cooperation, including measures to ensure safety and security for local communities, would be continued to smoothly realize the switchover of the aircraft carrier to be expected in the summer of 2008.

d. Roles, Missions and Capabilities

The two countries exchanged opinions concerning the importance of continuously deepening studies on roles, missions and capabilities in maintaining the effectiveness of cooperative relationship between JSDF and U.S. forces in the future, and the importance of further promoting planning in particular.

e. Intelligence Cooperation

The Japanese side commented that Japan fully understands the necessity of information security and information management for further promoting bilateral cooperation and therefore the Government of Japan would take all necessary measures, including those for counter intelligence. The two countries exchanged opinions concerning the importance of information sharing and intelligence cooperation, the necessity of information security for further promoting information sharing, and the continuance of close coordination on these matters between both countries.

f. Regional Situation

- North Korea: The two countries agreed that North Korea should implement the “measures of the initial stage” concerning the nuclear problem to which it agreed in February 2007 as soon as possible, and that both countries would continue close coordination with each other in the future.
- China: The two countries exchanged opinions as follows. It is important to increase the transparency of Chinese military forces. Although the two countries asked China to improve the transparency, it is necessary to continue to urge the country to do the same. The two countries will continue bilateral cooperation on this matter.

g. Cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia



Japan's Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates receiving the salute of a guard of honor (in April 2007)

The two countries agreed as follows. It is important to further enhance cooperation with partners that share fundamental values and interests with Japan and the United States. In particular, it is necessary to promote trilateral cooperation with Australia situated in the Asia-Pacific region, including security and defense.

h. Others

- Host Nation Support (HNS) for USFJ: The two countries exchanged opinions concerning the importance of HNS in the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, tight fiscal conditions of the Governments of Japan and the United States, and other matters.
- The Operational Improvement of the Status of Forces Agreement: The Japanese side commented as follows. It is important to establish a favorable relationship between USFJ and local communities. It is significant for both countries to agree on the procedure for use of USFJ facilities and areas in the case of disaster. The Japanese side intends to further improve the operation of the Status of Forces Agreement.

2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure their Effectiveness

1. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security announced in 1996 following changes in the security environment after the end of the Cold War, the review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation¹⁸ was listed as one of the matters of cooperation in core areas to increase the credibility of Japan-U.S. alliance. Accordingly, the Governments of Japan and the United States reviewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Former Guidelines) for the first time in approximately 20 years since its formulation in 1978,

to further increase the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. In 1997, the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Guidelines) were approved at the two-plus-two meeting. The following is an outline of the Guidelines.

(1) Objectives of the Guidelines

The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and reliable Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan and a situation in areas surrounding Japan.

(2) Matters for Cooperation Prescribed in the Guidelines

a. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing joint exercises and trainings; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

b. Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The two governments will cooperate in the following ways:

- 1) The SDF will primarily conduct defense operations in response to an armed attack against Japan¹⁹, and U.S. forces will conduct operations to supplement and support them;
- 2) The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct effective joint operations of their respective ground, maritime and air units in coordination with each other. The SDF and U.S. forces will respond to air attacks, defend waters around Japan, and counter airborne and seaborne invasions based on their respective concept of operations.
- 3) The SDF will have primary responsibility of check and repel unconventional attacks, including those of guerillas or special operation forces, at the earliest possible stage, and receive appropriate support from U.S. forces, depending on the situation. The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will consider, as necessary, the use of units having strike capabilities. (See Fig. III-2-3-3)

c. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan²⁰ from occurring. Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation in such situations are shown in Fig. III-2-3-4.

(3) Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines

In order to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to achieve positive results without fail, the two countries need to hold consultative dialogues throughout the spectrum of security conditions—normal circumstances, armed attacks against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. In addition, both sides must be well informed at various levels and undertake appropriate coordination to attain such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information-and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms for facilitation of consultations, policy coordination, and coordination of operations and activity areas.

Fig. III-2-3-3 Concept of Operations When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

Operations		Operations by Self-Defense Forces	Operations by U.S. Forces
Operations to counter the air attack against Japan		○ Will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense	○ Will support SDF operations ○ Will conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities
Operations to defend surrounding waters and to protect sea lines of communication		○ Will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations	○ Will support SDF operations ○ Will conduct operations, including those which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities
Operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan		○ Will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions	○ Will primarily conduct operations to supplement SDF capabilities <div style="border-left: 1px solid black; border-right: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px 0;"> The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of invasion, and will support SDF operations. </div>
Responses to other threats	Guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory	○ Will have primary responsibility to check and repel such attacks at the earliest possible stage. In its operations, the SDF will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies	○ Will support the SDF in appropriate ways depending on the situation
	Ballistic missile attacks	○ Will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to such attacks	
			○ Will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and ○ Will consider, as necessary, use of forces providing additional strike power

a. Comprehensive Mechanism

The comprehensive mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also the relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral works based on the Guidelines under normal circumstances. In the comprehensive mechanism, joint work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-5)

b. Coordination Mechanism

The coordination mechanism, established in 2000, is active even in normal circumstances so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities beforehand that will be conducted in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in a situation in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-6)

2. Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines


(1) Measures for ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

In order to secure effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding the Japan-U.S. cooperation in cases of armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan as well as in programs under normal circumstances. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole to collaborate in advancing joint efforts between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning in the Guidelines in peacetime.

Fig. III-2-3-4 Functions and Fields and Examples of Item Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Functions and Fields		Examples of Item Cooperation	
Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government	Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Transportation of personnel and supplies to the affected area ○ Medical services, communications and transportation in the affected area ○ Relief and transfer operations for refugees, and provision of emergency materials to refugees 	
	Search and rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Search and rescue operations in Japanese territory and at sea around Japan and information sharing related to such operations 	
	Noncombatant evacuation operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Information sharing, and communication with and assembly and transportation of noncombatants ○ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports by U.S. aircraft and vessels for transportation of noncombatants ○ Customs, immigration and quarantine of noncombatants upon entry into Japan ○ Assistance to noncombatants in such matters as temporary accommodations, transportation and medical services in Japan 	
	Activities for ensuring effectiveness of economic sanctions for maintenance of international peace and stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections ○ Information sharing 	
Japan's support for activities by U.S. forces	Rear area support	Use of facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for supplies and other purposes by U.S. aircraft and vessels ○ Reservation of spaces for loading/unloading of personnel and materials by the U.S. and of storage areas at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ○ Extension of operating hours for SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for use by U.S. aircraft and vessels ○ Use of SDF airfields by U.S. aircraft ○ Provision of training and exercise areas ○ Construction of offices, accommodations, etc., inside U.S. facilities and areas
		Supplies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ○ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and POL to U.S. facilities and areas
		Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Land, sea and air transportation of personnel, materials and POL inside Japan ○ Sea transportation of personnel, materials and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas ○ Use of vehicles and cranes for transportation of personnel, materials and POL
		Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Repair and maintenance of U.S. aircraft, vessels and vehicles ○ Provision of repair parts ○ Temporary provision of tools and materials for maintenance
		Medical services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Medical treatment of casualties inside Japan ○ Transportation of casualties inside Japan ○ Provision of medical supply
		Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Security of U.S. facilities and areas ○ Maritime surveillance around U.S. facilities and areas ○ Security of transportation routes inside Japan ○ Information and intelligence sharing
		Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provision of frequencies (including those for satellite communications) and equipment for communications among relevant Japanese and U.S. agencies
	Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Support for port entry/exit by U.S. vessels ○ Loading/unloading of materials at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ○ Sewage disposal, water supply, and electricity inside U.S. facilities and areas ○ Temporary increase of workers at U.S. facilities and areas 	
Japan-U.S. operational cooperation	Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Intelligence sharing 	
	Minesweeping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and on the high seas around Japan, and information and intelligence sharing on mines 	
	Sea and airspace management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Maritime traffic coordination in and around Japan in response to increased sea traffic ○ Air traffic control and airspace management in and around Japan 	

Fig. III-2-3-5 Structure of the Comprehensive Mechanism




From the standpoint of Japan-U.S. cooperation at the time of situations in areas surrounding Japan, related laws, including the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law, have been enacted.

From the standpoint of cooperation in armed attack situations and anticipated situations, measures to facilitate activities of U.S. forces have been incorporated as part of the development of emergency legislation.

(2) Outline of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law

The Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides the types, measures

Fig. III-2-3-6 Framework of Coordination Mechanism



and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. Its outline is as follows.

When the Prime Minister deems it necessary for the SDF to provide rear area support²¹, rear area search and rescue activities, or ship inspection operations, the Prime Minister must request a cabinet decision on such activities and on a draft basic plan of response measures. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures.

In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations.

Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may request persons other than the central government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan²².

The Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved its revision, or when the response measures have been completed.

(3) Rear Area Support

Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to U.S. forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (Article 3 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

In rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, port and harbor activities and base activities.

(4) Rear Area Search and Rescue Activities

Rear area search and rescue activities (including the transport of those rescued) are conducted in rear areas by Japan in the event that participants go missing during combat operations conducted in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (Article 3 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

In the event that noncombatants go missing, they will be searched and rescued as well. In addition, if there are any casualties in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the implementation area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue such casualties, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in the waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities.

(5) Ship Inspection Operations



MSDF inspectors questioning a captain (right) during a practice of ship inspection operations

Ship inspection operations mean such operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others²³) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place that are conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan with the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council or with the consent of the flag state²⁴ in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ²⁵). (Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Law)

3. Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises

Joint exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. forces are useful for enhancing their respective tactical skills²⁶. Joint exercises are also an indispensable means of facilitating mutual understanding and close communication



MSDF and U.S. forces' vessels participating in the RIMPAC (in July 2006)



GSDF personnel (left) and U.S. military personnel participating in the Japan-U.S. joint exercises (in March 2007)

under normal circumstances, thereby improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth conduct of Japan-U.S. bilateral actions. In addition, it is important for the SDF to conduct necessary trainings for collaboration and coordination between the SDF and U.S. forces in normal circumstances so that the SDF may carry out the missions conferred by the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and other laws. Such efforts serve to maintain and enhance the credibility and deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Therefore, the SDF has conducted a variety of joint exercises with U.S. forces, and maintains a policy to enhance these exercises in the future. In February 2007, for example, a Japan-U.S. joint exercises (a command post exercise), attended by approximately 1,350 personnel in total from the Joint Staff Office, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, was held to maintain and improve the bilateral joint operations capabilities. The exercises included cooperation and coordination procedures between the three SDF forces as well as between the SDF and U.S. forces, on the assumption that an armed attack against Japan or a situation in areas surrounding Japan has taken place. (See Reference 43)

4. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA)

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA)²⁷ is that if either side requests the provision of goods or services, the other side should provide these goods or services²⁸. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as joint exercises in peacetime, U.N. PKOs, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-2-3-7)

5. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty obligates the two countries to cooperate with each other in maintaining and developing their respective defense capabilities. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America provides a framework for cooperation between the two countries by stipulating that either government can provide the other government with equipment, materials, services, and other support. Consistent with the principles of such cooperation, Japan must actively promote cooperation with the United States regarding military equipment and technology, while paying due attention to the maintenance of its own technology and production base.


In view of the progress of technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States

Fig. III-2-3-7 Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services

In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by themselves. However, in case the units of allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services at sites would enhance the flexibility of the operations.

Scope of application of the ACSA



Shaded portions were added as a result of the revision of 2004.

despite the provisions of the Three Principles on the Armed Exports and other regulations. And, in 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America²⁹ with the United States. In June 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America³⁰ to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2, 5)

Under these frameworks, the Governments of Japan has decided to provide the United States with 17 items of arms and military technology, including portable surface-to-air missile (SAM) technology and weapon technologies related to joint technological research on BMD.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct joint research and development regarding the specific projects agreed at the forums. Since 1992, the two countries have concluded the joint project agreement, and conducted 15 joint projects thereunder, nine of which are already completed. The Japan-U.S. cooperation in military equipment and technology is significant for improving interoperability and reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the years to come. (See Fig. III-2-3-8)

6. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of USFJ

The stationing of USFJ forms a core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and also serves as an expression of U.S. deep commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. USFJ has contributed significantly to the peace and stability of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region in a number of ways. Especially, their presence itself is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan has already taken various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of USFJ and enhanced the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Fig. III-2-3-8 Japan-U.S. Joint Research Projects

Project	Summary	Time of Conclusion, Agreed upon by the Japanese and U.S. Governments, on the Implementation of Japan-U.S. Joint Research Projects	Time of Completion
Ducted Rocket Engine	Research into basic technology for the secondary combustion of solid rocket fuel through the injection of air from an external source	September 1992	January 1999
Advanced Steel Technology	Research into basic technology for the welding of extra-high-strength steel used in the pressure hulls of submarines and others	October 1995	January 2002
Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials	Research into basic technology related to diesel engines using ceramic materials	October 1995	October 2002
Eye-Safe Laser Rader	Research into basic technology related to LIDAR systems using eye-safe frequencies	September 1996	September 2001
Ejection Seat	Modification work to supplement combat aircraft ejector seats with pilot-restraint devices and seat-stabilizing equipment	March 1998	March 2003
Advance Hybrid Propulsion Technology	Research into basic technology related to thrust-controllable propulsion devices made up of solid fuel and liquid oxidizers	May 1998	May 2005
Shallow Water Acoustic Technology	Research related to the analysis of the characteristics of transmittance of sound waves in shallow sea regions, and the reflection of sound waves on the seabed	June 1999	February 2003
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology	Research related to the Navy's Theater Wide Defense System's (Current Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System) four principal missile components (infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, second stage rocket motor and nose cone)	August 1999	Ongoing
Low Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery	Research related to the development of gunpowder that avoids unintentional secondary explosions of the gunpowder at the time of bombing	March 2000	January 2004
Avionics Aboard the Follow-on Aircraft to the P-3C	Research into onboard avionics of the MSDF's next P-3C fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft (P-X) and the U.S. Navy's future Multi-purpose Maritime Aircraft (MMA) for better interoperability	March 2002	September 2006
Software Radio	Research into basic technologies of software radio, which enables primary radio functions through software	March 2002	March 2007
Advanced Hull Material/Structural Technology	Research into hull system of vessels improved in its stealth feature and survivability by utilizing advanced materials/structural technology	April 2005	Ongoing
Sea-Based Radar System	Research on the Phased Array Radar technology for ships that applies high-power semiconductor device	April 2006	Ongoing
Combat system for ship	Research on improving the information processing ability by applying the open architecture technology to the combat system for ship	April 2006	Ongoing
New guided missiles for ballistic missile defense	Development of new ship-based guided missiles for ballistic missile defense to improve the existing capability to counter threats caused by ballistic missiles and to deal with diversification of ballistic missiles with higher performance	June 2006	Ongoing

1. Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

The cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ is important to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. From this point of view, the Government of Japan has made efforts as much as possible within the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement or based on the Special Measures

Agreement³¹, with due consideration for its financial situation and other factors. At present, the Ministry of Defense bears the following costs as the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ: 1) costs for the Facilities Improvement Program for facilities and areas to be used by USFJ³²; 2) labor costs for USFJ local employees; 3) utility costs for official procurement by USFJ; and 4) additional costs for the relocation of USFJ training at the request of the Japanese side (training relocation costs).

In April 2006, a new Special Measures Agreement took effect to replace the Special Measures Agreement covering the period from JFY 2001 through JFY 2005 (the former agreement). Based on particular circumstances that it is difficult to accurately estimate the progress of realignment of USFJ, the new Special Measures Agreement was determined to cover a tentative period of two years, instead of a traditional period of five years. In this Agreement, the same cost sharing framework and level as the former agreement are maintained regarding three categories of expenditures—labor, utility, and^o training relocation costs. On the other hand, the Government of Japan, taking account of its tight financial situation, made efforts to further retrench costs for the Facilities Improvement Program. Thus, the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ was constrained as a whole. As for future cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, the Japanese government will take appropriate actions on the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ to ensure the smooth and efficient management of Japan-U.S. security arrangements with due consideration given to the country’s strained public finance and to the required overhaul of cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ in the “Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006” (so-called the large-boned policies), approved at a Cabinet meeting in July. (See Fig. III-2-3-9)


Fig. III-2-3-9 Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

Cost for Facilities Improvement Program	○ Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc. have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the Japanese side since JFY 1979 and furnished to USFJ	Within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
Labor Costs	○ Welfare costs, etc. since JFY1978 and pay that exceeds the one equal to the pay conditions of national public employees since JFY 1979 have been borne by the Japanese side.	Within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
	○ Eight kinds of allowances such as Adjustment Allowance have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1987	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1987)
	○ Basic pay, etc. have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1991. (By gradually increasing the costs borne by the Japanese side, the total amount have been borned within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since JFY 1995)	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1991)
Utility Costs	○ Fee or charge for electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage and fuels (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1991. (By gradually increasing the costs borne by the Japanese side, the total amount have been borned within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since JFY1995.)	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1991)
	○ The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1996) have been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since JFY 2001.	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 2001)
Training Relocation Costs	○ Additionally necessary costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the Japanese side have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1996.	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1996)

Besides the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, the Government of Japan bears costs needed for providing USFJ facilities and areas (rental fee for the facilities and others), takes measures to improve the living environment in the surrounding areas of these facilities and areas, and devises relief measures for

unemployment of USFJ local employees. Base subsidy³³ and others are provided to the municipalities as a substitute for fixed property tax. (See Fig. III-2-3-10)

Fig. III-2-3-10 Present Situation of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ (JFY2007 budget)



Note: Numbers in [] represent the relative composition within the whole.

2. Ensuring the Stable Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas

The Government has concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of the necessary U.S. facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of owners of land, it will acquire a title³⁴ under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land³⁵.

In addition, the Government of Japan has been promoting various measures concerning USFJ facilities and areas in order to achieve the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security and satisfy demands from the local communities around USFJ facilities and areas. (See 6 of Section 2)

Furthermore, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. service members and others³⁶ have affected local residents in the surrounding areas of USFJ facilities and areas.

The Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective steps for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating personnel and enforcing strict discipline among them, and has cooperated in such steps. The Government of Japan has also taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by such incidents and accidents.

3. Efforts to Preserve the Environment Surrounding USFJ Facilities and Areas

Concerning environmental issues surrounding USFJ facilities and areas, at the two-plus-two meeting held in September 2000, the Governments of Japan and the United States, in recognition of the importance of environmental protection associated with USFJ facilities and areas, reached an agreement on a common goal of ensuring the health and safety of local residents around USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. forces personnel and their dependents, and announced the Joint Statement of Environmental Principles³⁷. In order to follow up this statement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been more frequently held. Specifically, related ministries and

agencies have been engaged in discussions regarding strengthened cooperation at the time of periodic reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS)³⁸, exchange of environmental information, and response to environmental contamination in collaboration with each other. In addition, at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006, the two countries confirmed the importance of improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including proper attention to the environment.

Since September 2006, the officials of Japan and the United States have held working level meetings on disaster prevention and safety measures for nuclear aircraft carriers, and conducted meetings on scenarios of disaster prevention drills, a mutual assistance agreement and other matters, in preparation for a switchover to nuclear aircraft carrier that is scheduled to take place in 2008.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of an SDF Officer Working as the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters Liaison Officer

**Colonel Masami Yamada, GSDF
U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters Liaison Officer**

Colonel Yamada, who has been sent from the Joint Staff Office to the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters as the Liaison Officer, talks about his post and how he is working.

Aloha!

The State of Hawaii has population of about 1.24 million on eight islands, with the total area being slightly smaller than Shikoku Island. Hawaii is often called “paradise” for its crystal blue sky and sea, and visited by many Japanese tourists.

The U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters as well as its subordinate Army Pacific Headquarters, Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Pacific Air Force Headquarters, Marine Forces Pacific Headquarters and other forces, which are in charge of the largest area of all the U.S. joint forces (about 50% of the earth, 43 countries from the U.S. west coast to the African east coast), are located on the Oahu Island, and about 22% of the land of the island is used by these forces. The State of Hawaii is also home for about 93,000 soldiers, paramilitary personnel and their families, indicating its strong connection with the forces. The Japan Self-Defense Forces have sent four officers to Hawaii in exchange for U.S. officers dispatched to the SDF, with one each from the Joint Staff Office to the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters, from the Maritime Staff Office to the U.S. Pacific Fleet Headquarters, from the Air Staff Office to the Pacific Air Force Headquarters, and from the Air Self-Defense Force to the Pacific Air Force Headquarters.

The duties of the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters Liaison Officer include the liaison and coordination between the Joint Staff Office and the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters as well as the coordination and support for visitors from the Joint Staff Office. The U.S. forces often use the Internet, and because I perform most of my duties through e-mail. I do not have many opportunities to directly see and coordinate with U.S. side personnel. However, since personal relationships are important to smoothen liaison and coordination work, I am trying to see as many people as possible by, for example, participating



Colonel Yamada (left) receiving training in the U.S. army in Hawaii

in events. I am also careful about my own health and safety so as not to become injured or ill because I am working alone.

In connection with international peace cooperation activities that became a primary mission of the SDF in January this year, my duties also include liaison and coordination at the time when a disaster, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster in 2004, occurs. The Hawaii Island Earthquake in October last year caused a cut-off of power and water supply on Oahu Island. Although I could not use my TV, I managed to collect information on damages using a radio and check how the U.S. Pacific Command was responding to the disaster, and promptly notified the details to the Joint Staff Office by phone.

The collaboration between the Joint Staff Office and the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters has been becoming increasingly important particularly since the SDF's transition to a new joint operations posture in March last year. I continue to work hard every day with the importance of my mission as a liaison officer in mind so that I can contribute to further strengthening the relationships between the two forces.

Notes

- 1) The official title is the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America.
- 2) In East Asia, the United States has formed alliances with South Korea, the Philippines and other countries, in addition to Japan, based on respective treaties.
- 3) One of the occasions of policy talks between Japan and the United States of America which is attended by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense from Japan, and Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from the United States. (See Section 3 • Fig. III-2-3-1)
- 4) Future changes in U.S. facilities and areas and force structures not addressed elsewhere in the SCC document will be handled in accordance with existing practices under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements.
- 5) Accordingly, the previous cabinet decision designating the “coastal area of Henoko in Nago City in the Camp Schwab Water Area” as the construction site was abolished. (See Reference 40)
- 6) The members of this Council Meeting are the Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Minister of the Environment, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, the Mayor of Nago City, the Mayor of Ginoza Village, the Mayor of Higashi Village, and the Mayor of Kin Town.
- 7) October 2007 through September 2008
- 8) See 2 of Section 3
- 9) This study will be conducted as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military demand for use of Japanese airspace.
- 10) In May 2006, it was agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee that a part of the facilities of the subbase would be provided to U.S. forces for the temporary deployment of radar system for a limited period, and this matter was approved at the cabinet meeting. In June 2006, it was agreed between the two countries that land and other facilities needed for the deployment of the X-Band Radar System would be provided to U.S. forces.
- 11) The Government and Ruling Parties Council on Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Other Matters consists of 19 members, including Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of State for Defense and Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs on the part of the Government, and, on the ruling parties, Secretary-General, Chairman, Policy Research Council and Chairman, Diet Affairs Committee from Liberal Democratic Party and the counterpart from New Komeito.
- 12) Defense Facilities Administration Agency has been implementing measures to prevent and reduce inconveniences under the Law on Improvement Around Defense Facilities.
- 13) Under the Special Measures Law for the Realignment of USFJ and SDF, the changes of composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations in synchronization with USFJ air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with an nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated as the same as the realignment of USFJ.
- 14) The scope of specific projects will be determined by government ordinance by the time of enforcing the law.

- 15) Surrounding municipalities are limited to those for which it is considered necessary to implement promotional measures in synchronization with municipalities with heavy burdens in consideration of natural, economic and social conditions.
- 16) Chairman: Minister of Defense, Relevant Ministers, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Minister of the Environment, and Ministers of State specifically designated by Prime Minister
- 17) The exception to the percentage of expenses borne by the Government, or grant rate, will apply to the seven projects concerning road, port, fishing port, water supply, sewage system, land reform, and facility for compulsory education.
- 18) The Former Guidelines compiled in 1978. These guidelines stipulate how the cooperation between Japan and the United States should be made to effectively achieve the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others.
- 19) An operation carried out to interdict an enemy's offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved. An offensive operation refers to a positive posture of seeking enemies on one's own initiative to destroy them.
- 20) Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)
- 21) The term "Rear Area" refers to Japan's territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles (or approximately 370 km) from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear area activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters.
- 22) If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate has suffered a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take a necessary fiscal measure for the loss.
- 23) Warships, and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments and are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes
- 24) The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 25) Article 1 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf
Refer to the Website <<http://law.e-gov.go.jp/H08/H08H0074.html>>
- 26) The capabilities required to operate a unit of a certain size in addition to the use of individual items of equipment.
- 27) The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.
- 28) The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oil and lubricant; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations) (weapons are not included).
- 29) The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United State of America.

- 30) The official title is, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United State of America.
- 31) The official title is “Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning New Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.”
- 32) Concerning the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP), the Government of Japan formulated “Criteria for adopting the FIP projects” to make an effort for efficiency in implementation of FIP as follows: 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily by considering necessity, urgency and other factors; and 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting the facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profitable (shopping malls and others).
- 33) Provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
- 34) The official title is the Law for Special Measures Regarding the Use and Expropriation of Land, etc., Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.
- 35) The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.
- 36) As far as Defense Facilities Administration Agency knows, the total number of these incidents and accidents stood at 1,549 in JFY 2006, of which about 90% is traffic accidents. These incidents and accidents have been on the decrease since JFY 2003.
- 37) Consists of 1) environmental governing standards; 2) information exchange and access; 3) responses to environmental pollution; and 4) consultation on the environment.
- 38) The Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) is an environmental governing standard prepared by USFJ to guarantee that USFJ activities and facilities can protect the health of the people and the natural environment. The JEGS provides the method to handle and store environmental pollutants.

Chapter 3

Improvement of International Security Environment

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (The preamble)



SDF personnel engaging in Iraqi reconstruction support mission



ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Jang Soo meets Japanese Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma



SDF officer providing medical support in Iraq



MSDF vessel refueling U.S. warship in Indian Ocean

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

The present international community faces a range of global-scale problems, from international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, complex and various conflicts to international crimes. Globalization has raised concerns that the occurrence of events even in regions far from Japan will pose a threat to our country or have an impact on the country.

In light of the difficulty for a single country to respond to and solve these global threats and the need to take an approach to addressing these threats not only on the military front but also on various other fronts, it is widely recognized that the international community should join hands in coping with these threats.

Along with national defense, Japan's defense and security goals set under the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) are to improve the international security environment, based on the efforts made by the international society, so as to reduce the chances that any threats will reach Japan. The NDPG also calls for Japan to promote diplomatic efforts including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and, together with such diplomatic efforts, promote activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter referred to as "international peace cooperation activities") so that Japan can deal with these issues proactively and on its own initiative.



ASDF C-130 transport plane loading goods and materials in Iraq

Upon the transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense in January this year, missions of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were reviewed and its international peace cooperation activities have been stipulated as a primary mission. (See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2)

This chapter will explain in detail Japan's international peace cooperation activities and efforts being undertaken by the Defense Ministry and the SDF on such activities on the basis of the NDPG. (See Fig. III-3-1-1)

1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities Proactively and on Its Own Initiative

1. History of Japan's Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Persian Gulf War was an event that became a major turning point for Japan's efforts to support international peace cooperation activities because it made Japan recognize the need to promote international cooperation on the military front. The SDF dispatched a minesweeping unit of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the Persian Gulf in 1991 to ensure safe passage by Japanese vessels. The dispatch was significant because it marked Japan's international contribution on the personnel front through providing peaceful and humanitarian support for the reconstruction of countries affected by the war. In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law¹ was enacted, leading Japan to send Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) personnel to Cambodia in September in the same year as the country's first participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Since then, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have participated in various international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States led to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law². Based on this law, the SDF has been maintaining cooperation and support activities in the Indian Ocean and other places. In 2003, Japan enacted the Law Concerning Special Measures on

Fig. III-3-1-1 International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the Self-Defense Forces



Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq³ and since has been providing support to Iraq for its reconstruction. (See Fig. III-3-1-2)

2. Reviewing the positioning of SDF's International Peace Cooperation Activities

The SDF has participated in various international peace cooperation activities and steadily accumulated its experience and achievements, which have raised expectations and evaluation toward the SDF's such activities both at home and abroad. Under the new security environment, it is recognized that peace and stability of the international community are closely connected to Japan's peace and security.

In order for the SDF to engage in international peace cooperation activities more proactively and on its own initiative under this recognition, it needs to improve various infrastructures and systems concerning its operations. As part of efforts⁴ to international peace cooperation activities have become stipulated as a primary mission of the SDF.

With international peace cooperation activities becoming the SDF's primary mission, Japan has become able to send a strong message both at home and abroad that Japan has been committed to promoting peace and stability of the international community. In addition, the SDF has been able to establish a framework in which its members who have been executing their missions despite difficult work conditions and a tense atmosphere while being away from their home country and living separately from their family members for a long time can focus on executing these missions while maintaining further pride and self-awareness. (See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2)

Fig. III-3-1-2 Comprehensive Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

Item	International Peace Cooperation Law	Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law	Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq
Purpose	○ Active contribution to U.N.-centered efforts toward international peace	○ Active and proactive contribution to the efforts by the international society toward prevention and eradication of international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international society including Japan	○ Active and proactive contribution to the effort by the international society to support and encourage the independent efforts by the Iraqi people toward the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international society including Japan through reconstruction of Iraq
Provisions in SDF Law	○ Stipulated under Article 84-4 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Stipulated under supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○ Stipulated under Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	○ U.N. peacekeeping activities ○ Humanitarian international relief activities ○ International election monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the above-mentioned activities	○ Cooperation and support activities ○ Search and rescue activities ○ Disaster relief activities for affected people	○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security
Activity Areas	○ Areas excluding Japan (including high seas) (A cease-fire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement of the receiving country are required.)	○ Territories of Japan ○ High seas and international airspace ¹ ○ Territories of foreign countries (Approval from the relevant country is required) ¹	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (An agreement of the relevant country and in the case of Iraq an agreement of the agency in charge of administration) ¹ ○ High seas and international airspace ¹
Diet Approval	○ To be discussed, as a general rule, in the Diet in advance about the implementation by the SDF of the peacekeeping operation of the peacekeeping force ²	○ Response measures by the SDF to be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day that the measures started ²	○ Response measures by the SDF to be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day that the measures started ²
Diet Report	○ To report without delay about the details of the implementation and others	○ To report without delay about the details of the basic plan and others	

Notes: 1. Limited to regions where it is confirmed that there is no battle currently going on and there will be no battle throughout the duration of the activities to be implemented there.

2. In cases such as when the Diet is closed, an approval shall be asked for promptly in the Diet being first summoned thereafter.

3. Establishing the System to Adequately Undertake International Peace Cooperation Activities

Under the NDPG, the SDF, in order to appropriately undertake international peace cooperation activities, is to improve its educational and training systems, unit stand-by postures, and its transportation capabilities. By doing so, the SDF is to establish the foundation in which units can be dispatched expeditiously and continuous SDF operations become possible.

In March this year, the GSDF set up the Central Readiness Force and placed under it the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit. This unit is to provide its members with education for international peace cooperation activities in peacetime and train officers who are to become key members in future missions. Furthermore, the unit is designed to support training for international peace cooperation activities and study relevant issues.

In addition, the SDF will designate regional armies whose personnel are to be dispatched on a rotational basis, and will continue to improve defense equipment and outfits which are expected to contribute to Japan's international peace cooperation activities and aircraft and vessels which have large transportation capacity. These efforts are designed for the SDF to build an infrastructure or system in which Japan's international peace cooperation activities can be implemented more effectively.

Moreover, the SDF plans to set up the Central Readiness Regiment (tentatively named) under the Central Readiness Force at the end of the current fiscal year. The regiment is expected to boost the SDF's ability to respond to contingencies expeditiously and appropriately. The Central Readiness Regiment (tentatively named) is to assume the role of going to a dispatch area as an advance unit and engage in works to pave the way for smooth operations by other units which are to be dispatched later soon after Japan decides to participate in international peace cooperation activities. Because of this regiment, Japan can strengthen a framework in which the country can respond to the need for its participation in international peace cooperation activities expeditiously and appropriately.

4. Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Personnel

It is extremely important to improve the working environment for the dispatched SDF personnel, who are supposed to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and families, so that they can fulfill such duty smoothly while maintaining their health both physically and mentally.

The Defense Ministry and the SDF have taken various measures to ease anxiety of SDF members being dispatched overseas for participation in international peace cooperation activities and their families back in Japan so that the members can devote themselves to undertaking assigned work without worrying about the families.

For example, welfare services are provided to the dispatched SDF members to help them maintain close bonds with families in Japan. Specifically, direct communication between the dispatched SDF members and their families in Japan are ensured via international phone calls, TV telephones, e-mail and other services. Moreover, the SDF members and their families can exchange video correspondence. In Japan, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched members have been held to provide them with necessary information while family support centers and family counseling rooms have been set up to reply to all kinds of questions raised by the families.

The SDF offers mental health-care services for SDF members soon to be dispatched overseas. These members take a short course in Japan on how to reduce stress. While engaging in overseas assignment, dispatched SDF members can consult other SDF members who have been designated as counselors after undergoing counseling training. Such counselors are to provide the dispatched members with sufficient mental care. In addition, medical officers accompany the SDF units on overseas missions. Under certain situations, the Defense Ministry is prepared to send psychiatrists with professional medical knowledge to the SDF units undertaking overseas missions while having some of the dispatched personnel return home for full treatment. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit

The National Defense Program Guidelines requires the Self-Defense Forces to participate in international peace cooperation activities proactively and on Japan's own initiative as a new sphere of defense operations, and international peace cooperation activities became a primary mission of the SDF in January this year.

Considering such requirement, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit was newly organized accordingly under the command of the GSDF Central Readiness Force on March 28 this


year with the idea that the GSDF should possess a unit dedicated for providing regular training and education necessary for international peace cooperation activities.

The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit is stationed in the Komakado Garrison (Gotenba City). The mission of the unit is to provide a wide range of education services regarding international peace cooperation activities performed by the GSDF including lessons learnt from the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq. The assigned duties include (1) to provide education to personnel around the country who will participate in GSDF international peace cooperation activities, (2) to support training conducted by each army for international peace cooperation activities, and (3) to perform study on education and training for international peace cooperation activities.

The newly established International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit allows the GSDF to regularly provide education for international peace cooperation activities, and strengthen its posture to dispatch well-trained forces more promptly and continuously.



The ceremony to celebrate the organization of the International Activity Education Unit held in the Komakado Garrison



2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq

1. Details about Japan's efforts to support Iraqi reconstruction and significance

Major combat operations have ended in Iraq, and the international community is redoubling its efforts to help rebuild the country, following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483⁵ and subsequent resolutions since May 2003. The reconstruction of Iraq is extremely important for ensuring peace and security in the global community including Japan, as well as for attaining peace and stability for the Iraqi people and the Middle East. Japan started dispatching SDF units to the Middle Eastern countries in December 2003 based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, approved in the Diet in July of the same year. The dispatched SDF units have conducted operations for humanitarian assistance in cooperation with support provided by Official Development Assistance (ODA).

The SDF units have been also assisting troops of foreign countries in their efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq to the degree that would not hamper the units' activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

These cooperation activities by Japan can play a role in preventing Iraq from becoming a hotbed of terrorism and helping the country to rebuild itself so that it can become a peaceful, democratic and responsible country, paving the foundation for Japan and Iraq to establish favorable relations in the future. In addition, they are not only instrumental in stabilizing the overall Middle East but also are extremely important for Japan because the situation in the Middle East region directly affects the prosperity and stability of Japan, which relies on the region for nearly 90% of its petroleum consumption.

Japan's humanitarian contribution to the activities along with the United States for the reconstruction of Iraq has further cemented the relationship of mutual confidence between Japan and the United States, helping to strengthen their bilateral security alliance.

Japan's support to help rebuild Iraq have won acclaim both from the international community and the Iraqi people as playing a significant role in not only achieving closer and more effective security cooperation between Japan and the United States, but also enhancing trust in Japan by the global community.



Prime Minister Koizumi (then) delivers speech at ceremony to return flag by contingents formed to undertake humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq after end of their mission

2. Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and the Basic Plan

(1) Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

The international community has been engaged in efforts to improve the welfare of the Iraqi people, and support and promote Iraqi own initiative for the swift reconstruction of Iraq, following the use of force against Iraq by some U.N. member countries in March 2003 based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions.

The Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, or the Iraq Special Measures Law, is intended to allow Japan to implement activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and support activities for ensuring security in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 and others. It is also designed for Japan to contribute proactively and on its own initiative to global efforts for the reconstruction of Iraq in order to promote the peace and stability of the international community, including Japan.

This legislation is a temporary law as it will expire four years after its enforcement. But it can be extended for up to four years by enacting a separate law if such extension is deemed necessary. As the current law is set to expire on July 31, 2007, the Government judged that Japan needs to provide continued support to Iraqi reconstruction efforts on its own initiative given such efforts in the coming several years will hold a key to the success of nation-building in Iraq. Based on the judgment, the Diet enacted in June this year legislation that can extend the validity of the current law for an additional two years through July 31, 2009. (See Fig. III-3-1-3)

(2) Outline of the Basic Plan

The Basic Plan stipulated basic policies, kinds of aid activities, their contents, the scope of areas where such activities are undertaken, and others regarding response measures Japan is to take in line with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. The Government judged it necessary for Japan to conduct activities commensurate to its international status in order to fulfill its

Fig. III-3-1-3 Contents of Activities Based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Classification	Content of Activity
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <u>Medical services</u> ○ Assistance in helping victims of the Iraq war return home as well as provision of food, clothing, pharmaceuticals and other daily necessities, and construction of accommodation facilities for the victims ○ <u>Restoration and upgrading of facilities needed to help improve the welfare of victims of the Iraq war and to help reconstruct Iraq, and improvement of natural environments</u> ○ Advice and instruction on clerical and other administrative work ○ <u>Transport, construction and goods supply to support humanitarian relief activities for victims of the Iraq war, to relieve the damage of the war and to help reconstruct Iraq</u>
Support Activities for Ensuring Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <u>Medical service, transport works, goods supply and other activities provided by Japan in support of efforts by U.N. member countries to help ensure security and safety in Iraq</u>

Notes: 1. The activities that are to be (were) implemented by the SDF are underlined.
 2. The water supply activity that the GSDF dispatched troops was doing in Iraq is included in the "good supply" of the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities listed above.

responsibility in the international community, and the Cabinet approved the Basic Plan in December 2003. (See Reference 47)

The Basic Plan at first stipulated that SDF troops be dispatched to Iraq for up to one year. But Japan, acting on its independent judgment based on the Iraqi situation, revised the Basic Plan a total of seven times in order to extend the duration of the SDF's humanitarian activities in Iraq, withdraw GSDF units from the country and have the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) engage in a mission to support U.N. operations.

In December last year, the Basic Plan was revised and the duration of Japan's reconstruction mission in Iraq was extended until July 31 this year when the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq expires. The revised Basic Plan also deleted reference to a GSDF rear-support unit which had been operating in Kuwait to assist the redeployment of main GSDF units for Iraqi reconstruction from the country as they returned home on September 9 last year.

With the current Basic Plan set to expire on July 31 this year, Japan plans to revise it again, marking the eighth revision. (See Fig. III-3-1-4)

3. SDF Operations

The SDF had undertaken international peace cooperation activities to help Iraqi refugees and people who suffered as a result of the war before the enactment of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. Since December 2003, GSDF and ASDF units, based on the Iraq Special Measures Law, have provided humanitarian and reconstruction support to the country, such as restoration and improvement of public facilities, and transportation of personnel and aid materials, for local people facing the hardship, which contributed to global efforts to help Iraq rebuild its country on its own initiative.

Japan's aid mission to Iraq consists of humanitarian contribution led by the SDF and the Government's Official Development Assistance (ODA) which is under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both of which support each other in tandem. Japan's such efforts to support Iraq, having produced visible results, have won high acclaim from the international community, including Iraq.

Fig. III-3-1-4 Outline of Basic Plan Regarding Response Measures Based on Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Implementation Items		Implementation Outline
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities	Types and description	Transport of goods and materials used for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
	Geographical areas	Airstrip facilities in Kuwait and Iraq (aircraft)
	Scale, composition of SDF troops and their equipment	○ Up to eight transport and other aircraft, and personnel for operating such aircraft ○ Necessary amount of pistols, rifles and machine guns for securing safety
	Duration of dispatch	Through July 31, 2007
Support Activities for Ensuring Security		Medical service, transportation, storage, telecommunications, construction, repair, maintenance, supply and sanitation can be conducted for support activities for ensuring security within a scope that does not affect humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities.

In June last year, the Government of Japan, judging that reconstruction in Muthanna Province effectively advanced from the stage where quick support measures are necessary to the stage where its people can rebuild their country on their own, decided to have GSDF units pull out of Iraq.

Meanwhile, an ASDF squadron has been still undertaking Iraqi aid operations, providing airlifting support to the United Nations in response to such a request from the U.N. Secretary-General and continuing to provide similar support to the multilateral force.

(1) Activities of ASDF Units

Starting in December 2003, the ASDF's airlift squadrons, each consisting of three C-130H transport planes and about 200 personnel, have been dispatched for Japan's Iraqi reconstruction operations. Since March 2004, the C-130H planes have airlifted goods and materials donated by Japan for humanitarian and reconstruction use, including medical equipment, similar goods donated by other countries and relevant international organizations, and personnel dispatched by such countries and organizations as well as replenishing supplies being used by the dispatched GSDF units.

In April 2004, the airlift squadron transported 10 Japanese media correspondents posted in Samawah to cover the GSDF activities there from Talill Airport in Iraq to Al Mubarak Air Base in Kuwait, marking the first transport of Japanese nationals by the SDF under Article 84-3 of the SDF Law (previously Article 100-8).

Even after the withdrawal of the GSDF from Iraq, the ASDF, meeting needs from the United Nations and the multinational force, continues to cooperate in global efforts for Iraqi reconstruction and stability, providing support to the United Nations and the multinational force by, for instance, airlifting goods to Baghdad and Erbil, where U.N. operations are underway. As of May 10 this year, airlifting operations conducted by the ASDF for the Iraqi mission totaled



ASDF personnel engaging in aircraft maintenance in Kuwait

505 times with the total goods and materials transported weighing 524 tons.

(2) Dispatch of Liaison Officers

The SDF has dispatched⁶ liaison and other officers to the U.S. Central Command in Florida, the United States, and the headquarters of the multinational force in Baghdad to gather information deemed necessary for SDF operations being undertaken under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and make various coordination with the U.S. Central Command or the multinational force. The Liaison and other SDF officers being dispatched there have collected information in areas where SDF units are operating and engaged in coordination work regarding acceptance of SDF personnel and supplies, and goods procurements and their transportation. Activities by these liaison officers have contributed to smooth and efficient operations of SDF units being assigned to the Iraqi reconstruction missions. At present, the Joint Staff Office has dispatched liaison officers to the U.S. Central Command in Florida. Moreover, the ASDF has dispatched a liaison team to the headquarters of the multinational force in Baghdad.

(3) Withdrawal of GSDF Units

On June 20 last year, the Government of Japan judged that the reconstruction stage in which quick support measures were necessary has basically ended in Muthanna Province, both on the rehabilitation and security fronts. The GOJ, judging that GSDF units being dispatched to Iraq have achieved their initial objective of supporting reconstruction efforts by the Iraqi people in collaboration with the international community, decided to have the units withdraw from the province.



GSDF defense equipment being loaded into private transport vehicle for withdrawal from Iraq

Following the decision, the then Defense Agency and the SDF dispatched a rear-support unit⁷ of about 100 GSDF members to Samawah and Kuwait on June 27 last year to have it undertake operations to support the withdrawal of GSDF units from Iraq, including coordination for transportation-related work. The unit then began such rear-support operations there. The 10th SDF contingent for Iraqi reconstruction returned home on July 25, 2006 and the rear-support unit on September 9 in the same year, marking the end of the GSDF's operation in Iraq that lasted for about two and half years. (See Fig. III-3-1-5)

a. Activities of GSDF units in Muthanna Province

GSDF units undertook reconstruction operations in Samawah for about two and half years, such as restoration and establishment of medical services, water-supply systems and public facilities, since the First contingent for Iraqi relief and reconstruction mission and the First unit for supporting Iraqi reconstruction were dispatched.

A total of about 5,600 GSDF members participated in humanitarian and reconstruction support activities, including restoration and establishment of medical services, water-supply systems, schools and other public facilities, in Iraq between their first dispatch to the country and the period of withdrawal, and have made achievements in various fields, improving life-related infrastructure and creating jobs for people living in Muthanna Province.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (I)

Captain Midori Higuchi, ASDF
Squadron of the Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Wing
(currently the 401st Squadron of the 1st Transport Wing)

It was the support from my family that made it possible for me to go to the Middle East, leaving my two-year-old son behind. Some of the colleagues in my squadron have been sent to Iraq four times, and I think it is also thanks to the support of their family. The mission in Iraq made me realize it, and I am feeling immensely grateful to my family.

During the mission, I worked as a copilot of a C-130H air carrier, and supported the captain by monitoring a threat during flight, communicating with air traffic controllers, and through other duties. The crew was always working in a tense atmosphere, but because we had received sufficient training while in Japan, we were all confident that we can deal with any emergency situation.

The captain, as the leader of the crew, was paying attention to every risk he could think of and concentrating all his nerves on the securing of safety of his crew. His physical and mental burdens were therefore tremendous. I, as the copilot, made utmost efforts to alleviate his burdens. My next goal is to become a captain pilot and lead my crew to play an active role in international peace cooperation activities—with again the support from my son (who will be a little older by then) and family!



Captain Higuchi rejoiced to see her son for the first time in four months

Technical Sergeant Wataru Hashiguchi, ASDF
Engineering Platoon, Iraq Reconstruction Support Procurement Unit
(currently the Engineering Section, Support Department, the 3rd Technical School)

The first thing I noticed when I landed on the desert country was its unbelievable heat. The four months in Iraq were full of unique experiences I could not have had in Japan. The temperature began to rise immediately after the sun rose and exceeded 40°C. Sandstorms were so severe that there were even times when I could not see a thing only five meters away and was almost lost in the desert.

As a member of the Engineering Platoon, my duties were to regularly check, repair and maintain the buildings and other facilities as well as roads around them. There were rain leaks almost everywhere (!) including offices and quarters. If we leave even the slightest gap open, the room will be covered with sand almost instantly. Since



Technical Sergeant Hashiguchi at work in Iraq

there were PCs and other electric equipment in the offices, we needed to pay particular attention to gaps in the doors of the offices to completely shut out sand. The sand in the Middle East is as fine as dust. In addition, because there were no shovel loaders or dump trucks, we had to carry materials manually or by using wheel barrows while soaked with sweat. Physical strength mattered most there. We understood the importance of a physical examination we had received in Japan before the mission.

The assignment at the very forefront of the international contribution was a very meaningful experience. I want to take part again if I have a chance.

Fig. III-3-1-5 Details of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Support Activities by GSDF Units in Iraq

Year	2003			2004			2005			2006					
Month	4-6	7-9	10-12	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12
Iraq Political Process and U.N. Resolutions	5/1 ▼ Declaration of end of war	7/13 ▼ Inauguration of Iraqi Governing Council	12/13 ▼ Capture of former Iraqi President Hussein		6/1 ▼ Inauguration of Iraqi Interim Government/ Transfer of sovereignty		1/30 ▼ Election of Iraqi National Assembly	4/28 ▼ Inauguration of Iraqi transition government	8/15 ▼ Drafting of Iraqi Constitution	12/15 ▼ Election of Iraqi National Assembly		5/20 ▼ Establishment of new Iraqi Government			
	5/13 ▼ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483		10/16 ▼ U.S. Security Council Resolution 1511		6/1 ▼ U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546					10/15 ▼ Referendum on drafted Constitution			6/19 ▼ Transfer of security authority in Muthanna Province		
Domestic Developments		7/26 ▼ Enactment of Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq	12/9 ▼ Basic Plan (dispatch decision)		6/1 ▼ Revision of Basic Plan		12/9 ▼ Extension of Basic Plan				12/8 ▼ Extension of Basic Plan	3/27 ▼ Establishment of Joint Staff Office	6/20 ▼ Order to end GSDF activities in Iraq	8/1 ▼ Revision of Basic Plan	12/8 ▼ Revision of Basic Plan
GSDF Dispatch		9/14 ▼ Government research mission	11/15 ▼ Advance team for research	2/3 ▼ First Contingent	5/27 ▼ Second Contingent	8/31 ▼ Third Contingent	12/7 ▼ Fourth Contingent	2/28 ▼ Fifth Contingent	5/28 ▼ Sixth Contingent	8/19 ▼ Seventh Contingent	11/12 ▼ Eighth Contingent	2/18 ▼ Ninth Contingent	5/27 ▼ Tenth Contingent		
			1/16 ▼ Unit for supporting Iraqi reconstruction (first)		8/2 ▼ Unit for supporting Iraqi reconstruction (second)		1/24 ▼ Unit for supporting Iraqi reconstruction (third)		7/19 ▼ Unit for supporting Iraqi reconstruction (fourth)		1/23 ▼ Unit for supporting Iraqi reconstruction (fifth)		6/26 ▼ Transport unit aiding withdrawal from Iraq		9/9 ▼ Transport unit aiding withdrawal from Iraq

With the recognition that the Iraqi people should play a major role in reconstructing their country, members of GSDF units being dispatched to Iraq always paid their respects to the Iraqi people, and tried to engage in aid activities in a sincere manner while standing on the same place as they are standing. With their reconstruction activities winning trust and support from local people, the GSDF members were able to end their mission, without anyone of them being hurt physically. (See Fig. III-3-1-6)

b. Factors behind effective implementation of humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq by GSDF units

GSDF units and their humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq have received very high acclaim both at home and abroad, including from the Iraqi government hosting the GSDF's such activities, and also have received support from many Japanese people. Behind the successful GSDF activities in Iraq was sufficient use of human resources which have been accumulated by the SDF in order to fulfill its basic duty of

Fig. III-3-1-6 GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and their Results

Activities	Description	Action	Results
Medical Activities Since February 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Activities by GSDF medical personnel at four hospitals including Samawah General Hospital <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training and advice to local medical doctors regarding diagnosis methods and treatment policy • Training and advice on use of medical equipment supplied by Japan ○ Technical training of ambulance personnel in Al-Muthanna Province ○ Medical support including technical training for management of pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses 	Medical technique support provided for total of 277 times	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Newborn infant mortality rates in Samawah reduced to one-third with development of basic medical infrastructure ★ Improved ability of emergency medical service
Water Supply Activities Since March 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Water purification and supply to water supply vehicles in Samawah camp ○ Water supply activities by GSDF completed with startup of water purification facility installed close to the camp under ODA program on February 4, 2005 	About 53,500 tons of water supplied to total of about 11.89 million people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Stable access to clean water made possible
Public Facility Restoration and Construction Since March 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Repair of walls, floors, electric circuits and others of schools in Al-Muthanna Province 	Completion of 36 facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Improvement of facilities at about one-third of schools in Al-Muthanna Province, resulting in improvement of educational environment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Groundwork and pavement of roads to be used by local citizens 	Completion of groundwork at 31 locations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Greater convenience with construction of major roads important for daily life
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Repair works for other facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medical clinic (Primary Health Center) • Nursing facilities and low-income residential housing in Samawah • Water purification facilities in Warka and Rumeitha • Uruk ruins, Olympic Stadium and other cultural facilities 	Completion of 66 facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Improvement of quality of life and culture for citizens of Al-Muthanna Province
Local Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Local businesses mobilized for restoration and development of public facilities ○ Local citizens recruited for interpreting and garbage collection at the base camp 	Up to some 1,100 jobs created per day for total of 490,000 people	

national defense, skills and experiences of SDF personnel that have been fostered through their day-after-day hard training, and lesson learned by them through the past participation in various international peace cooperation activities.

Following are factors which have been believed to be behind the effective implementation of humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq by the GSDF members.

- 1) Was able to grasp the local situation and local needs promptly and accurately and having appropriately chosen a region where GSDF units would be dispatched for humanitarian and reconstruction support activities
- 2) Was able to provide effective support to meet needs of local people by combining humanitarian contribution by the SDF with the Japanese Government's ODA support
- 3) Took sufficient measures to offer welfare and mental-care services to GSDF members being dispatched to Iraq



GSDF personnel undertaking water-supply work in Iraq

- 4) Was able to build favorable relations with people in Samawah by promoting exchanges with them
- 5) Was able to build friendly and equal-footed relations with officials of defense-related organizations being dispatched from other countries

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (II)

**Lieutenant Colonel Hiroyuki Mochizuki, GSDF
Kuwait Evacuation Unit of the Iraq Evacuation Support Group
(currently Central Transportation Management Command)**

In June last year, after the end of the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance by the Ground Self-Defense Force in Iraq that had lasted for two and a half years, the Iraq Evacuation Support Group was sent to Kuwait and Samawah in Iraq as a unit to “close the column” with the mission to send back to Japan about 200 vehicles and 100,000 equipment (about 600 containers in total) used for the Iraq reconstruction support activities. For this evacuation operation, we used the private transport sector wherever possible by hiring local workers. Although the operation did not proceed smoothly at the beginning due to the difference in language and customs, we and the local workers could gradually establish communication, and by the time all the equipment had been loaded into containers and all the vehicles had been washed through mutual cooperation, everyone at the site could feel a sense of unity regardless of the nationality.



Lieutenant Colonel Mochizuki explaining the evacuation flow to Foreign Minister Aso in Kuwait

Although the evacuation operation was initially planned to commence in a cooler season, it actually began in the hottest season. The temperature was above 50°C during the daytime every day, and occasional severe sand storms relentlessly covered the just washed vehicles with sand. Despite all these adverse conditions, we completed the large-scale three-month evacuation operation. The working environment was harsh, and the work such as servicing and washing equipment and vehicles tended to be somewhat monotonous, but each member was determined to finish this final mission of the Iraq reconstruction support activities with success. Every member was working very carefully not to cause any accident and not to spoil the success of the SDF contingent for the Iraqi relief and reconstruction mission. Thanks to these efforts, we were able to fulfill the mission without any accident or injury. I believe that every member is pleased that they could take part in the final operation of, and contribute to, the Iraq reconstruction support activities, and has gained great confidence and pride.

In January this year, international peace cooperation activities of the SDF were positioned as one of its primary missions. The Defense Ministry and the SDF have pledged to commit themselves to such activities proactively and on their own initiative. In this sense, achievements they have made through their experience in the Iraqi reconstruction mission were significant. (See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1)

4. Evaluation of Japan's Efforts by Other Countries


Japan's activities in the rebuilding of Iraq have won acclaim and gratitude from Iraq and other countries, as mentioned below. A public opinion poll conducted on local people showed that about 70% of those polled supported the Japanese operations.

(1) Evaluation in Iraq

In June last year, shortly after Japan's decision to withdraw the GSDF from Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki talked with then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi over the phone and said he wanted to express deep gratitude for the SDF's activities in Iraq and Japan's support of Iraq on behalf of the Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister also said the SDF activities in Iraq left a favorable impression about Japan among the Iraqi people.

In his letter addressed to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on March 12 this year, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki said airlifting activities by Japan's ASDF for the United Nations and the multinational force have been playing a major and vital role for Iraq's efforts to promote reconstruction and nation-rebuilding. In the letter, the Iraqi Prime Minister also requested Japan to consider renewing its support activities in Iraq. During his visit to Japan in April, Prime Minister al-Maliki commended the ASDF's airlifting activities as encouraging to Iraqi people and expressed gratitude for Japan's contribution to rebuilding Iraq.

Results of a public survey conducted in 2006 on people in Samawah regarding the SDF's activities around the city are shown in Fig. III-3-1-7.



(2) Evaluation by the United Nations

In a letter delivered to Japanese Prime Minister Abe in March this year, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon expressed gratitude for Japan's airlifting operations saying the airlift service has been of particular importance to supporting UNAMI's Area Office in Erbil.

Ashraf Qazi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Iraq, in a letter to the Japanese Acting Ambassador to Iraq, appreciated the ASDF's airlift operations and asked for Japan to continue to engage in the operations.

(3) Evaluation in Other Countries

U.S. President George W. Bush thanked then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi during their summit meeting in June last year for Japan's humanitarian reconstruction assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for Japan's support to forces of various countries operating in the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Japan in July 2004 and highly commended Japan for its contribution to rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. Rice also said Japan's assistance in Iraq has wonderfully supported the Iraqi people.

During the Japan-U.S. defense chiefs' meeting in January last year between then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, Rumsfeld highly appreciated Japan's past efforts to rebuild Iraq. Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, who also serves as Inspector General and Minister of Defense and Aviation, meeting with then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in April last year, highly valued Japan's efforts to reconstruct and stabilize Iraq and expressed gratitude for its contribution in the country.

3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism

1. Efforts of International Community

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the international community has been fighting against terrorism not only on military but also on diplomatic, police, judicial, intelligence and economic fronts. But the threat of terrorist attacks has continued to exist in the global community in view of the outbreak in various parts of the world of a series of suspected terrorist acts⁸ by international terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda. Against this background, the global community needs to continue a long-term battle in a concerted manner in order to eradicate terrorism.

Strongholds of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are said to exist in the national border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Afghanistan has continued to serve as a production center for narcotics, a major funding source for terrorists, the U.S. military and others have been campaigning to combat terrorism in the region under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). (See Fig. III 3-1-8)

About 20 countries have dispatched their troops to Afghanistan to have them take part in the U.S.-led operation in an attempt to stamp out terrorists in the region. But some groups suspected of being linked with terrorist organizations and of involvement in smuggling of narcotics and weapons are believed to have escaped the region and moved to the sea via mountainous areas. These groups, using vessels, are believed to have already moved to wider areas like the Middle East, Africa, Europe or Southeast Asia and seen to be engaging in terrorist activities there.




MSDF personnel engaging in ship-to-ship refueling work on their vessel's deck in Indian Ocean

The international community has been engaged in Operating Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO) in the Indian Ocean in a bid to block and deter terrorists from moving and prevent the proliferation of weapons, ammunition and narcotics, using marine routes. At present, warships of U.S., European, Pakistani and other countries have been operating there in order to undertake MIO activities.

MIO has already generated results with some of these warships detecting and confiscating a large amount of drugs, guns and portable anti-tank rockets from suspicious boats after making wireless inquiries and conducting on-the-spot inspections of these ships.

Fig. III-3-1-8 Dispersion of Terrorists and Outline of OFE (conceptual image)



In addition, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been trying to maintain security in Afghanistan and rebuild⁹ the country, reflecting the pledge by the international society to prevent the Asian country from again becoming a hotbed of terrorism.

2. Japan's Efforts in Combating Terrorism

At a time when the international community has been united in fighting against terrorism, it is necessary for Japan to reinforce its efforts to combat terrorism as well in collaboration with other countries. Based on this idea, Japan is making anti-terrorism efforts¹⁰ on various fronts.

Activities by the SDF to support the international anti-terrorism campaign in line with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law have contributed to the peace and security of the international community, including Japan, enabling Japan to fulfill a role commensurate to its status in the international society and increasing confidence in Japan by the international community and also in making Japan-U.S. cooperation in security even more close and effective.

Specifically, soon after the terrorist attacks took place in the United States on September 11, 2001, Japan came to perceive the fight against international terrorism as its own task, and clarified its position that it would make a positive and independent contribution to world efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism. In October 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted. Following the enforcement of the law, the MSDF has conducted cooperation and support activities, refueling naval vessels of the United States and other nations operating in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the ASDF has been also continuing cooperation and support activities by airlifting goods and supplies of the U.S. military.

These activities by Japan's SDF have won high acclaim from the international community including the United States as paving the foundation for activities being undertaken by worships of many countries to block and deter terrorists, weapons and ammunition from moving using marine routes.

3. Outline of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Basic Plan

(1) Outline of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

The purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is to specify the following measures in order for Japan to contribute actively and on its own initiative to the efforts of the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community, including that of Japan.

- 1) The measures Japan implements in support of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces and other foreign forces are aimed at eradicating the threat being posed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, thereby contributing to achieving the purposes of the U.N. Charter, and procedures and other necessary actions for implementing these measures.
- 2) The measures Japan implements from a humanitarian point of view based on U.N. resolutions or requests made by the United Nations and other international organizations, and procedures and other necessary actions for implementing these measures.

Fig. III-3-1-9 Provision of Goods and Services by the SDF as Part of Cooperation and Support Activities

Conducted as cooperation and support activities	Supply:	Provision of water, fuel and meals, and provision of similar goods and services	Conducted as cooperation and support activities with the implementation of search and rescue activities
	Transportation:	Transportation of personnel and goods, and provision of transportation materials and similar goods and services	
	Repair and maintenance:	Repair and maintenance, provision of repair and maintenance equipment as well as parts and components, and provision of similar goods and services	
	Medical activities:	Provision of medical services for the sick and wounded, sanitary equipment as well as provision of similar goods and services	
	Communications:	Use of communication facilities, provision of communication equipment as well as provision of similar goods and services	
	Airport and seaport services:	Support for incoming and outgoing aircraft and ships entering and leaving ports in Japan, loading and unloading, as well as provision of similar goods and services	
	Base services:	Collection and disposal of waste material, provision of power and similar goods and services	
	Lodging:	Use of lodging facilities, as well as provision of bedding equipment and similar goods and services	
	Disinfection:	Disinfection, provision of disinfection equipment and related materials as well as similar goods and services	

- Notes: 1. Provision of materials will not include weapons (including ammunition).
 2. Provision of goods and services will not include fueling and maintenance of aircraft which are in preparation for combating.
 3. Transportation of goods will not include land transportation of weapons (including ammunition) in foreign territory.

Activities that can be conducted by the SDF under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law are 1) cooperation and support activities¹¹, 2) search and rescue activities¹² and 3) activities¹³ to assist people affected by terrorist acts. The types of materials and services to be provided by the SDF as part of its cooperation and support activities (including activities to support search and rescue operations by militaries of foreign countries) are shown in Fig. III-3-1-9.

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is a temporary law, expiring two years from the date of its enactment. If deemed necessary, however, its effect can be extended by up to two years by a separate law.

Furthermore, the Government judged it necessary for Japan to continue making efforts on its own initiative to eradicate terrorist activities in view of the global community's continuing battle against terrorism. Based on this judgment, the Government has presented a bill to extend the effect of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to the Diet for three times. Each time, the bill was enacted by the Diet. After the latest extension, the effect of the law is to last until November 1 this year.

(2) Outline of the Basic Plan

The Basic Plan stipulated basic policies regarding response measures Japan is to take in line with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, kinds of aid activities, their contents, the scope of areas where such activities are undertaken, and others.

In light of the situation surrounding anti-terrorist activities being undertaken by various countries in the Indian Ocean, the Government judged it necessary for Japan to maintain its cooperation and support activities. In April this year, the Government changed the Basic Plan to extend the duration of SDF dispatch for such activities, marking its 11th revision. (See Fig. III-3-1-10) (See Reference 49)

Fig. III-3-1-10 Outline of Basic Plan on Response Measures Being Taken Based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

Action	Implementation Outline
Cooperation and Support Activities	(1) Delivery of supplies (supply of fuel to vessels and helicopters on board vessels) (2) Transport (transport of vessel fuel by transport vessels and transport of personnel and goods by aircraft) (3) Others (repair and maintenance, medical service and domestic port administration)
Search and Rescue Activities	SDF troops are supposed to engage in search and rescue activities within areas in the Indian Ocean and its airspace designated for cooperation and support activities and for assistance to affected people, if they spot refugees or are requested to rescue them by U.S. troops and others.
Assistance to Affected People	Life-related goods are supplied to UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in response to request by the organization.

4. SDF Activities

(1) Activities by MSDF Units to Help Affected People and Cooperation and Support Activities a. Assistance to Affected People

The escort vessel Sawagiri and the minesweeping mother ship Uruga, dispatched by MSDF units as part of its efforts to assist people affected by combat in line with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, transported goods and materials necessary for daily life to the port of Karachi, Pakistan. Specifically, the vessels carried about 200 tons of aid materials¹⁴ such as tents and blankets and delivered them to a local representative office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)¹⁵ for two days from December 12, 2001.

b. Cooperation and Support Activities by the MSDF

The escort vessel Kurama, the Kirisame, and the supply vessel Hamana were dispatched to the Indian Ocean for information-gathering operations as part of measures worked out by Japan on September 19, 2001 to respond to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. In December 2001, the three vessels began fueling U.S. naval vessels in the ocean as the MSDF's cooperation and support activities. The destroyer Sawagiri and the supply vessel Towada, which had engaged in relief activities for people affected by combat, joined the three vessels in the Indian Ocean. These MSDF vessels also began fueling British naval ships on January 29, 2002.

Japan had initially limited the ships to be refueled as its cooperation and support activities to those belonging to the U.S. and British forces. However, the Government of Japan, judging it necessary to increase the operational efficiency of the global fight against terrorism, expanded the scope¹⁶ of countries receiving refueling gradually. As a result, ships from a total of 11 countries became subject to refueling by Japan's MSDF as of the end of March this year.

Since the October 2004 revision of the Basic Plan, Japan has provided ships of foreign forces with fuel not only for the ships but also for ship-based helicopters and water.

Refueling by the MSDF units as part of Japan's cooperation and support activities since such activities started reached 700 in November last year, further rising to 744 as of April 12 this year. (See Fig. III-3-1-11)

Fig. III-3-1-11 Warships on Missions (July 2006-June 2007)

Year/Month		2006						2007					
		7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6
Supply Ships	Oumi	→ ☆ 8/7 Return											
	Mashu						→ ☆ 12/22 Return						
	Towada			11/12 Dispatch ★ ←							→ ☆ 4/26 Return		
	Hamana							3/15 Dispatch ★ ←					
Destroyers	Inazuma	→ ☆ 8/7 Return											
	Sazanami						→ ☆ 12/21 Return						
	Makinami			11/12 Dispatch ★ ←							→ ☆ 4/26 Return		
	Suzunami							3/14 Dispatch ★ ←					
Commander					Escort Division 8 Commander			Escort Division 2 Commander			Escort Division 3 Commander		

(2) Cooperation and Support Activities by ASDF Units

ASDF units started transport operations between U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) bases on November 29, 2001, using C-130H aircraft from the First Transport Wing (Komaki Base), and overseas transport between USFJ bases and U.S. bases in Guam and other areas on December 3, 2001.

The ASDF units have engaged in transport operations as part of Japan's cooperation and support activities for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations, mainly using its C-130H transportation aircraft. From 2002, the ASDF units also began using C-1 transportation aircraft in addition to C-130H transportation aircraft for transport operations between the U.S. forces bases in Japan. Since 2004, it has been using only C-1 aircraft for domestic transportation.

Under these transport operations, the ASDF units have airlifted goods and materials of the U.S. forces, such as aircraft engines, components, maintenance equipment and clothing.

The number of transport operations by the ASDF units since they commenced cooperation and support activities for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign reached 345 at the end of January this year. (15 times for overseas transport and 330 times for domestic transport)

5. Commendation from the World for Japan's Contribution

In reference to Japan's efforts to fight against international terrorism, Afghan President Hamid Kharzai said in a speech delivered to a U.N. General Assembly session in September 2004 that he wishes to express gratitude to all countries, particularly the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain and Canada, which have dispatched their troops and allocated resources, on behalf of the Afghan people. In informal talks with members of Japan's House of Representatives special committee on anti-terrorism activities and Iraq, Kharzai also said he thinks that activities by the MSDF play an indispensable role for the overall anti-terrorism operation by the global community. He said these activities are significant not only for Afghanistan but also the rest of the international community.

At an international conference held in London in January last year to help rebuild Afghanistan, Afghan President Kharzai, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice separately referred to Japan's efforts to help reconstruct Afghanistan in their speeches and highly appreciated such assistance.

When an MSDF vessel paid a port call in France in July 2005 on a practice ocean voyage, the French Navy provided fuel to the vessel free of charge, expressing France's gratitude to Japan for supporting the international anti-terrorism campaign and the country's contribution to the international community.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Worked as Liaison Officer for Cooperation and Support Activities for the Indian Ocean

**Commander Yoshinori Maeda, MSDF
(currently belonging to the National Institute for Defense Studies)**

Bahrain is an insular Muslim country whose area is about the same as that of Amami Oshima Island. The Maritime Self-Defense Force Bahrain Liaison Officer is working in the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet Headquarters located in this country. The liaison officers sent from 15 countries including Japan are sharing information and coordinating operations for the Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO) in the Friendly Forces Coordination Center (F2C2). In order for vessels of each country to perform OEF-MIO efficiently to suppress terrorist activities, continuous fuel supply from MSDF supply vessels is essential. The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet Headquarters praises the cooperation and support activities conducted by the MSDF that supplies 40% of fuel used by vessels of other countries than the United States as "extremely



Commander Maeda (right) coordinating operations in a Pakistan Navy vessel

important for MIO performed by the fleet of each country to prevent international terrorists from committing terrorist acts and terrorist supporting activities on the ocean.” I worked as the Liaison Officer for 14 months from February 2006, and coordinated about 160 cooperation and support activities (maritime refueling) during the period. I coordinated the activities with the U.S. Navy Logistics Support Unit, as well as with liaison officers from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Pakistan and other countries sending vessels for OEF-MIO. When the liaison officers said “Thank you” for support of Japan after an NSDF supply vessel and a vessel of their countries meet as arranged on the large Indian Ocean and maritime refueling was successfully completed, I also felt recharged to continue with the hard coordination work in the Arabic country where the temperature exceeds 45°C. My duties also included discussion with other liaison officers to explore a way the MSDF can perform cooperation and support activities more effectively. Pakistan is the first Muslim country to participate in OEF-MIO, dispatching vessels and aircrafts on an ongoing basis. Lieutenant-Commander Imtiaz, the liaison officer from Pakistan Navy, was a good friend of mine working together in F2C2. Pakistan is sending its six gas turbine vessels built in the United Kingdom to the northern Arabian Sea in turn to join the terrorism suppression operations. At an F2C2 meeting held immediately prior to my return to Japan, Lieutenant-Commander Imtiaz expressed his gratitude for the support of the MSDF, and also read out a message from Rear Admiral Iqbal, who was in command of OEF-MIO between April and August last year, in the presence of the other liaison officers. The message was as follows: “We greatly appreciate the commitment of Japan in the supply of fuel for vessels and aircrafts as well as drink water for maintaining lives of the crew to the Pakistan Navy. The Pakistan Navy vessels require high-quality fuel to drive their gas turbine engines, and depends almost 100% on the MSDF supply vessels. It is no exaggeration to say that it is the continuous support of Japan that enables Pakistan to take part in OEF-MIO as a nation.” The Bahrain Liaison Officer is a background staff member making invisible efforts under the harsh environment to ensure that the MSDF performs cooperation and support activities without fail. However, when I was thanked by other liaison officers for the smooth support activities of our country, and I forwarded the message to the crew working very hard on the vessels, I felt very rewarded.

4. Efforts to Support U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO)

As a way to prevent the recurrence of regional conflicts after a cease-fire agreement, the United Nations sponsors peacekeeping operations, such as cease-fire monitoring, election monitoring, and reconstruction assistance. As of the end of April this year, U.N. peacekeeping operations are underway in 15 places around the

world, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. (See Reference 4)

In addition, international organizations, such as the UNHCR, and individual countries engage in relief and reconstruction activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective or from the viewpoint of stabilizing the domestic situations of affected countries.

Japan, in a bid to fulfill a role commensurate to its international status, has been cooperating, both on human and financial fronts, with global efforts being led by the United Nations to build a peaceful and stable international society.



Senior Vice Minister of Defense Kimura presenting unit flag to GSDF Major Toyota, Commander of 23rd Japanese transport unit of UNDOF

In order to help improve the international security environment, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have positively engaged in international peace cooperation activities by dispatching troops, among other ways.

1. Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law

The International Peace Cooperation Law, enacted in June 1992, is designed to contribute further to global efforts being led by the United Nations to achieve peace in the international community by upgrading Japan's framework for cooperating appropriately and speedily in 1) U.N. peacekeeping activities¹⁷, 2) humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations¹⁸ and 3) international election-monitoring activities.

The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (the so-called five principles for participation) for Japan's participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force (PKF).

Japan had suspended the SDF's participation in PKF's so-called core operations¹⁹. Meanwhile, Japan had provided logistical support to PKF missions, and steadily accumulated achievements and experience in the area. Finding expectations both at home and home for further participation in international peace cooperation activities, Japan amended the International Peace Cooperation Law in December 2001. The amendment lifted the ban on the SDF's participation in core PKF operations. (See Figs. III-3-1-12 • 13)

Fig. III-3-1-12 Basic Policy on Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles)



 	1 Warring parties must reach a cease-fire accord.
	2 Warring parties, including those from the countries in which the U.N. peacekeeping force are to operate, must consent to the U.N. force's operations and Japan's participation in the operations of the U.N. force.
	3 The U.N. peacekeeping force must take a neutral stance; they should not side with any particular warring parties.
	4 Japan must ensure that the SDF can withdraw from operations of the U.N. peacekeeping force if either one of the three principles stated above is not met.
	5 The use of weapons by SDF members participating in operations of the U.N. peacekeeping force should be limited as much as possible to situations that are conceivably necessary to protect the members' lives.

Fig. III-3-1-13 International Peace Cooperation Activities by SDF

Duration	International Peace Cooperation Activities (Type of Activities)	Region
Sept. 1992- Sept. 1993	Cambodia (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	Southeast Asia
May 1993- Jan. 1995	Mozambique (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	Africa
Sept. 1994- Dec. 1994	Rwanda (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Africa
Feb. 1996-	The Golan Heights (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	Middle East
Nov. 1999- Feb. 2000	East Timor (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Southeast Asia
Oct. 2001	Afghanistan (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Central Asia
Feb. 2002- June 2004	East Timor (U.N. peacekeeping operations)	Southeast Asia
March 2003- April 2003	Iraq (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Middle East
July 2003- Aug. 2003	Iraq (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Middle East
March 2007-	Nepal (U.N. peacekeeping operations)	South Asia

Bold frame: International peacekeeping activities are currently under way

2. United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

(1) Background behind establishment of UNMIN

In Nepal, the Maoists (Communist Party of Nepal) started armed struggle against the King in 1996 in a bid to capture power from him, leaving the country in a state of civil war for about 10 years. In May last year, a new government was inaugurated in Nepal. As a result of series of peace negotiations between the Maoists and the Government, both parties reached in June last year an eight-point agreement, including requesting the United Nations to oversee the management of weapons possessed by the Nepalese military and the Maoists, and soldiers of both sides. In November 2006, the Government and the Maoists signed an agreed document for realizing permanent peace in Nepal, which includes the holding of Constituent Assembly elections by the middle of June this year, and which spells out a framework for the United Nations to monitor the management of weapons of both sides and their soldiers. Later, both parties signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which includes transforming the existing cease-fire into a permanent and sustainable peace.

On January 24 (January 23 in New York time) this year, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1740, which decided the establishment of a United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), whose primary tasks are shown below, acting on a request by the Nepalese Government. The establishment of UNMIN will last until January 22 next year.

- Monitoring the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides in line with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- Assisting the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC) in implementing their agreement on the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides
- Assisting in the monitoring of cease-fire arrangements
- Providing technical support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent Assembly
- Providing a small team of electoral monitors to study all technical aspects of the electoral process, and report on the conduct of the election

(2) Background behind Japan's Personnel Dispatch to UNMIN

Bordered by China and India, Nepal is located in a point of strategic importance, making the country's stability very important for the stability of its surrounding region. In light of the possibility that a so-called "bankrupt state" will become a hotbed of terrorists and will make impacts on the international situation, it is important for Japan, as a member of the Asian region, to make contribution not only on financial but also on personnel terms at a time when the international community is making lofty efforts to restore peace and stability in Nepal.




GSDF Lieutenant Colonel Ishibashi engaging in U.N. Political Mission (UNMIN) in Nepal (far left)

On March 27 this year, Japan's Cabinet, acting on a request by the United Nations for the dispatch of military-monitoring personnel to UNMIN operations, decided to dispatch personnel to the mission. Following the decision, six GSDF officers have been posted at UNMIN since March 30. (See Fig. III-3-1-14)

(3) Activities of GSDF Officers at UNMIN

The GSDF officers being dispatched to Nepal for UNMIN have been monitoring the management of arms held by the Nepalese military and the Maoists, and soldiers of both sides at five regional headquarters

Fig. III-3-1-14 Location of Military Monitoring Officers Placed under U.N. Political Mission in Nepal



of UNMIN in Nepal, and combined seven Maoist camps and barracks of the Nepalese military.

The six GSDF officers being dispatched to UNMIN do not carry weapons in line with provisions of the United Nations. The officers, dispatched on an individual basis, have been working as military-monitoring personnel, which is different from the past personnel dispatch by Japan for the support of U.N. peacekeeping operations where SDF officers were dispatched both as military-monitoring personnel and personnel posted for the assignment at peacekeeping headquarters.

3. International Peace Cooperation Activities in the Golan Heights

(1) Background to Japan's Decision to Send Troops to UNDOF


The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been undertaking peacekeeping operations in a zone called the Area of Separation (AOS), set up between the opposing troops of Syria and Israel that have agreed to a cease-fire. UNDOF's mission is to observe a cease-fire between the two countries and the implementation of measures stipulated under an agreement between the countries over the separation of their opposing troops.

Japan's SDF has been providing logistical support for UNDOF operations. (See Figs. III-3-1-15 • 16)

Japan's participation in the UNDOF operations is significant because it marks Japan's personnel contribution to world efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. The participation is also significant for Japan because it would help develop human resources so that he or she can fulfill duties for international peace cooperation activities.


The Government of Japan decided in December 1995 to dispatch SDF units and others to the UNDOF. In February 1996, the first transport unit of 43 personnel was sent to the Golan Heights, and replaced a Canadian transport unit. Since then, an SDF unit has been sent there every six months on a rotating basis. As of the end of May this year, the 23rd dispatch of the transport unit was operating in the Golan Heights.

Fig. III-3-1-15 Map of the Golan Heights and Its Vicinity



Note: — Denotes main transport routes.

Fig. III-3-1-16 Organizational Structure of UNDOF



(2) Activities of SDF

The dispatched SDF transport unit is in charge of transporting daily goods and materials needed for UNDOF operations from the harbors, airports and commodities markets of Israel, Syria and Lebanon to the UNDOF campsites. The unit also provides logistical support, including repairs of roads which have become slippery due to rain and snowfall, and removal of snow from streets in plateau areas with an altitude of more than 2,800 meters. The transport unit is stationed in the same campsite as Indian forces, which replaced Canadian forces in March last year. Members of the SDF and Indian forces share their meals and others.

The ASDF flies a C-130H transport plane and a U-4 multipurpose assistance plane to the Golan Heights every six months to transport goods and materials for the transport unit.

Two SDF officers being sent to the UNDOF headquarters overseas take charge of planning and coordination of transport and other UNDOF rear-support operations, and are also responsible for publicity and budget-related works. SDF officers are assigned to the UNDOF headquarters for about one year, and are replaced by other SDF personnel after completing their assignment. SDF personnel working at the UNDOF headquarters as of the end of May this year are the 12th to be sent there.

Japan had originally intended to complete its participation in UNDOF operations within two years. However, participation has continued until now after taking into consideration various factors, such as strong requests from the United Nations, commendation being given to past Japanese operations by the United Nations and relevant countries, and the importance of Japan's personnel contribution to peace in the Middle East. Japan's contribution to UNDOF has been deepened with the SDF dispatch to the mission totaling 23 units with a total of about 1,000 personnel.

The experience the SDF has accumulated through the mission has been helpful in paving the groundwork for participation in other U.N. peacekeeping operations and activities to support the reconstruction of Iraq.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel Working as a Member of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

Sergeant First Class Naoya Kudo, GSDF The 23rd Golan Heights Mission Transport Unit

I am responsible for supplies and medical services for the detachment section stationed in Camp Faouar in Syria.

My major duties include the acceptance inspection of delivered fuels and food and the arrangement for accommodation for visitors for the camp, as well as the management of supplies for the Japanese unit and the health control and provision of medical services for the unit members. The most difficult part of my duties is communication with other people. I need to speak English to make coordination with soldiers from other countries, and even simple Arabic when inspecting delivered fuels—my main duty. Most of local Syrian suppliers speak



Sergeant First Class Kudo coordinating activities with other staff in UNDOF Camp Faouar in Syria

only Arabic. I am trying very hard to communicate with them using gestures everyday, but these efforts sometimes fail, making us unable to receive fuels and other supplies at designated time. I am also sometimes annoyed by some local suppliers who try to cheat us on the quantity of fuel by saying “shwai shwai” (slowly) with the finger tips of each hand put together above the palm—a typical gesture of local people. Despite these difficulties, however, I am fulfilling my duties thanks to the support from my colleagues in the unit.

Through this mission, I have realized that we can communicate our feelings to each other even when we do not understand language and gestures. We are working here to maintain peace in Syria and Israel, which will ultimately lead to peace in the world and Japan. I am sure that our desire for peace is understood by local people.

Although working here is not easy, I am leading a very exciting life every day by actively playing my part on the global stage. I will continue to do my best for the peace of Japan and the international society in the future as well.

4. Dispatch of Self-Defense Officials to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

In 2000, the United Nations established the Panel²⁰ on U.N. Peace Operations to review all issues associated with peace operations including U.N. peacekeeping operations. The United Nations expanded the number of officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO Department) in line with recommendations by the panel, as a means of reinforcing the peacekeeping function of the U.N. headquarters.

In November 2001, the Law on Working Conditions of Defense Agency Officials Dispatched to International Organizations (then) (1995 Law No. 122; hereinafter referred to as the “Dispatched Defense Agency Officials Working Conditions Law”) was revised to enable the Defense Agency (then) to send its officials to the PKO Department. The revision was based on the judgment that the agency’s dispatch of officials to the U.N. department would contribute to supporting the United Nations in its efforts toward achieving world peace. Under the revised law, one GSDF officer was dispatched in December 2002 to the Military Planning Section of the Military Division in the PKO Department of the United Nations, which is located in the United States. The dispatched GSDF official has been participating in various works including policy planning and formulation of measures for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), set up in June 2004.

5. International Disaster Relief Operations

The Defense Ministry and the SDF are determined to step up international disaster-relief operations from the viewpoint of increasing humanitarian contributions and improving the international security environment. The Defense Ministry has kept the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF ready to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster-relief operation plans, whenever a situation in which their operations are deemed necessary arises. The SDF has dispatched its units overseas for international disaster-relief operations while closely examining specific relief requests filed by governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries. Each of the SDF’s three units—the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF—has been conducting international disaster-relief operations in a manner that would increase the function and ability of each unit. (See Fig. III-3-1-17) (See Reference 50)

1. Outline of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster-Relief Teams

Since the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster-Relief Teams (1987 Law No. 93; hereinafter referred to as “the International Disaster-Relief Law”) was enacted in 1987, Japan has engaged in international

Fig. III-3-1-17 International Disaster-Relief Operations and Others by the SDF

Duration	International Disaster-Relief Operations and Others	Region
Nov. 1998- Dec. 1998	International disaster-relief operations in response to Hurricane that hit Honduras	Latin America
Sept. 1999- Nov. 1999	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster-relief operations in quake-hit northwestern Turkey	Middle East
Feb. 2001	International disaster-relief operations in response to major earthquake in India	South Asia
Dec. 2003- Jan. 2004	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster-relief operations in quake-hit southeastern Iran	Middle East
Dec. 2004- March 2005	International disaster-relief operations after large-scale earthquake off Indonesia's Sumatra Island and consequent tsunami in Indian Ocean	Southeast Asia
Aug. 2005	International disaster-relief operations for Russian mini-submarine accident off Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia	North Pacific
Oct. 2005- Dec. 2005	International disaster-relief operations in response to major earthquake in Pakistan and other countries	South Asia
June 2006	International disaster-relief operations in response to major earthquake in central Java Island in Indonesia	Southeast Asia

disaster-relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations.

In 1992, the International Disaster-Relief Law was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster-relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster-relief operations with self-sufficient capabilities, including relief operations and medical treatment, and with the use of its own equipment, organizations and benefits of regular training, even when local support is not available for transport, accommodation, food and water supplies, communications, sanitation, and so forth.

2. International Disaster-Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF's Posture

International disaster-relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations. The SDF's past record on domestic disaster-relief operations indicates possible fields of cooperation to be extended by the SDF overseas for disaster relief.

These fields are:

- 1) medical service, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention;
- 2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster-relief personnel by helicopter;
- 3) ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices;

Also, the SDF may use transport planes and transport ships to carry disaster-relief personnel, and equipment to the affected area.

Regional units of the GSDF are assigned duties on a six-month rotational basis to ensure that they can provide medical, transport and water-supply services in a self-sufficient manner anytime the need for disaster-relief operations arises.

The MSDF and the ASDF are always prepared to have their fleet and air-support teams, respectively, transport supplies to their units or units participating in international disaster-relief operations anytime the need for disaster relief arises.

3. International Disaster-Relief Activities by Japan after Earthquake in Central Java Island

On May 27 last year, a large-scale earthquake hit central Java Island in Indonesia, destroying almost all of the buildings in southern part of the Yogyakarta Special Region, located near the focus of the quake, and leaving many people killed and injured.

On May 29, the Japanese Foreign Minister, acting on a request by the Government of Indonesia for Japan's cooperation, discussed its response to the quake with the Director-General of Defense Agency (then) based on the International Disaster-Relief Law. The discussion led the Government of Japan to dispatch SDF personnel to areas affected by the earthquake to have them undertake international disaster-relief operations. The SDF personnel being dispatched to the affected areas provided medical services to quake victims in view of the scarcity of medical doctors in the areas, especially in mountainous areas, treating a total of about 3,800 local people and vaccinating about 1,700 people as well as taking epidemic-prevention measures in a 4,300-square-meter area.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

The Prime Minister Visits SDF Units Engaged in International Peace Cooperation Activities

Prime Minister Abe visited Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces units engaged in international peace cooperation activities on the Indian Ocean and in Iraq and other locations for the first time as an incumbent Prime Minister while he was touring around five Middle East countries between late April and early May this year.

Prime Minister Abe, who arrived in the United Arab Emirates on April 29, visited the MSDF units performing supply operations on the Indian Ocean under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. In front of about 320 members of the supply ship *Hamana* and the destroyer *Suzunami*, he praised their efforts by quoting the words of President Karzai of Afghanistan "The MSDF is playing an indispensable role," and stating that their activities are acclaimed internationally, and that he is proud of them as the Commander in Chief.



Prime Minister Abe meeting the MSDF personnel on the supply ship *Hamana*



Prime Minister Abe welcomed by the ASDF personnel

Prime Minister Abe then went to Kuwait on May 1, and visited the ASDF units stationed in the Ali Al-Salem Air Base to perform activities under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. He admired, in front of about 210 members, their unity that made it possible to perform nearly 500 flights without accidents, and expressed his expectation that they will continue to contribute greatly to the reconstruction of Iraq by flying through the crystal

blue sky of Iraq and supporting the United Nations and the multinational forces as a representative of Japan. The Prime Minister also addressed that the Iraqi relief and reconstruction mission will be recorded in Japanese history as a brilliant achievement thanks to their dedication, and that they should be proud of it and are expected to continue to work hard with the mission of reconstructing Iraq.

Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

The new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) says making independent and proactive efforts to help improve an international security environment should be regarded as a major role to be played by defense capability. Based on the idea, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been promoting security dialogue and defense exchanges, including bilateral and multilateral training, in addition to participation in international peace cooperation activities.

This section will describe efforts being made by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to promote security dialogue and defense exchanges.

1. Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

After the end of the Cold War, it has become important for countries to curb meaningless arms races and prevent accidental military clashes and their escalation by increasing the transparency of their military capabilities and defense policies, and promoting dialogue and exchanges between defense officials from different countries, and bilateral defense exercises for mutual confidence-building. This idea is now widely shared in the international society.

In areas surrounding Japan, large-scale military forces, including nuclear arms, continue to exist, and a large number of countries have devoted themselves to modernizing their military capabilities. In addition, unclear and uncertain factors have remained over issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the Strait of Taiwan.

Imperative issues to be tackled together by the international community are how to respond to new threats and diverse contingencies, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of ballistic missiles. Against this background, it is widely recognized that the international community should join hands in addressing these issues.

Under these security circumstances, the Government of Japan, in order to solidify peace and stability of the international community and the region, recognizes that it is necessary for countries in the world to build relations of mutual confidence and promote defense cooperation both on bilateral and multilateral bases. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF thus place an importance on bilateral exchanges as well as, multilateral security dialogue such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and joint multilateral defense exercises. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will redouble their efforts to improve the security environment by deepening and widening these defense relations taking into account the movements of countries concerned.

In recent years, Japan's defense exchanges, in line with changes in the international situations and others, have come to place an emphasis on 1) confidence-building, and the significance of establishing and strengthening cooperative relations with the global community 2) more global exchanges that go beyond Japan's neighboring countries and 3) the importance of promoting not only goodwill exchanges but also practical exchanges, and stepping up not only dialogue-based exchanges but also action-based exchanges.

At a time when Japan's defense exchanges have been expanding both qualitatively and quantitatively, the Defense Ministry formulated a basic policy²¹ for defense exchanges in April this year as a way for all officials at the ministry to get united in implementing such exchanges strategically.

The basic policy features emphasizing exchanges²² aimed at contributing directly to enhanced international defense cooperation in addition to promoting conventional defense exchanges. The basic policy also calls for Japan to build relations of trust and cooperation with other countries by effectively utilizing a variety of defense-exchange means²³ not limited to bilateral dialogue and consultations.

The Ministry of Defense, based on the basic policy, will formulate region and country plans for defense exchanges, expand defense-exchange plans and their implementation, and devise a mid-term defense-exchange

program so that ideas and directions envisaged under the basic policy can become concrete and get realized. (See Fig. III-3-2-1)

Fig. III-3-2-1 Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

Classification	Type	Significance	Outline
Bilateral	High-level exchange of defense officials	Improving and reinforcing relations of mutual trust and cooperation through frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are of important concerns to both countries, and subsequently spur exchanges of the countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dialogue and mutual visits between Japan's Defense Minister and defense ministers from other countries • Dialogue and mutual visits between Japan's Senior Vice-Minister for Defense, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, Vice Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff at Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF Chief of Staff, and their counterparts in foreign countries
	Regular consultation between defense officials	Paving the basis for high-level dialogue and exchanges through continuous and direct exchanges of views between policy-makers of both countries in charge of national defense policy, and contributing to improvement and enhancement of relations of mutual trust and cooperation between the countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultation between Director-General-level officials, Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their counterpart in foreign countries • Dialogue between Japan's Joint Staff Office, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries
	Exchanges between units	Contributing to improvement and enhancement of relations of mutual trust and cooperation between the countries through joint defense exercises and joint events for exchanges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel exchanges • Mutual visits of MSDF Training Squadrons, aircraft, and joint exercises for search and rescue operations
	Exchange of students	Increasing understanding toward other country's defense policy and the situation of its defense units, and building relations of mutual trust through promotion of personnel exchanges involving relatively long stay in other country in addition to human exchanges for educational purpose, and establishing human networks between both countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mutual acceptance of students • Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations
	Research exchanges	Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of both countries through frank exchanges of views from researchers' viewpoint, and contributing to maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges	Research exchanges between Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in foreign countries
Multi-lateral	Security dialogue	Deepening mutual understanding on recognition of situations and security perceptions among concerned countries and discussing multilateral issues efficiently and effectively	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARF dialogue • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by the Defense Ministry • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by the Japanese Government • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by Japan's private sector
	Joint exercises	Improving defense skills and contributing to improvement and enhancement of relations of mutual trust and cooperation among concerned countries through joint defense exercises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel exchanges • Joint exercises for minesweeping and submarine-rescue operations

2. Bilateral Defense Relations

Bilateral defense exchanges, involving officials of two countries in charge of defense affairs, are intended to promote building of reliable and cooperative relations between them. The characteristics of bilateral defense relations lies in the fact that they can be tailored to meet special needs in bilateral relations and that bilateral relations of trust and cooperation established through such exchanges can become a basis on which to effectively promote multilateral security dialogue and others.

1. Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Exchanges

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is an important country for Japan's security given its geopolitical location. It is also a friendly country for Japan as both countries respect fundamental values such as freedom and democracy. The ROK has formed an alliance with the United States and let it station its forces in the country from the viewpoint of maintaining security, as Japan has done. Therefore, it is extremely important for Japan and the

ROK to promote mutual understanding and relations of trust, and establish a basis for cooperation and to coordinate and cooperate further effectively in policy-making for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region.

In their summit meeting in 1998, then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and then ROK President Kim Dae Jung pledged to work toward building a new partnership between the two countries, and announced a Joint Statement, entitled “A New Japan-ROK Partnership Toward the 21st Century.” The two leaders welcomed bilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges, and agreed to further promote them.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

Almost every year since 1994 (except for 2001, 2004 and 2006), the defense ministers of Japan and the ROK have met alternately in each other’s country.

In February this year, ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Jang-Soo visited Japan and exchanged views with his Japanese counterpart Fumio Kyuma over the situation of Northeastern Asia and defense policies of their countries. Kyuma and Kim agreed to set up a new emergency communication system between the director of the Operations Department of Japan’s Joint Staff Office and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and also agreed to start defense exchanges between defense facility-related sections of the two countries.

In March this year, Chief of Staff Takashi Saito of Japan’s Joint Staff Office visited ROK and held frank discussions with Kim Kwan Jin, Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In addition to holding military-to-military consultations (bilateral consultations at the Director-General level/the Councilor level) every year since 1994, Japan and the ROK have held bilateral security dialogue with participants that include diplomatic and defense authorities of the two countries since 1998.

In December last year, Japan and the ROK held the 14th military-to-military consultations, and defense officials from the two countries exchanged views over the East Asian situation, defense policies of the two countries, efforts by the two countries on international peace cooperation activities and Japan-ROK defense exchanges. In May this year, Japan and the ROK had the sixth bilateral security dialogue and exchanged views on the security situation surrounding the two countries and their security policies.

Dialogue has also been held between Japan’s Joint Staff Office and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and between Japan’s GSDF, MSDF and the ASDF, and the ROK Army, Navy and the Air Force respectively. In addition, Japan and the ROK have been promoting mutual exchanges of students and bilateral interchanges on defense research.

(3) Exchanges between Units

Japan’s GSDF and the ROK’s Army have promoted defense exchanges since 2001, including mutual visits by unit commanders between the GSDF’s Western Army and the ROK’s Second Army.

Exchanges between Japan’s MSDF and the ROK Navy, including mutual visits by naval vessels, have been carried out since 1994. In September last year, a vessel of the ROK Navy visited Japan on a training mission. The Japanese MSDF and the ROK Navy conducted their joint search and rescue exercise in June this year, the fifth of its kind between the two countries.

Japan’s ASDF and the ROK Air Force have continued exchanges through mutual visits by aircraft since 2000. The ASDF Central Band participated in an international military band festival held in ROK in October last year. The ASDF’s transport aircraft flew to ROK, marking their third visit to ROK, to transport some members of the ASDF Central Band and their musical instruments as well as making a goodwill visit to ROK.

2. Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges

Russia, also being a neighboring country of Japan, has a great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, making it extremely important for Japan to deepen defense exchanges with this country and promote relations of trust and cooperation.

With Japan-Russia relations continuing to develop in wider areas following the 1997 summit between their leaders in Krasnoyarsk, Japan's Ministry of Defense has been steadily promoting defense relations with Russia.

In 1999, Japan and Russia signed a memorandum to confirm the direction of their defense exchanges. In January 2003, then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made an official visit to Russia and signed the Japan-Russia Action Plan²⁴ with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In this Action Plan, the leaders of Japan and Russia confirmed that the two countries would steadily promote their defense relations by continuing programs such as high-level dialogue, consultations between defense officials of both countries, bilateral exercises and goodwill exercises. Moreover, when Russian President Putin visited Japan in November 2005 and held talks with then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, the two leaders confirmed that relations between Japan and Russia have advanced steadily in wider fields in line with the Japan-Russia Action Plan.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In 1996, then Minister of State for Defense Hideo Usui visited Russia, becoming the first Japanese defense chief to visit the country since the Soviet era.

When then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga visited Russia in January of last year, Japan and Russia renewed the 1999 memorandum on defense exchanges between the two countries. Then Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov told his counterpart Nukaga that the Japan-Russia Action Plan has helped pave the foundation for the two countries to deepen cooperation between their high-level defense officials. Minister Ivanov also said defense exchanges have deepened most between MSDF and Russia's Navy but added he wanted to promote exchanges between GSDF and the ASDF, and Russia's Army and the Air Force. Minister Nukaga and Minister Ivanov also agreed that GSDF and Russia's ground troops will mutually visit each other's country to attend defense exercises as observers. They also agreed that representatives and aircraft of the ASDF and Russia's Air Force will be sent to each other's country.

In May last year, then GSDF Chief of Staff Mori visited Russia and held frank talks with Aleksei Maslov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. In October last year, Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, visited Japan and exchanged views with Saito, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office.



Saito, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office, meets Baluyevsky, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

The Ministry of Defense has continued to hold consultations with Russia, such as Japan-Russia Bilateral Working Group meetings, to discuss how to promote their defense relations in addition to holding regular consultations between Director-General level/Councilor-level defense officials of the two countries. It has also continued to hold an annual conference to review the implementation of the Japan-Russia Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas.

Besides, the GSDF and ASDF have actively held dialogue with their respective Russian counterparts, the Russian Ground and Air Forces, including Staff Talks between Japan's Joint Staff Office and the General Staff Office of the Russian Armed Forces. In addition, the National Institute for Defense Studies has continued to conduct joint studies with a research institute²⁵ affiliated with the Russian Defense Ministry.

(3) Exchanges between Units

The GSDF and the Russian Ground Forces have promoted their mutual exchanges since 2003, including a mutual visit to each other's country between the Russian Commander of Far Eastern Military District and the Commanding General of the GSDF's Northern Army. In October last year, the Commanding General of the GSDF's Northern Army visited the Far Eastern Military District of Russia.

The MSDF and the Russian Navy have conducted mutual visits by vessels every year since the MSDF's first port visit on Vladivostok in 1996. Both parties have conducted bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations since 1998. In October last year, the MSDF and the Russian Navy conducted their eighth joint exercise for search and rescue operations when a warship of the Russian Pacific Fleet visited Japan.

3. Japan-China Defense Exchanges

China has great influence on the Asia-Pacific region and its outstanding economic development and the modernization of its military capabilities in recent years have drawn much attention from other countries in the world. Japan's deepening mutual understanding with China on the defense front and promoting relations of trust between them will be meaningful not only for increasing the security of the two countries but also for ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In his visit to China in 1998, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fumio Kyuma and his Chinese counterpart reached an agreement on the ways to promote defense relations between Japan and China, including continued dialogue between their chiefs of defense.

In their summit meeting in 1998, then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and then Chinese President Jiang Zemin released the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development. The two leaders confirmed that defense relations between Japan and China had played an important role in increasing mutual understanding, and agreed to promote defense and security exchanges in a gradual manner.

Furthermore, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made an official visit to Japan in October last year, Japan and China released a Joint Press Statement in which the two countries agreed to deepen mutual trust on the security front through bilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges. In meetings of Japanese and Chinese leaders held in January and April this year, the two countries agreed to upgrade a system of communication between defense authorities of both countries. In the April summit, the Chinese side expressed intention to have National Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan visit Japan in autumn this year.

The Defense Ministry, through meeting with Chinese defense authorities, strove to deepen their understanding of Japan's defense policy while asking Beijing to increase the transparency of its defense capability and defense policy.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In September 2003, then Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba visited China and met with Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan. At their meeting, Minister Ishiba and Minister Cao agreed that Japan and China would promote defense exchanges, including those between high-level defense officials.

In November last year, Zhang Qinsheng, then Assistant Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, visited Japan and held talks with Japanese Administrative Vice Minister for Defense

Takemasa Moriya over the regional situation, defense policies of Japan and China, and bilateral defense exchanges. Moriya and Zhang agreed on the importance for the two countries to further promote exchanges between defense officials of their countries.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In July of last year, Japan and China held security dialogue between their diplomatic and defense officials. The two countries also have promoted research and educational exchanges, which mainly involve acceptance of Chinese defense officials for the enrolment in a regular course of Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies. The two countries also have continued mutual visits between defense officials taking regular courses at Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, the Joint Staff College and China's National Defense University.



Zhang Qinsheng, Assistant Chief of General Staff of the General Staff Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (then), meets Japanese Administrative Vice Minister for Defense Moriya

(3) Exchange between Units

When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan in April of this year, he and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed that the two countries will make efforts to realize mutual port visits by warships at an early date.

4. Defense Exchanges with Australia

Australia, sharing with Japan fundamental values such as respect for freedom, human rights, and democracy, is an important partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. On the security issue, both countries, being allies of the United States, share the same strategic interest, and there are many issues of mutual concern in the area of defense. In this context, it is important for Japan to promote defense relations with Australia, establish a basis for cooperative relationship, and step up cooperation and coordination more effectively, in order to secure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In recent years, defense exchanges between Japan and Australia have been deepened and expanded with bilateral collaboration²⁶ on the security field advancing steadily, including cooperation in Iraqi reconstruction activities and humanitarian support in the event of disasters.

Based on these circumstances, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Australian counterpart John Howard released the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation²⁷ on March 13 of this year in order for the two countries to further strengthen bilateral security cooperation under a comprehensive framework.

The Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation is intended to devise a framework for the two countries to further strengthen and expand their bilateral cooperation on the security front.

The scope of security cooperation between Japan and Australia will include at least nine items shown below:

- 1) law enforcement on combating transnational crime, including trafficking in illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting currency and arms smuggling;
- 2) border security;
- 3) counter-terrorism;
- 4) disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- 5) peace operations;

- 6) exchange of strategic assessments and related information;
- 7) maritime and aviation security;
- 8) humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief;
- 9) contingency planning, including for pandemics.

As part of the above-mentioned cooperation, Japan and Australia will, as appropriate, strengthen practical cooperation, including through:

- 1) exchange of personnel;
- 2) joint exercises and training to further increase effectiveness of cooperation, including in the area of humanitarian relief operations;
- 3) coordinated activities including those in the areas of law enforcement, peace operations, and regional capacity building.

The two countries agreed on four items shown below for implementation in the future.

- Japan and Australia will develop an action plan with specific measures to advance security cooperation in the above areas.
- Japan and Australia will build on their dialogue between Defense Ministers, on an annual basis.
- Japan and Australia will further strengthen the strategic dialogue between their Foreign Ministers on an annual basis.
- Japan and Australia will enhance joint Defense and Foreign Ministry dialogue, including through the establishment of a regular Ministerial dialogue.



Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2-Plus-2”)

Based on this joint declaration, Japanese Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma and his Australian counterpart Brendan Nelson held talks in Tokyo in June this year. During Nelson’s stay in Tokyo, Japan and Australia also held Joint Defense and Foreign Ministerial Consultations (“two-plus-two”) for the first time. During the Kyuma-Nelson meeting, Japan and Australia highly evaluated the advancement of defense exchanges between the two countries and their cooperation in the field of international peace cooperation activities that has been enhanced between them since Japan’s participation in peacekeeping

operations in Cambodia. The defense chiefs of the two countries also agreed to expand bilateral defense exchanges by promoting exchanges between their defense units through mutual visits of aircraft and ships and boosting personnel exchanges. The defense chiefs also agreed to cooperate in contributing to trilateral collaboration between Japan, the United States and Australia and multilateral collaboration by promoting bilateral cooperation between Japan and Australia. Kyuma and Nelson also decided to begin work to update a memorandum on defense exchanges which the defense chiefs of the two countries agreed during their meeting in 2003, as the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation action plan in the field of defense. During their “two-plus-two” security talks, the Defense and Foreign Ministers of the two countries highly evaluated and welcomed these agreements between Kyuma and Nelson, and issued a Joint Statement²⁸ that evaluated and welcomed the accords.

Based on the Kyuma-Nelson meeting and the “two-plus-two” security talks, Japan and Australia have been currently holding consultations in order to expand their defense cooperation.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

Japan and Australia have continuously promoted exchanges between high-level defense officials, including the defense chiefs of their countries. Then Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill visited Japan in September 2003 and met with then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba. During their meeting, Hill and Ishiba signed a memorandum on defense exchanges between Japan and Australia.

In March this year, Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma met with Australian Prime Minister John Howard during the latter's visit to Japan. Kyuma and Howard then confirmed the need for the two countries to advance bilateral defense exchanges in the future. When Japanese Defense Minister Kyuma attended the sixth Asia Security Conference sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Study (IISS) in June this year, he held talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Australian Defense Minister Brendan Nelson, marking the first trilateral meeting of defense chiefs between Japan, the United States and Australia. The defense chiefs of Japan, the United States and Australia agreed to promote security and defense cooperation among the three countries.

In September last year, Geoff Shepherd, Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force, visited Japan and held talks with then ASDF Chief of Staff Tadashi Yoshida while in March this year, Peter Leahy, Chief of the Australian Army, visited Japan and met with then GSDF Chief of Staff Tsutomu Mori. In February this year, MSDF Chief of Staff Eiji Yoshikawa visited Australia and held discussion with Russ Shalders, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy.



MSDF Chief of Staff Yoshikawa meets Sir Band, U.K. First Sea Lord

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

Japan and Australia have held military-to-military talks at the Director-General level/Councilor level as well as security dialogue which include diplomatic officials every year since 1996. The Joint Staff Office, the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective counterparts in the Australian military on a regular basis. Both countries have accepted each other's defense officials in their defense-related educational institutions and promoted research exchanges.

Especially in recent years, the two countries frequently held talks on various topics, reflecting the advancement of bilateral cooperative relations. Last year, the two countries held consultations of defense officials for two times. They held similar consultations in May this year. In April this year, Japan, the United States and Australia held Director-General-level talks for the first time and discussed defense cooperation among the three countries and other issues.

(3) Exchanges between Units

Japan and Australia have promoted defense exchanges, including mutual goodwill visits by vessels and aircraft between the MSDF and the Royal Australian Navy. Most recently, the MSDF's P-3C patrol airplanes made a goodwill visit to Australia for the first time and conducted an exercise in May and June last year.

In addition, Japan and Australia have promoted their defense exchanges in the field of international peace cooperation. The GSDF units dispatched to East Timor and Iraq, for example, had exchanges with units of the Australian Army sent there.

5. Defense Exchanges with U.K.



Sir Torpy, Chief of the Air Staff of U.K. Royal Air Force, meets ASDF Chief of Staff Tamogami

Being a major power having influence not only on the European area but also on the world, the U.K. has maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan has shared the same strategic interest with the U.K. because both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relations, it is important for both Japan and the U.K. to promote defense exchanges, build a basis of cooperation and promote cooperation and coordination.

In January 2004, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba and then U.K. Secretary of State for Defense Geoff Hoon signed a memorandum on bilateral defense exchanges, which confirmed the two countries' resolve to promote defense exchanges at all levels and in various fields.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In January last year, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga visited the U.K. and met with then U.K. Secretary of State for Defense John Reid. During their meeting, Minister Nukaga and Secretary Reid confirmed that high-level and working-level defense exchanges have advanced between Japan and the U.K. They also discussed the progress of Iraqi Security Forces' training and the process of transferring security authorities to Iraq.

When Nukaga attended the fifth IISS Asia Security Conference in June last year, he met with Adam Ingram, U.K. Minister of State for the Armed Forces. During their meeting, Nukaga expressed gratitude to Ingram for cooperation being extended by U.K. armed forces to Japan's SDF troops operating in Iraq. Nukaga and Ingram also exchanged views over issues including the transfer of security authorities to Iraq.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

Japan and the U.K. frequently hold exchanges of their defense officials. Among such exchanges are Director-General level and councilor-level defense talks and security talks that also include diplomatic officials, including exchanges of views over defense policies of the two countries and Iraqi issues. Japan's Joint Staff Office, the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective U.K. counterparts on a regular basis. Both countries have accepted each other's defense officials in their defense-related educational institutions and promoted research exchanges.

(3) Exchanges between Units

The GSDF²⁹ deployed its troops in Muthanna Province in Iraq in January 2004 following the deployment there of the U.K. forces.

The GSDF troops promoted exchanges with those of the U.K. forces in Samawah in the province.

6. Japan-India Defense Exchanges

Traditionally, India has maintained friendly relations with Japan, with both respecting such fundamental values as democracy and market-oriented economy.

India, with its vast land and its population exceeding 1 billion, has had great influence on the security of the South Asian region. South Asia is an important region for the safety of sea-lane linking Japan and the Middle East, and is also important for operations being conducted by SDF in the Indian Ocean.

Given these relations, it is meaningful for Japan and India to hold consultations to exchange views over defense policies of the two countries and the regional situation, and deepen their mutual understanding as well as to promote relations of mutual trust and cooperation.

In December last year, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan and signed a joint statement between Japan and India after meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In the joint statement, the two countries agreed to upgrade Japan-India relations to “Strategic and Global Partnership³⁰⁾” and specified measures to be taken in political and security fields toward building such partnership.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In May last year, then Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Japan and held talks with then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga over defense policies of the two countries and the international situation. After the meeting, the defense chiefs of the two countries signed a joint statement concerning bilateral cooperation in the field of defense. Last year, then MSDF Chief of Staff Takashi Saito, then GSDF Chief of Staff Tsutomu Mori and then ASDF Chief of Staff Tadashi Yoshida separately visited India, holding frank talks with their respective Indian counterparts.

In January this year, Indian Air Force Chief of Staff S.P. Tyagi visited Japan and exchanged views with then ASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida. In April this year, Indian Army Chief of Staff J.J. Singh visited Japan and exchanged views with GSDF Chief of Staff Ryoichi Oriki.

In April this year, Indian Defense Secretary Shekhar Dutt visited Japan and held a Japan-India Defense Policy Dialogue with Japanese Vice Minister of Defense Takemasa Moriya by upgrading the previous Vice Defense Minister-level meeting. Moriya and Dutt exchanged views on how to deepen defense exchanges between the two countries in the future and regional situations.



Chief of Indian Army Staff Singh meets GSDF Chief of Staff Oriki



Indian Air Force Chief Tyagi meets ASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida (then)

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In February last year, Japan and India held Director-General level/Councilor-level talks of defense officials and exchanged views with each other about defense exchanges between the two countries and the regional situation. Furthermore, Japan and India have promoted research exchanges, including acceptance of each other’s defense officials as students and mutually dispatching their researchers on defense issues.

(3) Exchange between Units

The MSDF and the Indian Navy have frequently visited each other's country in the past with MSDF vessels on overseas training cruises, for example, conducting a goodwill exercise with units of the Indian Navy for the promotion of unit-to-unit exchanges between the two countries. In April of this year, three vessels of the Indian Navy paid a port call in Japan, marking the 15th visit to Japan by an Indian Navy warship. During the Indian vessels' visit, Japan, the United States and India conducted a trilateral joint maritime exercise.

The music band of the Indian Army participated in an SDF Marching Festival held in November last year.

7. Defense Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries

Southeast Asian countries are situated in areas deemed as strategically important for maritime traffic, and they also have close economic relations with Japan. Therefore, promoting dialogue between Japan and these countries on security issues and deepening relations of mutual trust and cooperation are of great importance for both sides.

In August of last year, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga held talks with Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono and agreed that Japan and Indonesia will promote dialogue and cooperation in the fields of maritime security and disaster-relief operations.

In January this year, Japanese Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma visited Thailand and held talks with Thai Defense Minister Boonrawd Somtas. During the meeting, the ministers of Japan and Thailand deepened their mutual understanding about defense policies of their countries and the regional situation.

The recent high-level exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asian countries are shown in Fig. III-3-2-2. This shows how defense relations between Japan and these countries have steadily progressed.

Fig. III-3-2-2 Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries (since last year)

Visit

Date	Visitors	Visited Countries
Aug. 2006	Then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	Indonesia
Nov. 2006	Saito, Chief of Staff at Joint Staff Office	Malaysia
Jan. 2007	Defense Minister Kyuma	Thailand
Jan. 2007	MSDF Chief of Staff Yoshikawa	Indonesia
Mar. 2007	Then GSDF Chief of Staff Mori	Vietnam

Visit

Date	Visitors
Aug. 2006	Commander-in-Chief of Singapore Armed Forces
Nov. 2006	Indonesian Deputy Defense Minister
Nov. 2006	Commander-in-Chief of Indonesian Armed Forces
Mar. 2007	Malaysian Defense Minister

In addition to exchanges by high-level officials, Japanese defense officials have held consultations with working-level defense officials from Southeast Asian countries on a regular basis to promote discussions on security and defense issues involving both sides and build relations of mutual understanding and confidence. Japan and Southeast Asian countries have also steadily promoted staff talks between defense staff organizations, exchanges of researchers and students as well as units including port visits. Through these defense relations, Japan and Southeast Asian countries have been able to lay the foundation for building a multilateral defense network, which would play an important role for realizing peace and stability in the region.

8. Defense Exchanges with Other Countries

In addition to neighboring countries described above, Japan has promoted defense exchanges with many other countries.

The Defense Ministry has held high-level exchanges, working-level consultations and student exchanges with many other countries around the world. Among them are Pakistan, a country which has played an important role in global efforts to fight against terrorism, Canada, a country with which Japan had undertaken the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights, Asia-Pacific countries like Mongolia, and countries related to the SDF's aid mission in Iraq like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), European countries, and international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

On unit-to-unit levels, mutual visits by vessels have been frequent along with mutual exchanges between SDF units and units of foreign militaries belonging to countries where Japan's international peace cooperation operations are underway.

The recent high-level defense exchanges between Japan and other countries are shown in Fig. III-3-2-3. This indicates Japan has endeavored to build close cooperative relations with many foreign countries in defense areas.

In September last year, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga visited Mongolia and held talks with Mongolian Defense Minister Mishigiyn Sonompil. Also in September, Nukaga held talks with Canadian Defense Minister Gordon O'Connor. In October last year, Minister of State for Defense Fumio Kyuma held talks with New Zealand Defense Minister Phil Goff, exchanging views with them over the regional situation and international peace cooperation activities. In May this year, Defense Minister Kyuma visited Italy and Belgium, exchanging views with Italian Defense Minister Arturo Parisi, Belgian Defense Minister Andre Flahaut and NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer over the regional situation and international peace cooperation activities.

In January this year, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the NATO headquarters and held talks with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Abe attended a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's decision-making body, and delivered a speech³¹ to the NAC, making him the Japanese Prime Minister to speak before the council.

In February this year, MSDF Chief of Staff Eiji Yoshikawa visited New Zealand and held talks with Chief of the New Zealand Navy David Ledson over the regional situation and defense exchanges between Japan and New Zealand.



Togoo, Chief of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Mongolia, meets GSDF Chief of Staff Mori (then)

Japan held working-level consultations of defense officials with New Zealand in May last year and similar consultations with Pakistan in September last year. In February this year, Japan's Ground Staff Office held talks with the Pakistan Army for the first time.

Japan's defense exchanges with many other countries that share the same principles of freedom and democracy have played an important role for global peace and stability. (See Fig. III-3-2-4)

Fig. III-3-2-3 Exchanges with Other Countries

Date	Visitors	Visited Countries
Jan. 2006	Then Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Aichi	Austria, Slovakia, Czech Republic
Feb. 2006	Then MSDF Chief of Staff Saito (Currently Chief of Staff at Joint Staff Office)	Middle East, India
Mar. 2006	Then GSDF Chief of Staff Mori	India, Pakistan
Apr. 2006	Then ASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida	India, Pakistan
Jul. 2006	Then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	Kuwait
	Then Senior Vice Minister for Defense Kimura	Bahrain and UAE
	Then Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Takagi	Turkey, Ukraine
Sept. 2006	Then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	Mongolia
	Vice Minister for Defense Moriya	France
Nov. 2006	Then ASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida	Canada
Feb. 2007	MSDF Chief of Staff Yoshikawa	Australia, New Zealand
May 2007	Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kitagawa	Portugal and Spain
	Defense Minister Kyuma	Italy, Belgium and NATO

Date	Visitors
Jan. 2006	OSCE Chairman
Mar. 2006	Chief of Canadian Air Force
Jun. 2006	Chief of Pakistan Armed Forces
Jul. 2006	Chief of Belgian Armed Forces
Aug. 2006	Chief of Qatar Armed Forces
Sept. 2006	Chief of Royal Australian Air Force
Oct. 2006	Chief of Staff, Royal Swedish Navy
	New Zealand Defense Minister
Nov. 2006	Secretary General of French National Defense
Jan. 2007	Chief of Mongolian Armed Forces
Mar. 2007	French Defense Minister
Apr. 2007	German Defense Minister
May 2007	State Secretary Ministry of Defense, Latvia

Fig. III-3-2-4 Japan's Defense Exchanges (latest five years)

Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
		Singapore		
International conferences and others		ROK		Australia ¹
Visits		Mongolia		The Philippines
Acceptance of visits		The Philippines	The Philippines	New Zealand
Singapore		Australia	New Zealand	India
Australia		UK	Mongolia	ROK
France		Australia	Indonesia	Singapore
Russia		Singapore	Australia	NATO
India		Malaysia	Singapore	Belgium
China	The Netherlands	Indonesia	India	Italy
ROK	France	The Philippines	Canada	Thailand
ROK	UK	ROK	New Zealand	Australia ²
Mongolia	UK	Singapore	Mongolia	Germany
Russia	Finland	New Zealand	Indonesia	France
Australia	The Netherlands	Switzerland	Russia	ROK
New Zealand	Kuwait	NATO	UK	Malaysia

Exchanges of Working-Level Officials

Countries	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
ROK	◎●●	●	●	●	◎●
China		◎▲▲	▲	▲◎	
Russia	●	●	●	●	
Australia	◎●		●	◎●●	●
New Zealand			●	●	
Singapore	●	●	●		●
Thailand	◎●			◎●	
Vietnam	◎●		◎●		
The Philippines			◎●	◎●	
Indonesia					●
Malaysia			●		
India		◎	◎●	◎●	△
Pakistan		◎●		◎●	
UK		●		◎●	◎●
France	◎●	◎●	◎●	◎●	◎●
Germany	◎●	◎	◎●	◎●	
Canada			◎●	●	
NATO	◎			◎	◎

◎ Working-level meetings of officials of foreign affairs authorities and defense authorities
 ● Working-level meetings of officials of defense authorities
 ▲ Administrative vice minister-level meetings of defense officials from Japan and China
 △ Defense policy dialogue between vice defense ministers of Japan and India

Notes: 1. A meeting of defense chiefs was held between Japan, the U.S.A. and Australia.
 2. In addition to a meeting of defense chiefs between Japan and Australia, "2+2" security talks were held between the Defense and Foreign Ministers of Japan and Australia.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Studying at the NATO Defense College

Lieutenant Colonel Taro Omori, ASDF
 NATO Defense College student (currently Air Staff Office)

I studied in the Senior Course 109 at the NATO Defense College in Rome from August 28, 2006 to February 2, 2007. The NATO Defense College accepts 70 to about 80 colonel/lieutenant colonel-class officers or civil officers of equivalent rank from more than 30 friendly countries including the NATO member countries and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries for each Senior Course. The course was held twice a year to provide strategic level education so that the participants can be assigned to NATO-related posts in the future.

The studying environment was superb with prominent professors, ambassadors, soldiers and other experts invited every day from various countries to give a high-quality lecture and to have discussion with

us. In addition, the course offered us an opportunity to visit more than 10 countries in Europe, North America and other regions as field study to check what I had learnt in the class at actual sites. Furthermore, focus was also placed on learning negotiation and decision-making skills in the multinational environment where it is not easy to reach a consensus among people from different political, economical and cultural backgrounds. In this way, the curriculum of this course was well thought out to build a foundation on which NATO can work smoothly.

NATO is often referred to as the most successful military alliance in history. NATO has been actively promoting a reform through careful deliberations since the end of the Cold War—the 9/11 terrorist attacks in particular. The future direction that NATO will take is similar to that of Japan, and the study at the college made me realize that Japan and NATO need to further enhance their mutual cooperation to appropriately deal with new global threats.

I would like to contribute to the development of the Japan-NATO relationships in the future as well by making the most of these precious experiences I had at the college.



Lieutenant Colonel Omori discussing at the NATO Defense College (far left)

3. Multilateral Security Dialogue

1. Significance of Multilateral Security Dialogue

Multilateral security dialogue is extremely significant because participating countries can increase their mutual understanding and relations of mutual trust by exchanging views on security issues of mutual concern. Such security dialogue can also effectively contribute to bringing about regional peace and stability, with concerned countries tackling issues that affect multiple countries while making coordination and cooperation.

2. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

At the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in 1993, the foreign ministers from these 17 countries and those from the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU), agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. Since its first ministerial meeting in 1994, the number of members of the ARF has gradually increased as the forum has held its regular meeting annually. At present, the number of members stands at 25 countries and one organization³².

The ARF is not a type of security organization as seen in Europe but the ARF has significance because it provides opportunities for member countries to send both diplomatic and defense officials to various inter-governmental meetings.

The Ministry of Defense believes that it is necessary for defense officials among ARF member countries to enhance mutual confidence during the process of the ARF so that the ARF would become a forum to generate a sense of being part of one community among its members, and thereby stabilize the region's security environment. From this perspective, the Ministry of Defense has been continuing its efforts to deepen mutual understanding within the ARF by continuing to participate in the ARF process, by encouraging ARF members to increase the transparency of their defense policies and by promoting frank discussion among members' defense officials.

In recent years, ARF member countries have been actively exchanging their views on common regional security issues including international disaster-relief activities, maritime security and peacekeeping activities. The Ministry of Defense has been actively taking part in such discussion being made among ARF countries.

The ARF has held the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (CBM³³/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference in addition to the Foreign Ministerial Meeting every year. Aside from the so-called Plenary Meeting, which is composed of foreign and defense ministry officials from the ARF member countries, defense officials have convened their own “Defense Officials Dialogue” in advance of the Plenary Meeting. Since the 2002 Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Japan Defense Ministry has steadily increased its involvement in the ARF, actively participating in these meetings, and frankly exchanging views with defense officials from other ARF member countries.

3. Multilateral Security Dialogue Sponsored or Participated in by the Japan Defense Ministry and the SDF

The Defense Ministry believes that it is important for Japan to take the initiative in multilateral security dialogue in order to promote relations of mutual confidence and cooperation among defense officials of Japan and other countries through information exchanges and discussions. The Defense Ministry also believes that by doing so, Japan can contribute to making the Asia-Pacific region stable. Thus, the Defense Ministry has sponsored various seminars to promote multilateral security dialogue while it has also actively participated in such forums sponsored by foreign countries and other organizations. (See Figs. III-3-2-5 • 6)

In particular, the Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) has been sponsored by the Ministry of Defense every year since 1996. The Forum is designed to contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deepening mutual understanding among participating countries on each other’s defense policy and increasing the transparency of their defense policies. In the forum, defense officials of participating countries have exchanged views on defense policies, and efforts being made by each country to foster mutual trust in the field of defense.

The 11th Tokyo Defense Forum in October last year was participated in by 23 countries, European Union (EU), U.N. OCHA and the ASEAN Secretariat. The participants exchanged views under the agenda of “Efforts to Develop Strategies and Procedures for International Cooperation and Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief Operations”.

The IISS Asia Security Conference is an international conference being held annually in Singapore under the sponsorship of an organization in the private sector and is the only conference being participated in by a large number of defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the head of Japanese delegation, Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma participated in this conference in June this year, delivering a speech³⁴ on “Nuclear Challenges.” In the speech, Kyuma clarified Japan’s basic policy on nuclear issues and emphasized that North Korea issues such as nuclear development were an issue that should be tackled by the international community as a whole. He then explained the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and appealed for international cooperation to tackle this issue.



Parliamentary Secretary of Defense Omae delivering speech at 11th Tokyo Defense Forum

Fig. III-3-2-5 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations	
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	Internal Bureaus and others	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange, all from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence-building in defense areas with major attention paid to each country's national defense.	The 11th Tokyo Defense Forum in October last year was participated in by 23 countries and European Union, UN OCHA and ASEAN Secretariat were also invited. The participants exchanged views under the agenda of "Efforts to Develop Strategies and Procedures for International Cooperation and Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief Operations." Participants agreed that efforts in the area of these issues within the framework of ARF should be further pursued.
		Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Sub committee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with Director (colonel)-level working officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on defense issues including diversified military roles.	The 6th Sub committee of the Tokyo Defense Forum in January this year was participated in by 21 countries and the EU. The participants exchanged views under the agenda of "National Defense Policies," and "Instances of Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace-Building." Participants agreed that further discussion on efforts to promote international military cooperation and civil-military cooperation in peace-building are necessary.
	GSDF	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting government officials in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic systems.	The 10th MLST meeting was held in December last year with working-level officials in charge of logistic support, sent from armies of Australia, the ROK, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States, and from U.S. Marines, participating. Participants exchanged views on logistic support to be extended in international humanitarian support activities and disaster-relief operations.
		Army Command and General Staff College Seminar	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.	The sixth seminar was held in August last year with students of army academies from seven Asia-Pacific countries participating. Participants exchanged views on the roles of an army in battle against terrorism and how army training should be.
	MSDF	Seminar of Naval Academies in the Asia-Pacific Region	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with teachers of naval academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on roles of naval capabilities.	The 10th seminar was held in February this year with officials related to naval academies from 14 Asia-Pacific countries being invited. Participants exchanged views on challenges facing navies in multilateral cooperation.
		Navy Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation (WPNS SONG))	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2000 with students of naval academies participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on regional security and naval leadership.	The sixth seminar was held in November last year mainly with students of naval academies from 20 Asia-Pacific countries participating. Participants discussed naval leadership and how to evaluate such leadership, and each country's recognition of situations regarding maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the third seminar, this meeting has been named Seminar for Officers of Next Generation under the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations	
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	ASDF	International Air Force Education Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with officials related to air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on cadet education.	The 11th seminar was held in December last year with six countries being invited. Participants mainly exchanged views on how cadet education should be at the air force of each country.
		Air Command and Staff Course Students Exchange Program	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security issues and the roles of each country.	The sixth seminar was held in October last year with students of air force academies from nine Asia-Pacific countries participating. Participants exchanged views on security in the Asia-Pacific region and efforts by each country to ensure such security.
	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with teachers of military academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on cadet education.	The 11th seminar was held in July last year with 14 countries being invited. Participants exchanged views on leadership education for the era of integrated and multilateral collaboration.
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	The 10th seminar was held in March this year with 13 countries being invited. Participants exchanged views on security in the multi polar era.
	National Institute for Defense Studies	Asia-Pacific Security Seminar	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1994 with military officers from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security order in the region.	The 13th seminar was held in November last year with 21 countries participating. Under the main theme of military changes and security of the Asia-Pacific region, participants analyzed military changes of each country from a multi-angle, examined the impact of such changes on security and exchanged views on issues associated with regional cooperation for the enhancement of regional stability.
		International Security Symposium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with security researchers participating. The symposium is designed to provide them with opportunities to publicly exchange views and release reports on security for the purpose of deepening the general public's understanding on security issues.	This symposium was held in February this year with eminent scholars on security being invited from the United States and Japan. Participants exchanged views on rising China and the limit of the country that stands at the crossroads.
		International Security Colloquium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with people at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to have advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.	This forum was held in February this year with researchers from the United States being invited along with Japanese security experts. Participants exchanged views on how to make China a responsible stakeholder.
		Forum on War History Studies	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with military researchers participating. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of participants by making comparison of war history studies.	This forum was held in September last year with researchers on war history being invited from the United States, U.K., ROK, China and Russia. Participants exchanged views under the title of review of Korean War and its legacy.

Fig. III-3-2-6 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues

Other Multilateral Security Dialogues			Overview	
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureaus and others	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (AMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.	
	Joint Staff Office	Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating country on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.	
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted by a Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation nearby 30 countries.	
	GSDF	Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993.	
		Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999.	
	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.	
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.	
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotational basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when a minesweeping exercise is not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2006.	
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in this conference since the first meeting in 1989.	
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This symposium is hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every year. (held twice in 1996 and 1997) Air force strategy-formulation chiefs from Pacific-Rim countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting 1995.	
	Hosted by the Private Sector	Asia Security Conference		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in U.K., this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on regional security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.
		The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego and private-sector research institutes in the United States, Russia, China, the ROK and Japan (among them the Japan Institute of International Affairs), this dialogue is designed for participants—private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries—to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in Northeast Asia. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.

On the occasion of the IISS conference, Defense Minister Kyuma separately met with his counterparts from the ROK, Singapore, India, New Zealand and the Philippines to exchange views on defense issues. His trilateral defense ministerial meeting with the defense chiefs of the United States and Australia was the first of its kind.

4. Multilateral Exercises

1. Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Defense Ministry and the SDF consider participating in or hosting multilateral exercises will contribute not only to improving their maneuvering skills but also to helping establish the foundation for building cooperative relationship among participating countries through cooperation and exchange of views.

Since 2000, multilateral exercises involving various elements such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations, have been conducted in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to conventional combat exercises.

Specific exercises thus far conducted on a multilateral basis include refugee rescue training held as part of the Rim of the Pacific Exercise in 2000, the “Cobra Gold” Exercise conducted by the United States, Thailand and other countries focusing on humanitarian assistance and peace-enforcement activities, and the exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific, which was hosted by Singapore in 2000, Japan in 2002 and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2004.

The Defense Ministry and the SDF will continue to participate in these multilateral exercises proactively and on their own initiative.

2. Efforts on multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region

(1) Hosting Multilateral Exercises

The MSDF hosted “Pacific Reach 2002” in April 2002, a multilateral exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific³⁵. This was the first time Japan hosted a multilateral exercise. In October 2002, the MSDF hosted the Multilateral Search and Rescue Exercises³⁶.

The SDF has sent its officers to the annual Cobra Gold exercises since 2005. In May this year, SDF officers participated in a command post exercise for U.N. peacekeeping activities and joined a medical division of humanitarian and civic assistance activities.

Multilateral exercises in which the SDF recently participated are shown in Fig. III-3-2-7.



SDF officers participating in 2007 Cobra Gold exercise

(2) Inviting Observers to Multilateral Exercises

The SDF invited officers from eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan in September 2001 to observe the fourth Japan-Russia Search and Rescue Exercise. Since then, the SDF has been stepping up efforts to invite observers from foreign countries to multilateral exercises being sponsored by the SDF.

The GSDF has invited working-level officers from countries mainly in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan to participate in the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific (MCAP), which it has hosted annually since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation. (See Fig. III-3-2-8)

Fig. III-3-2-7 Participation in Multilateral Joint Exercises (Since Last Year)

Data	Exercises	Hosts	Participating Nations	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF
May 2006	Cobra Gold 2006	U.S. and Thai militaries	Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, U.S.A., Japan, and others	45 SDF officers
Jun. 2006	Third Western Pacific Mine Countermeasure Exercise	Malaysian Navy	21 countries, including Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, U.S.A., and Japan	One minesweeping mother ship, one minesweeping warship and one minesweeping vessel
Aug. 2006	Khaan Quest 2006	U.S. and Mongolian militaries	About 22 countries, including U.S.A., Mongol, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Thailand, and Tonga	A total of five from the Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office and ASDF participating as observers
May 2007	Cobra Gold 2007	U.S. and Thai militaries	14 countries, including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, U.S.A., and Japan	48 SDF officers
May 2007	WPNS Multilateral Sea Exercise	Singapore Navy	Australia, Bangladesh, China, France, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, U.S.A., and Japan	One MSDF destroyer and about 180 personnel including those aboard the destroyer

Fig. III-3-2-8 Dispatch of Observers to Multilateral Joint Exercises (since 2006)

Data	Exercise	Overview
Aug. 2006-Sept. 2006	Fifth Multilateral Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP2006)	This program was hosted by the GSDF with working-level officials from 17 countries, mainly from the Asia-Pacific region, being invited. Under the theme, "importance of military-civilian collaboration in the event of large-scale disasters and their ideal relations to be built in peacetime," participants held a training session and exchange views in order to enhance response ability under diverse contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and promote mutual understanding and confidence-building among participating countries.

Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (The preamble)

In recent years, the international community firmly recognizes the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials to terrorists and countries of concern. Addressing non-proliferation issues, such as restricting or controlling export of these weapons and their means of delivery, is a pressing issue for peace and stability of the international society today.

Meanwhile, international public opinion calling for restricting certain conventional weapons is also on the rise from a humanitarian point of view and it is an important challenge for each country to tackle the issue of certain conventional weapons by striking a balance between the humanitarian requirement and the defense necessity.

As an effort to cope with these challenges, a system aimed at promoting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is established in cooperation with each country in the world. (See Fig. III-3-3-1)

Fig. III-3-3-1 Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regarding Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials

Classification	Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others				Conventional Weapons
	Nuclear Weapons	Chemical Weapons	Biological Weapons	Delivery Means (Missiles)	
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) Restriction on illegal transactions of small arms and light weapons System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Australia Group (AG)		Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
New International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540				

Against this background, Japan has pledged to play a positive role in a practical and gradual approach toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation aimed at a nuclear-free world, disarmament and non-

proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and missiles as their means of delivery, and a global effort to restrict certain conventional weapons.

This section will explain about efforts being made by the Defense Ministry and the SDF regarding endeavors by the United Nations and other international organizations on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons.

1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Nuclear Weapons

(1) Relevant Treaties

Treaties related to control of nuclear arms, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and export-control systems are shown in Fig. III-3-3-2.

Fig. III-3-3-2 Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuclear non-proliferation The NPT recognizes the five countries—the United States, Russia, the U.K., France and China—as nuclear weapon states. It prohibits acquisition of nuclear arms by non-nuclear weapon states. • Nuclear disarmament The NPT obliges nuclear weapon states to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith. • Peaceful use of nuclear energy The NPT recognizes the “inalienable” right of signatory states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (Article 4-1) The NPT obliges non-nuclear weapon states to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)² to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy for peaceful use to military technologies. (Article 3) • The NPT entered into force in 1970. • There are 190 signatory countries to the NPT.
	Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CTBT prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion by signatory states at any place in the world, including outer space, the atmosphere, underwater and underground. • The CTBT has been signed by 177 states and ratified by 137 states. (Of 44 designated countries whose ratification is necessary for the treaty’s enforcement, 41 countries have ratified it) • All of the 44 states need to ratify the treaty so that it can enter into force. But some of states which have yet to ratify the treaty are uncertain if they will ratify it. As a result, the treaty has yet to enter into force.
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) ⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling exports of materials, equipment and technologies that could be used for development of nuclear arms. • The NSG was formed in 1978 following a nuclear test by India in 1974. • The group consists of 45 countries.

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/npt/index.html>>
 2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/iaea/index.html>>
 3. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/ctbt/index.html>>
 4. See<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/nsg/index.html>>

(2) Japan’s Efforts

Japan has been continuing to strive for an early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and for the reinforcement of IAEA safeguard measures from a viewpoint of strengthening global efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Japan has been also actively participating in discussion being made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

2. Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons

(1) Relevant Treaties

Treaties related to control of chemical and biological weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation of these weapons, and export-control systems are shown in Fig. III-3-3-3.

Fig. III-3-3-3 Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (biological and chemical weapons)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The CWC pursues to abolish chemical weapons by prohibiting signatory states from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring or using such weapons and obliging them to destroy the weapons if they own them. A strict verification system has been established to make the implementation of the convention effective. ○ The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established in The Hague, the Netherlands in 1997 in order to implement verification measures stipulated under the CWC following its enforcement. ○ The CWC entered into force in 1997. ○ CWC signatory states: 182 countries.
	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The BWC is designed to destroy biological weapons already in possession of some countries as well as prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. ○ The BWC entered into force in 1975. ○ BWC signatory states: 155 countries
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Australia Group (AG) ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The AG has been trying to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons by controlling exports of materials, manufacturing facilities and related technologies that could be used for making such weapons. ○ The first meeting took place in 1985. ○ Participating states: 40 countries

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/cwc/index.html>>
 2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/bwc/index.html>>
 3. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/ag/index.html>>

(2) Japan's Efforts

a. Since 1980, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have dispatched GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons to the negotiations to draft the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established in the Hague, the Netherlands, to implement verification measures stipulated in the convention. (See Reference 53)

The Chemical School of the GSDF, located in Saitama City, Saitama Prefecture, has synthesized a small quantity of chemical materials to research protective measures, which are subject to regulations of the convention. In line with the regulations, the school has opened its facilities to inspection by the OPCW six times since the OPCW's establishment.

The Government of Japan has been working on the project to dispose of chemical weapons that were abandoned in China in line with the CWC. Past investigations have shown that an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons that were abandoned by the former Imperial Japanese Army in China remain buried in the Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province.



GSDF officers being dispatched to OPCW [From left are Colonel Urano (Head of Operation and Planning Branch of Inspectorate Division), Major General Akiyama (Director of Inspectorate Division) and Major Shinkai(Inspector)]

The Defense Ministry and the SDF have cooperated in the project by sending four officials, including GSDF officers, to the Cabinet Office, which is in charge of the project. The Defense Ministry has also dispatched GSDF officers specializing in chemistry and ammunition disposal to China to help the excavation and collection of the abandoned weapons.

Since 1999, SDF officers have been so far dispatched to China for six times for the disposal of discarded chemical weapons in the country. From August to September of last year, eight SDF officers were sent to Han Xianyao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province where they identified the excavated shells and took measures to prevent them from being activated and exploding.

b. Regarding the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or BWC), Japan has dispatched GSDF officers with expertise in pharmacology and medicine to related conferences such as multilateral negotiations meant for introducing BWC verification measures, aimed at supporting global efforts to reinforce the convention.

c. Regarding the Australia Group (AG), Japan has sent officials to the AG’s annual meeting since 1994 in order to support global efforts to make regulations and rules set by the group effective.

3. Delivery Means (Missiles)

(1) Relevant agreements

International political agreements regarding control of weapons-delivery means, disarmament and non-proliferation of such means, and export control systems are shown in Fig. III-3-3-4.

Fig. III-3-3-4 Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles)

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The HCOC is a political agreement that mainly stipulates principles such as prevention of proliferation of ballistic missiles and restraint on tests, development and deployment of such missiles, and confidence-building measures among member states. ○ The HCOC was adopted in 2002. ○ Participating states: 126 countries
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The MTCR is designed to control exports of missiles, which can serve as means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and general-purpose equipment and technologies that are capable of contributing to missile development. ○ The MTCR was established in 1987. ○ Participating states: 34 countries

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtrcr/index.html>>

2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtrcr/mtrcr.html>>

(2) Japan’s Efforts

The Defense Ministry has dispatched its officials to an annual meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) since 1992 in order to make MTCR regulations and rules effective.

2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons

1. Relevant Treaties

Shown in Fig. III-3-3-5 are treaties and export-control systems related to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons whose use are deemed inhumane.

Fig. III-3-3-5 Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CCW is designed to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, such as land mines and booby traps. • The CCW entered into force in 1983. • Signatory states: 102 countries
	Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Convention) ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The convention totally prohibits the use mines, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel while obligating signatory states to destruct stockpiled mines within four years and remove laid mines within 10 years. It also stipulates international cooperation regarding the removal of anti-personnel mines and assistance of mine victims. • The convention entered into force in 1999. • Signatory states: 153 countries
	Restriction on Illegal Transactions of Small Arms and Light Weapons	The United Nations is currently studying ways to restrict illegal transactions of small arms and light weapons and to reduce excessive accumulation of such arms.
	System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms	This register system has been in operation from 1992 to help increase the transparency of armaments, following a proposal made by Japan along with the countries of the European Community (then). Under the system, each country is required to register to the United Nations the quantity of its annual exports and imports of defense equipment in seven categories ³ and the countries where such equipment is imported or exported.
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Wassenaar Arrangement ⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This arrangement is an international export control regime aimed at achieving following objectives. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) To contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations (2) To prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organisations as part of global efforts to fight against terrorism • The arrangement was established in 1996. • Participating states: 40 countries

Notes: 1. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/ccw/ccw.html>>

2. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/mine/index.html>>

3. The seven are 1) battle tanks, 2) armored combat vehicles, 3) large-caliber artillery systems, 4) combat aircraft, 5) attack helicopters, 6) warships and 7) missiles and missile launchers. As a result of an institutional review in 2003, MANPADS was newly registered as equipment under a subcategory of the "missile and missile launcher" category.

4. See <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/wa/index.html>>

2. Japan's Efforts

(1) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW)

In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been underway among the States Parties to work out ways to reduce the humanitarian risks caused by the explosive remnants of war (ERW), such as unexploded ordnance.

At their meeting in 2003, CCW States Parties adopted Protocol V, which concerns post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to reduce the risks of ERW. The protocol entered into force in November last year.

At the third review conference in November last year, the State Parties recognized the need for the global community to take urgent action to problems caused by the ERW, particularly by unexploded cluster munitions (munitions that eject multiple sub munitions), and decided³⁷ to focus their discussion on such munitions.

Japan has decided to address issues related to cluster munitions while striking a balance between giving humanitarian consideration and keeping defense need³⁸. Based on this idea, the Defense Ministry has dispatched its officials to the Meeting of the States Parties and the Groups of Governmental Experts of CCW, both of which are held to discuss and negotiate the addition of a protocol.

(2) Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines

The Defense Ministry and the SDF began disposal of the anti-personnel mines in January 2000. Japan completed the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in February 2003, with the exception of a minimum number of anti-personnel mines necessary for the development of and training in mine detection or mine clearance techniques, as permitted by the Ottawa Convention.

Meanwhile, the Defense Ministry, in order to ensure Japan's national security, has been acquiring "an anti-personnel obstacle system," an alternative to anti-personnel mines that would not be banned by the convention and would not cause harm to civilians, which will be used for the time being, combining directional fragmentation charges³⁹.

Although 153 countries have signed the convention as of February this year, only 12 out of 25 ARF member countries have joined the convention. The Defense Ministry has thus been encouraging ARF member countries that have yet to sign the convention to do so.

Furthermore, the Defense Ministry has actively supported⁴⁰ the international efforts in the problem of anti-personnel mines by annually reporting to the United Nations the data regarding exceptional possession and by sending its officials to relevant international meetings.

(3) System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms

As well as registering with the United Nations annual data on imports of its defense equipment, the Defense Ministry has provided⁴¹ information on its possession, domestic procurement and the transfer of small arms on a voluntary basis.

Moreover, officials of the Defense Ministry have been dispatched from time to time to expert meetings and others aimed at improving and strengthening the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.

3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others

1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

(1) Background behind Adoption of the PSI

In December 2002, the Bush administration, alleging that states suspected of weapons proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran, have been seeking to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), announced the National Strategy Against WMD, which sought a three-point comprehensive approach to such weapons: countermeasures against proliferation, non-proliferation and response to the consequences of the use of WMD.

As part of such approach, President George W. Bush announced in May 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)⁴². The initiative had garnered support from more than 80 countries, including Japan, as of February this year.

(2) Past Achievements of PSI and Japan's Efforts

PSI Participating countries have agreed to a Statement of Interdiction Principles⁴³, which stipulates the purposes of the PSI and principles of interdiction, and have conducted exercises for ground, maritime and air interdiction operations so each participating country can enhance its interdiction capability to implement the PSI. A total of 26 interdiction exercises have been conducted by April this year.

In addition to conducting these interdiction exercises, participating countries have held plenary meetings (high-level policy meetings) and meetings of Operational Expert Working Groups in order to examine policy-related and legal issues. As a result of these PSI activities, participating countries were able to handle actual interdiction cases successfully, for example the BBC China Incident⁴⁴.

Given the objective of the PSI is consistent with its security need, Japan has played an important role in PSI as one of its core members for some time since the establishment of PSI in 2003.

Japan has also actively participated in PSI's efforts as a member of its Operational Expert Working Group, consisting of 20 countries⁴⁵ at present.

(3) Efforts by the Defense Ministry and the SDF

The Defense Ministry and the SDF think it necessary to actively commit to PSI by making maximum use of the SDF's defense capability while keeping cooperation with relevant organizations and countries. Japan has taken part in information-gathering activities, including dispatching Defense Ministry staff to PSI-related meetings since the third PSI plenary meeting in Paris, and sending officials to PSI interdiction exercises as observers.

Through these activities, the Defense Ministry and the SDF believe they can play an important role in the PSI by providing relevant organizations and countries with information gathered in patrol and surveillance operations by the SDF's vessels and aircraft during PSI interdiction operations. The Defense Ministry and the SDF also believe that they can play other roles in maritime interdiction operations, including stopping suspicious ships and conducting on-the-spot inspections, in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, in the event of an issuance of an order for maritime security operations.

Based on the belief, Japan has actively participated in PSI interdiction exercises. In October 2004, the Defense Ministry and the SDF, along with the Foreign Ministry and the Japan Coast Guard, sponsored an exercise for PSI maritime interdiction operations⁴⁶. Participants in the exercise demonstrated their training on boarding a suspicious ship and conducting an on-the-spot inspection there.

As part of "outreach" activities aimed at strengthening the comprehensive non-proliferation regime, including the PSI, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have positively provided the national defense authorities of other Asian countries with information and knowledge that they have obtained through their past interdiction exercises in a bid to promote understanding by these Asian countries concerning the PSI. (See Fig. III-3-3-6)

(4) Future Efforts

Under the New National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan, in a bid to further solidify its peace and security, has pledged to participate proactively and on its own initiative in activities being conducted by the global community to improve the international security environment. In addition, the Mid-Term Defense Program calls for Japan to participate in joint exercises on international peace cooperation activities, including the PSI.

In light of cases, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in areas surrounding Japan, Japan should do its utmost to prevent proliferation of such weapons by regarding the PSI as a broadly defined security issue including defense, diplomacy, law execution and export control and by tackling the issue proactively and on its own initiative even during peacetime.

Therefore, Japan will positively commit itself to PSI activities. In order to expedite its commitment to the activities, Japan will try to establish an ideal organizational structure within the Government in close cooperation with relevant organizations.

Fig. III-3-3-6 Defense Ministry Participation in PSI Interdiction Exercises (Since Last Year)

Date	Exercises	Exercise Place	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF	
2006	April	Interdiction exercise hosted by the Netherlands	Rotterdam	Dispatched as observer
	April	Air interdiction exercise hosted by Australia	Darwin	Dispatched for command post training Dispatched as observer for field training
	May	Interdiction exercise hosted by Turkey	Facility in each country (command post training) Ankara (field training)	Dispatched for command post training Dispatched as observer for field training
		Interdiction exercise hosted by the United States		
October	Interdiction exercise hosted by the United States	Facility in each country (command post training) Manama, Bahrain (field training)	Dispatched for command post training Dispatched as observer for field training	
2007	April	Air interdiction exercise hosted by Lithuania	Vilnius (Lithuania)	Dispatched as observer
	May	Maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Slovenia	Koper (Slovenia)	Dispatched as observer

From a viewpoint of improving the SDF's response capability, Japan will consider participating in various interdiction exercises and sponsoring such exercises in the future.

2. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security and therefore the United Nations is prepared to take adequate and effective action against such threats. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction urges all U.N. Member States to 1) refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actor from attempting to develop WMD and their means of delivery, 2) adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor from manufacturing WMD and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, and 3) establish effective border-controls and export-controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

Recognizing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could disturb peace and stability of the international community, including Japan, and that preventing such weapons from proliferating to terrorists and other non-State actors is an urgent task, Japan supports the U.N. resolution and holds expectations that all U.N. Member States will observe the resolution.

Notes

- 1) The formal name is the “Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations.” (Law 79 of 1992) See <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/relatedbill/index.html>
- 2) The formal name is the “Special Measures Law concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions.” (Law 113 of 2001) See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampo/houan/tero/index.html>>
- 3) The formal name is the “Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq.” (Law 137 of 2003) See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html>
- 4) In June last year, the Public Officers Election Act was revised, enabling from March this year SDF personnel being dispatched overseas to cast an absentee ballot based on International Peace Cooperation Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. In unified municipal elections in April this year, a total of 340 SDF personnel cast an absentee ballot, including members of the 23rd Golan Heights Mission Transport Unit and (Israel and Syria) and members of the Air Transport Unit for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Mission (Iraq and Kuwait).
- 5) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and Britain as occupying powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member countries to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq.
- 6) The Joint Staff Office has sent two SDF officers to the Coalition Group, consisting of liaison officers from about 60 countries participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) undertaken by the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command.
- 7) Unit in charge of rear-support activities in the process of GSDF withdrawal (inspection of numbers and volume, customs clearance, rinsing and fumigation of equipment)
- 8) London (July 2005), Paris (October 2005), Jordan (Amman in November 2005)
- 9) As of March 2007, 37 countries were participating in the ISAF, which is designed to support the Afghanistan Government through maintenance of security in the country, in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a hotbed of terrorism again.
- 10) Japan is taking various measures for preventing terrorist attacks with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls, gathering and analysis of terrorism-related information, measures for preventing hijackings and others, measures for NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), keeping guard on important domestic facilities, and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an “Action Plan for Preventing Terrorist Attacks” containing 16 items of specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as international sharing of the information on lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verifications of foreign hotel guests, strengthening of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities.
- 11) Defined as supply of goods and labor to militaries of foreign countries, provision of benefits to these militaries, and other measures that are implemented by Japan. (Article 3-1-1 of the Law)

- 12) Defined as search and rescue operations for people who have become victims after participating in battles staged by militaries of foreign countries that are implemented by Japan. (Article 3-1-2 of the Law)
- 13) Defined as humanitarian activities (transport of food, clothing, pharmaceuticals and other life-related goods and materials, and provision of medical services) that are implemented by Japan to relieve people who have become victims of terrorism and those who are feared to be affected by the terrorism on the basis of U.N. resolutions on 9/11 terrorist attacks and related requests of the United Nations. (Articles 3-1-3 of the Law)
- 14) Tents (1,025), blankets (18,500), vinyl sheets (7,925), sleeping mats (19,980), and water containers (19,600) with a total weight of about 200 tons
- 15) An organization meant to settle issues related to refugees by expediting their international protection and supporting their efforts to return to their home countries on their own, permanently settle on host countries and settle in third countries.
- 16) As well as with the United States and Britain, Japan exchanged notes with Germany, New Zealand and France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Greece in 2003 and with Pakistan in 2004, bringing the number of countries with whom notes were exchanged to 11. These notes stipulate that Japan's cooperation and support activities are based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. The Government of Japan has also repeatedly explained to Japan's cooperation and support-recipient countries that goods provided to these countries as part of such activities are to be used appropriately so as to serve the purposes envisaged under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and may not be transferred to third parties without the prior consent of Japan. The recipient countries have accepted Japan's explanation on the matter.
- 17) Activities being conducted in line with a U.N. resolution and under the control of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and safety in the international community to deal with the outbreak of disputes, including ensuring the observance of an agreement concerning prevention of renewed military conflicts between the warring parties.
- 18) Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations or countries based on humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military disputes, and restoration work in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are started in line with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the UNHCR.
- 19) Japan considers core operations of the PKF to mean: 1) monitoring activities in connection with the observance of a cease-fire agreement, relocation of military forces, forces withdrawal and disarmament; 2) stationing and patrolling in buffer zones; 3) inspection and check of weapons being brought in or out; 4) recovery, storage and disposal of discarded weapons; 5) assistance in drawing a cease-fire line between conflicting parties; and 6) assistance in the exchange of prisoners of war between conflicting parties.
- 20) This is a review panel established in 2000 upon request by then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that measures be recommended to strengthen the ability of the United Nations on peacekeeping. The panel is comprised of 10 members, including former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi (panel chairman) and Hisako Shimura, President of Tsuda College.
- 21) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/exchange/01.html>>
- 22) Dialogue aimed at directly contributing to shared recognition of issues to be addressed, and contributing to policy coordination, and joint defense exercises that can directly lead to the facilitation of international peace cooperation activities by the SDF.
- 23) Mutual observation of units, dispatch of personnel to each other's training as observers, participation in various forums, symposiums and seminars, exchanges of information, interchanges of defense equipment

- and technologies, and provision of know-how and other practical information by the SDF in the field of disaster relief operations.
- 24) See <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/01/10keikaku.html>>
 - 25) The Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
 - 26) Specific bilateral collaboration since peacekeeping operations in Cambodia includes cooperation in aid missions in Iraq's Samawah and joint humanitarian support being provided following the huge earthquake off Indonesia and the consequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean.
 - 27) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/03/13.pdf>>
 - 28) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/06/06d.html>>
 - 29) GSDF troops completed their withdrawal from Iraq in September last year.
 - 30) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/change/pdf/india01.pdf>>
 - 31) Prime Minister Abe's speech to NAC "Toward Further Cooperation between Japan and NATO" (tentative translation) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/19/eabe_0112.html>
 - 32) The total membership is 25 countries and the EU. The 25 countries are 10 ASEAN nations—Indonesia, Cambodia (since 1995), Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar (since 1996) and Laos—North Korea (since 2000), ROK, China, United States, Japan, India (since 1996), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan (since 2004), Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste (since 2005), Mongolia(since1998), Russian Federation and Bangladesh (since 2006).
 - 33) CBM: confidence-building measures: efforts to disclose military information, impose some control on military action and promote military exchanges as well as preventing accidental military clashes from the viewpoint of fostering confidence-building among countries (Source: technical term list of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan)
 - 34) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/06/02a_01.html>
 - 35) The MSDF dispatched two vessels to the first submarine rescue exercise in the Western Pacific called "Pacific Reach 2000," hosted by the Singaporean Navy in 2000. In the 2002 exercise, the second of its kind, 10 vessels from five countries, including three vessels sent by the MSDF, participated. Techniques to rescue submarines were demonstrated in waters west of Kyushu.
 - 36) Multilateral search and rescue exercises were conducted mainly in waters south of the Kanto region to help participating vessels get accustomed to procedures and main points which are necessary when searching for or rescuing wrecked vessels. MSDF ships posing as wrecked commercial vessels were used for the exercise. Participating countries: Japan, India, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, France and Russia (nine countries).
 - 37) Study is underway within the framework of the CCW to solve problems related to cluster munitions. There are also moves outside the CCW framework to seek prohibition of the use of cluster munitions that cause intolerable harm to civilians, including an international conference held in Oslo in February this year and a similar conference in Lima in May.
 - 38) Given Japan being an island country which has a long coastal line around the country, it is extremely important for Japan to take swift action in the wake of landing operations by an enemy country and various other emergency situations in order to smash its military units which are being deployed widely to invade Japan. Japan has owned cluster munitions, which have effective firepower to expeditiously bring wider areas under control, judging the possession of such munitions by a country which has adopted an exclusively defense-oriented policy is necessary for the defense of the country. Japan has no plans to use cluster munitions overseas. When facing the situation in which the use of cluster munitions in Japan has become necessary, the Government will do its utmost for appropriate evacuation of citizens.

- 39) Anti-infantry combat explosives for obstructing the approach of enemy's infantry. In order that citizens are not injured indiscriminately, these explosives are actuated while the target is being watched by SDF personnel using them. They are not designed to explode by the presence, approach or contact by humans.
- 40) Between 1999 and December 2006, the Defense Ministry recommended to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) retired GSDF officers for supporting antipersonnel landmine removal activities in Cambodia. So far, two retired officers were dispatched as a maintenance and transportation advisor to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) under the framework of JICA's long-term dispatch of an expert.
- 41) In 2005 reporting, only five countries out of the ARF members—Australia, Canada, Japan, the United States and New Zealand—provided information. Among them, only Japan provided information on the transfer of small arms.
- 42) The PSI is a proposal intended to encourage participating countries to join forces in taking possible measures in line with existing international and domestic laws in order to prevent proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time for each country to make possible efforts to strengthen relevant international and domestic laws.
- 43) Under the Statement of Interdiction Principles, PSI participating countries are committed to join hands in stopping weapons of mass destruction and related materials from flowing to and from states and non-state actors that raise proliferation concerns. The Statement also calls on all countries concerned about the proliferation to support the PSI and join forces with PSI participants in taking possible measures to stop the flow of such weapons, with the willingness to implement them. Under the Statement, all countries that have a stake in non-proliferation are committed to take specific actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as much as possible within the range of related international law and domestic law.
- 44) In September 2003, the German Foreign Ministry obtained information that BBC China, a vessel whose registered nationality was Antigua and Barbuda, an island country in the Caribbean Sea, was heading for Libya to transport nuclear-related materials. The German Government dispatched intelligence experts to Italy, and conducted an inspection of the ship with the cooperation of the Italian Government and the U.S. Navy. The inspection revealed that the ship's container number was fabricated. The German Government confiscated the nuclear-related equipment (aluminum-made tubes that can be converted into centrifugals) after the ship was brought to Taranto, Italy. This incident helped unearth Libya's nuclear development program and the so-called "Khan Network," underlining the effectiveness of the PSI.
- 45) The United States, Japan, Britain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Australia, Poland, Singapore, Norway, Canada, Russia, Turkey, Greece, Denmark, New Zealand and Argentina
- 46) Exercises for maritime interdiction operations, sponsored by Japan, were conducted in waters off Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Port in order to mainly improve interdiction abilities of relevant organizations of participating countries, strengthen the mutual cooperation between Japan and participating countries, and to promote understanding by non-PSI members of the PSI. Warships dispatched from such countries as Australia, France and the United States participated in these exercises. From the SDF, vessels, aircraft and others participated. The Japan Coast Guard joined the exercises with its patrol boats and aircraft. Observers were sent to the exercises from 18 countries.

Chapter 4

Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities

Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens

Section 3. Gaining the Trust of Japanese Citizens



No matter how the equipment and systems of the SDF are modernized, they must still be operated by people. The full performance of equipment can only be achieved by individual personnel¹. Moreover, regardless of any strengthening of personnel and Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, certain preconditions must be met. Namely, without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it will not be possible to protect Japan and fulfill the goals of other activities, nor will it be possible to expect support from allies.

With the above background, this Chapter explains the following four aspects:

- The process from recruitment and employment, through education and training, to retirement and outplacement of personnel.
- Details on information and communication systems, which is foundation of all equipment; improvements to equipment and materials; prevention of information leaks; and related matters. (These are examined in Section 1.)
- Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF together with local communities, to gain the support of the Japanese people (Section 2)
- Building trust among Japanese citizens in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF (Section 3)

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities

Defense capabilities depend on human resources. The operational efficiency of organizations depends on the capabilities of their personnel, not only equipment and systems (for details on the organization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, see Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3). Under the new security environment in recent years, missions have become more diverse and international in character, and equipment within the Ministry of Defense and the SDF has been improved. Human resources must therefore be improved too, which means securing and training high-quality personnel.

The Ministry of Defense has worked to promptly and economically acquire equipment and materials to meet such environmental changes, while focusing on the transparency and fairness of procurement. Moreover, since leakage of information from the Ministry of Defense and the SDF could seriously threaten the defense of Japan and cause other problems, information protection is crucial.

This section explains the development of human resources in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, the efficient procurement of equipment and materials, and the prevention of information leaks.

1. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

1. Recruitment



Provincial Liaison Offices have changed to Provincial Cooperation Offices

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF need highly qualified personnel in order to fulfill their missions. SDF Regular Personnel and other personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are recruited and employed under various systems². (See Fig. III-4-1-1)

SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices (formerly SDF Provincial Liaison Offices; reorganized in July 2006), which are located in 50 locations throughout the nation (four in Hokkaido, and one in each of Japan's prefectures), conduct recruitment with the help of prefectural and municipal governments, schools, private recruitment counselors, and others. Local

public organizations are also required to carry out administrative work for recruitment³, and the Ministry of Defense defrays the costs incurred by local public organizations.


However, with the declining birth rate in Japan, recruitment by the SDF will become increasingly difficult, and so it is necessary to seek the assistance of local public organizations, related organizations, and other community organizations. (See Fig. III-4-1-2) (See Reference 54)

Fig. III-4-1-1 Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (Breakdown)

(As of March 31, 2007)

Personnel of the Ministry of Defense	Special Service	Minister of Defense		
		Senior Vice-Minister of Defense		
		Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (2)		
		Authorized Strength	Private Secretary (Special Assistant to the Minister)	
			SDF Personnel	Vice-Minister of Defense
			Director General, and others	372
			Administrative Officials, and others	22,856
			SDF Regular Personnel	251,222
			Ready Reserve Personnel	8,368
		Non-Authorized Strength		Reserve Personnel
			Candidate for Reserve Personnel	1,995
			National Defense Academy students	
			National Defense Medical College students	
		Part-Time Officials		
Regular Service	Authorized Strength	Administrative Officials, and others	30	
	Non-Authorized Strength	Part-Time Officials		

Fig. III-4-1-2 Changes in Male Population at the Ages Eligible for Recruitment of Male to the Short-Term Service



Sources: Data of up to and including 2004, and data of 2006; "Population Estimates of Japan 1920-2000" and "Annual Report on Current Population Estimates" by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications
 Data of 2005; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research made calculations based on the "Population Census", by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, and made corrections by proportionally distributing the population with unknown age
 Data of 2006 and after; "Future Estimate of Japan's Population" by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (based on average estimate as of December 2006)

2. Employment⁴

(1) SDF Regular Personnel




Entrance ceremony for the 53rd enrollees of the Youth Technical School (Students of GSDF)

SDF Regular Personnel enlist of their own free will on a volunteer basis and are employed as General Officer Candidates; General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)⁵, Privates (GSDF), Seaman Apprentices (MSDF), Airmen Third Class (ASDF), SDF Youth Cadets⁶, and others. Because of the special nature of the work they do, the employment criteria and working conditions of SDF personnel are distinct from those of general civilian government employees⁷.

Personnel management of the Regular SDF Personnel differs significantly from that of general civilian government employees because the former

Fig. III-4-1-3 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel



- Notes:
1. Ranks of Officials are General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF); Major General (GSDF, ASDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF); Colonel (GSDF, ASDF), Captain (MSDF); Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF, ASDF), Commander (MSDF); Major (GDSF, ASDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF); Captain (GSDF, ASDF), Lieutenant (MSDF); First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF); and Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Ensign (MSDF).
 2. Medical doctor and dentist Officer Candidates are promoted to First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF) upon passing the relevant national vocational examinations and completing the prescribed training courses.
 3. Although Youth Cadets were employed in each SDF service in the past, only GSDF Youth Cadets are recruited from fiscal 2007. Based on the results of reviews on the status of the SDF, the status of Youth Cadets will change to "Students", the same status as that of National Defense Academy students. This change may be applied starting from recruitment in fiscal 2008.
 4. The "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper)" System and the "Enlisted (Upper) Candidate" System are reorganized and unified into a single system, under which those qualified are recruited as "General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)" as from fiscal 2007.
 5. They are promoted to Sergeant First Class (GSDF) upon passing of the national nursing examination.
 6. \Rightarrow Enrollment examination \Rightarrow Examination or non-examination screening

adopts an early retirement system and a short-term service system to keep the forces strong. Under the early retirement system, personnel retire at a younger age than general civilian government employees. Meanwhile, under the short-term service system, employment may be completed in two or three years. Many of the Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), and Airman Third Class (ASDF) personnel are employed under this system. Upon employment, personnel who enlist in each SDF service complete the basic education and training in a training unit or at a school of each SDF service, and are then assigned to units and positions nationwide.

The preferences and aptitude of each personnel are taken into consideration when assigning them to occupational areas and positions, which are determined before they finish the basic education. (See Figs. III-4-1-3 • 4) (See Reference 55)

Fig. III-4-1-4 Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel

Rank	Designation	Mandatory Retirement Age
General (GSDF), Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)	Sho	60
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)	Shoho	
Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)	Issa	56
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)	Nisa	55
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)	Sansa	
Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)	Ichii	54
First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)	Nii	
Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)	Sani	
Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)	Juni	
Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Socho	
Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Isso	
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Niso	
Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)	Sanso	53
Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)	Shicho	
Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)	Isshi	—
Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)	Nishi	
Recruit (GSDF), Seaman Recruit (MSDF), Airman Basic (ASDF)	Sanshi	

- Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff is 62.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who are doctors, dentists, pharmacists and other personnel such as members of musical bands is 60.

Voice of a Newcomer (GSDF Enlisted (Upper) Candidate): My Best Colleagues

**Leading Private Tsuyoshi Hiwatashi
Enlisted (Upper) Candidate
The 5th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company**

The thing that I most appreciate about joining the Self-Defense Forces is that I could meet many good colleagues I can truly trust.

Newcomers receive about six-month training immediately after joining the SDF.

During these six months, newcomers who have met each other for the first time in the SDF spend 24 hours a day together, sleeping and dining in the same place, and undergoing the same very hard training.

Through this training immediately after joining the SDF, newcomers learn the basics about being a SDF member that they all at least need to know.

But for us, who had had no knowledge about the SDF, the six months were full of uncertainties, and the training was extremely hard.

A march training in which we walked for 24 km with heavy equipment on our back under the blazing sun, fighting drills repeated again and again in pouring rain, physical strength trainings we had to receive every day... Although there were many hard times, I was always together with my colleagues. We shared the same goal, the same living environment, and the same hardships. This is why we could support, encourage and trust each other. And when we support each other, we can overcome any hard training and difficult time.

I am very glad to have chosen the SDF where I can share everything with my best colleagues.



Leading Private Hiwatashi (center) receiving training with his "best colleagues"


Voice of a Newcomer (MSDF Trainee Officer)

**Ensign Takushi Kino, MSDF
Exercise Fleet**


It has been more than one year since I joined the Maritime Self-Defense Force and entered the Officer Candidate School in Etajima. Since I joined the SDF after graduating from a general university, everything in the MSDF is new to me, and every day is always fresh and invigorating. I was sometimes complaining about the hard life at school in the beginning, particularly about cutter rowing (that made me realize how heavy the oar is and how important the unity of the team is), one-day swimming (implemented after training was provided in several phases), strict rules about clothing, postures and behaviors, and everyday life in which everything is required to start and complete five minutes before the

set schedule. But thanks to other trainees who are my rivals as well as friends with whom I can share hardships and joys together, as well as to the support from instructors who are strict yet considerate, I could overcome many difficulties.

I graduated from the Officer Candidate School in March this year, and am currently on a long exercise cruise around the world as a trainee officer of the Exercise Fleet. While communicating with people in other countries as a representative of Japan, and developing an international sense, I am receiving training day and night to become a full-fledged MSDF officer.



Ensign Kino receiving ship handling exercise on the bridge of a training ship



Voice of a Newcomer (ASDF Student Pilot)

Staff Sergeant Kimihiro Kasamura, ASDF

ASDF Student Pilot

Student Unit, Student Pilot Training Group, the 12th Air Training Wing

I have been always dreaming of flying since my childhood. But it was when I was a junior high school student and sat in the cockpit of an F-15 fighter for the first time at an open base festival that I decided to fly with the fighter in the future and became serious about making the dream come true. I have been on the right way to fulfill my wish ever since.

After graduating from a junior high school, I became an ASDF youth cadet¹⁾. Then I took and passed (only one out of 36 applicants could pass!) an examination to become a student pilot. I am currently studying the basics about being a pilot on the Student Pilot Course (two years) in the ASDF Hofu Air Base in Yamaguchi Prefecture as an air officer candidate.



Staff Sergeant Kasamura, student pilot, during physical training

However, what I am studying now is not specific piloting techniques for flying. To fly, high intelligence as an ASDF member and officer, as well as superior physical strength, are essential. Furthermore, pilots are also required to be mentally strong so that they will remain cool in any situation without being panicked. To be honest, the education and training at the school are very hard, and there are even times I almost give up. But I am resolved to keep up with the instructions of instructors until I realize my dream with my colleagues.

My dream is, as mentioned earlier, to become an F-15 fighter pilot. However although what I wanted before joining the SDF was just to become a pilot and fly, I have now become aware of the importance of protecting Japan, and am hoping to be engaged in an assignment to protect my mother country with an F-15 fighter. My main assignment when I successfully become a pilot will be to scramble to respond to aerial invasion, and I think that it is challenging yet very honorable to be involved in defense activities to protect Japan at the forefront.

When I proceed to the Flight Course, I will receive even harder education and training. But however high the wall may be, and whenever I face difficulties, I will do everything I can to overcome them and become a full-fledged pilot. Then I will work hard to protect the skies of Japan to maintain its peace.

1) See Figure III-4-1-3.

(2) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel⁸

1) Purpose for Establishing the Reserve Personnel System

Normally, the number of SDF Regular Personnel is kept to the minimum needed to respond to situations: SDF Regular Personnel need to be available immediately in an emergency as the need arises. To meet such needs promptly and systematically, there are three systems: the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel System, the SDF Reserve Personnel System, and the System for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel⁹.

Fig. III-4-1-5 Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

	SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	SDF Reserve Personnel	Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
Basic concept	○ When defense call-up is received, or under similar conditions, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability.	○ When defense call-up or disaster call-up is received, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel.	○ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training
Candidate	○ Former Regular Personnel, Former Reserve Personnel	○ Former Regular Personnel, Former Reserve Personnel	○ Applicants who do not have service experience (Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel [General]; Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel [Technical])
Age	○ Enlisted (Lower): 18-31 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under three years younger than each retirement age	○ Enlisted (Lower): 18-36 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under two years older than retirement age	○ General: 18-33 years old ○ Technical: From 18 years old to 53 to 54 years old, depending on technical qualification
Employment	○ Employment on screening, based on application	○ Employment on screening, based on application ○ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training.	○ General: Employment on examination, based on application ○ Technical: Employment on screening, based on application
Rank	○ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ○ Former Reserve Personnel: As a rule, designated rank at the point of retirement	○ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ○ General: Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF) ○ Technical: Designated in conformance with technical qualification	○ Rank is not designated.
Term of service	○ Three years/One term	○ Three years/One term	○ General: A maximum of three years ○ Technical: A maximum of two years
Education/ Training	○ 30 days per year	○ Although the law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is five days per year.	○ General: 50 days within a maximum of three years (an equivalent to new recruitment education course (first term)) ○ Technical: 10 days within a maximum of two years (training to serve as a SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing each skill)
Promotion	○ Promotion is determined by screening a service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days).	○ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days).	○ Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion.
Benefits, allowances, and other terms	○ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day ○ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ○ Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term ○ Special subsidy for corporations employing Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month	○ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ○ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month	○ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ○ Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty is not imposed on them.
Call up duty, and other duties	○ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	○ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	○ Education and Training Call-up

In particular, the System for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, which is mainly for personnel without experience, was established to develop and expand the defense basis, secure the stability of SDF Reserve Personnel, and effectively use civilian expertise in fields such as medical practice and language skills. (See Fig. III-4-1-5) (See Reference 56)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of Reserve SDF Personnel: Having Participated in a Japan-U.S. Combined Command Post Exercise

Reserve Sergeant First Class Aoi Tomita, GSDF

Since I was dreaming of becoming an interpreter while I was at college, I became, upon suggestion from a Provincial Cooperation Office, a reserve technical member (language) of the Self-Defense Forces in 2003. Although I became gradually accustomed to wearing a uniform and boots, acting in a unit, and using technical terms of the SDF through training for reserve personnel, I was concerned, as I had never experienced working as an interpreter, if I could perform my duty sufficiently even at the time when a contingency occurs. While I had such a concern, I was provided with an opportunity to take part in a Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise for GSDF units in the State of Hawaii in the United States in July last year.



Reserve technical personnel (Reserve Sergeant First Class Tomita (center)) serving as interpreters during the Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise in Hawaii

My first duty in Hawaii was to interpret for courtesy visits to U.S. army officers and a flower offering ceremony at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific. Although I was not familiar with military technical terms, I managed to fulfill my duty for these events thanks to the cooperation of others and prior meetings. However, when we were guided around the cemetery after the flower offering ceremony and given explanations such as episodes about soldiers buried in the cemetery who had fallen during the World War II and Korean War, I could not interpret well although almost no military technical terms were used in the explanation, and fully realized that my interpretation skills are not sufficient. After returning to my accommodation, a veteran interpreter showed me his notebook used for note taking at the time of interpretation, and taught me some knowhow including how to take notes. I became aware of the necessity of developing my own techniques to provide smooth interpretation.

On the following day, the interpreters were allocated to each section of the exercise headquarters. I was assigned to the section for making plans regarding civil affairs, legal affairs, patrolling, medicine and other areas. The content of and the terms used for the conversations were highly technical, and the conversation covered such a wide span of areas that I had to struggle with a different area each time I interpret. I really had a hard time at the beginning. My interpretation was corrected, and there was even a time when I was replaced by another interpreter. But by receiving explanations about technical terms, and checking and clarifying every single unclear point, I could increase my vocabulary. I was also given a longer time than usual to translate in the middle of a conversation. In this way, I could gradually expand the scope of interpretation I can handle. From these experiences I realized that I need to know much more technical terms.

By utilizing these precious experiences, I would like to play a part in maintaining peace of Japan and the international society in the future.

2) Cooperation from Corporations Employing Personnel

SDF Reserve Personnel and other personnel carry out their normal jobs, but are also expected to undergo training to maintain the required skills. To attend such training, they take leave or vacation, or adjust their work schedules accordingly. To function smoothly, such systems require the understanding and cooperation of the employers of the personnel. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, in particular, attend training for 30 days a year, so employers need to allow Ready Reserve Personnel to take this leave and prepare for their absence.

To assist, the Ministry of Defense provides a special subsidy to companies and other organizations to cover for their Ready Reserve Personnel when attending training sessions and the like. This reduces the burden on such employers.

(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 24,000 civilian officials—Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, or Instructors, and others—in addition to SDF Regular Personnel at the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. These civilians are mainly employed through the Class I Examination for National Civil Officials, or the Class I, II, or III Examination for Ministry of Defense Civilian Officials. After participating in the same training course, Class I and II personnel undertake a wide range of work.

Administrative Officials plan defense policies and manage the basic arrangement over control and operation of the SDF at the Internal Bureau; handle intelligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH); and carry out administrative functions (general affairs, measures to ensure harmony between defense facilities and surrounding communities, and others) and provide logistic support (maintenance, supply, and others) for SDF units throughout Japan.

Technical and Engineering Officials work at the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI) and other organizations, where they conduct R&D to maintain and improve the nation's technological defense capabilities. Instructors' duties include basic investigation and research on the management and operation of the SDF at the National Institute for Defense Studies, and training of highly qualified personnel at organizations such as the National Defense Academy and the National Defense Medical College.

At the end of March 2007, there were 586 Technical and Engineering Officials and Instructors with doctoral degrees.

Moreover, in the various organizations where these civilian officials work, SDF Regular Personnel of the ground, maritime and air forces work together with the civilians, mainly in fields where the special knowledge of SDF Regular Personnel is required.

2. Daily Education and Training¹⁰

In order to accomplish its missions starting from the defense of the country, the SDF needs to do more than simply upgrade its equipment. Each member, from commanding officers down, must possess excellent knowledge and skills and be highly qualified, and each unit must maintain a high level of proficiency. Personnel must always be prepared to demonstrate their capabilities in any situation, so that the SDF can immediately and appropriately deal with various situations and deter any country threatening to invade Japan.



GSDF paratrooper jumps out of plane



MSDF divers participate in training for descending by rope



Search and rescue unit members of ASDF participate in parachute drop training

Education and training are crucial for the SDF to develop its human resources and strengthen its capabilities, as described above. While working within constraints and making great effort to prevent accidents and address other safety concerns, the SDF is committed to educating its personnel and training its units to make them strong, and to maintaining and improving its readiness to respond to any situation.

1. Education of SDF Regular Personnel

(1) Present Status of Education

Highly proficient SDF Regular Personnel need to be trained properly if units are to perform their duties successfully. At its schools and training units, the SDF provides a systematic phased education, starting from basic education immediately after joining the SDF, to life-long learning to nurture the qualities necessary for positions and duties, in order to cultivate quality, knowledge and skills.

When it is judged that personnel need to improve their professional knowledge and skills, or if it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, they may study abroad, at external educational institutions¹¹, domestic companies, research institutes, and similar organizations. Education is entrusted to such organizations, and so a wide range of outside educational organizations is used to help personnel continuously improve their qualifications, knowledge, and skills. (See Reference 57)

(2) Joint Educational Programs

The Joint Operations Posture was started in March 2006. Knowledge and skills regarding joint operations are essential in order to develop the system, which is done primarily through joint educational programs. Therefore, the SDF has enhanced education on joint operations at Staff Colleges¹² of each force, and at other educational facilities. Additionally, a joint educational program system, anchored by the Joint Staff College¹³, has been set up. High-ranking SDF officers who will become Senior Unit Commanders and Senior Staff receive joint educational programs at this College.

(3) Educational Programs Meeting the Needs of the Times

The SDF has increasing opportunities to take part in international activities, and is developing more active relationships with other countries, and so has added language programs for English, Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and other languages to its curricula. The SDF also accepts students from abroad to increase the understanding of other countries. Furthermore, to help conduct international peace cooperation activities, the SDF established the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit assigned under the Central Readiness Force of the GSDF in March 2007. (See Chapter 3, Section 1 • Reference 58 • 59)

2. SDF Training

(1) Training by Each Self-Defense Force

There are two main types of training within units in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF: training for individual SDF personnel to improve their proficiency in respective fields, and training for units to conduct systematic operations.

Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training for units is conducted by size of unit, from small to large, and large-scale comprehensive training is also carried out to ensure that overall abilities can be exercised. (See Fig. III-4-1-6)

Fig. III-4-1-6 Results of the Main Exercises of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY 2006)

Exercise		Period	Location	Main participating units, and others	Remark		
GSDF	Cooperative Long-Distance Exercise	Northern region	June 19, 2006-Aug. 11, 2006	Central Army District-North Army District (Yausubetsu Maneuver Area)	13th Brigade, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 2,000 Vehicle: Approx. 650	Exercise to improve distance mobility using various transportation methods including ground, sea and air, and also improve joint operation capability for divisions and under, by implementing cooperative training with MSDF and ASDF	
		Southern region	First	July 10, 2006-July 25, 2006	North Army District-East Army District (Higashi-Fuji Maneuver Area, Asaka Training Area, and other locations)		5th Brigade, 6th Infantry Regiment, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 250 Vehicle: Approx. 60
			Second	Aug. 28, 2006-Sept. 9, 2006	Northeastern Army District-East Army District (Higashi-Fuji Maneuver Area, Asaka Training Area, Ohmiya Garrison, and other locations)		9th Division, 39th Infantry Regiment, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 720 Vehicle: Approx. 120
			Third	Sept. 5, 2006-Sept. 18, 2006			6th Division 44th Infantry Regiment, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 800 Vehicle: Approx. 150
MSDF	MSDF Exercise	Actual exercise	Nov. 9, 2006-Nov. 15, 2006	Sea area surrounding Japan	Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District Units and others Naval vessel: Approx. 90 Aircraft: Approx. 170	Exercise for commanders of various ranks to make judgments on conditions, unit operations, and joint/cooperative operations at naval operations	
ASDF	Air Defense Command Comprehensive Exercise	Actual training	Nov. 6, 2006-Nov. 17, 2006	Entire Japan and the surrounding area	Air Defense Commands and others Aircrafts (cumulative): Approx. 300	Exercise to improve capability for Air Defense Commands, and others, to complete missions, by actual training on response procedures in case of armed attacks, and similar situations	

In addition to such training for national defense, training is given on the diverse roles required of the SDF in recent years. Such roles include: responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan, dealing with incidents related to suspicious boats and armed agents, protecting SDF facilities threatened by a major terrorist attack, and joint training with other ministries, agencies, and local public institutions. (See Fig. III-4-1-7) (See Chapter 1, Section 2)

(2) Joint Training

In order to deploy defense capabilities most effectively in the event of an armed attack on Japan, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF must conduct joint training during peacetime. Therefore, the SDF has been conducting joint training involving two or more forces. Such joint training has been strengthened with the transition to a Joint Operations Posture in March 2006.

Fig. III-4-1-7 Results of Joint Exercises with the Police and the Japan Coast Guard (FY 2006)

Date	Location (Garrison)	Participating Units and Others	
		GSDF Side	Police Side
Oct. 13, 2006	Zentsuji	14th Brigade (Kagawa pref., Zentsuji city)	Kagawa Prefectural Police Tokushima Prefectural Police Ehime Prefectural Police Kouchi Prefectural Police
Nov. 29, 2006	Iizuka	4th Brigade (Fukuoka pref., Kasuga city)	Fukuoka Prefectural Police
Feb. 20, 2007	Asaka	1st Division (Tokyo Metropolitan, Nerima ward)	Saitama Prefectural Police Ibaraki Prefectural Police
Feb. 21, 2007	Shinodayama	3rd Division (Hyogo pref., Itami city)	Osaka Prefectural Police Nara Prefectural Police Wakayama Prefectural Police
March 7, 2007	Asahikawa	2nd Division (Hokkaido pref., Asahikawa city)	Hokkaido Prefectural Police, Asahikawa Area Headquarters

Term	Name of Training	Location	Participating Units and Others	
			MSDF Side	Japan Coast Guard Side
May 27-May 28, 2006	Fleet Review and Integrated Exercise by Japan Coast Guard in FY 2006	Off the coast of Haneda	Destroyer × 1	Patrol Vessel × 6 Aircraft × 1
March 12, 2007	Joint Exercise pertaining to Response to Unidentified Vessel	Surrounding sea area of Sasebo	Destroyer × 1 Missile Craft × 1 P-3C × 1 SH-60J × 1	Patrol Vessel and Boat × 3 Aircraft × 1

Fig. III-4-1-8 Results of Joint Exercises (FY 2006)

Name of Exercise	Period	Location	Main participating units and others		Remarks
			Japan side	U.S. side	
SDF joint exercise (command post exercise)	Sept. 11-Sept. 15, 2006	Ichigaya garrison, and other locations	Joint Staff Office (JSO); Defense Intelligence Headquarters; Staff of GDSF, MSDF and ASDF; Regional Armies; Self-Defense Fleet; Regional District Units; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; and others Approx. 1,800 personnel	/	Exercise to sustain and improve joint operation capability of the SDF by exercising integrated SDF operation in case of armed attacks, and similar situations
Japan-U.S. combined joint exercises (command post exercise)	Jan. 29-Feb. 8, 2007	Ichigaya garrison, Yokota Air Base of U.S. Forces in Japan, and other locations	Joint Staff Office (JSO); Defense Intelligence Headquarters; Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense; Staff of GDSF, MSDF and ASDF; Regional Armies; Self-Defense Fleet; Regional District Units; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; and others Approx. 1,350 personnel	Headquarters of USFJ; Headquarters of U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army in Japan; and others Approx. 3,100 personnel	Exercise to sustain and improve combined joint operation capability by exercising U.S.-Japan cooperation and SDF responses to various situations in areas surrounding Japan, and U.S.-Japan joint responses for the defense of Japan

For example, training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Combined Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response Exercises to deter threats to Japan; training such as International Peace Cooperation Exercises and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training in preparation for international peace cooperation; and related activities. (See Fig. III-4-1-8)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of an Instructor for the Ship Inspection Course (MSDF)

Lieutenant Commander Tetsuya Okumura, MSDF
Ship Inspection Leader, Guard Division, MSDF 1st Technical School

I am an instructor at the Marine Self-Defense Force 1st Technical School and working as the Ship Inspection Leader for the Ship Inspection Course. The Ship Inspection Course is a relatively new course established in FY 2001 after the suspicious boat incident in waters off the Noto Peninsula in 1999.

Ship inspections performed by the MSDF are classified roughly into three types depending on which law the inspection is based on: “inspection operations” as performed by boarding ships under the Ship Inspection Operations Law, “boarding inspections” as performed under the Japan Coast Guard Law applied *mutatis mutandis* during guarding operations at sea, and “detention inspections” as performed under the Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc., in Armed Attack Situation (Maritime Transportation Restriction Law) during defense operations. The Ship Inspection Course provides training necessary for these inspections, such as the procedures by which personnel sent from a destroyer boards a suspected vessel, inspects cargo, ship’s papers, and each compartment, and carries out other necessary duties. However, because actions authorized under each of the laws are different and complex, I am struggling every day as to how I can ensure that trainees accurately understand the difference.

In addition, while the training of MSDF personnel is generally centered around the operation of equipment and administrative procedures, the Ship Inspection Course focuses more on how to deal with people—rather than machinery and paper—to perform inspections. Because there is a possibility that people on a suspected vessel may commit a dangerous act, we place a particular focus on the usage of pistols, clubs and other weapons so that trainees will learn how and when to use them under the applicable law through practicing what they have learnt in classrooms. To ensure that trainees master all the skills they have learnt, instructors spend time together with trainees even during the time other than during training, such as while trainees study at night and on holidays, so that instructors can teach trainees at any time upon request.

Through enabling instructors and trainees to spend time together in this way, the Ship Inspection Course is designed to improve the skills of trainees within the limited period of only about four weeks, and produce an atmosphere in which trainees voluntarily seek instructions from instructors—rather than passively learning what is taught—throughout the entire period.



Trainees on the Ship Inspection Course (front) and instructors (behind) practicing on a training mock ship

Considering the recent international circumstances, there is always a possibility for the MSDF to encounter a situation in which they will have to inspect a vessel. We instructors are therefore currently making utmost efforts to train trainees into strong elite personnel who can perform various duties such as ship inspections at any time.

(3) Restrictions on Education and Training, and Responses

Various facilities and equipment¹⁴ are available for SDF training under near-wartime conditions, yet many restrictions are imposed on their usage.

Particularly, restrictions¹⁵ in maneuver areas, sea and airspace, and firing ranges where training is carried out are becoming tighter along with the modernization of equipment and other changes. Such areas are not all sufficient in size, are unevenly dispersed across the nation, and have time limitations. Furthermore, training under electronic warfare¹⁶ conditions—conducted as practical training—is limited by the need to avoid radio wave interference.



Annual fire training of medium range SAM by GSDF

To overcome these restrictions, each SDF makes maximum use of its limited domestic maneuvering area, by moving to large-scale maneuver areas and other areas. Each SDF also strives to carry out training under conditions similar to actual wartime by conducting live-firing training and Japan-U.S. combined joint exercises in the United States and waters off the United States where there are training conditions not possible in Japan. (See Fig. III-4-1-9)

Fig. III-4-1-9 Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY 2006)

(As of End of January 2007)

	Name of Training	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Sept. 9 -Dec. 10, 2006	McGregor Range in New Mexico (U.S.A.)	Seventeen anti-aircraft companies
	Fire training in the U.S.	Sept. 7-Sept. 16, 2006	Yakima Training Center in Washington (U.S.A.)	Major tank unit of 7th Division, anti-tank guided-missile unit of the 2nd Division, and anti-tank helicopter unit of the North Army District
	Surface-to-surface missile unit level live-fire training	Oct. 1-Nov. 12, 2006	Point Mugu Range in California (U.S.A.)	Six surface-to-surface missile regiments
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer, and others	May 11-Aug. 15, 2006	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, and other locations	Four destroyers * Incl. participation in RIMPAC 2006 (June 26-July 28, 2006)
	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of fixed-wing patrol aircraft	June 9-Aug. 4, 2006	Same as above	Eight P-3Cs * Incl. participation in RIMPAC 2006 (June 26-July 28, 2006)
	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	June 5-Aug. 25, 2006	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, and other locations	One submarine
	Training in the area near Guam by dispatch of mine-laying ship Muroto	Oct. 8-Nov. 30, 2006	Area near Guam	One mine-laying ship * Incl. mine-laying training
	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Jan. 9-April 11, 2007	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, and other locations	One submarine
ASDF	Annual practice by anti-aircraft units	Aug. 14-Dec. 2, 2006	McGregor Range and White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico (U.S.A.)	Twelve anti-aircraft/anti-aircraft training units, eight base air defense units

(4) Safety Management

Because the SDF's main mission is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk, but accidents that cause injury or loss of property to the public or the loss of life of SDF personnel must be avoided at all costs.

Continuous safety reviews and improvements are vital, and must be jointly handled by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF take great care to ensure the safety of aircraft traffic and firing training at ordinary times, and prepare aeronautical safety radio facilities and equipment for prevention and rescue in the event of marine accidents.

3. Working Conditions of Personnel, Measures on Personnel Matters, and Other Related Issues

The duties of the SDF make no distinction between night and day, and SDF personnel must always be at the ready to perform their duties. The work assigned to SDF Regular Personnel can be extremely demanding, involving various operations onboard aircraft, long-term service on ships or submarines, or parachuting. To instill SDF personnel with both pride and peace of mind in their work, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF provide salaries and allowances, medical care, health & welfare, and benefits that reflect the special nature of their duties. (See Fig. III-4-1-10)

1. The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force

The Ministry of Defense has acknowledged the significance of maintaining high-quality human resources, and implemented various measures for the new era¹⁷. Given the rapidly declining birth rate in recent years and changes in lifecycles of SDF personnel, a wide range of reforms, which focus on the personnel field of the Defense Force, has become a pressing issue, in order to secure sufficient human resources and create a comfortable working environment where personnel can concentrate on their duties without anxiety. In September 2006, the Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reforms in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established. The Panel



Meeting by the Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force

is headed by the Minister of State for Defense (at the time), and includes top officials of the Defense Agency (at the time) and outside experts. This Panel holds administrative meetings, headed by the Administrative Vice Minister, and consists of six examining groups: 1) Examination Steering 2) General Issues; 3) Lifecycle; 4) Appointment System and other Related Issues; 5) Ranking and Payment System; and 6) Financial Measures for Retired Personnel.

Four discussion meetings have been held as of May 2007. In December 2006, various surveys by the Panel were carried out, along with a survey with questionnaires targeted at 2,000 active-duty Regular Personnel and 1,000 retired SDF personnel. Based on these, issues concerning the personnel field of the defense force have been identified, and ways of solving the issues were discussed in March 2007. These issues include expansion of employment of non-fixed term SDF personnel, utilization of retired SDF personnel, review on personnel management of SDF officers (i.e., increase in the number of young personnel who are promoted to officers and decrease in the number of middle-aged or older personnel who are promoted to higher ranks), study of the pay scale of officers and enlisted personnel, early retirement system, and measures to support life after retirement.

Fig. III-4-1-10 Main Measures on Personnel Matters

Items	Measures by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF	Related governmental actions, and movements
Discussions on Reform of the Public Servant System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A new personnel evaluation system was introduced on a trial basis in January 2006. ○ Laws have been organized: to set up a system which obliges personnel who leave their position soon after returning from overseas to reimburse overseas training expenses; to improve the system for personnel exchanges between the public and private sectors; and to introduce a system for leave of absence for self-development. These laws have been prepared in accordance with those applied to other Ministries and Agencies. ○ In response to the submission of the Diet bill to partially revise the National Civil Service Law and related regulations, study is underway on laws that will be applied to SDF personnel, considering the specific features of the special service. 	Reform of the Public Servant System (Approved in the Cabinet meeting on April 24, 2007)
Efforts for Gender-Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Defense Agency Headquarters for the Promotion of a Gender-Equal Society was established in 2001, with the Senior Vice-Minister for Defense heading the organization. It has implemented various measures. ○ In 2006, the headquarters drew up the Basic Plan on Gender Equality in the Defense Agency and made other decisions to promote: the expansion of recruitment and employment of female personnel; support for female personnel to balance work with family life; the improvement of facilities and accommodation on ships and other work areas to fit situations where more and more female personnel are placed. 	Gender-Equal Society Law (1999) ¹
Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Defense Agency Committee for the Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generations was established. ○ The Defense Agency drew up the Action Plan of the Defense Agency as Specific Proprietor. (In particular, encouraging male personnel to take child-care leave and special leave, and establishing day care centers on the premises of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF) 	Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation (2003) ²
Approaches to Mental Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Defense Agency Headquarters for the Prevention of Suicide was established in 2003. It has discussed measures to prevent suicides, and distributed referential materials on suicide prevention to garrisons and bases. ○ Efforts to enhance the awareness of SDF personnel have been made through improvement in a counseling system, and the production and dissemination of educational videos. ○ Measures on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and stress disorder, resulting from critical incidents, have been examined as one of the issues on mental health. 	
Active Utilization of Warrant Officer and Enlisted (Upper) Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The GDSF, MSDF, and ASDF have assigned Warrant Officers and senior enlisted personnel new roles, which include giving instruction on service discipline to enlisted personnel. For example, the MSDF introduced the Command Master Chief System in April 2003, while the GDSF and ASDF introduced the Master Sergeant Major System and Command Master System respectively on a trial bases last year and are examining those new systems. 	

Notes: 1. See <http://www.gender.go.jp/9906kihonhou.html>

2. See <http://mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/kouyou/jisedai/suisin.html>

Remark: As for the reference to the measures taken before the transition to the Ministry of Defense, the former name, "the Defense Agency", is used.

As of May 2007, discussions are progressing based on past surveys and studies, aiming toward a conclusion by this summer. Some of the feasible conclusions from this Panel are planned to be carried out.

2. Efforts to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel

Since 1998, the annual number of suicides in Japan has exceeded 30,000. This is a serious social problem, and the number of SDF personnel committing suicide has also been increasing in recent years, setting a record-high of 94 personnel in FY 2004, followed by a figure of 93 personnel for both FY 2005 and FY 2006.

The suicide of an SDF personnel is truly a great tragedy for both the personnel themselves and their bereaved families, and it is also a great loss for the SDF to lose capable personnel. The Ministry of Defense established, in July 2003, the Defense Agency Headquarters for the Prevention of Suicides (at the time), headed by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (at the time), and took the following measures to prevent suicide. Much effort will continue to be made to prevent suicide.

- (1) Expanding the counseling system (inside counselors, outside counselors, and 24-hour telephone hotline for counseling)
- (2) Promoting education, to ensure that commanders sense signs of mental problems among the subordinates, and that general personnel are aware of their mental health
- (3) Instituting a campaign period for mental health in spring and summer, which is when personnel are transferred, to enhance awareness of mental health, which includes: having commanders closely monitor the mental condition of subordinates who undergo a change in environment due to personnel transfer; distributing various reference materials; and providing lectures.

3. Commemorating Personnel Killed in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950, which has evolved through the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have accomplished this by dealing with various changes surrounding Japan, and devoting themselves unstintingly to training day and night to fulfill the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time, however, more than 1700 personnel have been killed in the line of duty.

In the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by each SDF unit, to which the personnel killed in the line of duty belonged, in order to express condolences to them. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel killed in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, and support is provided to the families of the deceased.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF carry out an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel killed in the line of duty, in the Memorial Zone¹⁸, on the premises of the Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense, on the SDF Commemoration Day, or other nearby days. This ceremony is joined by the bereaved families of the personnel, the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, including the Minister of Defense and past Minister of State for Defense. At the ceremony, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and others give memorial addresses; the Guard of Honor carries out a funeral gun salute; and all participants bow in honor of the deceased. Plates, on which names of the deceased are inscribed, are placed inside the memorial stone located in the Memorial Zone.

When key figures, such as a minister of defense from overseas, pay a courtesy call to the Ministry of Defense, they offer a floral tribute and express respect and condolences to the martyrs to duty. There have been 50 visitors¹⁹ from about 25 countries to the present. Ministry of Defense officials, such as the Minister of Defense, also express respect and condolences on leaving and taking up the post.

In addition, memorial ceremonies of the same kind are carried out in each garrison and base of the SDF.

See the section titled “Presence of the Prime Minister at a Funeral Ceremony of a Martyr of Duty”



Prime Minister Abe at the annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel killed in the line of duty (October 2006)

Opening of a Ministry of Defense Day Care Center (Mishuku Garrison)

As part of its efforts to help SDF personnel with child-rearing¹, the Ministry of Defense opened a day care center for children on the premises of the Mishuku Garrison (City of Setagaya, Tokyo) in April this year as a model facility to meet the needs specific to the SDF.

The day care center is on the first floor of a four-story barrack, which has been refurbished. It consists of a nursery room, post-illness nursery room, kitchen, and medical treatment room, and offers services for preschool children aged up to five.

The day care center is designed to meet the needs specific to the SDF, where working hours tend to be irregular². It features long-hour services from early morning to night, as well as night-time and holiday services. Many SDF personnel with children are pleased, saying, "It's very helpful because its around-the-clock service fits every working situation such as night shifts and disaster relief missions."

The Ministry of Defense will further enhance the quality of the service to make the center even more convenient for SDF personnel, while considering the establishment of facilities of the same kind, based on demands from personnel, in other garrisons and bases.



"Kids' Garden Mishuku," the day care center opened in the Mishuku Garrison in April this year

1) The Ministry of Defense formulated the Action Plan of the Defense Agency as Specific Proprietor in March 2005 in accordance with the Action Plan Development Guidelines (announced in August 2003) provided under the Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation (enforced in July 2003). In the Action Plan, the importance of providing facilities to support the balance of working and family life of the SDF personnel is cited, and the establishment of day care centers on the SDF premises is defined as one of the most urgent matters.

2) Due to around-the-clock duties, shift-based work, emergency calls, long-time exercises, trainings, disaster relief missions, and other irregular assignments

How is mental health care provided to personnel of the Ministry of Defense/the Self-Defense Forces?

The Ministry of Defense/the Self-Defense Forces consider mental health care of their personnel extremely important to enable them to maintain their commitment to missions and perform their lofty assignment of defending Japan, and is currently implementing various plans.

As a result of hearings from SDF units conducted between March and May 2000, it was pointed out that a consultation service that can be used easily by SDF personnel and other services should be provided, and the Study Group Regarding Metal Health Care for SDF



MSDF personnel receiving mental health education. They are wearing private clothes so that they do not mind ranks.

Personnel made up mainly of external intellectuals was established in July the same year. After many discussions, the Study Group compiled the Proposals for the Mental Health of SDF Personnel in October the same year, and proposed such measures as the development of a system to control all mental health activities, education on mental health care, and the strengthening of the counseling system. The Ministry of Defense/the SDF have been taking various actions based on these proposals.

In addition, the Defense Agency Headquarters to Prevent Suicides (at the time) was established with the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (at the time) as the head in July 2003, and education on mental health care, strengthening of the counseling system, and other measures have been promoted. As for the counseling system, for example, many measures including the following have been taken:

- Allocation of inside counselors¹ in each garrison and other locations
- Invitation of outside counselors
- Opening of an around-the clock outside telephone counseling service

1) Inside counselors

GSDF: ○ One for each company and other forces, two for each garrison (GSDF personnel who has completed various counseling trainings)

○ One mental health officer (Major) for each Army Headquarters

MSDF: ○ One for each unit and vessel (MSDF personnel who has completed various counseling trainings)

○ Counseling at the Personnel Consultation Room provided in each headquarters.

ASDF: ○ Counseling by Chief Warrant Officer (ASDF personnel who has completed various counseling trainings)

○ The Mental Health Care Officer Seminars are held at the Mental Health Department of the SDF Gifu Hospital to nurture counselors. Two personnel from those who have completed the seminars are assigned to each base as counselors.

4. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel, and Related Issues

1. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel

There is an early retirement system and a short-term service system for SDF Regular Personnel, to keep the forces strong. Unlike general civilian government employees, many SDF Regular Personnel retire by their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) and their 20s (most uniformed personnel serving under the short-term service system).

To resolve concerns that SDF Regular Personnel may have about their future, it is essential to ensure they can live a steady retirement, and thus can work diligently with peace of mind while in service. Such treatment also boosts morale and makes it easier to attract high-quality human resources.

For these reasons, the Ministry of Defense places great importance on outplacement measures for retiring SDF Regular Personnel in personnel matters, and assists outplacement such as by providing occupational training to teach useful skills, and by effectively using employment information.

Specific measures include: provision of education and training to acquire useful knowledge and skills for outplacement; promotion of employment of retiring SDF Regular Personnel in the public sector; networking of employment information at each SDF; and improvement of job-seekers' skills by enhancing the job training curricula.

Various local organizations help retiring SDF personnel find new jobs. On the other hand, since the Ministry of Defense is not authorized to conduct employment placement services itself, the SDF Assistance Foundation, with the permission of the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, offers free employment placement services. As the job market is expected to remain tight, assistance from local governments and other organizations is also becoming increasingly necessary.

Retired Regular Personnel of the SDF work in various sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, and are now increasingly being employed as risk management staff, including disaster prevention,

by local public organizations. Retired SDF personnel are highly evaluated by their employers because they generally have an excellent sense of responsibility, diligence, physical strength, spirit, discipline, and other qualities. In particular, those retired on reaching mandatory retirement age have great leadership skills cultivated through many years of service. (See Fig. III-4-1-11)

Fig. III-4-1-11 Main Measures for Reemployment Support

Category	Description
Occupational aptitude testing	○ Testing aimed to provide guidance on the basis of individual aptitudes
Technical training	○ Provide transferable technical skills for use after retirement (e.g. heavy-duty/special-purpose vehicle operation, information processing skills, crane operation, vehicle maintenance, boiler operation, handling dangerous materials)
Driver training	○ Grant heavy-duty vehicle license
Disaster prevention and risk control training	○ Provide Technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan
Correspondence courses	○ Provide capabilities to obtain official certification (e.g. social insurance officer, health manager, real estate business manager) to SDF Regular Personnel that will take mandatory retirement
Business management training	○ Enlighten SDF Regular Personnel that will take mandatory retirement so that they foster social adaptability. Also provide know-how to lead a stable life after retirement or reemployment
Career guidance	○ Prepare near-retiree SDF Regular Personnel to find new employment and provide them with know-how to choose new occupation

2. Regulations on Outplacement of Personnel after Retirement

There are restrictions on the outplacement of SDF Regular Personnel to prevent impropriety. For example, within the first two years after a person leaves the SDF, if the prospective employer is a private company that had a contract with the organization where the person worked within five years before leaving the SDF, then the approval of the Minister of Defense or other regulated personnel is required²⁰. In 2006, the Minister of Defense approved 78 individual cases (78 persons) of reemployment of SDF Regular Personnel at private companies.

3. Reappointment System

The reappointment system allows the re-employment of personnel who have the desire and capabilities to continue working as SDF personnel when they reach the retirement age. The system makes the best possible use of experienced and valuable human resources, and secures the linkage between employment and pension. Under this system, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have reappointed 221 personnel as of the end of May 2007. (See Fig. III-4-1-12)

Fig. III-4-1-12 Overview of Reappointment System

Item	Administrative Officials, and others	SDF Regular Personnel
Basic approach	○ Present mandatory retirement age to remain in place; personnel in their early 60's who have the ability and motivation to work in the public service to be reappointed	○ While maintaining present mandatory retirement age, personnel with the motivation and ability to work as a SDF Regular Personnel beyond the mandatory retirement age remains to be appointed to a position determined by the Minister of Defense.
Job conditions	○ Full-time ○ Shorter-time service	○ Full-time
Period of reappointment	○ One year, with renewal allowed	○ One year, with renewal allowed ○ Extension is allowed for a certain period of time (between six months to a year) in the case of mobilization.
Maximum age for reappointment	○ 65 (Maximum age was 61 between fiscal 2001 to fiscal 2003. After this, the age is being increased incrementally by one year, every three years)	
Salary and allowance	○ Fixed monthly salary is provided based on job level and rank. Allowances, such as a commuting allowance, are provided.	

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

The Prime Minister Attends the Memorial Service for SDF Personnel who Lost Their Lives on the Duty

A helicopter belonging to the 101st Squadron of the Ground Self-Defense Force 1st Combined Brigade, which was heading from Naha to Tokunoshima Island on a disaster relief mission upon request from the governor of Kagoshima Prefecture to transport an urgent patient, crashed on March 30 this year. This accident claimed precious lives of four SDF members.

Prime Minister Abe attended the memorial service for these members held in the Air Self-Defense Force Naha Base on April 15. He prayed for their souls, paying respect to their dedication in

his heartfelt words, “As the supreme commander of the SDF, I am utterly aggrieved at having lost these four men, who demonstrated the pride and the responsibility of SDF members through their firmly-held sense of mission to save patients at night despite harsh weather conditions. It is the responsibility of each of us to respect their noble sacrifice and inherit their will to protect our people and land.”

Disaster relief missions are performed in an urgent situation where there is a need to maintain public order and to protect life and property, and when no one but the SDF can handle the situation. The missions often have to be performed in dangerous and harsh conditions or places. The SDF will continue to fulfill its missions to protect what they must protect under even the most dangerous conditions.



Prime Minister Abe expressing his condolence for the SDF personnel who lost their lives while on duty at the memorial service held in the ASDF Naha Base (Okinawa Prefecture)

5. Enhancing Information and Communications Capabilities

Information and communication in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are the basis for command and control, extending from the central command, to the headquarters of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and to the lower units. It is like the central nervous system of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF recognize the importance of enhancing information and communication capabilities in related fields that are directly related to the capabilities of the SDF to execute missions.


1. Response to the Information Technology (IT) Revolution

In response to the IT revolution in recent years, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are pursuing information superiority²¹, and are systematically establishing the infrastructure to integrate their defense capabilities in order to enable efficient operations. The following three core measures have been taken: a) Developing sophisticated networks, including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) or Common Operating Environment (COE), b) Enhancing information and communications functions, such as the Central Command System (CCS) and the command system of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF²², and c) Assuring information security, such as protection of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF systems against cyber attacks²³.

2. Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)

Going forward, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF must meet the new roles expected of the SDF, such as promoting joint operations and ensuring that international peace cooperation activities are carried out smoothly. Therefore, various mobile information and communications systems using the existing information and communications infrastructure must be developed. To this end, policy targets for strengthening command and communications capabilities and related capabilities have already been set²⁴. The Ministry of Defense and the

Fig. III-4-1-13 Enhancement of System to Cope with Cyber Attacks and Evaluation Function



SDF are now developing sophisticated information and communication systems in line with superior technological advances both inside and outside Japan.

As a result, DII has become the standardized network for all SDF services, with the majority of information systems of the Ministry of Defense being linked (approximately 130 information systems). By the end of fiscal 2006, the COE has been developed and a common environment has been established for all command systems. Procedures for complying with the information system are now underway, and a common environment with information systems used in support operations, such as supply and accounting, is being constructed.

In fiscal 2007, in addition to enhancing DII and COE, new measures will be taken. These will include establishing a new organization—the SDF Command and Communication Squadron (tentative name)—and strengthening analysis and countermeasures against cyber attacks through simulations. (See Fig. III-4-1-13) (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4)

6. Efforts for Efficient Acquisition of Defense Equipment

Efficient acquisition of equipment and material is one of the most important elements for our defense. It is also imperative to maintain production and technological bases for defense equipment within Japan even in peacetime.

To achieve these goals, the Ministry of Defense has been promoting multidimensional reforms aimed at bringing about more efficient and effective acquisition of defense equipment and materials, while enhancing R&D activities including those at the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI). Details of these efforts are as follows.

1. Promotion of Acquisition Transformation—the Reform Process and Outline of Various Efforts—

The Ministry of Defense has been promoting acquisition transformation. The major goals are; more efficient and streamlined procurement, supply, and life-cycle management of defense equipment and materials; enhancement of open and transparent procurement processes; as well as preservation and upgrading of the necessary defense production and technological bases.

Major defense equipment is used over a period of 10 to 20 years after procurement. Furthermore, advanced capabilities and reduced acquisition quantities have pushed up acquisition costs of current equipment. Under these conditions, acquisition transformation towards more efficient and streamlined management of equipment—from concept-refining, development, procurement, operation (incl. maintenance and repairs), to disposal—is of increasing importance.

The ministry's Equipment Procurement Office was established in July 2006 to provide efficient acquisition of equipment. Enhanced life-cycle management of equipment through advanced life cycle cost information management is being introduced to the MOD.

The Ministry of Defense is pursuing a variety of efforts for efficient procurement of equipment and material. These include bulk purchase of equipment in a single fiscal year rather than over multiple fiscal years; bulk purchase of equipment and material instead of separate purchases by the three SDF services; commoditization of some specifications at the development stage; introduction of commercial off-the-shelf products; private consignment; and review of the ways of maintenance of equipment.²⁵ Moreover, a review is under way to improve cost accounting of equipment and materials, while improvement of the efficiency of the procurement of stock components are in progress.

While the Japanese government is making efforts to assure appropriate public purchase in all fields, the Ministry of Defense has also been reviewing private contract procedures to enhance the transparency and fairness of the procurement process. Private contract procedures are being reformed by expanding the scope of the comprehensive evaluation bidding system, increasing the number of contracts for bulk purchase of

equipment over multiple fiscal years, and introducing efficient bidding procedures. A vice-chief in charge of auditing has been appointed at the Equipment Procurement Office, while a councilor in charge of auditing and an Audit Division have been set up in the Internal Bureau in the Ministry of Defense.

Moreover, from the view of preventing information leakages from contractors, a new special contract clause has been added that imposes penalties for failing to protect classified information on protection of classified information; and the scope of the special contract on information security has been expanded to cover all contracts.

2. Enhancement and Strengthening of the Defense Industry & Technological Bases

The defense industry is an important sector for national security. Therefore, in order to “acquire high-quality equipment in a shorter time at a lower cost,” it is essential to (even in peacetime) secure, defense production and technological bases that are capable of designing, manufacturing, and maintaining equipment and materials. Only a few companies have the capacity to develop and produce equipment because the production quantities are small, while large initial investment and highly advanced technologies are required. This is especially so in the case of major equipment, such as aircraft, warships, tanks, guided missiles, and related items. As a result, the withdrawal of a company involved in manufacturing of equipment or material from the market can immediately lead to an obstacle to the stable acquisition or maintenance of equipment and materials. Moreover, it is critical to maintain this manufacturing base, in case that equipment is to be procured from a foreign country, in order to maintain bargaining power with counterpart in the country and acquire the equipment at the best condition.

On acquisition of equipment and materials, appropriate methods (e.g. domestic development, domestic production based on license or import) have been decided after deliberate consideration on the costs and availabilities of maintenance, supply, and education/training, and the potential necessity of making improvements in the future, in addition to the performance and procurement cost. Taking the present severe financial situation and the increasing price of equipment and materials into consideration, it is difficult to expect large increase in acquisition quantity in the coming years. Therefore, it becomes all the more important to make renewed effects so that defense production and technological bases with high productivity, high technological capability and sound financial conditions, are maintained and fostered.

On the other hand, in the private sector, Japan possesses the high-tech capabilities to realize cutting-edge performance and the production capabilities to manufacture highly reliable products as well. By appropriately combining such technologies with existing defense technologies, and utilizing dual-use technologies, it is possible to establish technologies for high-quality equipment. In addition, expanding the ‘spin off’ of defense technologies to the private sector may contribute to the maintenance and promotion of defense production and technological bases.

Amid such an environment, to “establish truly necessary defense production and technological bases,” the Ministry of Defense is focusing attention on the defense production and technological bases that should be maintained and promoted. (See Reference 60)

7. Enhancement of Technical Research & Development

1. Research & Development of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)

In the Ministry of Defense, it is required to select and concentrate research programs (e.g. by sharing works with the private sector, focusing on fields of our country’s superiority) due to strict financial situations. TRDI implemented a medium-to-long-term technology outlook which determined the vision on priority technology areas and clarified future directions for each technology area²⁶. In the outlook, focus was placed on advanced



Full-scale aircraft model being subject to radar reflection surface measurement in France



The first prototype of the next air carrier (C-X) (above) and the next fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-X) (below)

technologies that may produce equipment superior in the future battle space, not depending on the prepossession evoked by the conventional equipment and materials system. Examples of priority areas are improvement in detection and precision interception capabilities against new threats such as cruise missiles; improvement in autonomy and networking of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and robots; improvement in the protection capability of soldier equipment and NBC detection capabilities; and improvement in stealth treatment and mobility of aircraft, ships, etc. In addition, for the response to various situations and joint operations, it becomes necessary to introduce up-to-date technologies into R&D, and conduct deeper analysis on operational needs. For these purposes, a number of new R&D methods are being adopted²⁷.

In order to optimize the performance, schedule, and cost throughout the life-cycle of equipment or materials, it is effective to thoroughly conduct trade-off analysis on a number of proposals regarding performance and cost at the point of concept creation or R&D. Additionally, it is effective to follow-up for improvements and other necessary measures, after deployment of equipment and materials. Continuous study is under way as part of efforts to enhance the R&D system. (See Figs. III-4-1-14 • 15)

2. Strengthening Relations with the Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology Field

In regard to R&D at the Ministry of Defense, the National Defense Program Guideline and the Mid-Term Defense Program state that efforts should be made “by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors.”

TRDI aims to investigate and introduce superior technologies in the private sector. As part of this effort, from fiscal 2007, basic (element) technology research themes have been selected, and investigation & research projects that invite public participation by not only private corporations, but also universities and independent administrative institutions, have been newly introduced. Implementation of such projects are intended to push forward introduction of superior technology from a wide range of organizations, including research organizations such as universities and independent administrative institutions, without direct past contact with the Ministry of Defense, and corporations not related to the defense industry.

Together with the use of COTS technology, it is also important to spread the outcome of R&D at the Ministry of Defense into the private sectors. The Ministry of Defense is cooperating to promote the conversion of aircraft that have been developed as SDF aircraft for civil use, since this may lead to a reduction in the procurement costs of such aircraft. The Ministry of Defense is cooperating with other related ministries and agencies through the Council of Ministries and Agencies Related to Promotion of Development of Civil Aircrafts²⁸.

Fig. III-4-1-14 Cutting-Edge Technologies Underway at TRDI

Category	Item	Features	Started (FY)	To be completed (FY)
Aircraft	Flight control system for a high maneuver aircraft	Technology aimed to achieve high maneuver flight control by integrating engine thrust vectoring and flight control, and technology for optimized aerodynamic shape that realizes both stealth and high-maneuver capabilities	2000	2013
	Smart skin airframe structure	Airframe structure technology to enhance target detection and tracking capability of an air fighter by positioning radars along the contour of the airplane body	2006	2011
Guided missile	Ground based guidance system	Technology related to the future ground based guidance system for anti-air missiles to combat future aerial threats and the present targets.	2003	2007
	Advanced SAM component technology	Technology to achieve a missile system that can intercept small supersonic targets cruising in very low or flying from high altitudes using a multi-layered structure for from long to short ranges	2005	2010
Naval vessel and submersible equipment	Torpedo guidance and control device	Technology to guide and control torpedoes in image-homing with superior target identification capability, so as to cope with improvement in torpedo defense capability and stealth vessels	2002	2010
	Submarine structure with walk-back prevention and impact resistant features	Walk-back prevention technology that reduces noises caused by submarines, and submarine structure related technology to improve impact resistant features	2007	2014
Electronic devices	Infrared countermeasure system	Technology for infrared countermeasure system to be applied to airborne environment in order to effectively protect aircraft itself against the threat of a man portable surface-to-air missile with infrared guidance towards helicopters and large aircrafts, such as carriers.	2004	2009
	Two wave-length infrared sensor technology	Two wave-length infrared sensor technology that is superior in high-temperature operation and mass-productivity, and with potential to have superior characteristics in extracting the target item and identification	2005	2014
Others	Countermeasure technology against biological weapons	Technology concerning the detection and identification of biological agent, and individual protective equipment against multiple threats of biological agents	2004	2010

8. Preventing Information Leaks

1. Protection of Classified Information

Unauthorized leakage of some of the information handled by the Ministry of Defense could seriously damage national security. Classified information must be kept secure for the sake of national defense and safety.

The Ministry of Defense defines three classifications and stipulates procedures for designation and handling such as communication, storage, and disposal for each classification, in order to prevent unrelated personnel from inappropriately accessing information. The three types of classified information are “Special Defense Secret” which is information concerning materials, equipment, and other items provided by the United States based on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America; “Defense Secret” that is designated by the Minister of Defense as information concerning SDF operations, defense capability development, and related issues that must be kept highly confidential for national defense; and the so-called “Ministry of Defense Secret” that is classified information, other than those listed above, related to the services of the Ministry of Defense.

Following an information leak via the Internet (in February 2006), the Ministry of Defense has taken drastic measures to prevent a recurrence, as explained below in detail. Moreover, in view of cases of information leaks at contractors, it is essential to ensure that private companies working for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF handle information, particularly classified information, with the greatest care. The

Fig. III-4-1-15 Major Systems and Equipment Currently under Development at the Ministry of Defense

Category	Item	Start of development (FY)	Features
Aircraft	Next fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft and air carrier	2001	Next fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft and air carrier planned to be operable from 2011 in order to replace P-3C and C-1. Low cost development will be achieved by commonality of applied technology.
	Unmanned aircraft research system	2004	System for operation of unmanned aircraft (fixed wing) that automatically gathers and transmits images and other data by autonomous flights, and returns. The system is achieved by establishing technologies for automatic running and landing, and image processing by unmanned aircrafts.
Guided missile	Type 99 air-to-air guided missile (remodeled)	2002	Intermediate-range air-to-air missile with improved functions and performance compared to the original Type-99 air-to-air guided missiles in survivability, shooting coverage, and jamming features
	Intermediate-range multipurpose missile	2004	Multipurpose missile used in infantry units and others to destroy enemy units in diverse situations
	Short-range SAM (Rev. II)	2005	Surface-to-air missile to provide overall air defense coverage in the operation area as a replacement of Type-81 short range surface-to-air guided missiles. It will also be used as major air defense means at bases.
	New guided missiles for ballistic missiles defense	2006	Advanced ship-board guided missiles for ballistic missiles defense that will be jointly developed by Japan and the U.S. It will have improved capability to respond to the threats of existing ballistic missiles, and potential to respond to advanced and diversified ballistic missiles.
Artillery and vehicle	New tank	2002	Tanks that will be used in tank units to replace the present tanks to destroy enemy units in diverse situations
	NBC detection vehicle	2005	Vehicle used by Chemical Protection Units (platoons) to promptly reconnoiter (e.g. detect, identify) a wide area contaminated by harmful chemical or biological agents, or radioactivity
Naval vessel and submersible equipment	New ASROC	1999	System equipped on destroyers to attack and destroy submarines in long distance by combined use with surface ship sonar systems
	New anti-submarine short torpedo	2005	Short torpedo for attacking advanced submarines that run in all sea areas from shallow to deep
Electronic devices	IRST system for fighters	2003	Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) system used to complement the weakening detection capability of fire-control radar in electronic warfare environment and similar conditions, and fire control for air-to-air missiles on board, as well as detection and tracking of target
	Anti-aircraft combat command and control system	2004	System used by anti-aircraft artillery units to collect, process and transmit necessary information for anti-aircraft combat; and to implement prompt and accurate command and control needed in anti-aircraft combat unit
	Firing combat command and control system	2006	System used by field artillery units and others to collect, process and transmit target information; and to implement prompt and accurate command and control needed in firing combat
	New outdoor telecommunication system	2007	System for Regional Armies, Divisions, and other levels to assure continuous telecommunication for command, control, and communication
Others	Air-to-air small sized target	2006	Small sized, light weight, low cost targets that will be used in place of some multifunction and expensive targets that are presently used. It will be loaded on target mother planes (F-15) for various air-to-air missile fire training.

Ministry of Defense will therefore add a clause to contractual documents stipulating fines as civil punishment in the event of any leakage of secret information.

2. Countermeasures for Information Leaks through the Internet

(1) A Case of Information Leakage and Its Background

A series of information leaks via the Internet occurred at the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. In February 2006, a case of leakage of classified information on the MSDF destroyer Asayuki from a privately-owned PC through file-sharing software came to light.

The Ministry of Defense's information security systems and the attitudes of personnel toward rapid IT innovation lay behind this case. Specifically, as personal computers and portable memory devices have become more powerful and mobile, it has become easy to save, copy, and carry enormous quantities of information. Personal computers are now commonly used to give presentations, and can even handle music and video. Although PCs were quickly introduced in a planned manner by central organizations such as the Internal Bureau from around 1997, local organizations have been slower due to the number of staff (approximately 270,000), units and organizations scattered across the nation, and the fact that most units operate in the field or on board vessels. As a result, many privately-owned PCs and portable memory devices were brought in and used in the workplace. Consequently, both work-related and personal data (e.g. music) coexisted on private PCs and portable memory devices, and personnel inadvertently took work-related data home with them on their PCs and memory devices. This has caused information to be leaked onto the Internet by file-sharing software.

(2) Preventing Recurrence

1) Emergency Measures

In reaction to the information leak in February 2006, the Ministry of Defense issued the following emergency instructions.

- (a) File-sharing software installed in privately-owned PCs used for work must be immediately deleted.
- (b) Among the work-related data saved on privately-owned PCs and memory devices, classified information and unnecessary data must be immediately deleted.
- (c) Handling of classified information by privately-owned PCs and other memory devices, which had been allowed with official permission in the past, is totally prohibited.

2) Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence

In addition to these emergency measures, the Commission on Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages, headed by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (at the time), was established in February 2006. The Commission discussed specific ways to prevent recurrence and published its findings on April 12, 2006.

From April 2006, the Committee to Implement Measures for the Prevention of the Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages, headed by the Parliamentary Secretary of Defense and attended by the heads of all institutions within the Ministry of Defense, has held meetings to implement specific measures. The specific measures now being taken are listed below.

- (a) Specific measures for information security
 - a. Technology and hardware measures (e.g. introduction of new technology)
 - Immediate procurement by the government of approximately 56,000 PCs, and total removal of privately-owned PCs from the workplace by November 2006.
 - Implementation of measures to prevent leaks of work-related data from portable memory devices, such as by introducing software that automatically encrypts data when saving it to such devices.
 - b. Review of the system
 - Total ban on privately-owned PCs in the workplace, and introduction of government-supplied PCs.
 - Total ban on privately-owned portable memory devices from April 2006. Concentrated control of government-supplied portable memory devices.
 - Preparation of a Ministry-wide response manual to cope with information leaks on the Internet.
 - Investigation on the state of compliance with the information security system, including spot-checks.

c. Leveling up education

- Provision of periodic education programs on the information security system and system for protecting classified information. The education programs are tailored according to needs, such as the ranks of personnel and types of information they handle.
- Establishment of contact desks in each organization to answer questions and provide advice on information security (Help Desk) quickly and directly to personnel, and generate greater awareness of information security.

(b) Drastic measures for protecting classified information

a. Strengthening the deterrent effect

- To change the classification of classified documents from “Ministry of Defense Secret (Top Secret/Secret/Confidential)” for which punishment is relatively light, to “Defense Secret” for which punishment is heavier, based on a close examination of the content of such documents. This was completed in April 2007 to strengthen the deterrent effect.
- To prevent excessive designation of classified information through a strict process of designation, and to reduce the number of unnecessary classified documents by declassifying those which no longer need to be treated as secret.
- To obligate all personnel handling classified information to submit a written oath to make them aware of their serious duty to protect classified information.

b. Strengthening the inspection system

To carry out spot examinations (e.g. body searches on entering and leaving off-limit zones; inspections of data kept on computers which are not allowed to handle classified information, and spot inspections of contractors which handle classified information), in order to prevent problems, such as taking out classified information or inappropriately saving such information on portable memory devices or other tools.

(c) Drastic measures from the standpoint of disciplinary action

The deterrent effect, awareness and responsibility toward information security have been upgraded by clarifying the punishment standard. The standard has been clarified by giving examples of violations that can occur relevant to information leaks in this Internet society and notifying personnel that violators will be strictly punished, including the person responsible for controlling information.

3) Further Measures

While these measures were still being carried out, an information leakage occurred at a Naha ASDF base in November 2006. The Ministry of Defense therefore prepared and issued the following additional countermeasures at a meeting of the Committee to Implement Measures for the Prevention of Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakage on January 19, 2007.

(a) Thorough implementation of drastic measures

- a. Preparation and distribution to individual personnel of a pamphlet citing case examples of the risks of information leakage. The level of personnel’s understanding is checked.
- b. February every year has been designated as “Information Security Month of the Ministry of Defense,” and awareness activities and other events are carried out.

(b) Measures against non-compliance by personnel

- a. Strengthening of inspections to prevent privately-owned portable memory devices and other tools being brought into the workplace.
- b. Making sure that privately-owned PCs at home do not contain work-related data, with permission from the owner. Measures are again taken to confirm that work-related data is not saved in privately-owned PCs, etc. Personnel are encouraged to delete file-sharing software by providing education on the threat of information leakage caused by such software.

- (c) Strengthening the control system for preventing information leakage
 - a. Personnel who support the administrator shall be assigned carefully: they shall have a good knowledge of computers and related matters.
 - b. Education and inspection shall be strengthened when personnel are under special working conditions outside of the reach of the administrator.

3. Occurrence of Case Regarding the MSDF Destroyer Shirane and Responses

In March 2007, it was found that a crew member of the MSDF Destroyer Shirane had saved information that was thought to be classified on a privately-owned external hard disk drive at home.

As this case could constitute a violation of the law on the handling of classified information, the police affairs unit of the MSDF is working with the Kanagawa prefectural police to clarify the details. An Investigation Commission headed by the Vice Chief of Staff at the MSDF was established on April 4, 2007 to carry out detailed investigations, including the timing at which the information was taken out.

Details, including the cause, will become apparent as the investigation proceeds, yet the case reveals a lack of awareness of the importance of information handled by the SDF, and the risk of information leaks caused by computerization. Efforts to raise awareness seem not to have reached rank-and-file staff. The possibility that work-related data taken out before drastic measures were implemented may still exist on privately-owned PCs at home and in other places is a real threat.

The Ministry of Defense takes such cases extremely seriously. For the Minister of Defense to head the prevention of information leaks, the Committee to Implement Measures for the Prevention of the Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakage was abolished on April 24, 2007 and the Council for Prevention of Information Leakage was newly established. This Council is chaired by the Minister of Defense, and consists of the heads of all organizations within the Ministry of Defense, such as the Administrative Vice Minister, Director-General of the Secretariat, all the Director-Generals of Bureaus, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, and ASDF Chief of Staff.

At the first meeting of the Council, some measures were decided to address the lack of awareness. These measures include dispatching a special action team, consisting of high-ranking personnel and others belonging to the Internal Bureau and other organizations, to local regions, to instill the importance of recurrence prevention measures among local personnel; and conducting individual training for those involved in preventing information leaks. These efforts will raise staff awareness of information security and related issues.

Through the Council, the Ministry of Defense will continue to do its utmost to prevent information leaks.

Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens

As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF cannot carry out their diverse responsibilities without the understanding and cooperation of all Japanese citizens, local public organizations, and other organizations.

Section 1 explained that cooperation by local public organizations and other organizations is essential in assisting the recruitment and outplacement of SDF Regular Personnel. In other fields too, the SDF's activities are supported in various ways by local communities and Japanese citizens. Likewise, the SDF effectively uses its organizational structure, equipment, and abilities to contribute to people's livelihoods. Such activities not only foster mutual reliance between the SDF and the local community and the wider public, but also strengthen the foundation of defense while instilling in SDF personnel a sense of pride and confidence.

In addition, defense facilities²⁹ are an indispensable foundation of the nation's defense capabilities and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. For these facilities to function optimally, harmonious relations with local communities and the understanding of local residents are crucial, so that the facilities can be kept ready at all times. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF do their best to minimize the effects of the presence and operation of defense facilities on the daily lives of local residents through various measures.

This section explains how the Ministry of Defense and the SDF relate with local communities and people on a daily basis, and activities and measures undertaken to gain public understanding and cooperation.

1. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations with the SDF

1. Cooperation in Recruitment of SDF Regular Personnel and Support for Outplacement

As explained in the previous section, amid the severe recruitment environment and tight job market, cooperation from local public organizations and related organizations is necessary to secure highly qualified personnel and to assist the outplacement of SDF Regular Personnel who retire at a relatively young age.

(See Chapter 4, Section 1)

2. Support of SDF Activities

SDF garrisons and bases are located in all prefectures of Japan and are closely linked with the local host communities. Therefore, various forms of cooperation and the support of local communities are indispensable for the SDF to conduct diverse activities, including the management of garrisons and bases, education and training, disaster relief dispatch and actions necessary for the nation's defense.

The activities of the SDF are strongly supported by the people of Japan, including local residents and various organizations near SDF garrisons and bases.

In addition to such support from local communities, many people send letters of encouragement to SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation activities and other missions, thus raising the morale of SDF personnel and strengthening their awareness of serving the people of Japan.



MSDF personnel supports the yacht race in the National Sports Festival

Voice of an Administrative Official Working as an Interpreter and Coordinator

Ikuo Yoshida
Defense Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy,
Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense

I am working mainly as an interpreter and coordinator at the Defense Policy Division, Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense for activities with the United States. I entered the Ministry of Defense in April 2002, and after working at the Air Staff Office, was assigned to the current post in August 2006.

My duties include coordination with the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, as well as prior arrangement and interpretation for meetings with the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) and visits by foreign officers to the staff of the Ministry of Defense.



Administrative Official Yoshida (left behind) working as an interpreter at a meeting with Guam U.S. Army officers

I always realize the need to study harder whenever I work as an interpreter. Interpretation requires not only language skills but also a variety of knowledge and information. In addition to everyday English conversation skills, interpreters need to have deep knowledge particularly with regard to defense, and I come across English that I have never been taught at school every time I work as an interpreter. When I had just entered the ministry, I did not know technical terms very well, and even “SAM,” “CAP” and “dog fight” only sounded to me like “Sam” (a man’s name), “baseball cap,” and “dog fight” (literally). My current duty involves attending various meetings, and I am struggling with countless defense abbreviations and the unique ways of speaking of Japanese and American people, while hoping to gradually improve my interpretation skills.

The coordination work involves discussing plans for receiving visitors and closely collaborating with the U.S. side. I am sometimes confronted with differences in the way of thinking and culture, but when visits end successfully and visitors return home satisfied, I really feel rewarded. I often need to use English while at work, and am very pleased that I am working in an ideal environment for further refining my language skills.

I had been a university student until only six years ago, and had had no knowledge about the Ministry of Defense or the Self-Defense Forces, nor any interest in defense issues. I had taken peace of Japan as granted, believing that peace is something naturally given, and that Japan is a naturally peaceful country and does not have to do anything to maintain the peace. However, as I became an interpreter after entering the Ministry of Defense and began to attend meetings where Japan and foreign countries exchange opinions regarding defense, I have realized that, behind the peace we take for granted, there are dedicated people who are making tremendous unseen efforts to protect the peace of Japan.

I think that there are now many Japanese who have experiences of living abroad and are good at language. I hope that those who are interested in entering the Ministry of Defense will fully utilize their experiences and language skills built up abroad for the ministry and the SDF where international exchanges are becoming increasingly important.

2. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society

The SDF's role is much more than the defense of the country as defined in the National Defense Program Guidelines. The SDF also carries out activities in various fields based on requests from local public organizations, relevant organizations, and other bodies to support people's livelihood. Such activities foster mutual reliance between the SDF and the public, and help reinforce the defense infrastructure. These activities also give SDF personnel a sense of pride and confidence in their constant contribution to the livelihood of the people. (See Figs. III-4-2-1 • 2)

Fig. III-4-2-1 Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ○ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 2,403 disposal operations (average 46 operations per week), weighing about 74.5 tons; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled about 30.9 tons, accounting for 41.3% of such bombs removed across the nation)
Removal of Mines ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II. ○ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. At present, the MSDF has been removing or disposing of explosives at the request of municipal governments. ○ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 94,462 units were disposed of, including 7 underwater mines (average about 1,816 units per week), weighing about 20.0 tons. (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond disposal ability of the SDF. But the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking if fuses are attached.)
Medical Activities ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Medical services are provided to general citizens at National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and part of hospitals affiliated with the SDF (five out of 16 such hospitals, including SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ○ National Defense Medical College runs a emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical service to seriously injured patients and patients in a critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency service. ○ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide emergency medical service and work for the prevention of epidemics. ○ GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture) and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine and aviation medicine, respectively. ○ National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.
Cooperation for Supporting Athletic Meetings ⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In response to support requests from concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of athletic competitions such as Olympic games and Asian games being held in Japan and national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical service and emergency medical service. ○ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.
Exchanges with Local Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Sports facilities like grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. ○ SDF personnel promote exchanges with people of local communities by participating in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or by acting as sports referee and instructors on an individual basis.

Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of Self-Defense Forces Law

2. Article 84-2 of Self-Defense Forces Law

3. Article 27 of Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law and others

4. Article 100-3 of Self-Defense Forces Law

Fig. III-4-2-2 Activities Contributing to Society

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Offering of Education and Training on Consignment from Other Parties ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The SDF, acting on requests from third parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel. ○ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, education on how to respond to chemical disasters, and aircraft-maneuvering training are provided to police officers and personnel of the Japan Coast Guard. National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of National Defense Academy offer education to employees at private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries on a consignment basis.
Transportation Work ²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Acting on requests from concerned government ministries and agencies, the SDF, using GSDF, MSDF and ASDF helicopters and government planes, transports state guests and the Prime Minister. ○ Acting on requests from Ministries such as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SDF provides transportation support for events such as recovery of remains of dead Japanese soldiers, the Joint Japan-U.S. Commemorative Ceremony of the Battle of IWOTO, and pilgrimages to IWOTO in memory of the war dead. ○ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other imperial members make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)
Ceremonial Work at National Events ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other imperial members and state guests, with its personnel serving as honor guard⁴, forming a line for guests⁵ and firing a gun salute for them⁶. ○ Guard of honor and firing of gun salute are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.
Cooperation in Antarctic Exploration ⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The SDF has provided operational support for icebreakers being dispatched to the South Pole for Antarctic expedition since the seventh Antarctic expedition team was sent there in 1965, contributing greatly to Japan's Antarctic exploration project that recently marked the 50th anniversary. ○ Most recently, the SDF provided support to the 48th Antarctic expedition team, which was dispatched to the Antarctic Ocean from November last year to April this year, by helping icebreaker Shirase transport members of the expedition team and 1,100 tons of goods and supplies, and by assisting maritime observation, fixed-point observation and research observation being planned by the expedition team. (Icebreaker Shirase is set to retire from active service following the completion of voyages planned for this fiscal year because the ship is outmoded in its various parts with the passage of 24 years since its maiden voyage. Construction of Shirase's successor ship began in fiscal 2005. It will be put on active service in fiscal 2009.
Other Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Acting on requests from the Japan Meteorological Agency, the SDF supports it in various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions. ○ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps. ○ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed as serving training purposes)⁸ ○ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support of flights of private chartered aircraft, and transportation of music bands to IWOTO.

Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of Self-Defense Forces Law

2. Article 100-5 of Self-Defense Forces Law and others

3. Article 6 of Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing Self-Defense Forces Law and others

4. Guard of honor: officers of Honor Guard, as a mark of state respect for guests, give a salute to them while carrying a gun.

5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and give a salute to them.

6. Firing of gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.

7. Article 100-4 of Self-Defense Forces Law

8. Article 100 of Self-Defense Forces Law

3. Harmony between Defense Facilities and the Local Community, and Environmental Conservation

1. Scale and Features of Defense Facilities

Defense facilities have a wide range of uses, including maneuver areas, airfields, ports, barracks, and other uses. As of January 1, 2007, the land area of defense facilities totaled about 1,397 km², accounting for about 0.37% of the nation's total land area³⁰. Of this, SDF facilities occupy about 1,085 km², about 42% of which is concentrated in Hokkaido. By use, maneuver areas account for about 75% of the total. On the other hand, USFJ

facilities and areas (for exclusive use) total about 309 km², of which about 37 km² of land is jointly used by the SDF under the Status of Forces Agreement. (See Figs. III-4-2-3 • 4)

Fig. III-4-2-3 Situation of SDF Facilities (land plots)





Fig. III-4-2-4 Situation of Facilities of U.S. Forces in Japan (exclusively used facilities)



Many defense facilities, including airfields and maneuver areas, require vast areas of land. Some defense facilities compete with cities and industries in small plains due to the natural geography of Japan. Therefore, problems of restricted presence and operations of defense facilities have occurred due to the urbanization of areas around many defense facilities as a result of economic development. Another problem concerns

residential environments being affected by noise, and other factors arising from frequent takeoffs and landings of aircraft, firing and bombing, artillery firing, tank operations, and other reasons.

2. Resolving Defense Facility Issues, and Various Measures

Defense facilities are indispensable infrastructure for the security of Japan to underpin Japan’s defense capabilities and Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and it is necessary to assure such facilities are always available. To achieve this, and to solve the problems previously listed, the Ministry of Defense has been carrying out the measures presented in Fig. III-4-2-5 to ensure harmony between defense facilities and surrounding communities, and to gain the support of local residents. (See Reference 63)

Fig. III-4-2-5 Measures to Ensure Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities

Purpose	Measures	Description of Measures
Prevention of Noise Problems	Subsidies to Finance Sound Insulation Work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools and kindergartens, medical facilities like hospitals and clinics, and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly and special nursing homes for the elderly ○ Housing
	Compensation for Relocations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Compensation for relocating buildings ○ Land procurement ○ Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems and sewage facilities in land where housing is to be relocated
	Improvement of Green Zones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Tree planting, upgrading of grass fields
Prevention of Problems Other Than Noise	Subsidies to Finance Trouble-Prevention Work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ River improvement projects, improvement of irrigation and drainage canals, dams, reservoirs, pumping stations, roads, sewage facilities and facilities for jointly receiving TV broadcasting services
Reduction of Troubles Related to Life and Business	Subsidies to Build Facilities Meant to Stabilize People’s Livelihood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Learning facilities ○ Garbage and human-waste treatment plants, fire-fighting facilities, parks, roads, green zones, community halls, libraries, welfare centers for the elderly and nursing homes for the elderly ○ Agricultural facilities ○ Fishery facilities
Reduction of Effects on Surrounding Areas	Provision of Grant Aimed at Improving Areas Surrounded by Designated Defense Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improvement of public facilities like traffic facilities, recreation centers and welfare facilities

One such measure is improving the living environment around airfields. The Ministry of Defense has long put priority on such measures, including providing subsidies for sound insulation works for houses. However, some residents have filed law suits concerning noise damage and other issues³¹.

In 2001, therefore, the Ministry of Defense established the Council for the Improvement of the Living Environment around Airfields, consisting of outside experts, to discuss future measures. In 2002, the Council presented a report³² asserting that a) in response to the Fair Compensation Movement, measures to help win deeper understanding of the residents living near airfields, including those not filing noise-related lawsuits,

should be taken; and b) in response to various requests from local public organizations and residents, it is essential to diversify measures to suit local characteristics, and to develop measures focusing on those local public organizations and residents that are seriously affected by aircraft noise, within budget constraints, instead of simply continuing conventional measures.

The Ministry of Defense will appropriately review measures, such as projects to improve living environments, commencing with the subsidizing of sound insulation work for houses, based on the recommendations made in the report of the Council. After gaining understanding in the actual status of noises in the surrounding area of defense facilities, and appropriately reexamining the target area for sound insulation work for houses, by taking the actual conditions into consideration, the Ministry is also striving to enhance new measures.

Moreover, to further streamline efficient measures for the environment around airfields, based on the so-called “Large-Boned Policy 2006” (decision at Cabinet Meeting on July 7, 2006), subsidy options and rates are being readjusted. (See Figs. III-4-2-5 • 6 • 7 • 8)



Construction to widen the Nagae river in Miyazaki prefecture (Ebino city) was carried out as part of efforts to ensure harmony with communities surrounding defense facilities

Fig. III-4-2-6 New Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities

New Measures	Description of Projects
Initiative to Integrate Various Projects Undertaken in Areas Surrounded by Defense Facilities	Various livelihood-improvement projects being planned separately by municipalities in designated areas where serious problems are caused due to installation and operations of defense facilities will be integrated with certain discretion given to concerned municipalities for project implementation.
Subsidies to Installation of Solar-Power Systems	Monitoring will be conducted to study whether it is advisable to provide subsidies to households which have installed a solar power system as part of sound-insulation work so as to reduce their financial burden of paying electricity charges for air-conditioning equipment which has been also installed for sound insulation.
Promotion of Housing-Exterior Work for Sound Insulation	In order to improve livelihood of affected households, sound-insulation work covering the entire part of their houses will be promoted instead of room-based work as being applied previously.
Community-Building Support Projects	Subsidies and other support will be provided for an initiative by municipalities to promote community-building using surrounding assets (near airfields). Such support is meant to significantly contribute to the development of local communities as well as reducing negative effects of defense facilities to minimal levels.
Renovation of Existing Public Facilities	When public halls and other public facilities become unable to meet needs of local people because such facilities have become outmoded with the passage of time or the people got aged, these facilities will be renovated using subsidies so that they are made barrier-free with their safety being enhanced.
Active Use of Assets Near Airfields	The state will promote the use by the general public of surrounding assets it has established and managed, such as green zones, by installing benches and rest facilities and permitting municipalities to use them. The state will also permit municipalities to use farm areas so that they are open to citizens.

Fig. III-4-2-7 FY 2007 Costs to Finance Counter-Measures in Areas near Bases (Based on Expenditures)





Fig. III-4-2-8 FY 2007 SACO-related Spending (Measures to Expedite Implementation of SACO Projects) (Based on Expenditures)



Note: Other projects are those meant to improve green zones.

3. Environmental Conservation

In maintaining facilities, including maneuver areas and quarters, and equipment, such as aircrafts, ships, and vehicles, the SDF is implementing environmental conservation measures to reduce its environmental burden³³.

In 2001, Defense Agency Environment Month and Week were established. The Ministry of Defense has been striving to raise environmental awareness among SDF personnel, and has been organizing events for the prevention of global warming at military garrisons and bases throughout Japan. These include environmental conservation promotion programs, an environment-related senryu (short humorous verse) contest, lectures, exhibitions, and designating a “no-car day.” The Ministry of Defense, as a member of the government, has been preparing implementation plans based on various central government plans, and has been taking a positive approach toward the environment³⁴. The Ministry will forge ahead with such initiatives and activities.

4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

1. Various Public Relations Activities

As the SDF has expanded the scope of its activities at home and abroad, including international peace cooperation activities and disaster relief dispatches, and with the growing concern over the security environment in East Asia, including ballistic missile launches by North Korea, the public’s interest in national defense has been increasing³⁵.

With general recognition that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF need to actively promote public relations on defense policy and SDF activities, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF continually carry out various PR activities. Unprecedented types of PR, such as “packaged PR” that combines several types of campaigns over a certain period, have been carried out recently. With consideration for changing public awareness and needs as well as increasing overseas interest in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, constant efforts are exerted for a better understanding toward the actual state of SDF through these various PR activities.

(1) Website (<http://www.mod.go.jp>), Pamphlets, and others

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct PR activities using multimedia, including providing information and gathering public opinions on the Internet, producing PR videos, and showing PR commercials of each SDF service on large outdoor screens.

Especially, the website of the Ministry of Defense provides information on National Defense Program Guidelines which are bases for Japan’s defense policy, the Mid-Term Defense Program, and the status of SDF activities both in and outside Japan. The website also daily provides the latest information on the Ministry of Defense and the SDF for all segments of the Japanese population, including details of press conferences by the Minister of Defense, meetings between the high level officials of the Ministry of Defense and key figures of other countries. As results of these approaches, monthly hits rose by 22%, from approximately 360,000 in fiscal 2005 to approximately 440,000 in fiscal 2006. Moreover, in December 2006 a “Kids Page” for children was started on the website of the Ministry of Defense, and in April 2007 a website specifically for mobile phones (<http://www.mod.go.jp/m/>) with superior simplicity and immediacy for all segments of the Japanese population as well as youngsters was started. Through these and other efforts, the Ministry of Defense is also promoting innovative PR campaigns particularly designed for the young and younger generations.

The Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to provide accurate information on the SDF and national defense to the public more extensively, including issues and distribution of various pamphlets explaining the policies of the Ministry of Defense, activities of the SDF, etc., cooperation for media coverage, and assistance in editing the new PR magazine, “MAMOR.”³⁶ Additionally, as the SDF has increased activities overseas, interest in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from overseas has been mounting. Efforts including the



An Indian Army music band participated in the SDF Marching Festival (behind the SDF music band)



A destroyer underway at a fleet review with people on board (October 2006)

furnishing of information to overseas are expended by publishing the quarterly English pamphlets Japan Defense Focus, facilitating the participation of foreign media in regular press conferences, improving the English website of the Ministry of Defense, and preparing an English version of the defense white paper, English pamphlets and PR videos on policies, and so on.

(2) Events, PR Facilities, etc.³⁷

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct activities in informing the people of Japan about the current state of the SDF broadly as follows: annually demonstrating the GSDF comprehensive fire power exercise, held at the foot of Mt. Fuji; conducting sailing tours of MSDF destroyers at each location; and demonstrating flying and conducting flight tours of aircraft at ASDF open base festivals. At stations and bases across Japan, events including equipment exhibitions, unit tours and concerts by SDF bands are held on the anniversary of a unit's foundation, and so forth. In addition, a SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, an air review, etc., are held as events of the SDF Commemoration Day.

The 2006 SDF Marching Festival was held at Nippon Budokan with the participation of a military band of the Indian Army and other guest bands, attracting an audience of approximately 46,000 in total. Annual reviews by the SDF, the troop review, fleet review and air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, at which the SDF equipment and exercises are exhibited to the public. Last year, the MSDF held the fleet review with about 52,500 people on board. This year, the GSDF will hold the troop review.

In addition to such events, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively give tours around PR facilities. For example, at the Ministry of Defense, the head offices in Ichigaya are open to all visitors on two guided tours each weekday, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Since the tours started in June 2000, more than 180,000 people have so far visited. Each SDF service also has PR facilities that can be visited free of charge, and stations and bases nationwide have facilities for PR and historical materials open to the public. (See Reference)

(3) Enlistment Experience Programs³⁸

The SDF provides enlistment experience programs for employees at the request of private companies, etc. The purpose is to gain experience of the SDF through living and training according to the same daily schedule as SDF personnel by staying at a SDF station or base for two or three days. In fiscal 2006, about 1,500 programs were provided, and about 25,700 people participated in the programs. Tours of enlistment experiences are also provided for youngsters, college students and women³⁹.

2. Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System⁴⁰ and Personal Data Protection System⁴¹

Along with the enforcement of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001, the Ministry of Defense developed an information disclosure system, and discloses administrative documents under its jurisdiction when disclosure is requested, based on the Act. Moreover, in compliance with the enforcement of the Law for the Protection of Personal Data Held by Administrative Organs in 2005, the personal information protection system has been developed. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF secure personal information owned by the organizations, and take measures, such as disclosing personal information based on the Law, in response to requests for disclosure, correction, or suspension of information utilization.

To carry out these measures, the Ministry of Defense opened personal information disclosure/protection counters at its Headquarters (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo) and SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices throughout the country to receive disclosure requests and other documents, and to disclose such information.

Moreover, the Defense Facilities Administration Agency has information counters at the Headquarters, Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus, and Defense Facilities Administration Branches, and carries out the same work. However, following the abolishment of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, information counters at the above SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices will be abolished. Instead of the conventional Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus (Branches), information counters will be established in new Provincial Defense Bureaus (Branches). The counters will carry out the same work, and the information disclosure system and personal information protection system will be operated appropriately. (See Reference 62)

3. Appropriate Operation of the Whistle-Blower Protection System⁴²

In recent years, various scandals in private corporations that have endangered security and people's lives have been revealed by the employees of the organization.

The Whistle-Blower Protection Act went into effect in April 2006 to urge corporations to comply with the law on protecting human lives, health, and safety-related conditions; and to develop a safeguard system to protect workers who disclose information that is of public interest from receiving unfair treatment, such as dismissal.

In accordance with the Act, the Ministry of Defense set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by the MOD employees and outside workers on issues where the Ministry of Defense has the legal right to punish or issue recommendations. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have established an internal contact desk for information disclosure in the public interest by the MOD employees, and an external contact desk for such disclosure by outside workers. Through the contact desks, the Ministry deals with the disclosure of information that is of public interest and protection of whistle-blowers.

4. Engagement in Policy Evaluation⁴³

A system to evaluate government policies was introduced in order to improve the efficiency and quality of administration for the benefit of the people in 2001, while the Government Policy Evaluations Act (GPEA) came into effect in 2002.

Based on these policies, the Ministry of Defense is evaluating various policies designated to achieve the objectives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF: to ensure the peace and independence of Japan, and the security of the state. These evaluations involve analysis from various perspectives, such as domestic and overseas circumstances and technological innovation trends, and a comprehensive evaluation system is used.

In fiscal 2006, a total of 43 policy evaluations were performed, including one for "multilateral security dialogue."

Section 3. Gaining the Trust of Japanese Citizens

Defense forces are the last resort to ensure the nation’s security and cannot be substituted by other means. Nevertheless, defense forces that do not have the public’s backing cannot function effectively. SDF personnel work hard on a daily basis to meet the people’s trust and expectations.

However, certain incidents have undermined public trust. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF deeply regret such incidents and strive to prevent recurrence as explained below⁴⁴.

1. Actions Taken Against Collusive Bidding, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency

Report on Drastic Measures to Prevent Collusive Bidding, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency

On January 30, 2006, senior officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and other persons were arrested on charges of interfering with bidding for the construction of defense facilities. Following this incident, to create a new system for the former Defense Agency as a policy-making government organization

Fig. III-4-3-1 Gist of “Report on Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence of Bid Rigging Involving Defense Facilities Administration Agency”

Areas to be Studied	Main Areas for Improvement
Bidding Procedures for Construction Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Improvement of bidding procedures ○ Reinforcement of supervisory and checking functions in bidding and contract processes ○ Reinforcement of preventive measures against bid rigging ○ Establishment of proper relations between the agency and industry officials including those previously employed by the agency ○ Continuous monitoring
Re-employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Review of early retirement system at the agency ○ Restraint on re-employment
Clarification of Standards for Disciplinary Actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Formulation of punishment standards in regard with procurement and accounting violations
Personnel Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Integrated personnel management of Class-I technical and engineering officers ○ Active personnel exchanges ○ Combination of administrative officers and technical and engineering officers for work placement ○ Drastic change of employees’ mind setting toward their work
Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Scrutiny and review of work at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency ○ Review of procurement work directly undertaken by SDF units in regional areas ○ Streamlining of regional organizations that play the role of connecting regions and administrative defense policy ○ Reorganization of Internal Bureaus ○ Creation of organizations and bureaus which are in charge of agency-wide supervision and auditing ○ Future study
Public-Interest Entities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Dissolution of Defense Facilities Technology Foundation ○ Improvement of other public-interest entities placed under jurisdiction of the Defense Ministry ○ Review of labor loan contracts

that can be trusted by the people, the former Defense Agency established the Committee to Investigate the Case of Collusive Bidding Procedures, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency headed by the Director General of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, Iwao Kitahara, and the Panel to Examine Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence of Collusive Bidding, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency headed by the then Senior Vice-Minister for Defense, Taro Kimura, under the auspices of the then Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga. Detailed investigations were conducted prior to taking measures to prevent recurrence.

On June 15, 2006, the Committee prepared and published its report, "Investigation on the Case of Collusive Bidding Procedures, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency." The following day, on June 16, 2006, the Panel published its report, "Report on Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence of Collusive Bidding, and Similar Cases by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency"⁴⁵.

The Ministry of Defense is aware that, before carrying out such measures, it must change the attitudes of its personnel. In particular, it is important to repeatedly announce that the budget is taxpayers' precious money, and to foster awareness of compliance among its personnel. All staff must maintain the proper attitude, verify the effects of measures, make changes when a problem occurs, and act appropriately. (See Fig. III-4-3-1)

2. Measures against Drug Abuse

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF deeply regret the series of drug abuse cases in 2005⁴⁶, and established the Committee on Measures for Drug Issues in October 2005. This Committee issued a final report⁴⁷ in February 2006, describing the problems, prevention measures, and other related issues.

Despite these efforts, there have been further cases of SDF Regular Personnel being arrested on allegations of violating the Stimulants Control Law and the Law Concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law, etc., and Other Matters for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conducts and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation. One ASDF Regular Personnel was arrested in April 2006; two MSDF Regular Personnel were arrested in September 2006; and one GSDF Regular Personnel was arrested in February 2007. In response to the case in September 2006, at a meeting of the Committee on Measures for Drug Issues in September, a more effective drug testing system⁴⁸ was discussed, and it was decided that drug testing should be carried out on all personnel covering SDF Regular Personnel working in ground, maritime, and air forces within a fixed term⁴⁹. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will continue to take strict measures to prevent recurrence.

Voice of a Female SDF Member Working as a Base Security Guard

**Staff Sergeant Tomoyo Matsumoto, ASDF
Security Guard Unit, Air Base Group, the 3rd Air Transport Unit**

Do you know what duties a base security guard performs?

The duties include guarding a front gate and other spots, patrolling the base, and coping with contingencies inside and outside the base. In an emergency, we even prevent an enemy's attack or invasion to protect the function of the base, which is vulnerable part of the air force. Guarding of the base is thus something that the Air Self-Defense Force is actively reinforcing.

I am very pleased that, although I am a woman, I have been assigned to that post and provided with an opportunity to work on the frontline of guarding of the base. The job is challenging, and I enjoy working every day. In addition to protecting the base, I can also work at the front gate as the “face” of the base, and am glad that many people recognize me and give me a cheer when they pass the gate. I also feel happy—and blush—when my children say, “You are cool, mum!”

I am currently responsible for general affairs in a security guard platoon, and performing such duties as the improvement of the working environment so that everyone can work comfortably, the support for administrative work of the platoon, as well as the implementation of base security guard training. I sometimes join a team which works around the clock in shifts as security guards. When I worked in shifts for the first time, I was very worried about my children because the work required me to stay in the base for a full day without returning home. But since my husband and parents understand my work and give me a helping hand, I can now work without any concern.

My motto is to be as reliable as male personnel and be as attentive to work as possible as a woman. I was promoted to staff sergeant this January, and my responsibility became heavier accordingly. I am currently studying very hard to become a squad leader and lead my own team as soon as possible.

However, my biggest concern is to build up physical strength. However hard I am working, it is obvious that I am not as strong as men in fighting drills and other exercises. While I am doing my best to overcome my disadvantages, I am also trying to find out what I can do in the area other than physical performance by consulting with my superiors and seniors. There are only a few female security guards. I am proud of my work, and will continue to make the utmost efforts to ensure that everyone in the base can work in a safe environment.



Staff Sergeant Matsumoto at work as a base security guard

Notes

- 1) The importance of human resources is also pointed out in the National Defense Program Guideline and Mid-Term Defense Program. Also see Chapter 2 of Part II for details on the National Defense Program Guideline and the Mid-Term Defense Program.
- 2) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/>> for details on the recruitment of SDF Regular Personnel.
- 3) Notification of the recruitment period, checking of qualifications for application, processing of application forms, issuance of examination admission tickets, notification of examination dates and locations, provision of locations and facilities necessary for examinations, public relations, and related works.
- 4) For details on employment information, see <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/saiyou/>>
- 5) Until fiscal 2006, there were two systems applied to employment of SDF Regular Personnel who are 18 years old or over as candidates for “enlisted (upper)”: the “Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System” and the “Enlisted (Upper) Candidate System.” In fiscal 2007, the two systems were reorganized and unified into a new appointment system. It adopts some elements of the “Enlisted (Upper) System,” which aims to raise awareness of candidates for the Enlisted (Upper), and the “Candidates for the Enlisted (Upper) System,” which emphasizes individual capabilities in personnel management. Those qualified for SDF Regular Personnel are recruited as “General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)” from fiscal 2007.
- 6) The SDF Youth Cadet system was reviewed, and the recruitment of MSDF Youth Cadets and ASDF Youth Cadets was abolished; the recruitment round of fiscal 2006 (employment in fiscal 2007) was the last. Nevertheless, the framework of the GSDF Youth Cadet system will be continued, with the status of authorized SDF Regular Personnel being changed to non-authorized “Students,” which is the same status as the National Defense Academy students.
- 7) SDF personnel must perform duties such as defense operations as specified in the Self-Defense Forces Law. They are, therefore, designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law, and personnel management of SDF personnel is conducted independently of that of general civilian government employees.
- 8) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/yobiji/index.html>>
- 9) Many countries other than Japan also have reserve personnel systems.
- 10) Details on education and training can be found on the website of each SDF group:
GSDF at <<http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/>>
MSDF at <<http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/>>
ASDF at <<http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/>>
- 11) Such external educational institutions in fiscal 2007 include the University of Tokyo and Waseda University in Japan; and the National Defense University (U.S.) and Harvard University (U.S.) overseas.
- 12) Institutes of each SDF where high-ranking SDF officers of each SDF and others receive training on security, defense strategy, and other subjects.
- 13) The Joint Staff College is part of the Joint Staff Office and educates high-ranking SDF officers on joint operations.
- 14) For example, the GSDF has a Command Post Exercise Center for carrying out command and staff activities at the division/regiment level, and the Fuji Training Center and urban warfare training facilities for company-level training.
- 15) For example, some firing training involving tanks, antitank helicopters, missiles, long-range artillery, surface-to-air guided missiles (improved Hawk and Patriot System), surface-to-surface missile, torpedoes, and other weapons, cannot be carried out at some firing ranges in Japan, or is prohibited in Japan as ranges exceed domestic limits. There are also various restrictions on exercises by large-scale units that

- require larger areas, minesweeping training and submarine rescue drills that are carried out in relatively shallow sea areas, and early-morning and night-time flight training.
- 16) Activities to detect, exploit and reduce or annul the effects of enemies' electromagnetic waves, while securing the use of electromagnetic waves by friendly forces.
 - 17) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/2006/07/12.html>> for details on gender equality; and <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/koudou/index.html>> for details on the Laws for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation.
 - 18) The Memorial Stone of SDF Martyrs to Duty was established in 1962, and reinforced in 1980, due to aging through weathering. Afterwards, when the headquarters of the Defense Agency (at the time) was moved to Ichigaya in 1998, the Memorial Zone was located on the east side of the memorial area with the Memorial Stone of SDF Martyrs to Duty and other monuments. However, because it did not have enough space for memorial ceremonies involving the Guard of Honor to take place, renovation of the area started in 2002, with its space expanded, including space for a resting-space. The renovation was completed in 2003. Today many people visit the Memorial Zone, when they participate in the Ichigaya-dai Tour, which includes visits to Ichigaya Memorial Hall, the Public and Health Center, and square for the Guard of Honor ceremony.
 - 19) This is the number from September 2003 to March 2007.
 - 20) "Seclusion from private companies" is stipulated in Article 62 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
 - 21) Superiority in prompt and accurate recognition, gathering, processing, and dissemination of information.
 - 22) For details on the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII: Standardized network for all the SDF), the Common Operating Environment (COE: Basic group of software commonly used by computer systems maintained by each service of the SDF), and the Central Command System (CCS: central command system that conducts data aggregation processing and other data processing by online-connecting the command system of each SDF service), see <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/it/youkou/>>
 - 23) For example, as part of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, the "Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation Regarding Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense" (MOU), which aims to strengthen the response to cyber attacks by exchanging information between Japan and the United States, was concluded in April 2006.
 - 24) The five policy targets are "Enhancement in Gathering/Communicating Information in the Chain of Command (Vertical Direction)"; "Promotion of Intelligence Sharing Among Units (Horizontal Direction)"; "Establishment of System to Cope with Cyber Attacks"; "Promotion of Intelligence Sharing with External Organizations"; and "Enhancement of Various Telecommunication Infrastructures."
 - 25) The Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform (approved by the Cabinet on July 7, 2006) also presents the significance of "3. Transforming procurement of SDF equipment, material, stock components, and other items so as to make procurement more efficient and streamlined."
 - 26) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/>>
 - 27) a) "Operational Demonstration Research" is introduced. In this type of research, the SDF service (the future operator) will evaluate the prototypes of the equipment. The evaluation will be reflected onto the later R&D, procurement, and related operations.
b) "Evolutionary Development" is introduced. At the start of the development phase, the performance requirements to be achieved are left undecided. Even after the start of the development phase, the precision of required performance can be upgraded, and up-to-date military science technology can be newly introduced.

- 28) This council was established in September 2003 by the former Defense Agency, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. It was established to promote development of civil aircraft and engines based on initiative taken by our nation as a whole. This is important in the sophistication of our country's industrial infrastructure, as well as the development and dissemination of industrial technology.
- 29) This is a generic term for facilities used by the SDF, and facilities and areas used by the U.S. Forces in Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It includes maneuver areas, airfields, ports, communication stations, quarters, warehouses, ammunition depots, and fuel bunkers.
- 30) The land area covered by defense facilities (approximately 1,397 km²) is the total of those for the SDF facilities (approximately 1,085 km²), facilities and areas exclusively used by USFJ (approximately 309 km²), and non-SDF facilities jointly used by USFJ under the Status of Forces Agreement (approximately 4 km²).
- 31) 1) Residents around five airfields, including Komatsu Airfield (in Ishikawa Prefecture), have filed lawsuits demanding a ban on nighttime takeoffs and landings, and claiming compensation for damage caused by noise. In some of these lawsuits, the court has ordered the national Government to pay "compensation for past damage" in its final and conclusive judgment; 2) On the other hand, some of the residents who have been annoyed by noise but have not filed lawsuits felt that they have not been treated fairly. These residents claimed the same monetary compensation for past damage as ordered by the court in past noise-related lawsuits, and started a campaign for establishing a damage compensation system (so-called "Fair Compensation Movement"); 3) Local public organizations and residents in the vicinity of defense facilities requested that various measures be expanded and enhanced.
- 32) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/dfaa/kondankai/hokoku.pdf>>
- 33) These measures include conservation of air and water quality, recycling, disposal of waste, improvement of environmental conservation facilities, and environmental assessments.
- 34) This includes the implementation plan, developed by the Defense Agency (at the time) in June 2005, based on the Governmental Plan for Measures to Restrict Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Administrations and Operations approved by the Cabinet in 2002 and its revisions; and the Environmental Protection Policy of the Defense Agency which was established in 2003 and reviewed in January 2005, in accordance with the national Government's Basic Environmental Plan. For details on the Environmental Protection Policy of the Ministry of Defense, see <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hairyoi/index.html>>
- 35) In an "Opinion Poll on the SDF and Defense Issues" in February 2006, about 67% of respondents replied that they were interested in the SDF and defense issues, and about 85% had a "Good" impression of the SDF. For details, see Reference 61. Additionally, in a "Special Opinion Poll on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities in Iraq by SDF" in September 2006, about 72% of respondents who had seen and heard reports on SDF activities in Iraq, which accounted for 91% of all respondents, replied that they "value" such activities.
- 36) Cooperation in producing the movies "Ore wa Kimino Tamenikoso Shinini Iku" (For Those We Love), Midnight Eagle and "Mari to Koinu no Monogatari" (A Tale of Mari and Three Puppies).
- 37) For details on events, see the website of the Ministry of Defense, <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/events/index.html>>
- 38) Living experience tours of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. (For information on the tours, visit the above event information address.)
- 39) In addition to these several tours, "Day Visit to the SDF for Women" has been run since March 2005, as a program that enables women of the wide range of age to easily participate in.
- 40) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/index.html>>

- 41) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hogo/index.html>>
- 42) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/koueki_tuho/index.html>
- 43) See <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hyouka/index.html>>
- 44) In addition to those incidents explained in this report, there was a case involving overseas travel by a MSDF member without prior consent and an illegitimate copy of a Letter of Warning (revealed in July 2006), and a case of lost weaponry at Kusu Garrison (in September of the same year), and other cases.
- 45) For details, see <<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/delibe/dangou/houkoku/20060616.pdf>> and <http://www.mod.go.jp/dfaa/topics/nyusatsu_bogai/pdf/tyousa_houkoku.pdf>
- 46) From July to December 2005, a total of 17 SDF Regular Personnel (11 MSDF members, five GSDF members, one ASDF member) were arrested, or their case files were referred to the Public Prosecutors Office, on charges of violating the Cannabis Control Law, and other related laws.
- 47) The “final report” recommended immediate, comprehensive implementation of the following, and other measures to prevent recurrence: a) Thorough disciplinary guidance and education; b) Introduction of drug testing (urine analysis) upon enrollment of SDF personnel; and c) Setting up a helpline or report desk. Since 2002, SDF personnel are drug-tested upon enrollment.
- 48) Testing without advance notice.
- 49) One example is testing within two years.

Reference

Table of Contents

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Reference 1.	Post-World War II Armed Conflicts.....	449
Reference 2.	Major Nuclear Forces	455
Reference 3.	Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles	455
Reference 4.	List of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Currently Underway	457
Reference 5.	Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers).....	458
Reference 6.	Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers).....	459
Reference 7.	Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan	460

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts on Japan's Defense Policy

Reference 8.	Written Answers to the Questions by Representatives Seiichi Inaba on the Constitution, International Law and the Right of Collective Self-Defense (submitted on May 29, 1981) —Excerpt—	461
Reference 9.	Written Answers to the Questions by Representative Muneo Suzuki on the Right of Self-Defense (submitted on May 11, 2007) —Excerpt—	461
Reference 10.	Basic Policy for National Defense.....	462

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-Up of Defense Capability

Reference 11.	National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-	462
Reference 12.	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009).....	469
Reference 13.	Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary	475
Reference 14.	Cost of Major Programs in FY 2007	478
Reference 15.	Major Equipment to be Procured in FY 2007.....	481
Reference 16.	Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications	483
Reference 17.	Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications.....	484
Reference 18.	Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data	485
Reference 19.	Guided Missile Specifications	486
Reference 20.	Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis).....	488
Reference 21.	Changes in Major Areas of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)	489
Reference 22.	Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis).....	490
Reference 23.	Trend of Defense Expenditures in Major Countries.....	492

Chapter 3 Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of the International Peace Cooperation as SDF's Primary Mission

Reference 24.	Congratulatory Speech by Guest at Ceremony Held to Mark the Transition from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense.....	493
Reference 25.	Congratulatory Speech by Guest at Ceremony Held to Mark the Transition from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense.....	494

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief and Civil Protection

Reference 26.	Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Joint Japan-U.S. Technical Research on the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).....	497
Reference 27.	Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.....	498
Reference 28.	Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures”.....	500
Reference 29.	Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary “Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense” (tentative translation).....	501
Reference 30.	Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law.....	502
Reference 31.	Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces.....	505
Reference 32.	Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel and Units.....	509
Reference 33.	Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the Civilians (Outline).....	512
Reference 34.	Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense and Defense Facilities Administration Agency.....	520

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Reference 35.	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century.....	521
Reference 36.	Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee.....	525
Reference 37.	U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.....	527
Reference 38.	United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document Joint Statement.....	535
Reference 39.	United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.....	537
Reference 40.	Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others.....	541
Reference 41.	Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee U.S. Department of State.....	542
Reference 42.	Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.....	547
Reference 43.	Record of Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises in FY 2006.....	555
Reference 44.	The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.	557
Reference 45.	Outline of 23 Issues.....	558
Reference 46.	The SACO Final Report.....	559

Chapter 3 Improvement of International Security Environment

Reference 47.	Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.....	564
Reference 48.	Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq.....	570
Reference 49.	Basic Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.....	571
Reference 50.	The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities.....	577
Reference 51.	Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years).....	580
Reference 52.	Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years).....	582
Reference 53.	Dispatch of the Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations (Last Five Years).....	582

Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF	
Reference 54.	Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel583
Reference 55.	SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2006)583
Reference 56.	SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2006)584
Reference 57.	The Ethos of SDF Personnel.....584
Reference 58.	Outline of the SDF Educational System586
Reference 59.	Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY 2006)587
Reference 60.	Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method.....588
Reference 61.	Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues (The Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office: This survey was conducted in February 2006).....588
Reference 62.	Record of Information Disclosure by the Defense Agency (FY 2006)592
Reference 63.	Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities.....592
Related Articles for Reference (Reference 64 to 76)593	
Defense Chronology598	

Reference 1. Post-World War II Armed Conflicts

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Asia	Civil War in China	1945–49	Chinese Nationalist Party vs. Chinese Communist Party	Unification of China by the Chinese Communist Party following direct confrontation with the Nationalist Party
	Indonesian National Revolution	1945–49	The Netherlands vs. Indonesia	Indonesia's struggle for independence from the Netherlands
	First Indochina War	1946–54	France vs. Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (North Viet Nam)	Armed conflict for the emancipation of the Vietnamese from France
	First India-Pakistan War	1947–49	India vs. Pakistan	Conflict over the sovereignty of Kashmir following independence
	Malayan Emergency	1948–57	United Kingdom vs. Communist guerrillas	Attempt by communist guerrillas to seize control of British-controlled Malayan states
	Malayan Emergency	1957–60	Federation of Malaya vs. Communist guerrillas	Attempt by communist guerrillas to seize control of states of the Federation of Malaya
	Korean War	1950–53	Republic of Korea, United States and others (United Nations) vs. North Korea and China	Attempt by North Korea to unify the Korean Peninsula through force of arms
	Bombardment of Quemoy Island and Matsu Island	1954–78	Taiwan vs. China	Bombardment and propaganda war for Quemoy Island and Matsu Island
	Civil War in Laos	1959–75	Government of Laos (rightist and centrist factions) vs. Pathet Lao (leftist faction) and North Viet Nam	Conflict between Government of Laos and North Viet Nam-backed Pathet Lao forces
	Tibetan Uprising	1959	Pro-Dalai Lama faction vs. Government of China	Uprising of the pro-Dalai Lama faction over the Tibetan problems
	China-Indian Border Conflict	1959–62	India vs. China	Border dispute
	Viet Nam War	1960–75	South Viet Nam, United States and others vs. North Viet Nam and the National Front for Liberation of South Viet Nam	Conflict between U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government forces and North Vietnamese forces cooperating with the National Front for Liberation of South Viet Nam
	Goa Conflict	1961	India vs. Portugal	Annexation by India of Portuguese colonies, including Goa
	West Irian Campaign	1961–62	Indonesia vs. the Netherlands	Conflict over the possession of western New Guinea
	Malaysian Confrontation	1963–66	United Kingdom and Malaysia vs. Philippines	Conflict over the possession of North Borneo
	Malaysian Confrontation	1963–66	United Kingdom and Malaysia vs. Indonesia	Indonesia's policy of confrontation against the formation of the federation of Malaysia
	Second India-Pakistan War	1965–66	India vs. Pakistan	Conflict surrounding the jurisdiction of Kashmir
	China-Soviet Border Dispute	1969	China vs. Soviet Union	Clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops on Damansky Island and in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
	Civil War in Cambodia	1970–75	Government of Cambodia vs. of Kampuchea National United Front	Civil war between the Cambodian government (Lon Nol faction) and the Khmer National United Front (Sihanouk faction and the Khmer Rouge)
	Third India-Pakistan War	1971	India and Bangladesh vs. Pakistan	Conflict over the independence of Bangladesh (East Pakistan)
	Conflict over the Paracels	1974	South Viet Nam vs. China	Conflict surrounding possession of the Paracels
	Civil War in Timor	1975–78	Pro-Indonesia faction and Indonesian militias vs. the Independence Now! faction (leftist faction)	Civil war following Portugal's decolonization policy
Viet Nam-Cambodia Conflict	1977–91	Viet Nam vs. Cambodia	Border dispute between Viet Nam and Cambodia, and Viet Nam's military intervention into Cambodia	


Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Asia	China-Viet Nam Conflict	1979	China vs. Viet Nam	Conflict with China against Viet Nam's military intervention into Cambodia
	Spratly Island Conflict	1988	China vs. Viet Nam	Conflict over the possession of the Spratly Islands
	Tajikistan Conflict	1992–97	Government of Tajikistan vs. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO)	Conflict following civil war in 1992 between Islamic armed groups, which fled to Afghan territory, and the Government of Tajikistan at the border zone between Tajikistan and Afghanistan—peace treaty signed in June 1997
	Cambodia Conflict	1997–98	Then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh's forces vs. Second Prime Minister Hun Sen's forces	Armed conflict between forces for then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh holding the government leadership and forces for Second Prime Minister Hun Sen
	Conflict in the Jammu and Kashmir Regions	1999	India vs. Islamic Armed Forces	Conflict in the Jammu and Kashmir regions (Kargil) between armed groups infiltrating from Pakistan and the Indian Army
Middle East/North Africa	First Middle East War	1948–49	Israel vs. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq	Arab countries' attempt to deny the independence of Israel
	Algerian War	1954–62	Government of France vs. Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN)	Algerian conflict seeking independence from France
	Cyprus Conflict	1955–59	Government of the U.K. vs. National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA)	Attempt by people of Greek lineage to dispel British control and merge into Cyprus Greece
	Second Middle East War	1956	U.K., France, Israel vs. Egypt	Conflict between Egypt and the U.K. and France surrounding the Suez Canal—Israel sides with the U.K. and France
	Dispatch of Troops to Lebanon	1958	Government of Lebanon and the U.S. vs. Lebanese rebels	Revolt against the attempted resumption of office by Christian President Camille Chamoun; the U.S. dispatches troops to Lebanon at the request of the Government of Lebanon
	Dispatch of Troops to Kuwait	1961	Kuwait and the U.K. vs. Iraq	Dispatch of troops by the U.K. to Kuwait to counter Iraq's attempt to annex Kuwait
	Civil War in Yemen	1962–69	Government of Yemen and Egypt vs. Yemeni Royalist faction	Royalist faction's struggle against the Republican regime
	Civil War in Cyprus	1963–64	Government of Cyprus and Greece vs. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey	Turkish Cypriots revolt against Greek Cypriots' strengthening of power
	Algeria-Morocco Border Dispute	1963–88	Algeria vs. Morocco	Conflict over possession of border zone
	Third Middle East War	1967	Israel vs. Egypt, Syria and Jordan	Conflict over the continuation of Israel's independence
	Fourth Middle East War	1973	Israel vs. Egypt and Syria	Conflict involving Egypt and Syria to restore the land occupied by Israel in the Third Middle East War
	Western Sahara Conflict	1973–	Governments of Morocco and Mauritania (in 1978, Mauritania concluded a peace accord with the Polisario Liberation Front) vs. Polisario Liberation Front (supported by Algeria)	Conflict surrounding the sovereignty of Western Sahara following Spain's withdrawal from the region—in August 1988, Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front agree to settle sovereignty by referendum (referendum not since held). In September 1997, Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front agree in principle on the issues hampering the implementation of the 1988 agreement.
	Cyprus Conflict	1974–	Cyprus vs. Turkey	Turkish military intervention in order to protect inhabitants of Turkish lineage and prevent Cyprus from becoming part of Greece through the ousting of centrist President Makarios
	Conflict between North and South Yemen	1978–79	North Yemen vs. South Yemen and groups opposing the Government of North Yemen	Conflict in border zone between government forces and anti-government groups, including Yemen National Liberation Front, and South Yemeni forces

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Middle East/North Africa	Afghanistan Conflict	1979–89	Khmal regime and the Soviet Union vs. anti-Khmal and anti-Soviet forces; after May 1986, Najibullah regime and the Soviet Union vs. anti-Soviet and anti-Najibullah forces	Armed intervention by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where there had been continued domestic uprisings against land reforms and other policies by the Taraki and Amin regimes. — In February 1989, Soviet withdrawal is completed.
	Iran-Iraq War	1980–88	Iran vs. Iraq	Conflict over the possession of the border river—cease-fire reached in August 1988.
	Civil War in Lebanon	1975–91	Christian rightist faction (supported by Israel and Iraq) vs. Arab Deterrent Force (Syrian forces) and Islamic leftist faction	Intervention by Syria in a dispute between right-wing Christians and left-wing Muslims. —In 1989, the Taif Agreement (Charter of National Reconciliation) was made and in 1991 the civil war ended.
	Invasion of Lebanon	1982	Israel vs. PLO and Syria	Israeli forces invade Lebanon to crush the PLO (withdrawal completed in 2000)
	North-South Civil War in Sudan	1983–2005	Sudanese central government vs. anti-government forces, including the Sudanese People's Liberation Army	Started with the conflict in which southern anti-government forces oppose a policy by the Sudanese central government to apply the Islamic law throughout the country The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2005.
	Sudan Darfur Conflict	2003–	Sudanese central government vs. anti-government forces including Sudan Liberation Army	Conflict between the Arab central government and anti-government forces comprising African ethnic groups. The conflict has expanded into the neighboring countries, Chad and Central African Republic.
	Civil War in Afghanistan	1989–2001	In and after February 1989, the Najibullah regime vs. anti-Najibullah government forces; in and after June 1992, Rabbani regime vs. anti-Rabbani government forces; in and after September 1996, Taliban regime vs. anti-Taliban government forces	The civil war continued even after the Soviet Union withdrew its forces, but in 2001 the war ended following the collapse of the Taliban administration.
	Gulf War	1990–91	Iraq vs. Kuwait, U.S., U.K., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.	Iraq invades Kuwait; 28 countries, including the U.S. and the U.K., send Armed Forces acting on U.N. resolutions. —Truce is formally established in April 1991.
	Civil War in Yemen	1994	Political leaders of the former North, led by President Saleh, vs. political leaders of the former South, led by Vice President Beydo	Confrontation between leaders of the former North and South over post-unification political operation of the country intensifies and escalates into a civil war between armies supporting the former North and those supporting the former South. —Civil war ends when the Northern Army gains control of Aden.
	Military Campaign in Afghanistan	October 2001–	Taliban, Al Qaeda vs. American, British, French, Canadian, Australian and other nations and anti-Taliban forces including the Northern Alliance	Military campaign by U.S., U.K., Northern Alliance and others to eliminate Al Qaeda, which was responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., and the Taliban, which harbored Al Qaeda, from Afghanistan —In December 2001 Kandahar falls. Campaign to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda is still underway.
	Military operations in Iraq	March 2003–	Iraq vs. the United States, the United Kingdom, etc.	Exercise of force against the Hussein administration by the U.S., U.K., and other countries (U.S. President Bush declared end of major combat operations in May 2003.) Security maintenance activities are currently underway.
	Israel-Lebanon Conflict	2006	Israel vs. Hezbollah	Israel invaded Lebanon to recover its soldiers abducted by Hezbollah. The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire in August 2006, and the Israeli army withdrew from southern Lebanon in October 2006.

Item	Country	Name	Maximum Range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
SLBM	U.S.	Trident C-4	7,400	MIRV (100 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100 KT × 8 or 475 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-N-18	6,500 – 8,000	Single (450 KT) or MIRV (500 KT × 3 or 100 KT × 7)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Two-stage liquid
		SS-N-20	8,300	MIRV (200 KT × 10)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		SS-N-23	8,300	MIRV (100 KT × 4)	Inertial + Stellar reference + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage liquid
	U.K.	Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100-120 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	France	M-45	5,300	MRV (100 KT × 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
China	JL-1 (CSS-N-3)	2,150 – 2,500	Single (20–500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid	
IRBM MRBM	China	DF-3 (CSS-2)	2,650 – 2,800	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	One-stage liquid
		DF-4 (CSS-3)	4,750	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-21 (CSS-5)	2,150 – 2,500	Single (20–500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + Radar	Two-stage solid
SRBM	China	DF-11 (CSS-7)	280 – 530	Single (2 KT–20 KT)	Inertial + GPS + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
		DF-15 (CSS-6)	600	Single (90 KT)	Inertial + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
Cruise missile (long-range)	U.S.	Tomahawk (TLAM-N)	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Sea surface and underwater launched
		AGM-86B	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Air launched
	Russia	SS-N-21	2,400	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Underwater launched
		AS-15	2,500 – 3,500	Single (200–250 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Air launched

Sources: *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems*, etc.

Reference 4. List of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Currently Underway



Reference 5. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or region	Ground forces (10,000 persons)	Country or region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of vessels	Country or region	Number of combat aircraft
China	160	United States	567.8	950	United States	3,840*
India	110	Russia	213.5	980	China	3,520*
North Korea	100	China	107.0	780	Russia	2,180*
Pakistan	55	United Kingdom	86.7	240	India	990*
Republic of Korea	54	France	41.4	260	Syria	580
United States	51	India	35.4	150	Egypt	550*
Viet Nam	41	Indonesia	23.8	190	Republic of Korea	610*
Turkey	40	Turkey	21.1	200	North Korea	590
Russia	40	Taiwan	20.7	330	Turkey	540
Iran	35	Spain	20.6	140	Taiwan	530*
Myanmar	35	Germany	20.2	130	Israel	410
Egypt	34	Italy	17.9	180	France	430*
Indonesia	23	Brazil	15.8	130	United Kingdom	380*
Syria	20	Australia	14.9	80	Libya	380
Taiwan	20	Republic of Korea	14.1	180	Ukraine	380
Japan	14.9	Japan	43.2	150	Japan	450

- Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from *Military Balance 2007* and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from *Jane's Fighting Ships 2006–2007* and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY 2006, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
3. Of the combat aircraft, the asterisk denotes inclusion of air force, naval and marine combat aircraft.
4. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

Reference 6. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)




Country or Region	Military Service System	Regulars (10,000 persons)		Reserves (10,000 persons)
United States	Volunteer	151		97
Russia	Conscription/Volunteer	103		2,000
United Kingdom	Volunteer	19		20
France	Volunteer	25		2
Germany	Conscription	25		16
Italy	Volunteer	19		6
India	Volunteer	132		116
China	Conscription	226		80
North Korea	Conscription	110		65
Republic of Korea	Conscription	67		450
Egypt	Conscription	47		48
Israel	Conscription	17		41
Japan	Volunteer	Army	14.9	3.3 (0.6)
		Navy	4.4	0.1
		Air Force	4.6	0.08

Notes: 1. Data taken from *Military Balance 2007* and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground Self-Defense Force, the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Air Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY 2006. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.

3. Russia has made the shift from a conscription to voluntary system a top priority issue.

Reference 7. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan



Note: Data taken from Military Balance, etc., of the respective years (Figures for Japan represent actual strength as of the end of the respective fiscal years.)

Reference 8. Written Answers to the Questions by Representatives Seiichi Inaba on the Constitution, International Law and the Right of Collective Self-Defense (submitted on May 29, 1981) —Excerpt—

The relationship between the right of collective self-defense, Article 9 of the Constitution, and international law is not necessarily explicit. Since the situation at hand requires the elucidation of this relationship, the following questions were submitted.

1. Unified definition as a Cabinet
2. It is beyond doubt that as a sovereign state, Japan has the right of self-defense under existing international law; however, is the right of collective self-defense included herein?
3. Does the Constitution ban the right of collective self-defense and if it is banned, in which article is that stipulated?
4. Is the collective self-defense not being implemented from a policy standpoint and not from the fact that it is banned?
5. Realistically, does Japan face disadvantages in national defense due to the fact that it does not have the right of collective self-defense?

Answers to 1 through 5

Under international law, it is understood that a state has the right of collective self-defense, that is, the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack.

It is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sovereign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit.

In addition, Japan views the exercise of the right of self-defense within the limit of minimum necessary level for the defense of the nation, and therefore, the Constitution's preclusion of the right to exercise the right of collective self-defense does not generate disadvantages.

Reference 9. Written Answers to the Questions by Representative Muneo Suzuki on the Right of Self-Defense (submitted on May 11, 2007) —Excerpt—

1. What is the definition of the right of self-defense?
2. Under what circumstances is the right of self-defense allowed to be exercised?
3. What is the definition of the right of collective self-defense?
4. Does the current Constitution allow the right of collective self-defense?

Answers to 1 through 4

The Government has understood that Article 9 of the Constitution does not go so far as to prohibit use of the minimum force necessary to eliminate an armed attack by a foreign country, which would expose the lives and the bodies of the Japanese to danger. It is generally understood under international law that the right of collective self-defense is one that justifies the use of force by a state to stop an armed attack on a foreign

country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack. The Government has understood that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permitted under the Constitution.

In his policy speech in the 166th session of the Diet, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, “It is necessary for the Government to rebuild a legal foundation to ensure national security that fits the present era and to promote study on individual and specific cases in security situations in order to find what actions would constitute the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, which is prohibited under the Constitution.” Based on the Diet remarks by Prime Minister Abe, the Government has decided to set up under the Prime Minister an informal panel on the rebuilding of a legal foundation for national security, which is in charge of studying the clarification of relations between the Constitution and various security actions, including the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, by referring to individual and specific cases in security situations.

Reference 10. Basic Policy for National Defense

(Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy.

In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows:

- (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
- (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
- (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation.
- (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

Reference 11. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

I. Purpose

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

III. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy

IV. Future Defense Forces

V. Additional Elements for Consideration

I. Purpose

In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and peace and stability of the international community, given the current security environment surrounding our country, the Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-.” The Guidelines build on the December 19, 2003 Security Council and Cabinet decision, “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures.”

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today's security environment.

Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter "new threats and diverse situations"). We need to bear in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have neither states nor citizens to protect.

Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community, including those within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of conflict and the reconstruction assistance.

2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain.

North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts.

China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues.
4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in

addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan's geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country's prosperity and growth.

III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

1. Basic Principles

The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, and with the international community.

To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.

Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defensive defense policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles.

2. Japan's Own Efforts

(1) Basic Ideas

Based on the premise that any country's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner—the United States—Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.

(2) Japan's Integrated Response

In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government's decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments.

(3) Japan's Defense Forces

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan's will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.

Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 1996-” (The Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring.

Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter “international peace cooperation activities”).

In developing Japan’s defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available.

3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan’s security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.

Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks.

Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.

In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in “situations in areas surrounding Japan”; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.

4. Cooperation with the International Community

In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world's only global and comprehensive international organization—the United Nations—to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.

In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. Role of the Defense Forces

Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas:

(1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Should such a situation emerges, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows:

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner.

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.

- d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels
We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters, and other similar vessels.
 - e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters
To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.
- (2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion
Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.
- (3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment
In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.
We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations.
2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities
Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above.
- (1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities
In order to have three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.
 - (2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities
In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest

possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces' intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas. In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.

(4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

We will take various measures to maintain high morale and firm discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train and educate high quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issue, and develop human resources.

The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table.

V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration.
 - (1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.
 - (2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing life-cycle cost, including purchase price, of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resource in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological base, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security.
 - (3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.
2. These National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities; strengthening joint operation capabilities and intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human resources as well.
4. In building, maintaining and operating defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities.
5. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relations with the U.S. based on the Arrangements.
6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, and with due consideration paid to other national measures, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces.

II. Review of the Organizations of Defense Agency and SDF

1. The GOJ will review organization of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, and take necessary measures.
2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.

3. Concerning the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades, among which a Division and two Combined Brigades are converted into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Force that administrates and operates units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks. The authorized number of GSDF personnel will be around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of the FY 2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 at the end of FY 2009.
4. Concerning the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will consolidate the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of Escort divisions for regional deployment. The GOJ also consolidate the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into five, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into four and Patrol Helicopter unit into five.
5. Concerning the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into that composed with two squadrons. The GOJ will establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit.

III. Major Plans Related to SDF Capabilities

1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations
 - (1) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot Surface-to-Air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. The GOJ will study the course of capability

improvement for FY 2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the U.S., and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE), and to start to build up a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles.

The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.

(2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units

In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, The GOJ will improve the readiness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries, and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks.

(3) Response to Invasions of Japan's Offshore Islands

In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan's offshore islands by improving transportation, deployment and other capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), tanker-transport aircrafts (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and new transport aircrafts that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will, based on actual operations and other matters, reconsider the total number of tanker-transport aircrafts, and will take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching transport aircraft (C-130H) the in-flight refueling function for rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Vessels

In order to patrol and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); modernize early warning aircrafts (E-2C) and the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; procure new patrol aircrafts that will replace P-3Cs; and initiate the project to modernize early warning and control aircrafts (E-767).

The GOJ will also promote the modernization of fighters (F-15), and procure new fighters that will replace F-4s while restricting the total number of the procurement under the new NDPG.

(5) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type Disasters

In order to effectively respond to large-scale and/or special-type disasters and other situations that demand protection of human lives and properties in cooperation with related institutions, the GOJ will take measures to help the SDF units improve necessary capabilities.

2. Preparations to Deal with Large-Scale Invasion of Japan

Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, and will downsize equipment and personnel earmarked for a large-scale invasion. At the same time, because reconstructing defense forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, while taking into accounts developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircrafts, fighters, and so on.

3. Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

(1) Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activity

In order to send units quickly to international peace cooperation activities and sustain the operation, the GOJ will: establish a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities;

expand and improve the current rotating standby posture; and procure equipment for international peace cooperation activities.

(2) Enhancement of Security Dialogue, Defense Exchanges and Co-Training/Exercises with Other Countries

The GOJ will promote measures for bi-lateral or multi-lateral security dialogue and defense exchanges by positively promoting defense exchanges of each level and participating in international peace cooperation activities such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and co-exercises for rescue and other objectives. The GOJ will also take part in efforts in the areas of arms control and disarmament led by international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.).

4. Critical Elements of Defense Capabilities

(1) Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities

In addition to create a new joint staff organization and reorganize service Staff Office as mentioned in section II 2 above, the GDJ will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercise, establish common information and communication infrastructure, and take other measures to build foundations for the joint operations.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence section such as Defense Intelligence Headquarters by securing and training able personnel and enhancing measures for gathering and analyzing various intelligence including signal and geospatial intelligence. The GOJ will modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3), and start tentative modification for converting some of F-15 fighters to reconnaissance aircrafts.

In addition, the GOJ will take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicle of high altitude and endurance.

(3) Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces

a. Strengthening Command and Control Capability, etc.

In order to have credible command and control and swift information sharing that are indispensable for joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities with enhanced operational and organizational efficiency, the GOJ will establish advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas, thereby concentrating and circulating information through chains of command, sharing intelligence in unit level, strengthening capability to respond cyber attacks and enhancing information sharing with relevant organizations and other entities.

b. Promoting Research and Development

The GOJ will promote development of next generation aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and C-1s, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote, taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development (R&D) of various command and control systems, unmanned aerial vehicle, and other equipments, with focused distribution of resources. In the mean time, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient implementation of R&D by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors, using modeling and simulation methods, using the same parts or components for different equipment, and promoting cooperation with the U.S. and other nations.

Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for focused investment in R&D, and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take necessary measures.

- (4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources
 - a. Enhancement of Measures for Personnel, Education and Training

The GOJ will take various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of the personnel. The GOJ will secure and raise SDF personnel of high quality through increase of young officers endowed with flexible judgment and other means, and also enhance education and training so that the SDF can better respond to diversified and internationalized missions, advanced defense equipment and joint operations.

The GOJ will also consider effective way of utilization of retired personnel in the society, and take necessary measures.
 - b. Promotion of Research and Education Regarding Security Issues

The GOJ will improve research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area.
- 5. Measures to Support Defense Capability
 - (1) Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb life-cycle-cost of equipments including cost of procurement, with a concrete target to achieve. The GOJ will promote general procurement reform and take necessary measures, such as establishing the efficient procurement and replenishment posture which can cope with diverse situations and establishing the truly necessary defense industrial and technological basis the center of which constitutes core technological areas indispensable for national security.
 - (2) Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Societies

The GOJ will improve coordination with the relevant organizations such as police, fire department, the Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local societies with the Citizen's Protection Law on its basis.

In addition, the GOJ will efficiently maintain and develop defense-related facilities. In order to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities, the GOJ will continue to promote measures for local communities surrounding those facilities under close cooperation with local governments.

IV. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

- 1. Exchanges of Intelligence and Policy Consultations

The GOJ will promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and keep strategic dialogue with the U.S. on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between two countries and the military posture that includes force structure of the U.S. Force in Japan (USFJ), bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.
- 2. Operational Cooperation and Bilateral Exercise/Training

Based on the outcome of the strategic dialogue, the GOJ will make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and expand bilateral exercise/training.
- 3. Promotion of Cooperation based on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The GOJ will strengthen Japan-U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.

4. **Equipment and Technology Exchanges**

The GOJ will make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges including joint R&D projects with the U.S. in the area of equipment and technology.

5. **Promotion of Efforts to Make the Stationing of the USFJ Smooth and Effective**

The GOJ will take measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and efficient, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the U.S. regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

6. **Enhancement of Japan-U.S. Cooperation concerning International Measures for Regional or Global Security**

The GOJ will take measures to closely cooperate with the U.S. and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and diverse situations such as war against terrorism and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

V. Size of Procurement

Regarding the size of equipment procurement as described in the preceding section III (Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities), specific numbers of main equipment procurement are shown in the attached table.

VI. Expenses Required

1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yens at the prices of FY 2005.
2. In the annual budget-formulation process, the GOJ will decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while achieving harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond an unforeseeable situation in future, extra budget, besides the defense related-expenditures shown in I, might be provided within the limit of 100 billion yens on condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve.

The GOJ will continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the “Program for the Future Build-Up of Defense Capability” (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet in January 24, 1987).

3. Within the limit of the total amount of expenditures to this program, the program will be reviewed if necessary in three years from now, considering various factors in and outside Japan including international situations prevailing at that time, global trends in the technologies such as information and communication technology and Japan’s fiscal condition.

VII. Others

1. The GOJ will review the modality of defense forces stated in the new NDPG to make necessary changes, in five years or when serious situational changes emerge, taking into account security environment and technological trend at the time.
2. The GOJ will steadily implement projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified.

(Attached Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 craft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	11 craft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of AEGIS system equipped	3 ships
	Destroyers	5 ships
	Submarines	4 ships
	Others	11 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (Tonnage)	20 ships (Approx. 59,000 tons)
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 craft
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 craft
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 craft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided patriot missiles	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	26 craft
	Fighters(F-2)	22 craft
	New fighters	7 craft
	New transport aircraft	8 craft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	4 craft
	Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 craft

Reference 13. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

(December 10, 2004)

1. The Government of Japan approved the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-” (the new NDPG) and the “Mid-Term Defense Program, FY 2005-FY 2009” at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today.
2. In light of the new threats and diverse situations presented by today’s security environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and other various situations that affect peace and security, the Government has developed the new NDPG in recognition of the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan’s future security and defense.
3. The new NDPG spell out both Japan’s vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision. Japan has two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place. The new NDPG make it clear that, in particular, improving the international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea line of communication.

The new NDPG point out that it is necessary to achieve these goals by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan’s alliance partner, as well as with the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan.

4. In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. Should a threat reach Japan, the Government will take an integrated response, swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having

them cooperate fully. The new NDPG have clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard will utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people. In addition, as a part of its own effort, Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any threats. Japan's defense forces—the ultimate guarantee of its national security—should be capable of effectively responding to any new threats and diverse situations, while inheriting the elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. Japan's defense forces should also be capable of actively participating in international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment. While roles that the defense forces have to play are multiplying and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate, Japan's future defense forces should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective while, at the same time, more rationalized and streamlined.

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on the Arrangements, close cooperative relations between Japan and its alliance partner, the United States, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to effectively address new threats and diverse situations. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives in it.

Regarding its cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize its Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG have clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve the international security environment.

5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will develop highly responsive and mobile defense forces capable of dealing effectively with new threats and diverse situations, and deploy them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Japan's future defense forces should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, and invasion of offshore islands. They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships and other similar vessels, and large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters. Should such a situation emerges, the defense forces will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles.

Since, in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Thus, based on a fundamental review, we have decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with such a contingency. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

In our effort to improve the international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements to engage in international peace cooperation activities. Japan will continue to strongly promote activities conducive to international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges.

6. We will continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based.

If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.

In addition, through the process by which the NDPG were developed, questions were raised regarding how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Decisions will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflicts.

7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan's vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan's security and defense policy, including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces' mission priorities, and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems.
8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG in five years.
9. The "Mid-Term Defense Program, FY 2005-FY 2009" was formulated to achieve the defense forces level that Japan should possess as provided for in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Program to be approximately ¥24,240 billion measured in constant FY 2004 yen.
10. The Government of Japan will report today's decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

Reference 14. Cost of Major Programs in FY 2007

1. Contents of Major Programs

(Unit: million yen)

Classification	Budget for FY 2006	Budget for FY 2007	Notes
1. Effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies			
(1) Response to ballistic missile attacks	139,879	182,599	Maintenance of new warning control and surveillance radars (FPS-5), Japan-U.S. joint development of interceptive missiles with improved capabilities for BMD, etc.
(2) Counterattacks against guerillas and special operations units	84,515	88,903	Development of mobile surveillance radars (16 units), new short-range surveillance equipment (9 units), biological detection vehicles (1 units), chemical protection vehicles (1 units), chemical agent monitoring system (1 set) NBC reconnaissance vehicles, etc.
(3) Response to submarines and armed special-operations vessels in the surrounding sea areas	8,151	32,624	Maintenance of bistatic signal processing devices for P-3C (1 set) and improved DIFAR buoys for P-3C (256 units), research in the anti-submarine Morse missiles, development of new anti-submarine torpedo, etc.
(4) Response to large-scale and particular disasters	68,687	94,890	Improvement of the rescue system, US-2 (1 unit), CH-47J (2 units), UH-60J (2 units)
2. Efforts for a peaceful and stable international society including Japan	7,082	12,001	Education on international activities and PR facilities, promotion of international peace cooperation activities, efforts toward security dialogues/mutual defense talks, arms control and disarmament, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
3. Establishment of a more advanced information communication network	196,165	176,377	Enhancement of functions to evaluate and cope with cyber attacks, development of various information and communications infrastructure, etc.
4. Response to progress of military technology applications	165,922	134,005	Research on portable chemical agent detection technology, development of field communication systems, etc.
5. Hygiene (including enhancement of measures regarding medical officers)	29,766	25,579	Opening of the SDF district hospitals to public, promotion of research in defense medicine, investigation of possibilities to change the length of nurse training program to 4 years
6. Stable improvement of defense capability (main equipment)	730,975	743,583	Modernized upgrade for battle tanks (9 units), artileries (8 units), destroyers (DD: 1 unit), fighters (F-2: 8 units), etc.

Notes: 1. Amounts are pursuant to contracts (the same applies to the table below).

2. There is some overlap of mutually related operations in terms of "Response to various situations."

2. Enhancement of Equipment

(Unit: million yen)

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY 2007 Budget	Future Obligation
Ground Equipment				
Type-90 tank	9	7,149		7,149
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	17	2,133		2,133
Type-99 155 mm self-propelled howitzer	8	7,296		7,296
Type-87 reconnaissance and control vehicle	1	265		265
Chemical protection vehicle	1	185		185
Light armored mobile vehicle	173	5,227		5,227
Other		5,889	23	5,866
Total		28,144	23	28,121

(Unit: million yen)

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY 2005 Budget	Future Obligation
Vessels				
Destroyer (DD)	1	74,972	210	74,762
Submarine (SS)	1	53,332	96	53,237
Oceanographic research ship (AGS)	1	16,748	71	16,678
Replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-class destroyer	(1)	494	148	346
Functional improvements of AEGIS-equipped destroyer (including the acquisition of SM-3 missile)	(1)	30,899	593	30,306
Total	3	176,445	1,117	175,328

Notes: 1. Monetary amounts in this table are rounded off and therefore totals are not exact.

2. The figures for the equipment and material for improvement of the improved missile (Hawk) are the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile.

3. The figures for the surface-to-air missile (Patriot) are the expenses needed for the maintenance/deployment of missiles for firing.

4. The figures for the Type-88 surface-to-ship missile are the expenses needed for the improvement of the training missile.

5. The amount listed for combat helicopters (AH-64D) includes the costs needed to maintain fire control radars.

6. Figures for the improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C) and improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767) are not included in the total number of aircraft for FY 2005 since these are a part of the work to improve the aircraft in use at present. The figures for improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C) include the craft repair expense.

7. The figures for replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-class destroyer and functional improvements of AEGIS-equipped destroyer are not included in the total number of aircraft for FY 2005 since these are a part of the work to improve aircraft currently in use.

Reference 15. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY 2007

Item		Counting Unit	Number Procured	
			FY 2006	FY 2007
Ground Self-Defense Force	Type-89 rifle	Gun	6,064	6,424
	5.56-mm machine gun MINIMI	Gun	348	416
	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Gun	80	80
	Type-87 anti-tank missile launcher	Set	5	–
	81-mm mortar L16	Mortar	9	9
	120-mm mortar RT	Mortar	4	4
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled new howitzer	Vehicle	7	8
	Type-90 tank	Vehicle	11	9
	Light armored mobile vehicle	Vehicle	180	173
	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Vehicle	20	17
	Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	Vehicle	3	1
	Type-99 ammunition supply vehicle	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-90 tank recovery vehicle	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-91 tank bridge	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-78 snowmobile	Vehicle	12	12
	Chemical protection vehicle	Vehicle	2	1
	Anti-personnel sniper rifle	Gun	164	133
	Observation helicopter (OH-1)	Aircraft	2	2
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	Aircraft	1	–
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-1J)	Aircraft	4	16
	Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	Aircraft	1	1
	Combat helicopter (AH-64D)	Aircraft	1	1
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	Company	1	1
	Improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	1	1
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	4	2
	Man-portable surface-to-air missile (modified version)	Set	–	23
	Type-96 multi-purpose missile system	Set	1	1
	Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	Set	48	36

	Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured	
			FY 2006	FY 2007
Maritime Self-Defense Force	13,500-ton destroyer	Vessel	1	–
	5,000-ton destroyer	Vessel	–	1
	2,900-ton submarine	Vessel	1	1
	570-ton minesweeper	Vessel	1	–
	3,200-ton oceanographic research ship	Vessel	–	1
	Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	Aircraft	3	5
	Rescue amphibian (US-2)	Aircraft	–	1
	Primary trainer (T-5)	Aircraft	1	4
	Instrument flight trainer (TC-90)	Aircraft	–	2
	Next helicopter trainer (TH-X)	Aircraft	–	1
	Improvements of electronic intelligence aircraft (EP-3)	Aircraft	1	–
	Exchange of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers	Vessel	2	1
	Repair of destroyers equipped with the Aegis system	Vessel	1	1
	Air Self-Defense Force	Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	Aircraft	2
Combat aircraft (F-2)		Aircraft	5	8
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)		Aircraft	1	1
Search and rescue aircraft (U-125A)		Aircraft	1	1
Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)		Aircraft	2	2
Primary trainer (T-7)		Aircraft	3	–
Improvement of the early warning aircraft (E-2C)		Aircraft	0.5	1.5
Improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)		Aircraft	4	4
Improvements in reconnaissance function of reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4E)		Aircraft	–	1
Capacity improvement of the surface-to-air guided missile, Patriot		Group of items	1	1
Light armored mobile vehicles	Vehicle	8	8	

Reference 16. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications

Number Owned

(As of March 31, 2007)

Type	Recoilless guns	Mortars	Field artillery	Rocket launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft machine guns	Tanks	Armored vehicles
Approximate Number Owned	3,110	2,020	660	1,670	110	910	950

Note: All figures except for those of tanks and armored vehicles include self-propelled guns.

Performance Specifications and Data

Type	Item	Artillery	Total Weight (ton)	Maximum Speed (km/h)	Capacity/No. of Operators (people)
Tanks	Type-90 tank	120-mm anti-tank gun	Approx. 50	70	3
Armored vehicles	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher	Approx. 15	100	10
	Type-89 armored combat vehicle	35-mm machine gun	Approx. 27	70	10
	Type-82 command and communication vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Approx. 14	100	8
	Type-87 reconnaissance and warning vehicle	25-mm machine gun	Approx. 15	100	5
Field artillery	155-mm howitzer FH70	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 9.6	16	9
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 40	49	4
	203-mm self-propelled howitzer	203-mm howitzer	Approx. 28	54	5
Anti-aircraft machine guns	Type-87 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun	35-mm anti-aircraft machine gun	Approx. 38	53	3

Note: The weight of the 155-mm howitzer FH70 includes that of the supplementary power unit. The maximum speed indicated above is the maximum speed of the howitzer with the supplementary power unit activated.

Reference 18. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data

Number of Ships

(As of March 31, 2007)

Class	Number (vessels)	Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)
Destroyer	53	205
Submarine	16	42
Mine warfare ship	31	27
Patrol combatant craft	9	1
Amphibious ship	13	29
Auxiliary ship	29	123
Total	151	428

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Performance Specifications and Data

Class	Type	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry
Destroyer	Kongo	7,250	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 AEGIS system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Atago	7,750	30	5-inch gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 AEGIS system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Shirane	5,200	32 (31)	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hatakaze	4,600 (4,650)	30	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Tartar system × 1 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Takanami	4,650	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapons system [20 mm] × 2 Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Murasame	4,550	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1

Class	Type	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry
Destroyer	Asagiri	3,500 (3,550)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Hatsuyuki	2,950 (3,050)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Abukuma	2,000	27	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 1 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
Submarine	Oyashio	2,750	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set
Minesweeper (Ocean)	Yaeyama	1,000	14	20-mm machine gun × 1 Deep-sea minesweeping equipment × 1 set
Minesweeper (Coastal)	Sugashima	510	14	20-mm machine gun × 1 Minesweeping equipment × 1 set
Missile ship	Hayabusa	200	44	76-mm gun × 1 SSM system × 1 set
Amphibious ship	Osumi	8,900	22	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Landing craft air cushion [LCAC] × 2

Note: Parentheses indicate that some ships have these standard displacements.

Reference 19. Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2007)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System	
Anti-ballistic	Patriot (PAC-3)	ASDF	Approx. 300	Approx. 5.2	Approx. 26	Program + command + radar homing	
	Patriot (PAC-3)		Approx. 1,000	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 41	Pre-program+command + TVM	
Anti-aircraft	Improved Hawk	GSDF	Approx. 640	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 36	Radar homing	
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx. 930	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 33	—	
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (improved) (SAM-1C)	GSDF/MSDF/ASDF	Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7/2.9	Approx. 16	Image + IR homing Radar homing	
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)		Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7	Approx. 16	IR homing	
	Portable SAM (Stinger)		Approx. 10	Approx. 1.5	Approx. 7	IR homing	
		Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)	GSDF	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
		Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing

Reference 27. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.

(Adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003)

(Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System)

1. On the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD), under the recognition that Japan should take active measures on the issue given the advancement of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001 to FY 2005) (hereinafter “MTDP”), which was adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 15, 2003, stipulates that “necessary measures will be taken upon the review of its technical feasibility.” As recent tests of various kinds have confirmed the high technical feasibility of the BMD, development of the BMD system has become feasible upon the improvement of capacities and joint operation of the existing Aegis system-equipped destroyers and the surface-to-air PATRIOT guided missile system. Thus, considering that the BMD system is the inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and is the only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the system agrees with the Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy. Consequently, the Government of Japan determines to equip the nation with the same system.

(Review of Japan’s Defense Capabilities)

2. Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as diverse contingencies that is likely to have negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter “the new threats, etc.”) has been urgently needed for the international community. In order for peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc. through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to a conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.

To this end, we will make effectual measures against the new threats, etc. according to the specific features of each of them while maintaining close cooperation with concerned agencies and local communities, further developing cooperative relationship with the United States. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and promoting cooperation with neighboring nations and other nations and international organizations concerned. At the same time, the Government of Japan will review the whole defensive capacities of Japan in order to prepare for proactive and affirmative actions that are to be taken to protect peace and stability of the international community to which Japan belong. In so doing, preparation of necessary schemes that can effectually deal with the new threats, etc., including terrorist attacks and ballistic missile attacks, will be prepared, and at the same time the current defense build-up concept and equipment system will be fundamentally reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made, while taking events of large-scale invasion into consideration. These actions are to build defense forces that are capable of effectively responding to the new security environment.

Based on the views described above, when renewing the current system of the Self Defense Forces into a new system, we will pursue for the improvement of readiness, mobility, flexibility and multi-purpose functions of the system as well as highly advanced technical capabilities and intelligence

capabilities, and at the same time we will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations, equipment and other items concerned in order to improve their efficiencies. In so doing, the following items will be focused in order to establish an effectual system.

- (1) The current organizations and alike will be reviewed, and new organizations, including an advisory organization to the Defense Minister, necessary for the operation of the Self Defense Forces that centers on the joint operation, will be formed.
- (2) As for the major units of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, new schemes, including a new organization, will be constructed in order that effectual measures may taken in the events of new threats, etc.
- (3) Necessary functions, organizations and equipments will be prepared in order to readily take actions that effectively contribute to the peace and security of the international community.
- (4) In order to prepare for the unexpected change of the security situations in the future, while securely retaining the fundamental components to respond to events of large-scale invasion and concerning the security situations of the surrounding area of Japan, the following measures will be taken.
 - a. Regarding the Ground Self-Defense Forces, a defense build-up concept focused on the anti-tank warfare will be developed, and a system that can be promptly respond to the new threats, etc. will be prepared through improvement of mobility and other capabilities, while the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made.
 - b. Regarding the Maritime Self-Defense Forces, the defense build-up concept will be altered to one that is focused on anti-submarine warfare, and preparation of a responding system to ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc. will be attempted, while the current situation of destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made.
 - c. Regarding the Air Self-Defense Forces, the current defense force build-up concept focused on the anti-combat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missile and other new threats, etc. At the same time, the current situation of combat aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing and other measures will be taken.

(Defense-related Expenditures)

3. When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces based on the items described above (see 2) in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, makes efforts to reduce the defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration. Based on such views, the government will lay down a new Mid-Term Defense Program that will replace the current program by the end of 2004 and determine the limit of the total amount needed for the same program.

(Formulation of New Defense Program Guidelines)

4. As a precursor to the formulation of a new Mid-Term Defense Program, the Government of Japan will formulate new National Defense Program Outline that will replace the National Defense Program Guidelines from FY 1996 (adopted by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995). The new outline will be formulated to adopt the system to the new security environment and follow the concepts described above (see 1 and 2). We also aim to stipulate our visions for the Japan's defense forces, including the position of the Japan's Self-Defense Forces in the activities to maintain peace and stability of the international community.

Reference 28. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures”

(December 19, 2003)

1. The Government of Japan decided “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures” at the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet today. This decision shows the thinking behind the introduction of BMD system, and at the same time, indicates the direction of Japan’s defense force review taking into account the introduction of BMD system and the new security environment. Based on this decision, the Government of Japan will formulate a new National Defense Program Outline and a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of the year 2004.
2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defense-oriented policy, decided to introduce the multi-tier defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).
3. The technical feasibility of the BMD system has confirmed with the results from interception tests and other capability tests carried out by the United States as well as with the Japan’s original simulation experiments. Therefore, we concluded that technical reliability of these systems is considerably high and the technology has reached a sufficiently high level for practical use as we can see from the decision by the United States on the primary deployment.
4. BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the regional stability.
5. As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It will be operated based on Japan’s independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan’s own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan’s own sensors.
6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted as a defense operation that is undertaken in situations regarded as an armed attack against Japan. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic missile and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation.
7. The joint Japan-U.S. technical research currently undergoing is not for the system being introduced this time, but it aims to improve the capability of future interceptor. It remains important to carry on the research in order to take all possible measures to ensure national defense. The future transition to the development and deployment stage will be decided separately, taking international situations of the time and other factors into consideration.
8. Japan will take all possible measures to ensure national defense and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by ensuring transparency and encouraging international understanding on BMD, and by promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation.

Reference 29. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary “Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense” (tentative translation)

(December 24, 2005)

1. The Government of Japan, through today’s meetings of the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet, decided to initiate Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. The Government of Japan has started and promoted Japan-U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system since 1999 with the understanding that BMD system is the only and purely defensive measures, without alternatives, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks and meets the principles of exclusively defense-oriented policy, in an environment marked by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This research does not aim at the BMD system which Japan started to introduce since FY 2004, but aims to improve the future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan’s national defense.
3. “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009)” states “the Government of Japan will consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.” Based on the result of Japan-U.S. joint technical research to date, the Government of Japan has sufficient prospect for solving the initial technical challenges. In the current international situation, taking into consideration the continuing fiscal constraint, we consider it appropriate to promote Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missile efficiently in order to acquire the capability against future ballistic missile threats. Future transition to deployment stage of the advanced missile will be decided based on the results of the joint development.
4. Regarding the relation with Three Principles on Arms Export, “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary” for National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005- (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004), states “if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles on Arms Exports will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.” We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. Based on these, arms that need to be provided to the United States for the Japan-U.S. joint development will be provided under strict control after coordinating with the United States in the future on the framework for arms transfer.
5. Japan will continue to ensure the transparency and increase the international understanding of its BMD system while further promoting the cooperation in the areas of policy, operation and equipment/technology with the United States. Through these efforts, Japan will strive to take all possible measures in ensuring its national defense and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Reference 30. Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law

(Cabinet Decision on March 23, 2007)

In line with Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the SDF Law (No. 165 of 1954 law and hereinafter called the Law) and Article 104-2 of the Ordinance to Execute the SDF Law (No. 179 of 1954 ordinance and hereinafter called the Ordinance), emergency-response procedures concerning measures to destroy ballistic missiles and others (as stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law) are stipulated as follow.

These procedures are stipulated based on the current defense capability Japan has against ballistic missiles, arising from the deployment of a PAC-3 Patriot missile at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group of the Central Air Defense Force of the Air Defense Command of the ASDF (hereinafter called the 1st Air Defense Missile Group). The procedures will be revised in the future if a revision is deemed necessary due to reasons including the enhancement of Japan's ballistic-missile defense capability.

1. Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of “emergency” as stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-1 of the Ordinance)

(1) Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2

If either of conditions shown below is met, the Defense Minister will issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2.

- a. When a ballistic missile is suspected of having been launched in a foreign country or is feared to be launched in a foreign country but it cannot be recognized at that time that the missile is feared to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the purpose of a possible launch of the missile and its capability and other factors
- b. When a satellite launch rocket launched in a foreign country or other objects except aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property are feared to fall due to an accident and other reasons but it cannot be recognized at that time that the rocket or other objects are feared to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the location of the accident and the situation of the accident and other factors

(2) Conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of “emergency”

It can be certified that the situation is a state of “emergency” if Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system recognizes that a ballistic missile or other objects are flying toward Japan.

2. Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects which become subject to measures stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and means to destroy the missiles or others (related to Article 104-2-2 of the Ordinance)

(1) Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects

Either of objects listed below that is recognized to be flying toward Japan using its BMD system

- a. Ballistic missile
- b. Satellite launch rocket

- c. Artificial satellite
- d. Other objects except aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property

(2) Means to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects

Based on provisions stipulated under Article 93-2 of the Law, a PAC-3 Patriot missile deployed at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group will be launched with the aim of destroying an incoming ballistic missile or other objects over Japanese territory or over international waters in the vicinity of Japan (including an exclusive economic zone stipulated under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea).

3. Areas where SDF units undertake activities to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-3 of the Ordinance)

Areas where SDF units undertake activities following the issuance of an order by the Defense Ministry to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law are in Japanese territory, international waters in the vicinity of Japan and over such waters.

Areas where SDF personnel belonging to the 1st Air Defense Missile Group undertake activities are limited to places where their activities are deemed necessary to prevent a possible fall of a ballistic missile or other objects from causing damage in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Such areas will be designated under an order to be issued by the Defense Minister based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

4. Matters concerning command of SDF units which implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-4 of the Ordinance)

SDF units which implement these measures are the 1st Air Defense Missile Group, the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing and other units whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations. SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be placed under the Commander of the Air Defense Command.

The command of the Defense Minister with regard to operations of SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be conducted via the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office. A Defense Minister's order regarding this matter will be executed by the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office.

5. Matters concerning cooperation with relevant government organizations (related to Article 104-2-5 of the Ordinance)

When the Defense Ministry recognizes the flight of a ballistic missile or other objects toward Japan using its BMD system, it will immediately inform relevant government organizations (the Cabinet Secretariat, the National Police Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fisheries Agency, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Japan Coast Guard and other administrative organizations whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations) of the detection of the missile or the objects, areas where they are forecast to fall and an estimated arrival time.

When SDF units in charge of implementing measures to destroy the missile or other objects have taken such measures, the Defense Ministry will immediately inform the relevant government organizations of the situation regarding the destruction.

In addition, the Defense Ministry will conduct necessary cooperation with the relevant government organizations in response to their requests.

6. Matters concerning measures to be taken when it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are feared to fly toward Japan while an order issued based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place (related to Article 104-2-6)

When it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are feared to fly toward Japan while an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place, the Defense Minister, based on Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law, will order SDF units to take the measures to destroy the missile or the objects after receiving an approval from the Prime Minister. The Defense Minister will then withdraw the order which has been in place based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

Reference 31. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Authorized Actions Authority is Provided
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Use of force (only if the case fulfills 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense) ○ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation) ○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Establishment of positions and defense-purpose facilities in the intended deployment area ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tensed situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services—Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies—not required; services—required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law ○ Provision of services as an action measure ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc. Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (see Note 2) (evacuation, crime prevention and control, entry, use of weapons) (all only when police officers are not present) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation from nearby people and ships)
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Use of weapons for guarding operations and suppression of disturbances ○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Action for Which Authority is Provided
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Use of weapons for guard operations and suppression of disturbances
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control; use of weapons) ○ Use of weapons is permitted for the prevention of large scale destruction of guarding facilities
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there is a particular need in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (use of weapons) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections and use of weapons, etc.)
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is anticipated that missiles are flying toward Japan and the measure is deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the-fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)	○ Use of weapons to destroy ballistic missiles, etc.
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea in the event of natural calamities or other disasters (see Note 3)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (evacuation, entry, etc.; restricted to cases when no police officer is present) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Action for Which Authority is Provided
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft enters Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	The action necessary to make invading aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) (see Note 4)
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	○ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a disaster, commotion, or other emergency situations occur in a foreign country	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals and protect their life and body	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Rear area support (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspection Operations Law)	When a situation that may seriously affect peace and security of Japan occurs in an area surrounding Japan	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services/rear area search and rescue activities/ship inspection operations—Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking any response measure, in principle) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (according to the basic plan and the established implementation guideline)	○ Provision of supplies and services for rear area support; rear area search and rescue activities; and ship inspection operations ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Action for Which Authority is Provided
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Disaster Relief Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs	○ International disaster relief activities by units and the like or personnel of the SDF, and transportation of personnel and goods necessary for the activities
International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Peace Cooperation Law)	When a request is made from the United Nations to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law	(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (2) Consent of the Diet: required if units or other groups of the SDF implement peacekeeping operations of the peacekeeping force (3) Additional requirements: Cabinet decision for operations other than peacekeeping operations	○ International peace cooperation activities by units and the like of the SDF, and transportation operations entrusted to Japan ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (supplementary provision of the Self-Defense Forces Law Paragraph 8 Item 1, Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Article 6)		(1) Authorized by: supplies-Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services-Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required	○ Provision of supplies and services by organizations or units of the Ministry of Defense as cooperation and support activities; and search and rescue activities and victim relief activities by units and the like ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Activities based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (supplementary provision of the Self-Defense Forces Law Paragraph 8 Item 2, Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Article 8)		(1) Authorized by: supplies-Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services-Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required	○ Provision of supplies and services by units and the like of the SDF as response measures ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

(All authority referred to in the above table is prescribed by applicable law)

- Notes: 1. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).
2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials.
3. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.
4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary action."

Reference 32. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel and Units

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	It is considered that the use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of making aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Defense operation	Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Civil protection Dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves and other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves or other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or Japanese and foreign nationals to be evacuated. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of themselves, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, the said personnel may use their weapons within the extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of war Law		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments		SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel, and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc. as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 12, Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Cooperation and support activities		SDF personnel and others engaged in cooperation and support activities, etc. may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them on the scene, or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 17, Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, etc., may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, staff members of humanitarian or reconstruction assistance organizations in Iraq, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of Self-Defense officials. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Reference 33. Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the Civilians (Outline)

Introduction

The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was enacted in June 2003. The law stipulates basic response measures in the event of armed attacks against Japan from foreign countries. Enacted in June 2004 following the enactment of the situation law was the Civil Protection Law, which stipulates necessary measures to be taken to protect Civilians life, their bodies and their assets from armed attacks in situations including one in which Japan comes under armed attacks. Meanwhile, the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in December 2004. The national security goal set under the NDPO is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Under this background, basic guidelines are to be set based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law.

Chapter 1 Basic Policy Concerning Implementation of Measures for Protecting Civilians

The state, local governments, designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions do their utmost in order to implement measures for protecting Civilians appropriately and expeditiously in line with the Civil Protection Law, other laws, basic guidelines, civil protection plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and civil protection plan undertaken by designated public institutions while taking following points into consideration.

- 1) Respecting fundamental human rights, limiting the scope of restrictions on citizens' freedom and rights to minimum necessary levels, and implementing measures under fair and adequate procedures
- 2) Ensuring to take procedures and adequately managing documents to enable relief measures to be taken in an expeditious manner for protection of citizens' rights and profits
- 3) Providing citizens with accurate information on situations about armed attacks at an appropriate timing and in an appropriate manner
- 4) Ensuring to establish relations of mutual cooperation among the state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions, and ensuring to promote cooperation among local government, the Defense Ministry and the SDF when taking measures including requesting SDF units to be dispatched to engage in civil protection activities
- 5) Implementing educational and enlightenment measures, improving activities by fire-fighting groups and voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations, and seeking citizens' support and cooperation in activities by volunteering groups
- 6) Respecting the independency of the Red Cross Society of Japan, giving special consideration to freedom of expression in speech and others by broadcasting business operators, and respecting the independency of designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions
- 7) When issuing warnings, guiding people for evacuation and engaging in rescue operations, special considerations are to be given to people needing special protection measures, such as aged people and handicapped people. When information is collected on the safety of foreign people, adequate measures are to be taken based on international laws concerning humanitarian protection.
- 8) Safety measures are to be implemented sufficiently for parties in charge of implementing civil protection steps, transportation services operators, people providing medical services, parties managing livelihood-related facilities and running livelihood-related facilities, and parties providing cooperation in implementation of civil protection measures.

- 9) Measures to revise initial instructions issued by the Prime Minister when governors of concerned prefectures deem it impossible to implement measures being introduced based on the Prime Minister's instructions such as an instruction for evacuation

Chapter 2 Items Concerning Assumed Situations in which Japan Comes under Armed Attacks

Assumed situations in which Japan comes under armed attacks cannot be defined in a uniformed manner. But such situations can be roughly categorized into four types. These situations are likely to occur in a compound manner. Characteristics of each type of situation are explained below.

- 1) Invasion via landing
 - Prior preparations against the invasion are possible. Advanced evacuation from expected battle areas is necessary.
 - Generally speaking, areas where civil protection measures are to be implemented are assumed to be wide.
- 2) Armed attacks by guerrillas and special forces
 - Activities by these forces cannot be forecast or detected in advance. Damage from attacks by these forces is assumed to occur in an instant manner.
 - Citizens are to be temporarily evacuated to indoor areas as an immediate step against the attack. Full-fledged evacuation is to follow with safety measures being taken by concerned institutions.
- 3) Attacks by ballistic missiles
 - Determining the missile's target area when it was fired is extremely difficult. A missile is to reach its target extremely quickly after it was fired.
 - It is important to try to localize the missile's damage area by providing information on the launch in a speedy manner. Evacuation is to be mainly in indoor areas.
- 4) Attacks via air
 - Bombing by airplanes makes it difficult for authorities to determine specific targets of the attack, which underlines the need for authorities to issue an instruction for outdoor evacuation in wide areas.

Chapter 3 Establishment of Implementation Posture

- (1) The state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions are to establish a posture to implement civil protection measures in an appropriate and expeditious manner, including allocating clerical works to be assigned to divisions and bureaus of these parties and posting of employees of these parties for specific works under civil protection plans. The state and local governments are to take measures to foster human resources, including improving educational and training courses.

Local governments are to improve a system to implement civil protection measures while utilizing existing systems for disaster prevention. Prefectural governments, in particular, should strive to establish a posture in which their employees stand by around the clock so that they can respond the moment after the outbreak of an emergency situation, as well as establishing a disaster-prevention system. Municipalities should strive to strengthen an employee stand-by system in cooperation with local firefighters' groups formed on a permanent basis.

- (2) A special task force of the state and task forces of local governments are to promote cooperation in order to implement civil protection measures in a perfect manner.

The Prime Minister is to set up a special task force in an area concerned, when taking response measures in the local area is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a special task force created at a concerned prefectural government.

Chapter 4 Items Concerning Measures for Protecting of Civilians

1. Measures Concerning Evacuation of Residents

- (1) A warning relating to the situation of armed attacks, a forecast on armed attacks and areas expected to come under imminent armed attacks is to be issued in document written as easily as possible and as compactly as possible. Such warning is to be notified to residents via public communications networks such as comprehensive administrative networks and regional satellite communications networks as well as disaster-prevention wireless radio networks operated by local municipalities. Sirens are to be used in principle so as to ensure that the warning can reach areas where armed attacks are deemed to be imminent or armed attacks are deemed as having occurred.

Municipalities are to ensure that the warning has reached all of households covered by the municipalities in cooperation with voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations and neighborhood associations. Special consideration is to be given so that aged people and handicapped people can be informed of the warning.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast the warning so as to convey the warning's content to households.

- (2) The task force chief is to instruct the governor of a concerned prefecture to take evacuation measures when evacuation of residents from specified areas is deemed necessary after situations surrounding the emergency are examined in a comprehensive manner.

When the instruction of evacuation measures becomes necessary beyond a certain prefecture, the task force chief is to instruct the state to take evacuation measures as the state's policy after hearing views and opinions from affected prefectures.

- (3) Following are points to be considered in the event of evacuation.
 - In view of the fact that having a large number of residents in big cities evacuate to remote areas quickly during a short period of time is extremely difficult, governors of prefectures should strive to get information about available evacuation facilities and designate facilities that can sufficiently accommodate such residents while the task force chief should basically instruct affected residents to immediately evacuate to indoor facilities in their neighborhood, before issuing other instructions in response to new developments later.
 - On the evacuation of people living in isolated islands, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is to provide necessary support by examining the availability of airplanes to be used in the event of an emergency, so as to smoothly airlift affected people in response to requests by concerned local governments.
 - On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, the task force chief is to instruct adequate evacuation measures in response to developments in the situation.
 - On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of SDF facilities and U.S. military facilities, the state and local governments are to keep close cooperation even during peacetime in order to ensure the use of evacuation facilities, evacuation routes and means to transport evacuees. The state is also to implement necessary coordination with local governments so that the governments can take measures to evacuate local residents in the event of armed attacks.
 - On the evacuation of people living on peninsulas, mountainous areas and in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, governors of concerned prefectures, when issuing evacuation instructions, can recommend the use of self-owned vehicles as transportation means for evacuation after taking into consideration traffic situations of the regions.

- In cooperation with local governments, the state is to clarify points to be taken into account by Civilians in the event of evacuation and to disseminate these points to the people, depending upon types of armed attacks including those by ballistic missiles.
 - It is necessary to avoid guiding people to evacuate leeward in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and is important to have them put on hats and masks in evacuation to help reduce the skin's exposure to the contaminated air as much as possible. When human bodies are seen to be contaminated by radioactive iodine in the wake of nuclear weapons attacks, affected people are to be instructed to take agents to neutralize such iodine. When attacks by biological and chemical weapons are launched, affected people are to be instructed to leave the attacked areas or the sites immediately and evacuate to indoor rooms that are highly shielded against the air outside.
- (4) Governors of prefectures who have received evacuation instructions are to instruct affected people to evacuate immediately via mayors of municipalities. The governors are then to show major evacuation routes such as national roads and local roads, and cite available transportation means for evacuation such as railways and buses, after examining geographical features of each region. Local governments are to keep close contact with designated public transportation operators to ensure means to transport evacuees.

Mayors of municipalities are to have residents informed of the evacuation instruction, using disaster-prevention wireless radio networks operated by the municipalities and public relations vehicles.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the evacuation instruction in a prompt, accurate and compact manner.

- (5) When an instruction of evacuation is issued, mayors of municipalities are to devise evacuation-implementation measures in line with the civil protection plan and evacuation guidelines prepared in advance, and to guide people to safe places.

In order to adequately evacuate aged people and handicapped people, the mayors are to request those who run facilities that house such people to implement measures for their smooth evacuation in line with measures that would be taken in the case of fires and earthquakes.

If response measures by employees of the municipalities and local fire-fighting agencies alone are deemed to be insufficient, police officers, Japan Coast Guard officers or SDF officers are to be mobilized to smoothly evacuate affected people.

2. Measures Concerning Relief of Evacuees

- (1) Following the receipt of an instruction by the task force chief to give relief to evacuated people, governors of prefectures are to conduct relief operations that are deemed necessary, including provision of accommodation facilities, supplies of food stuffs and provision of money to buy daily necessities. The governors are to conduct these relief operations without receiving a relief instruction by the task force chief, if such operations are deemed to be necessary immediately. Special considerations are to be given in order to provide an adequate relief to aged people and handicapped people.
- (2) Prefectural governments are to establish shelters and manage these facilities in an adequate manner by ensuring to keep the evacuees' health conditions sound and maintain their privacy in the shelters.

Prefectural governments are, even during peacetime, to establish methods to supply and procure food, water and sleeping gear to be used in the event of armed attacks in line with methods that would be employed in the case of natural disasters.

The state is to supply pharmaceuticals, food stuffs, daily necessities and fuel, when necessary or in line with support requests from governors of concerned prefectures. The state is also to ensure ways to supply such goods in cooperation with concerned industrial organizations. The state is to give special consideration to ensuring ways to supply food stuffs and daily necessities to people in isolated islands.

If necessary, concerned prefectures are to open emergency medical facilities in cases where a large number of citizens sustained injuries as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan. The prefectures are also to set up medical squads and dispatch qualified people to the squads. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and other ministries are to secure medical doctors and form their own medical teams, if necessary. The Defense Agency is to dispatch hygiene units to affected areas in response to requests from governors of concerned prefectures or the head of a special task force.

- (3) When a disaster stemming from an armed attack occurs, the state and prefectures will utilize medical supplies and medical equipment that have been stockpiled so that they could be used in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
- (4) On medical activities in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is to instruct concerned Cabinet ministers to take necessary measures, including dispatch of emergency medical teams, and provision of medical supplies and medical equipment, in cooperation with concerned prefectural governments. In the event of attacks by biological weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary protection measures, including vaccination, to provide medical treatment to the victims and prevent the spread of the biological agents used in the attacks to other areas. In the event of attacks by chemical weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary measures, including neutralizing the contamination of the chemical agents used in the attacks as fast as possible.
- (5) On activities to collect information on the safety of citizens and provision of such information to other parties, consideration is to be given to the protection of personal information and freedom of press.

Heads of local governments are to collect and sort out information on the safety of citizens, including evacuees and people who have been admitted to hospital. Other administrative organizations are to help heads of local governments in collecting information on safety of citizens.

Upon receiving inquiries on the safety of citizens, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications or heads of local governments are to provide information on such safety unless the inquiries are deemed as being done for undue purposes.

Designated administrative agencies, designated public institutions and other relevant organizations are to try to cooperate with heads of local governments in collecting information on the safety of citizens.

The Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications and heads of local governments are to cooperate with the Red Cross Society of Japan in collecting and sorting out information on the safety of foreign people.

3. Response Measures Concerning Disasters Caused by the Armed Attacks

- (1) On response measures concerning disasters caused by the armed attacks against Japan, the state is to take necessary measures on its own while the head of a special task force is, if necessary, to immediately instruct governors of prefectures to implement these measures after explaining an implementation policy to the governors.

Governors of prefectures are to request the head of a special task force to take necessary measures, including dispatches of firefighters, police officers, Maritime Safety Agency officers and SDF units, if preventing disasters from armed attacks and reducing the damage from such attacks by relevant prefectures alone are deemed difficult.

- (2) If emergency measures to prevent danger of citizens are deemed necessary, governments of concerned prefectures are to swiftly issue an emergency notice and, if necessary, take measures, including an issuance of an evacuation instruction and designation of dangerous areas.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the emergency notice swiftly.

- (3) Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities and relevant prefectures should ensure to get information on these facilities during peacetime.

Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities should keep contact with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the National Police Agency and the Maritime Safety Agency, and take note of special points to be considered to ensure the safety of each facility according to the characteristics and feature of each.

When taking measures to ensure the safety of certain livelihood-related facilities and their surrounding areas is deemed necessary, the Prime Minister is to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to strengthen security and take other measures including evacuation of citizens living in the areas, based on the government's basic response plan.

In the event of armed attacks being launched against Japan, governors of prefectures are to request public safety commissions of the prefectures to swiftly designate livelihood-related facilities where people are barred from entry. To be designated off-limit are facilities whose security, if not ensured, would cause significant damage to the surrounding areas, such as dams, nuclear power plants and stations handling a large amount of dangerous objects.

- (4) Following points need to be considered as ways to ensure the security of nuclear power plants in addition to taking measures which are usually meant to ensure the safety of a livelihood-related facility.

- When the leakage of radioactive substances is reported or the leakage of such substances is warned, the Prime Minister is to immediately set up a special local task force while ensuring safety in the affected area. In principle, such a special task force is to be headquartered in an off-the-site area. The task force is to organize a joint council with a concerned local government to work out measures against disasters stemming from armed attacks on nuclear power plants. The joint council is to be led by the head of the local task force.
- In the event of armed attacks, nuclear power plant operators are to immediately take necessary measures to halt the operation of nuclear power reactors. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to immediately order nuclear power plant operators to stop the operation of nuclear reactors located in areas covered by the warning. If a warning is issued without designating specific areas, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to order suspension of operation for nuclear reactors whose suspension is deemed necessary after the degree of danger and its specific content are examined. Nuclear power plant operators are to stop the operation of their reactors on their own decision if the situation is emergent. After relevant nuclear power reactors stop operating, the state and nuclear power plant operators are to take necessary measures to ensure power supply.

- (5) When disasters arise following armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is, based on the basic response plan, to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to swiftly collect information, launch operations to rescue victims, promptly identify objects that have caused the disaster, determine the contaminated area, and implement necessary measures to decontaminate the area and prevent the spread of the contamination. If the situation is emergent, the Prime Minister is to ask for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures.

In response to these instructions by the Prime Minister and his request for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures, fire-fighting agencies, prefectural police authorities, the Maritime Safety Agency and the SDF are to implement necessary response measures. These response measures are to be implemented after necessary safety measures are taken, including the use of protection gear by those who are to engage in actual rescue and other operations. In the event of attacks by biological agents, response measures are to be taken after protection measures are implemented, including vaccination against the agents.

Information on the disaster is to be disseminated to citizens in order to prevent the citizens from going panic. In the event of attacks by biological agents, information on vaccination is to be disseminated to citizens while the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare is to instruct governors of relevant prefectures to have citizens vaccinated against the agents, if necessary.

The Governor of a concerned prefecture is to make coordination with governors of other prefectures and police authorities of concerned prefectures before introducing measures including barring citizens from entering certain buildings and imposing traffic restrictions.

When water used by citizens is contaminated as a result of attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare or governors of prefectural governments are, if necessary, to order water-supply parties to take measures, including limiting water supply.

- (6) If fire-fighting, rescue and first-aid activities are deemed necessary in response to disasters stemming from armed attacks against Japan, the Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency is to instruct governors of concerned prefectures or mayors of concerned municipalities to ensure that these activities can be conducted in an appropriate and expeditious manner.

If citizens are infected with biological agents used as weapons in armed attacks against Japan or they are feared to be infected with such agents, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is to designate the infection from the chemical agent as a designated infection and, if necessary, take measures under the Infectious Disease Law.

When a large amount of waste, such as rubble and debris, arises as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan, the Environment Ministry is to promptly dispose of such waste under exceptional rules set to govern waste disposal.

When protection of important cultural assets from possible damage following armed attacks is deemed particularly necessary, the Commissioner of the Cultural Affairs Agency is to order or recommend owners of the assets to take measures to change the assets' storage places, and to provide necessary support to the owners if they ask for such support.

4. Points to be Considered Concerning Measures in General to Protect Civilians

- (1) Telecommunications carriers are to preferentially cater to important telecommunications needs by the state, local governments and designated public institutions to implement measures for civil protection in the wake of armed attacks against Japan.
- (2) In consultation with designated public institutions that serve as transportation operators, the state and local governments are to strive to ensure transportation of evacuees and emergency relief goods while taking into consideration safety issues involved.
- (3) In the event of armed attacks, police authorities of prefectural governments are to implement traffic restriction measures on general vehicles, including their being barred from using certain roads, in order to secure traffic routes for transporting evacuees and emergency relief goods.
- (4) Concerned local governments, in cooperation with relevant organizations, are to try to improve systems to receive emergency relief goods from the general public and business corporations, and to distribute these goods to people needing them.
- (5) The state is to set standards and procedures for issuing Red Cross and other special badges to be used in emergency. Based on these standards and procedures, heads of designated administrative agencies and others are to devise necessary guidelines for specifically issuing such badges.

- 1) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities containing inherently dangerous substances
(destruction of nuclear power plants and explosion of petrochemical complex facilities)
 - 2) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities accommodating a large number of people and against public transportation systems
(explosion of terminal stations and railways)
 - 3) A situation in which an attack is launched using substances that are capable of injuring and killing a large number of people
(indiscriminate sprinkling of anthrax and sarin)
 - 4) A situation in which an attack is launched using transportation systems as a way to destroy targets
(suicidal terrorist attacks using civil airplanes)
- (2) When a special headquarters is set up to deal with situations requiring emergency response action, the state, led by the headquarters, is to do its utmost to implement emergency response protection measures in cooperation with local governments and designated public institutions.
- The Prime Minister is to establish a special task force in a certain local area if setting up such a task force there is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a prefectural task force.
- (3) Emergency response protection measures are to be taken basically in line with basic policies and civil-protection steps stipulated under Chapter 1 to Chapter 4 of the basic guidelines.
- The notification of warning and the scope of areas subject to such notification in the case of situations requiring emergency response measures are to be determined by the task force chief after the degree of the damage by the attack and the scope of geographical areas impacted by the attack are examined.

Chapter 6 Procedures for Planning for Concerning Civil Protection

Civil protection plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and civil protection plan undertaken by designated public institutions are to be devised or revised after views and opinions from wider quarters of society are heard. Designated public institutions are to ensure opportunities for hearing opinions from those who are engaging in work to devise civil protection plans.

Reference 34. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense and Defense Facilities Administration Agency

Civil Protection Plans are prepared by all designated administrative agencies based on provisions including Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law.

1. Basic Concept

The SDF shall take measures to protect civilians such as evacuation, relief of residents, and responses to armed attack disasters, to the extent possible without affecting its main duty to repel an armed attack with full force in an armed attack situation.

2. Implementation Framework

- a. An intra-ministry coordination system and emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime.
- b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Defense Minister shall instruct necessary responses with the advice of the Defense Council, to be held as necessary. To that end, the system assisting the

9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the Ministers concurred that both Governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.
10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:
 - Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
 - Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
 - Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
 - Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
 - Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
 - Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
 - Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
 - Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
 - Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.
 - Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
 - Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
 - Maintain the security of maritime traffic.
11. Global common strategic objectives include:
 - Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community.
 - Further consolidate U.S.-Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
 - Promote the reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.
 - Prevent and eradicate terrorism.
 - Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member.
 - Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

Strengthening of U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation

12. The Ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan's capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan's active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The Ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure

- and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.
13. In this context, the Ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan's NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.
 14. The Ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the alliance as the bedrock of Japan's security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The Ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.
 15. The Ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.
 16. The Ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

Reference 37 U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future

(Washington DC, October 29, 2005)

I. Overview

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the alliance also plays an important role in effectively dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment. Therefore, following the December 2002 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the U.S. and Japan intensified consultations on respective U.S. and Japanese security and defense policies in order to examine the direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and to develop options to adapt the alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the SCC, the Ministers reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces in pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results.

Today, the SCC members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the U.S. and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to

pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives identified in their February 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

The SCC members approved findings and recommendations on roles, missions, and capabilities. They also approved recommendations for realignment, as reflected in this report. These measures are designed to enhance the alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

II. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides recognized recent achievements and developments in security and defense policies related to the roles, missions, and capabilities of the U.S. and Japan, to include: bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the earthquake in South Asia; Japan's December 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines; progress in ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation; Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies; the SDF's planned transition to a new joint operations posture; and the transformation and global posture realignment of U.S. forces.

1. Primary Areas

In this context, the U.S. and Japan examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, particularly those of the U.S. forces and the SDF, for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas:

- Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies;
- Efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities.

2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation. Related to defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, these concepts include:

- Bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.
- Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defense posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.
- The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.
- U.S. and Japanese operations in the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.
- Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for U.S. forces (hereafter referred to as "U.S. facilities and areas"). Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to U.S. operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.

- U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.

Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include:

- Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.
- Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.
- The U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment.

In addition, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defense capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

Both sides reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened, consistent with relevant national security policies and laws, and with agreements between the U.S. and Japan. Through their examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, they emphasized the importance of improving several specific areas of cooperation:

- Air defense.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Counter-terrorism.
- Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.
- Humanitarian relief operations.
- Reconstruction assistance operations.
- Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.
- Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
- Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.
- Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).
- Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

Both sides emphasized that other areas of operations not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities; this list highlights key areas for further enhancement but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation.

4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities described above, both sides further identified the following essential steps that can be taken in peacetime to strengthen the posture of bilateral security and defense cooperation to deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. Both sides also emphasized the importance of continuing examinations of roles, missions, and capabilities, based on the progress made thus far, to ensure effective bilateral cooperation.

- **Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.**

Both sides recognized that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance's timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Close and continuous policy and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression, and to respond to diverse security challenges. Development of a common operational picture shared between U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation by streamlining their functions.

- **Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.**

Recalling that the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation provide a basis for bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, both sides affirmed the continual requirement for such planning while taking full account of the changing security environment. This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use by U.S. forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programs.

- **Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.**

Recognizing that common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated cooperation, both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.

- **Improving Interoperability.**

To ensure smooth cooperation as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, U.S. forces and the SDF will maintain regular consultations to maintain and strengthen interoperability. Continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters of U.S. forces and the SDF and will benefit from improved secure communications capabilities.

- **Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.**

Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities, and advance the effectiveness of bilateral operations. These measures will include increasing mutual use of U.S. and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan. The training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland will also be expanded.

- In particular, the U.S. plan to expand its training infrastructure in Guam will provide increased training opportunities for the SDF in Guam.

The SCC members confirmed that advancing the alliance transformation agenda for security and defense cooperation will contribute to regional and global peace and security.

Reference 42. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(New York, September 23, 1997)

I. The Aim of the Guidelines

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an Armed Attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the U.S. will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the “National Defense Program Outline.” In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.

(d) Responses to Other Threats

- (i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.
- (ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

(a) Command and Coordination

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command-and-control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

(b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

(c) Communication and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

(d) Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

(e) Logistics Support Activities

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

(i) Supply

The U.S. will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(ii) Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the U.S. to Japan.

(iii) Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan; The U.S. will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities.

Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

(iv) Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

(v) Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that Will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

(a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a flow of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the flow; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.

(b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operation in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

(c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arises with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

(d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

(2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

(a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

(b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

(3) Japan-U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the U.S. to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an Armed Attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including, SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The SDC will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures

Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

(1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an Armed Attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an Armed Attack against Japan or when such a situation and an Armed Attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

(2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an Armed Attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an Armed Attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved. They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

(The Schedule omitted: See p. 317)

Reference 43. Record of Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises in FY 2006

Joint Training

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Japan-U.S. joint exercises (Command post exercise)	January 29 –February 8, 2007	Ichigaya garrison, Yokota Air Base, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, internal bureau of the Ministry of Defense, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, Regional Armies, MSDF fleet, District Units, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approx. 1,350 personnel	USFJ Command, USFJ Armed Forces, etc. About 3,100 personnel	Training for bilateral actions and cooperation, as well as for the response to various situations including those in areas surrounding Japan, with the aim of maintaining and enhancing joint operation capabilities

GSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Combined command post exercise	July 12–21, 2006	Fort Shafter in Hawaii, United States	Ground Staff Office, etc. Approx. 105 personnel	U.S. Army Japan, 1st Corps, etc. Approx. 100 personnel	Training in coordinated operations
Field training	October 16–26, 2006	Sekiyama Maneuver Area, etc.	1st Airborne Brigade Approx. 350 personnel	Oregon National Guard 41st Infantry Brigade Approx. 240 personnel	Training in joint operations
Field training in the United States (U.S. Army)	October 24 –November 27, 2006	Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, United States	Eastern Army Approx. 180 personnel	29th Infantry Brigade (Separate)	Training and exercises for tactical and combat skills for street warfare
Field training in the United States (U.S. Marine Corps)	January 18 –February 21, 2007	Camp Pendleton in California, etc., United States	Western Army 21st Infantry Regiment Approx. 180 personnel	U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force	Training and exercises for tactical and combat skills for diverse contingencies
Field training	January 29 –February 10, 2007	Oyanohara Maneuver Area	1st Combined Brigade Approx. 270 personnel	3rd Marine Division Approx. 100 personnel	Training in joint operations
Combined command post exercise	February 4–16, 2007	Itami Garrison	Central Army, etc. Approx. 3,400 personnel	U.S. Army Japan, 1st Corps, etc. Approx. 1,400 personnel	Training in coordinated operations

MSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Special training for base security	November 13–16, 2006	Port of Yokosuka	Yokosuka District Unit, etc. Approx. 320 personnel	U.S. Navy Yokosuka Base Security Police, etc.	Training in joint operations for guarding the base
Special medical training	November 15, 2006	Yokosuka Naval Base	Yokosuka District Unit, etc. Approx. 50 personnel	U.S. Navy Hospital, Yokosuka, etc. Approx. 100 personnel	Medical training
Special minesweeping training	November 19–30, 2006	Hyuganada Sea	Vessels: 30 Aircrafts: 4	Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel, etc. Approx. 7 personnel	Minesweeping training
Special transportation training	March 3–7, 2007	Sea area between Yokosuka and Surugawan Bay	One vessel	One vessel	Transportation training

ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Air defense combat training Fighter training	May 15–25, 2006	Air area surrounding Okinawa and temporary air area for training	Aircrafts (total): 75	Aircrafts (total): 40	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training Air defense combat training Air-to-ground firing and bombing practice	May 26 –June 20, 2006	Andersen Air Force Base in Guam and Farallon De Medinilla Air-to-Ground Firing Site as well as their surrounding air areas	Aircrafts (total): 96	Aircrafts (total): 16	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Air defense training for guarding bases	July 13 –August 11, 2006	Eielson Air Force Base and Elemendorf Air Force Base in Alaska and their surrounding air areas	Aircrafts (total): 103	Aircrafts (total): - (unknown)	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Fighter training	December 1–6, 2006	Air area surrounding Okinawa and special temporary air area for training	Aircrafts (total): 24	Aircrafts (total): 25	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training	March 5–8, 2007	Air areas north and west of Kyushu	Aircrafts (total): 16	Aircrafts (total): 16	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills

Reference 44. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.

○ The export of “arms” needs a license from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949)(Note) and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

Note: Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

1. The Three Principles on Arms Export

On April 21, 1967, then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives’ Audit Committee meeting.

(Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

- (1) Communist Bloc countries;
- (2) countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions; or
- (3) countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

2. The Government’s Unified View on Arms Export

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government’s view at the House of Representatives’ Budget Committee meeting.

(Full text)

(1) The Government’s Policy

With regard to the export of “arms,” the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

- (i) The export of “arms” to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.
 - (ii) The export of “arms” to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles, shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
 - (iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as “arms.”
- (2) Definition of Arms

The term “arms” is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.

- (i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are “those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat.” Specifically “arms” are those that are listed in Items from No. 197 to No. 205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.
- (ii) “Arms” under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as “firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle.” Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc. for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered “arms.”

Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, “the item No. 109” in (3) of 1) and “the items from No. 197 to No. 205” in (1) of 2) have been changed to “the Item No. 1.”

Reference 46. The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce US facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002 ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of US forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between US forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.

— Markings on US forces official vehicles

Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical US forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other US forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance

Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the US has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims

Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

- Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under US laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by US authorities.
- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the US Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures

Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen

Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the US forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction

- a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Mister Ikeda, Mister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
- b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality-of-life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In

addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

- c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.-Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Subcommittee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of the work.

2. Decisions of the SCC

- a. Pursue construction of the SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
- b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
- c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
- d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
- e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

3. Guiding Principles

- a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
- b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing US facilities and areas.
- c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other US military facilities and housing.
- d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency

- operations.
- e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
 - f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods
- Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
- a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
 - b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
 - c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
5. The Next Steps
- a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
 - b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
 - c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

Reference 47. Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(Approved by the Cabinet on December 9, 2005)

(Partially revised on December 12, 2006)

1. Basic Principles

On March 20 2003, the United States and other countries began to use force against Iraq as the last resort to remove the threat posed by Iraq against peace and security of the International community. Major combat operations in Iraq have ended, and the international community has been actively engaged in reconstruction assistance to Iraq.

That Iraq be rebuilt as a peaceful and democratic state while maintaining its sovereignty and territorial unity is of utmost importance not only for the people of Iraq and to peace and stability of the Middle East, but also to securing peace and stability in the international community including Japan which depends on the Middle East for nearly 90% of its oil imports.

Japan's aid to Iraq has consisted of two major pillars—humanitarian and reconstruction assistance being provided by the SDF and official development assistance being extended by the Foreign Ministry. Based on the idea, Japan has extended as much assistance as possible, on its own initiative and proactively, to Iraq, taking into account the will of the international community expressed in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, so that Iraq will be reconstructed as early as possible by the people of Iraq themselves. Based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Law No.137 of 2003, hereinafter called the “Special Measures Law”), Japan dispatched SDF units to Muthanna Province and other places in Iraq. At a time when Iraq restored its sovereignty and moved toward full-fledged restoration, which is mentioned in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, Japan further supported the efforts of Iraqi people and the international community, and enhanced its assistance so that rehabilitation of Iraq will progress steadily. Thanks to international backing as mentioned above, an election for the National Assembly was held in Iraq based on the newly adopted Constitution, leading to the formation of a new Government and concluding the political process specified in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546. In addition, the Iraqi security force has taken root and the process of transferring security authority from the U.N. multilateral force has advanced, marking the first step forward toward full-scale reconstruction led by the people of Iraq on their own initiative. In the future, Japan will strive to make fruitful results of its reconstruction assistance take root in Iraq and will try to establish relations of broad and long-term partnership with the country. In light of the continued support of Iraq by the United Nations and the multilateral force, including the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1723 that extends the authority of the multinational force for one year upon request of the Iraqi transition government, Japan will carry out activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and other response measures based on the Special Measures Law.

2. Matters Regarding Implementation of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

(1) Basic Matters Regarding Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

Iraq, in the first place, was ravaged by a quarter century of oppressive rule, and development of its social infrastructure was delayed. Its government collapsed following the use of force by the United States and other countries in March 2003. Thus, its people were thrown into a difficult situation, making the need for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance extremely important. In particular, in the area of medical services, there were shortfalls regarding operation, maintenance and management of hospitals including insufficiency in medical equipment. Regarding supply of electricity and water, supply networks at the national level were not functioning sufficiently, becoming major issues in certain regions.

Therefore, expeditious assistance in these areas was necessary. Furthermore, in addition to assistance to meet such short-term needs, assistance that would lead to a more full-fledged development of social infrastructure was also necessary.

In view of such a situation, Japan conducted activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, dispatching GSDF units to Muthanna Province in Iraq in line with the Special Measures Law and having ASDF units undertake airlifting of goods and materials used in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities. Aid activities by the GSDF units in the Iraqi province continued for about two years and a half in wide-ranging areas, from medical services and water supply to reconstruction of public facilities such as school and roads. These assistance measures along with the provision of ODA produced visible results in the province, such as the establishment of livelihood-related infrastructure and creation of new jobs, basically ending the stage of assistance for meeting short-term needs. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq have now moved to the stage in which the people of Iraq should play a leading role on their own initiative. Under such circumstances, on June 20, 2006, Japan decided to terminate the aid mission by GSDF units of implementing response measures to meet domestic needs in Iraq. GSDF units in charge of providing

humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq returned home on July 25, 2006 and GSDF units in charge of undertaking supplementary work accompanied by the ending of response measures arrived in Japan on September 9 in the same year.

Meanwhile, ASDF units, acting on a request from the United Nations, will continue to undertake activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

In order to smoothly conduct these activities, and to contribute to the stability and improvement of the livelihood of the people of Iraq, amongst others, personnel of SDF units in charge and Japanese Government officials tasked with undertaking reconstruction assistance in Iraq will communicate closely with each other as well as with the overseas establishments concerned, and will collaborate on reconstruction assistance in Iraq.

(2) Categories and Contents of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

A. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be Conducted by SDF units

SDF units will engage in transport of goods and materials used for activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. (activities stipulated under Article 3, Paragraph 2, Sub-Paragraph 5) These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner, with safety measures to be taken in view of the nature and form of the activities to be conducted.

B. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be Conducted by Officials in Charge of Iraqi Reconstruction

Categories and contents of activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Japanese officials in charge of Iraqi reconstruction shall be as follows. These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner, with safety measures to be taken after full assessment of the security situation in Iraq in view of the nature and form of the activities to be conducted, and under the premise that the security of officials conducting the activity will be ensured.

(a) Medical Services (activities stipulated under Article 3, Paragraph 2, Sub-Paragraph 1 of the Special Measures Law)

To provide advice and guidance to Iraqi doctors and others on operation, maintenance and management of hospitals with the aim of rebuilding the function of Iraqi hospitals and thus improving conditions for domestic medical services.

(b) Improvement in Irrigation (activities stipulated under Article 3, Paragraph 2, Sub-Paragraph 5 of the Special Measures Law)

To conduct construction activities such as setting up water purification and supply equipment that can be maintained by the local residents themselves. These activities will be carried out after conducting a survey on the current situation of supply and sources of water.

(3) Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction are to be Implemented and the Designation of the Areas

A. Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Units of SDF Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and the Designation of the Areas

(a) Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by the units of SDF shall be implemented in areas where combat is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the units of SDF must be ensured when implementing these activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which the units of SDF conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance within the range of (b), the Defense Minister shall fully consider the contents of the activities, overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe

the operation of these aircraft.

The ASDF units shall be equipped with as many pistols, rifles, machine guns as necessary for ensuring security, and other equipment required for implementing their activities depending on the size of the units. When replacing the equipment, additional number of equipment may be added as necessary for the said replacement.

B. Duration of Dispatch

The duration of dispatch shall be from December 15, 2003 to July 31, 2007.

During the above-mentioned period, the Government will properly review the activities of the dispatched SDF units in consideration of various factors, such as the progress of the political process by the new Iraqi government toward establishing valid sovereignty, security conditions, activities of the United Nations and its multinational force, and changes in the composition of the force. The Government, after evaluating the progress of rehabilitation in Iraq, will take response action appropriately.

(5) Important Matters Regarding the Procurement of Goods Other Than Those Goods which are or Have been Utilized by the Relevant Administrative Agencies for Their Work or Operations with a View to Transferring Them to the United Nations and Others

The government shall procure the electric generators necessary for their installation to public facilities as well as water purification and supply facilities necessary for the improvement of irrigation that are to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

(6) Other Important Matters Regarding the Implementation of the Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

A. Including in designating the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance are to be conducted, and in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others.

B. Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq as stipulated in (2) B. shall be implemented carefully and in a flexible manner during the necessary period that falls between December 15, 2003 and December 14, 2006, while assessing the security situation and paying due regard to ensuring security, including the form of implementation, location for accommodation of personnel, security arrangements, and equipment to be carried, and provided that security is ensured.

C. The government shall conduct necessary surveys concerning the development of Iraq's social infrastructure such as key industrial facilities and facilities related to daily life such as electricity power plants and cement plants, provided that security is ensured, and based on their results, endeavor to achieve rehabilitation and maintenance of these facilities through the activities of Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

D. With respect to the implementation of the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (2) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

3. Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security

(1) Basic Matters Regarding the Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security, Categories and Contents of the Activities, Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which the Activities are to be Implemented, and the Designation of the Said Areas, as well as Size, Composition, Equipment and

Duration of Dispatch of Troops of SDF That Conduct the Activities in Territories of Foreign Countries

- A. Japan shall implement its response measures focusing on activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. On the other hand, in order to support the UN Member States' activities to restore security and stability in Iraq, the SDF troops that conduct the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as stipulated in 2 (4) A, may conduct medical services, transportation, storage of goods/stockpiling, communications, construction, repair/maintenance, supply and decontamination activities as stipulated in Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law, insofar as it does not affect the accomplishment of their assigned activities.
- B. The range of the areas in which support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops shall be the same as that stipulated in 2 (3) A designated as the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by SDF troops as stipulated in 2 (4) A.

The SDF units' support activities for ensuring security shall be implemented in the areas where combat* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the SDF troops must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which SDF troops conduct support activities for ensuring security within the range stated above, the Defense Minister shall fully consider the contents of the activities, the overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situations with special care.

- (2) Other Important Matters Regarding Support Activities for Ensuring Security
- A. Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries, as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, including the designation of the areas in which support activities for ensuring security are to be conducted.
- B. With respect to the implementation of support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (1) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

4. Matters Regarding Coordination and Cooperation among the Relevant Administrative Agencies for the Implementation of Response Measures

To promote the response measures based on the Special Measures Law in a comprehensive and effective manner, and to ensure the safety of SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched under the said law, relevant administrative agencies, including the Defense Ministry/SDF, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shall maintain close coordination and conduct necessary cooperation centering around the Cabinet Secretariat, including the matters listed below.

- (1) SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched, and relevant overseas establishments, will liaise closely with each other, including exchange of information necessary for carrying out the activities and ensuring security, and cooperate in working to deliver reconstruction assistance to Iraq.
- (2) The relevant administrative agencies shall closely communicate with each other concerning the overall situation of activities by other countries in the areas in which SDF troops or Support Personnel for

Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct the activities based on the Special Measures Law and their vicinities, information on the security situation on the ground, and other necessary information for conducting the activities based on the said law and for ensuring safety, obtained through the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence.

- (3) The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall cooperate to the extent that it does not affect the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence when he (or she) is requested by the Prime Minister or the Defense Minister to dispatch officials that have the skills and ability, among others, that are necessary to conduct the activities based on the Special Measures Law, to transfer the control over the goods under his (or her) control and to cooperate by other means.
- (4) The Prime Minister shall endeavor to enlist a wide range of human resources in recruiting Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, with the cooperation of relevant administrative agencies, local governments or private organizations. The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall provide necessary cooperation in this regard.
- (5) The Heads of overseas establishments designated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall provide necessary cooperation for conducting the activities based on the Special Measures Law and for ensuring safety upon instructions by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Reference 48. Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq

(Approved by Cabinet on June 18, 2004)

On June 8, 2004, Resolution 1546 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council. As provided in the Resolution, the occupation of Iraq will be terminated and its sovereignty will be fully restored on June 30.

Japan welcomes the full restoration of sovereignty of Iraq and the entering into a new phase toward full-fledged reconstruction.

Up until now, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan has been carrying out activities centering on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities for the people of Iraq, based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and its Basic Plan in accordance with the Constitution of Japan. Its activities are highly appreciated in Iraq, and there is a strong expectation for the continuation of these activities after the restoration of Iraq.

In line with the unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution, which is based on the request of the Iraq Interim Government to the International Community for assistance including the continued presence of the Multinational Force (MNF), and with the understanding that the reconstruction and stability of Iraq is important for the security and prosperity of Japan, the SDF will continue to carry out the above mentioned activities after the restoration of sovereignty.

In this respect, taking into account that the new Resolution clearly defines that humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities, as have been carried out by the SDF, are included in the tasks of the MNF, and upon sufficient deliberation within the Government on this matter, the Government has decided that the SDF will continue its activities henceforth within the MNF.

Beyond June 30, the SDF will be in the MNF and under the unified command of the MNF, and it will maintain communication and coordination between the command of the MNF. However, it will not be subject to the command of the MNF. The SDF will continue to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities etc., based on Japan's own judgement and under the Japanese national command, in a manner welcomed by the

Iraq Interim Government. An understanding was reached on this point, between the government of Japan and the government of the U.S. and the U.K., which jointly proposed the draft Resolution, and which are core members of the MNF and its unified command.

The SDF will not be engaged in any activities that may be deemed as the use of force which is prohibited by the Constitution. It will continue its activities in so-called “non-combat areas” in accordance with the Special Measures Law, and its activities will not become an integral part of the use of force by other States.

As explained above, SDF’s activities within the MNF will not alter the Government position regarding participation in so-called multinational forces in a manner considered to be impermissible in regard to the Constitution.

(Reference) Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq

(Cabinet Approval on June 28, 2004)

The sovereignty was fully restored to Iraq on June 28, 2004. Therefore, the date, “June 30” being cited as the day to restore sovereignty to Iraq in the “Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq” (Cabinet Understanding of June 18, 2004) should be understood as “June 28.”

Reference 49. Basic Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

(Approved by Cabinet on November 16, 2001)

(Partially revised on April 24 this year)

1. Basic Policy

The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001 were nasty and unforgivable acts that were committed not only against the United States but also against human kind as a whole. At present, the whole world has joined together to confront such acts, filing criticism against terrorism regardless of their positions.

With the recognition that battle against international terrorism is its own problem, Japan has taken the position that it will make an active contribution on its own initiative for prevention and eradication of international terrorism, and thus it is important for the Government of Japan to engage in cooperation and support activities as far as possible within the range permitted by the Constitution.

Given such a recognition, Japan has decided to undertake cooperation and support activities, search and rescue activities and activities to assist people affected by terrorism in line with the Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and Concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions (Law No. 113 of 2001; called the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law under the Basic Plan)

2. Matters Concerning Implementation of Cooperation and Support Activities

(1) Basic Matters Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities

In response to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the United States and other countries started military operations against the Taliban and other forces on October 8, 2001. Given this situation, the Government of Japan will undertake cooperation and support activities as follows for the U.S. and other

military forces, which have contributed to achieving goals envisaged under the U.N. Charter by trying to remove threat being posed by terrorist activities.

(2) Types and Contents of Cooperation and Support Activities

Following are types and contents of cooperation and support activities to be undertaken by the SDF for U.S. and other military forces in the form of provision of goods and materials belonging to the SDF, and provision of labor and services.

A. Supply

Supply of fuel for vessels and ship-based helicopters by ships

B. Transportation

(A) Transportation of fuel by vessels (if transport vessels are used, transportation of construction machinery and people, for the purpose of maintenance of the air stations used by the U.S. forces)

(B) Transportation of people and materials by aircraft

C. Other activities

(A) Repairs and maintenance

Repair and maintenance services, provision of equipment, parts and components used for repairs and maintenance, and provision of similar goods and labor

(B) Medical activities

Provision of medical services and medical equipment to injured and people with illness, and provision of similar goods and labor

(C) Port services

support of ships leaving Japan or arriving in Japan, and provision of cargo loading and unloading services, and provision of similar goods and labor

(3) Matters Concerning Range of Areas Where Cooperation and Support Activities Are Conducted and Designation of Such Areas

A. The range of areas where supply and transportation activities listed in (2) A and (2) B are conducted is as follows.

(A) Japanese territories

(B) Indian Ocean (including the Persian Gulf), its airspace and following areas (except Indian Ocean and its airspace) for supply and transportation by ships

(a) Diego Garcia Island of England, its territorial waters and its airspace

(b) Australian territory

(c) Territories of the countries located along the Indian Ocean coast, the Japanese territories, and in the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation between these territories and countries (however, if transport vessels are used, the territories of countries for transit and loading and unloading of construction machines and people for the purpose of maintenance of the air stations used by the U.S. forces)

(C) If airplanes are used, areas for transportation are Guam Island, its airspace, airspace above U.S. territorial waters related to Guam Island, Diego Garcia Island of England, its airspace, airspace above U.K. territorial waters related to Diego Garcia Island, and territories of the countries located along the Indian Ocean coast, the Japanese territories, and in the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation between these territories and countries and locations for loading and unloading of goods.

(D) Waters and airspace where ships and airplanes pass to link two locations in areas listed in (A), (B) or (C) <excluding locations in areas listed in (A), (B) or (C)>

- B. The range of areas where repairs and maintenance work listed in (2) C (A) is undertaken is areas listed in A (A) and A (B), waters where ships pass to link two locations in these areas <excluding locations in areas listed in A(A) or A (B)> and foreign territories listed in A (C).
 - C. The range of areas where medical services listed in (2) C (B) are provided is areas listed in A (A) and A (B), and waters where ships pass to link two locations in these areas. <excluding locations in areas listed in A (A) or A (B)>
 - D. The range of areas where port services listed in (2) C (C) are conducted is areas listed in A (A).
 - E. When designating international waters, airspace above the waters and foreign territories where Japan's cooperation and support activities are to be undertaken, the Defense Minister shall fully consider overall situations of the activities conducted by other countries and local security situations so that the activities are to be conducted in areas where combat is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there and safety is to be ensured while activities are underway.
- (4) Size and Composition of SDF Units Engaging in Cooperation and Support Activities in Overseas Territories, Their Equipment and Dispatch Period
- A. Size and Composition
 - (A) The number of MSDF troops who are to engage in supply and transportation operations listed in (2) A and B (A) using supply ships and destroyers is up to 800. If unit replacement is involved, the number will be up to 1,600. If a transport ship is used for transportation operations, an additional 400 troops can be added, including troops at a destroyer.
 - (B) The number of ASDF troops who are to engage in transportation operations listed in (2) B (B) using a transport plane and a multi-purpose supporting plane is up to 180.
 - (C) SDF units listed in (A) and (B) are to undertake repair and maintenance work listed in (2) C (A) while SDF units listed in (A) are to provide medical services listed in (2) C (B).
 - B. Equipment
 - (A) Vessels
 - 1 supply ship and up to two destroyers (two supply ships and up to four destroyers when unit replacement is involved). If a transport ship is used for transportation work, one transport ship and one destroyer can be added.
 - (B) Aircraft
 - Up to six transport planes and up to two multi-purpose supporting planes
 - (C) Others
 - (a) Pistols corresponding to the number of ASDF troops who are to engage in transportation work listed in (2) B (B).
 - (b) Equipment necessary for ensuring health and safety of SDF personnel and for activities listed in (2) A through C (B), excluding activities listed in (A) through (C) (a).
 - C. Dispatch Period
 - November 20, 2001 and November 1, 2007 (However, transportation by transport ships shall be conducted only once, during the period between December 31, 2002 and March 31, 2003)
- (5) Important Matters Concerning Procurement and Transfer to Foreign Militaries of Goods Other Than Those Being Used or Used by Relevant Government Organizations in Clerical Work and Business Projects
- As part of the SDF's cooperation and support activities, the Government procures the fuel for vessels and ship-based helicopters and water for transfer to the U.S. military and other foreign military forces.

- (6) Other Important Matters Concerning Implementation of Cooperation and Support Activities
- A. Relevant government organizations communicate each other to share information they have obtained through execution of administrative duty which is deemed necessary for implementation of cooperation and support activities by the SDF, including overall situations of activities by foreign military forces in areas where SDF units are to engage in such activities and their vicinity and local security conditions.
 - B. Heads of relevant government organizations cooperate with the SDF when the Defense Minister files a request with such organizations for dispatching to SDF units which are to engage in cooperation and support activities their employees with technological expertise and ability which are deemed necessary for implementation of the activities and for providing goods and equipment belonging to the government organizations, as long as such cooperation does not hamper execution of their administrative duty.
 - C. Heads of Japan's foreign establishments designated by the Foreign Minister provides necessary cooperation for the implementation of cooperation and support activities by the SDF, acting on an order by the Foreign Minister.

3. Matters Concerning Implementation of Search and Rescue Activities

- (1) Basic Matters Concerning Search and Rescue Activities, Range of Areas Where Such Activities are Conducted, Designation of the Said Areas, and Size and Composition of SDF Units Which Are to Engage in the Activities in Foreign Territories, Their Equipment, and Dispatch Period
- A. Japan undertakes search and rescue activities if SDF units which are conducting cooperation and support activities listed in 4 or conducting rescue operations for people affected by disasters, conflicts and others listed in 4 discover combatants meeting with accidents, or if the United States and other countries file a request for Japan to conduct search and rescue operations for such combatants. The range of areas where Japan is to conduct search and rescue activities is areas in the Indian Ocean and the air above the ocean that are listed in 2 as places for cooperation and support activities, and areas listed in 4 as places for assisting people affected by disasters, conflicts and others. If non-combatants are found to be meeting with accidents, Japan will also conduct search and rescue activities for them.
 - B. When designating international waters, airspace above the waters and foreign territories where Japan's search and rescue activities are to be undertaken, the Defense Minister shall fully consider overall situations of the activities conducted by other countries and local security situations so that the activities are to be conducted in areas where combat is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there and safety is to be ensured while activities are underway.
- (2) Important Matters Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities Listed in Second Half of Paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in Connection with Implementation of Search and Rescue Activities Types and contents of goods and equipment belonging to the SDF and its service that are to be provided to units of U.S. and other militaries engaging in search and rescue activities along with the SDF as part of Japan's cooperation and support activities are listed in the attached table 2 of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.
- (3) Other Important Matters Concerning Search and Rescue Activities
- A. Relevant government organizations communicate each other to share information they have obtained through execution of administrative duty which is deemed necessary for implementation of search and rescue activities by the SDF in areas where SDF units are to engage in such activities and their vicinity.
 - B. Heads of Japan's foreign establishments designated by the Foreign Minister provides necessary

cooperation for the implementation of search and rescue activities by the SDF, acting on an order by the Foreign Minister.

4. Matters Concerning Implementation of Activities to Assist Affected People

(1) Basic Matters Concerning Implementation of Activities to Assist Affected People

Shortage of daily necessities has become serious at refugee camps in Pakistan. In order to cope with this situation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian aid organizations are engaged in assistance activities at the refugee camps. The Government of Japan participates in this activity, taking these circumstances into account.

As regards medical assistance in Pakistan, the Government cooperates and coordinates with Pakistan and the United Nations to facilitate specific adjustment and study as soon as possible, aiming at encouraging relevant administrative organizations to carry out this activity.

For similar measures in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, Japan will decide what to do after assessing future developments in the area.

(2) Types and Contents of Activities to Assist Affected People

Provision of daily necessities to UNHCR based on its request (including transportation of daily necessities by SDF vessels)

(3) Matters Concerning Range of Areas Where Activities to Assist Affected People are to be Conducted and Designation of Such Areas

A. The range of areas where activities to assist affected people are to be conducted is as follows.

(A) Japanese territories

(B) Pakistani territories

(C) The Indian Ocean coast, and the territories of any countries of transit located between Japan and the Indian Ocean coast area

(D) Waters where ships pass to link two locations in areas listed in (A), (B) or (C), and the air above the waters <excluding locations in areas listed in (A), (B) or (C)>

B. When designating international waters, airspace above the waters and foreign territories where Japan's activities to assist affected people are to be undertaken, the Defense Minister shall fully consider overall situations of the activities conducted by other countries and local security situations so that the activities are to be conducted in areas where combat is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there and safety is to be ensured while activities are underway.

(4) Size and Composition of SDF Units Engaging in Activities to Assist Affected People in Overseas Territories, Their Equipment and Dispatch Period

A. Size and Composition

MSDF units comprising up to 120 personnel for transportation work listed in (2) using minesweeping mother ships and destroyers designed for use in cooperation and support activities (except for personnel involved with the destroyer engaged in cooperation and support activities)

B. Equipment

1 minesweeping mother ship and 1 destroyer (the destroyer that is also engaged in cooperation and support activities)

C. Dispatch period: November 20, 2001-December 31, 2001

(5) Other Important Matters Concerning Implementation of Activities to Assist Affected People

A. Relevant government organizations communicate each other to share information they have obtained through execution of administrative duty which is deemed necessary for implementation of activities

by the SDF to assist affected people, including overall situations of activities by foreign military forces in areas where SDF units are to engage in such activities and their vicinity and local security conditions.

- B. Heads of relevant government organizations cooperate with the SDF when the Defense Minister files a request with such organizations for dispatching to SDF units which are to engage in activities to assist affected people employees with technological expertise and ability which are deemed necessary for implementation of the activities and for providing goods and equipment belonging to the government organizations, as long as such cooperation does not hamper execution of their administrative duty.
- C. Heads of Japan's foreign establishments designated by the Foreign Minister provides necessary cooperation for the implementation of activities by the SDF to assist affected people, acting on an order by the Foreign Minister.

5. Matters Concerning Coordination and Liaison between Relevant Government Organizations for Implementation of Response Measures

The Cabinet Secretariat takes an initiative in promoting coordination and liaison between relevant government organizations to implement response measures based on the Anti-Terrorism Measures Law comprehensively and effectively.

Reference 50. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

(As of May 31, 2007)

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq	January 2004–July 2006	about 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities
	Kuwait	June–September 2006	about 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf	February 20–April 8, 2004	about 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipments required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait	December 2003–	about 210	• Transportation of materials for the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Northern Indian Ocean	November 2001–	about 320	• Material supplies for U.S., U.K. and other forces
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan		–	• Transportation of materials

(3) International Peace Cooperation Activities

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Cease-fire monitors	September 1992–September 1993	8	16	• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of cease-fire • Monitor observance of cease-fire at the border
	Engineering unit	September 1992–September 1993	600	1,200	• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities needed for work and medical care to UNTAC component personnel
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993–January 1995	5	10	• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at ONUMOZ Headquarters
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993–January 1995	48	144	• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport-related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Relief Operations for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	September–December 1994	260		• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	September–December 1994	118		• Airlift members of Rwandan refugee relief units and additional supplies between Nairobi (Kenya) and Goma (former Republic of Zaire and present Democratic Republic of Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Headquarters staff	February 1996–	2	24	• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
	Transport unit	February 1996–	43	989	• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow-clearance

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Humanitarian Assistance to East Timor	Air transport unit	November 1999–February 2000	113		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR-related personnel
Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	October 2001	138		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002	Headquarters staff	February 2002–June 2005	7 (10 for the first Headquarters staff)	17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters
	Engineering unit	March 2002–June 2005	405 (680 each for the first and second units, 522 for the third unit)	2,287	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations • Civic assistance
Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	March–April, 2003	50		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	July–August, 2003	98		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims
United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Military monitors	March 2007-	6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor weapons and soldiers of Maoists and the Nepali government force

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and East Timor) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, East Timor, and Afghanistan).

2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(4) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International disaster relief activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	November 13–December 9, 1998	80		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medical treatment and disease control in the Republic of Honduras
	Air transport unit		105		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc. between Japan and Honduras • Air transport of equipment and other materials between the United States and Honduras
Transportation of materials for international disaster relief activities in Turkey (earthquake)	Maritime transport unit	September 23–November 22, 1999	426		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marine transportation of materials necessary for international disaster relief activities in the Republic of Turkey (e.g. temporary dwellings)
International disaster relief activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	February 5–11, 2001	16		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport of aid materials and support units, etc.
International disaster relief activities in Iran (earthquake)	Air transport unit	December 30, 2003–January 6, 2004	31		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of aid materials
International disaster relief activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	December 28, 2004–January 1, 2005	590		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims around Thailand and its sea

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	January 6–March 23, 2005	22		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities • Communication and coordination with authorities and foreign forces involved in the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of aid materials • Medical treatment and disease control
	Maritime transport unit		593		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maritime transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Support for the activities of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Transport of aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air Transport of aid materials
International disaster relief activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Maritime transport unit	August 5-10, 2005	346		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rescue of a Russian submarine
International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (earthquake)	Air support unit	October 12-December 2, 2005	147		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia	Medical support unit	June 1-22, 2006	149		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medical and epidemic prevention operations
	Air transport unit		85		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams

Notes: 1. For International disaster relief activities in Iran, fixing team was sent to Singapore separately because of the mechanical problem of transport aircraft on the way to Iran.

2. 11 officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

Reference 51. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2002–April 30, 2007)

Country	High level officials exchange		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
ROK	Minister of Defense (Apr. 02, Mar. 03, Jan. 05) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (May 04, Mar.07) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Sep. 03, Jul. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Oct. 02, June. 04) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov.02, Feb. 04)	Minister of National Defence (Nov. 02, Nov. 03, Feb. 07) Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Office (Nov. 02, Feb. 05) Chief of Army Staff Office (Nov. 02) Chief of Naval Staff Office (Oct. 02. Jan. 05) Chief of Air Staff Office (May 03)	Japan-ROK security dialogue (Nov. 03) Japan-ROK military-military consultation (Sep. 02, Jun. 03, Nov. 03, Aug. 04, Aug. 05, Dec. 06)
Russia	Minister of Defense (Jan. 03, Jan. 06) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (May 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Jun 02, May 06)	Minister of Defense (Apr. 03) Chief of General Staff (Oct. 06) Air Force Commander in Chief (May 02)	Japan-Russia defense official consultation (Oct. 03, Nov. 04, Oct. 05, Apr. 06) Japan-Russia annual meeting based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Maritime Accidents (Feb. 03, Mar. 04, May 06) Japan-Russia working group meeting (Oct. 02, Mar. 03, Sep. 03, Mar. 04, Nov. 04, Apr. 05, Oct. 05, Apr. 06)
China	Minister of Defense (Sep. 03) Administrative Vice Minister (Jan. 04, Mar. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 04)	Deputy Chief of General Staff for the PLA (Oct. 04)	Japan-China security dialogue (Feb. 04, Jul. 06)
Southeast Asian Nations	• Cambodia Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02)		
	• Indonesia Minister of Defense (Jan. 05, Aug. 06) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Feb. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02, Aug. 04) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Feb. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Nov. 02)	Vice Minister of Defense (Nov. 06) Military Commander (Aug. 06, Nov. 06)	Japan-Indonesia military-military consultation (Mar. 07)
	• Malaysia Minister of Defense (Jan. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02, Aug. 04) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Nov. 06)	Minister of Defense (Mar. 07) Defense Force Chief (Mar. 03) Chief of Naval Staff (Oct. 02)	Japan-Malaysia military-military consultation (Feb. 05)
	• Philippines Minister of Defense (May 05) Administrative Vice Minister (Nov. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 03)	Navy Commander (Oct. 02) Air Force Commander (Mar. 04)	Japan-Philippines military-military consultation (Feb. 05, Apr. 06)
	• Singapore Minister of Defense (May 02, May 03, Jan. 05, Jun. 05, Jun. 06) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Nov. 02) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Nov. 04) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Feb. 04)	Minister for Defense (Feb. 05) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Prime Minister's Office for Coordination in Public Security and Defense (Jun. 04) Second Minister for Defense (Sep. 02) Chief of Naval Staff (Aug. 05) Defense Force Chief Commander (May 04)	Japan-Singapore military-military consultation (Jul. 02, Nov. 03, Jul. 04, Aug. 05, Mar. 07)

Country	High level officials exchange		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
Southeast Asian Nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thailand Minister of Defense (Jan. 07) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Feb. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Jul. 03) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Feb. 05) 	<p>Supreme Commander (Oct. 04, Jul. 05)</p> <p>Navy Commander (Apr. 02)</p> <p>Air Force Commander (Jul. 05)</p>	Japan-Thailand politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Dec. 03, Mar. 06)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Viet Nam Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Jul. 03) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 07) 	Vice Chairman of the State Committee on Search and Rescue and Vice Minister of Defense (Apr. 01)	Japan-Thailand politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Mar. 01, Mar. 02, Dec. 03, Mar. 06)
India	<p>Minister of Defense (May 03)</p> <p>Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (May 05)</p> <p>Administrative Vice Minister (May 04)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Sep. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 06)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, ASDF (Dec. 02, Apr. 06)</p>	<p>Minister of Defense (Jul. 02, May 06)</p> <p>Vice Minister of Defense (Apr. 07)</p> <p>Chief of General Staff, Army (Apr. 07)</p> <p>Chief of General Staff, Navy (Oct. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, Air Force (Jan. 07)</p>	<p>Japan-India politico-military consultation (Jan. 04, Mar. 05, Feb. 06)</p> <p>Japan-India military-military consultation (Mar. 05, Feb. 06)</p>
Australia	<p>Minister of Defense (Aug. 02, May 05)</p> <p>Administrative Vice Minister (Sep. 04)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, GSDF (Oct. 02)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, MSDF (Sep. 07)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 03, Nov. 05)</p>	<p>Minister for Defense (Sep. 03)</p> <p>Vice Minister for Defense (Sep. 03)</p> <p>Defense Force Chief Commander (Oct. 04)</p> <p>Secretary of Army (Jul. 02, Mar. 07)</p> <p>Secretary of Navy (Oct. 02, Sep. 03, May 05)</p> <p>Secretary of Air Force (Sep. 04, Sep. 06)</p>	<p>Japan-Australia politico-military consultation (Dec. 02, Dec. 03, Aug. 06)</p> <p>Japan-Australia military-military consultation (Dec. 02, Dec. 03, Sep. 05, May 06, Aug. 06)</p>
New Zealand	<p>Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 05)</p>	<p>Minister for Defense (Aug. 03, Jun. 05, Oct. 06)</p> <p>Vice Minister for Defense (May 03)</p> <p>Chief of Naval Staff (Oct. 02)</p> <p>Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04)</p>	Japan-New Zealand military-military consultation (Dec. 05, May 06)
Canada	<p>Chief of Staff, MSDF (May 02)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 02)</p>	<p>Minister of Defense (Mar. 02, Sep. 06)</p> <p>Chief of Defense Staff (Jul. 03)</p> <p>Chief of Naval Staff (May 04)</p> <p>Chief of Air Staff (Mar. 06)</p>	<p>Japan-Canada politico-military consultation (Nov. 02, Mar. 05)</p> <p>Japan-Canada military-military consultation (Nov. 02, Mar. 05, Nov. 06)</p>
United Kingdom	<p>Minister of Defense (Jan. 04, Jan. 06)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, MSDF (Sep. 03, Jun. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 07)</p>	<p>Minister for Defense (May. 02, Sep. 04)</p> <p>Chief of the Defense Staff (Jul. 02)</p> <p>Chief of Army Staff (Sep. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Naval Staff (Oct. 02, Jan. 07)</p> <p>Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04, Oct. 05)</p>	<p>Japan-U.K. politico-military consultation (Apr. 02, Aug. 06, Jun. 07)</p> <p>Japan-U.K. military-military consultations (Jul. 02, Feb. 04, Feb. 06, Jun. 07)</p>
France	<p>Minister of Defense (Jan. 04)</p> <p>Administrative Vice Minister (Sep. 02, Sep. 06)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, GSDF (Oct. 03)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jul. 05)</p>	<p>Minister for Defense (Mar. 07)</p> <p>Chief of Army Staff (Jan. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, Navy Force (Jan. 04)</p>	Japan-France politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Feb. 03, Feb. 04, Jan. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 07)
Germany	<p>Administrative Vice Minister (Sep. 02, Jan. 05)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, GSDF (Nov. 03)</p> <p>Chief of Staff, MSDF (May 02)</p>	<p>Minister of Defense (Oct. 06, Apr. 07)</p> <p>Naval Inspector-General (Dec. 05)</p> <p>Air Inspector-General (Feb. 03)</p>	<p>Japan-Germany politico-military consultation (Feb. 03, Mar. 04, Jan. 05, Jun. 06)</p> <p>Japan-Germany military-military consultation (Feb. 03, Jan. 05, Jun. 06)</p>

Note: Politico-military consultation: Security talks among diplomatic and defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor level

Military-military consultation: Talks among defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor level

“Ministry of Defense” and “Senior Vice-Minister of Defense” on the Japanese side were called “Minister of State for Defense” and “Senior Vice Minister for Defense,” respectively, until January 9, 2007. Likewise, “Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office” was called “Chairman of Joint Staff Council” until March 27, 2006.

Reference 52. Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2002- May 31, 2007)

	Dialogue		Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministerial Meeting • Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) • Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG) 	Jul. 02, Jun. 03, Jul. 04, Jul. 05, Jul. 06 May 02, Apr. 03, May 04, May 05, May 06 Apr. 02, Nov. 02, Mar. 03, Nov. 03, Apr. 04, Oct. 04, Feb. 05, Oct. 05, Mar. 06, Nov. 06, Mar. 07
	Hosted by the private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IISS Asia Security Conference 	May 02, May 03, Jun. 04, Jun. 05, Jun. 06
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	○ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)		Oct. 02, Oct. 03, Oct. 04, Jun. 05, Oct. 06
	○ Subcommittee Meeting on Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum subcommittee)		Jan. 02, Jan. 03, Jan. 04, Jan. 05, Jan. 06, Jan. 07
	○ Asia-Pacific Security Seminar		Nov. 02, Nov. 03, Nov. 04, Nov. 05, Nov. 06
	○ International Seminar for Military Science		Jul. 02, Jul. 04, Jul. 05, Jul. 06
	○ International Conference of Cadets		Mar. 02, Mar. 03, Mar. 04, Mar. 05, Mar. 06, Mar. 07

Reference 53. Dispatch of the Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations (Last Five Years)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
June 9, 1997–June 30, 2002, August 1, 2004–	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)
October 1, 2002–	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
December 2, 2002– June 1, 2005	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN DPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
February 9, 2001– July 31, 2003	Analyst, Division of Analysis and Assessment, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Headquarters (New York)	1 MSDF personnel (Commander)
March 10, 2003– March 9, 2005	Analyst, Division of Analysis and Assessment, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Headquarters (New York)	1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
July 11, 2005–	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
November 28, 2005–	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN DPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Reference 56. SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2006)

		Number of Examinees	Number of Successful Examinees	Number of Recruits
General		2,169	1,503	1,074
Technical	Medical (Ko)	24	15	15
	Medical (Otsu)	105	76	74
	Linguistic	71	42	40
	Maintenance	38	25	22
	Information processing	19	13	11
	Telecommunication	13	8	8
	Electricity	8	5	6
	Construction	45	25	24
	Subtotal	323	209	200
Total		2,492	1,712	1,274

(Notes)

1. The numbers of recruits represent those of persons recruited in FY 2006.
2. Although the number of successful examinees for electricity in FY2006 was five, the number of recruits was six including one successful examinee in FY2005.
3. Medical (Ko): Medical doctor, dentist and pharmacist
4. Medical (Otsu): Physical therapist, occupational therapist, medical radiology technician, clinical technologist, nurse, paramedic (with the qualification of practical nurse), nutritionist, practical nurse, and dental technician
5. Linguistic:
 English—Graduate of junior or higher-level foreign language college, or person who has passed STEP (Society for Testing English Proficiency) pre-1st or 1st grade, or person who has a linguistic ability that is equal to, or higher than, the ability of the preceding person.
 Russian, Chinese and Korean—Graduate of junior or higher-level foreign language college, or person who has a linguistic ability that is equal to, or higher than, the ability of the preceding person.
6. Maintenance: 1st grade large or small vehicle mechanic, 1st or 2nd grade motorcycle mechanic, 2nd grade petrol-powered vehicle mechanic, or 2nd grade diesel-powered vehicle mechanic.
7. Information processing: Systems auditor, system analyst, project manger, application engineer, production engineer, 1st grade information processing specialist, software development engineer, network specialist, database specialist, systems operation management engineer, technical engineer (network), technical engineer (system management), technical engineer (information security), technical engineer (embedded system), senior systems administrator, information systems security administrator, 2nd grade information processing specialist, fundamental information technology engineer
8. Telecommunication: 1st, 2nd or 3rd Class Radio Operator for General Services, 1st or 2nd Technical Radio Operator for On-the-Ground Services, AI TYPE I Installation Technician, Analog TYPE I Installation Technician, DD TYPE I Installation Technician, Digital TYPE I Installation Technician, AI and DD Installation Technician, Analog and Digital Installation Technician
9. Electricity: Type I, II or III electrical licensed engineer.
10. Construction: First- or second-grade registered architect, land surveyor, assistant land surveyor, first- or second-grade construction machinery specialist

Reference 57. The Ethos of SDF Personnel

(Adopted on June 28, 1961)

Ours is a country with a long history and splendid tradition that has emerged from the many trials it has faced, and is now in the process of developing as a nation based on the principles of democracy.

Its ideals are to cherish freedom and peace, encourage social welfare and contribute to a global peace that is founded on justice and order. In order to bring about these ideals, it is essential that we ensure the continued existence and security of a Japan that stands on the premise of democracy by protecting its peace and its independence.

In observing the realities of the world, we find that countries are making ever greater efforts to prevent war through international cooperation. At the same time, the development of weapons of mass destruction means that the outbreak of large-scale war would be disastrous, and thus efforts to keep such weapons under control are growing stronger. International disputes, however, continue unabated, with countries seeking to protect their own peace and independence by putting in place the defense arrangements they need to serve their continued existence and security.

While retaining the sincere hope that the wisdom of mankind and the cooperation of people of all countries will lead to a lasting world peace, the Japanese people have created the present-day SDF to protect their own country.

The mission of the SDF is to protect the peace and independence of the country and preserve its security.

The principal task of the SDF is to prevent the occurrence of direct and indirect aggression against Japan, and to repel any such aggression should it take place.

The SDF exist as part of the nation. In accordance with the principles of democratic government, the Commander-in-Chief of the SDF is, as such, the Prime Minister, who represents the Cabinet, and the basic administration of the SDF is subject to control by the National Diet.

Whether in peacetime or in the event of an emergency, SDF personnel must, at all times, be prepared to identify themselves with the people and take pride in serving the public without regard to themselves.

The spirit of SDF personnel is founded on the healthy spirit of the nation itself. Cultivation of the self, love of others and concern for the motherland and its people—these particular attributes provide the SDF with the proper sense of patriotism and identification with their own people that lie at their spiritual heart.

We must remember the true nature of our role as members of the SDF, and refrain from taking part in political activities, reflect deeply on the distinguished mission bestowed on us as members of the SDF and take great pride in our work. By the same token, we must devote ourselves unstintingly to training and self-discipline and, in the face of events, be prepared to discharge our duties at risk to ourselves, acting on the basis of the criteria below.

1. Awareness of Mission

- (1) We will protect from external aggression the nation of Japan, its land and people, which we have inherited from our forefathers and which we will bequeath to the next generation enriched and developed.
- (2) We will safeguard the peace and order of our national life, which is founded on freedom and responsibility.

2. Individual Development

- (1) We will strive to make ourselves into positive and upstanding members of society who are free from prejudice, and cultivate sound judgment.
- (2) We will develop into well-balanced individuals with regard to qualities such as intellect, initiative, trustworthiness and physical fitness.

3. Fulfillment of Responsibility

- (1) We will go about our duties with courage and perseverance at the risk of our lives as dictated by our responsibilities.
- (2) We will be bound to our comrades by love and protect our posts steadfastly in the spirit of public service.

4. Strict Observance of Discipline

- (1) We will be true and impartial in our observance of the law and submission to orders, in the belief that discipline is the lifeblood of a unit.
- (2) We will make sure that the orders we give are appropriate, and cultivate the habit of positive, considered obedience.


5. Strengthening of Solidarity

- (1) Outstanding leadership and warm comradeship will allow us to develop the confidence to endure hardship and suffering collectively.


(2) We, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, will do all we can to respond to the responsibilities with which we are entrusted by devoting ourselves as one to ensuring the continued existence of our country and its people.

Reference 58. Outline of the SDF Educational System

1. SDF Officers and Officer Candidates



2. Enlisted SDF Personnel



Reference 59. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY 2006)

(Unit: persons)

Country Name Institution Name	United States	Thailand	Republic of Korea	Australia	Indonesia	China	Singapore	Viet Nam	Cambodia	India	Pakistan	Mongolia	Subtotal
National Institute for Defense Studies	2	1	2	1		1				1			8
National Defense Academy	2	7	8		3			4	4			2	30
Ground Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	2		3										5
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1	2	1				1						5
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1	4	4								1		10
Joint Staff College		1	1								1		3
Total	8	15	19	1	3	1	1	4	4	1	2	2	61

Reference 60. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Procurement Type Fiscal Year	Domestic Procurement (A)	Imports			Total (E = A + D)	Domestic Procurement Ratio (%) (A/E)
		Commercial Imports (B)	Foreign Military Sales (C)	Subtotal (D = B + C)		
1993	16,408	1,356	1,574	2,930	19,338	84.8
1994	17,349	1,195	1,056	2,251	19,600	88.5
1995	18,131	914	598	1,512	19,642	92.3
1996	18,725	938	541	1,478	20,204	92.7
1997	18,479	1,173	376	1,548	20,027	92.3
1998	17,344	1,127	348	1,474	18,818	92.2
1999	17,704	1,185	390	1,575	19,280	91.8
2000	17,685	1,249	439	1,687	19,372	91.3
2001	17,971	1,156	489	1,646	19,617	91.6
2002	17,218	1,326	1,101	2,427	19,645	87.6
2003	17,598	1,292	1,006	2,298	19,896	88.4
2004	18,233	1,334	979	2,313	20,546	88.7
2005	18,917	1,525	937	2,462	21,379	88.5

- Notes: 1. Figures for "Domestic Procurement," "Commercial Imports" and "Foreign Military Sales" are based on the results of the Survey of Equipment Procurement Contract Amounts for the year in question.
 2. "Foreign Military Sales" refers to the amount of equipment procured from the U.S. Government under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement.
 3. Figures are rounded up or down, and may not tally precisely.

Reference 61. Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues (The Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office: This survey was conducted in February 2006)

(<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html>)

Summary of the Survey

Survey conducted between February 16-26, 2006

Surveyed population: 3,000 people of age 20 and older throughout Japan


Valid number of respondents (%) : 1,657 people (55.2%)

Survey method : Individual interview by survey personnel


Survey conducted by the Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office

Note: As the figures (in %) are rounded up, total may be more or less than 100.

1. Interest in the SDF and Defense Issues




2. Impression about the SDF




3. Awareness of the role and activities of the SDF

(1) Reasons that the SDF exists (Multiple answers)




(2) Impression about SDF's disaster relief activities




5. Awareness of National Defense


(1) Measures to Maintain the Security of Japan



(2) Risk that Japan Would Be Involved in a War




(3) Which international affairs are you interested in as regarding the peace and security of Japan



Reference 62. Record of Information Disclosure by the Defense Agency (FY 2006)

	Ministry of Defense	Defense Facilities Administration Agency
1. Number of disclosure requests		
Number of received disclosure requests	727	260
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure		
Number of decisions regarding disclosure	724	279
Requests accepted	351	188
Requests partially accepted	286	74
Requests declined	87	17
3. Administrative protests		
Number of administrative protests	178	2
4. Number of lawsuits		
Number of lawsuits	1	0

Reference 63. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities



Note 1: (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area


Areas around bases are classified according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise, as follows:

Class 1 Area: WECPNL is 75 or more

Class 2 Area: Area within Class 1 Areas in which WECPNL is 90 or more

Class 3 Area: Area within Class 2 Areas in which WECPNL is 95 or more

(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.



Note 2: Compensation for loss or damage resulting from the actions of the USFJ and others is made under the Law Concerning Compensation for Special Damages Incurred by Acts of United States Forces Stationed in Japan (promulgated in 1953).

Related Articles for Reference

Reference 64. The Constitution of Japan (Excerpt)

Article 9

- (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
- (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article 66

- (1) The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.
- (2) The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians.
- (3) The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.

Reference 65. Article 5, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty)

Article 5

Each Party recognizes that an Armed Attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such Armed Attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Reference 66. Article 6, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty)

Article 6

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

Reference 67. Article 7, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Command and Supervisory Powers of the Prime Minister)

Article 7

The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, shall hold the supreme powers of command and supervision over the Self-Defense Forces.

Reference 68. Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Defense Operations)

Article 76

- (1) When there is an Armed Attack to our nation from the outside (hereinafter referred to as “Armed Attack”) or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of an Armed Attack, the Prime Minister, when he or she considers it necessary from the standpoint of defending the nation, he or she may order the whole or part of the Self-Defense Forces into operation. In this case, the approval of the Diet shall be required pursuant to Article 9 of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack (Law No.79, 2003).
- (2) The Prime Minister must immediately order the Self-Defense Forces to withdraw when operations by the Forces are no longer necessary.

Reference 69. Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Civil Protection Operations)

Article 77-4

- (1) In case that the Defense Minister receives a request from a governor of a prefecture following the provisions stipulated in the Paragraph (1), Article 15 of the Civil Protection Law and that it is considered necessary, or in case that the Minister receives a demand from the Task Force Chief for Armed Attack Situation, etc. following the provisions stipulated Paragraph (2) of the same Article, the Minister of State for Defense, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, may dispatch troops and other units in order to implement measures for protecting Civilians that are necessary to fulfill the request or demand.
- (2) In case that the Defense Minister receives a request from a governor of a prefecture following the provisions stipulated in the Paragraph (1), Article 15 of the Civil Protection Law applied correspondingly to the Article 183 of the same Law and that it is considered necessary, or in case that the Minister receives a demand from the Task Force Chief for Emergency Response Situation following the Paragraph (2) of the

same Article 15 of the same Law applied to the Article 183 of the Law, the Minister of State for Defense, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, may dispatch troops and other units in order to implement emergency response protection measures that are necessary to fulfill the request or demand.

Reference 70. Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Measures for Destruction of Ballistic Missiles)

Article 82-2

- (1) In case when it is recognized that there is a threat of a ballistic missile, etc. (hereinafter “ballistic missile, etc.” refers to ballistic missiles and other objects other than airplanes that are recognized to cause serious damages to the lives and/or properties of citizens when falling) flying to the land of Japan and that destruction of such objects are necessary to prevent the damages on the lives and/or properties of citizens within the territory of Japan, the Defense Minister, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, may order the units of the Self Defense Forces of Japan to take measures for the destruction of the ballistic missile, etc. that is flying at that moment toward Japan within the territory of Japan or in the air above the high sea (including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).
- (2) When it is recognized that the previous paragraph is no longer applicable, the Defense Minister, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, must immediately remove the order.
- (3) Aside from the situation where the Paragraph (1) is applied, in case that a ballistic missile, etc. is flying toward the land of Japan without sufficient time to obtain authorization stipulated in the same paragraph from the Prime Minister due to the urgent change of the situation, the Defense Minister may order the units of the Self Defense Forces of Japan to take measures stipulated in the same paragraph in advance in order to prevent the damages on the lives and/or properties of citizens within the territory of Japan following the Emergency Response Guidelines that are prepared by the Defense Minister and authorized by the Prime Minister. In this case, the Defense Minister shall set the period during which the ordered measures are to be implemented.
- (4) The specific provisions that are necessary for the preparation of the Emergency Response Guidelines and authorization of the Prime Minister shall be stipulated in the relevant government ordinance.
- (5) When measures are taken either following the Paragraph (1) or Paragraph (3), the Prime Minister must immediately report the results to the Diet.

Reference 71. Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Disaster Dispatch)

Article 83

- (1) Governors of prefectures and individuals prescribed by an ordinance may request the Defense Minister or individuals designated by him or her to dispatch units, etc., if they deem it necessary for the protection of lives or properties because of natural calamities and other disasters.
- (2) The Defense Minister or the individuals designated by him or her may, upon the request referred to in the preceding paragraph and finding that the situation requires it, dispatch units, etc. for rescue. However, in the event of natural calamities and other disasters, if it is recognized that there is no time to wait for such request as referred to in the preceding paragraph because of the pressing emergency, he or she may dispatch units, etc. without such request as referred to in the same paragraph.
- (3) In the event that a fire and other disasters occur in and around Defense Ministry facilities including offices and quarters, commanders of units, etc. may dispatch units, etc.

- (4) Procedures for the request referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be prescribed by an ordinance.
- (5) The provisions stipulated in the Paragraph (1), (2) and (3) shall not apply for the disasters in a armed attacked situation stipulated in the Paragraph (4), Article 2 of the Law related to the Measures to Protect Citizens in Armed Attack Situation etc. nor the disaster in a emergency response situation stipulated in the Paragraph (1), Article 14 of the same Law applied correspondingly to the Article 183 of the Law.

Reference 72. Article 96-2, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Defense Secrets)

Article 96-2

- (1) The Defense Minister shall designate as a Defense Secret an undisclosed matter that particularly needs to be made confidential from the perspective of national defense among those listed in Annexed Table 4 regarding the Self-Defense Forces (excluding those falling into the Special Defense Secrets provided in Paragraph (3), Article 1 of the Law Concerning the Protection of Secrets Incidental to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America, etc. (Law No. 166 of 1954)).
- (2) The designation based on the provision of the preceding paragraph must be made by any of the following means:
 - i. Marking a document, drawing or property that records a matter provided in the preceding paragraph or a property that embodies the matter as prescribed by an ordinance; and
 - ii. Notifying those who handle the matter of the fact that it is subject to the preceding paragraph as prescribed by an ordinance when it is difficult to comply with the preceding sentence due to characteristics of the matter.
- (3) The Defense Minister may have national Government personnel engaged in duties related to national defense or personnel engaged in the provision of materials and services regarding the Defense Secret based on a contract with the Defense Ministry to handle the Defense Secret as prescribed by an ordinance as long as such handling is particularly necessary for the execution of the missions of the Self-Defense Forces.
- (4) The Defense Minister shall take measures to protect a matter provided in Paragraph (1) as prescribed by an ordinance, in addition to those stipulated in Paragraph (1) and (2).

Reference 73. Article 97, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Partial Delegation of Recruiting Functions)

Article 97

- (1) Governors of prefectures and Mayors of municipalities shall perform part of the functions related to recruiting Self-Defense officials as prescribed by an ordinance.
- (2) The Defense Minister may request the National Police Agency and prefectural police to cooperate in part of the functions related to recruiting Self-Defense officials.
- (3) Expenses required for functions performed by Governors of prefectures and Mayors of municipalities under the provision of Paragraph (1) and cooperation rendered by prefectural police under the provision of the preceding paragraph shall be defrayed by the national treasury.

Reference 74. Article 122, Self-Defense Forces Law

Article 122

- (1) One whose duty is to handle the Defense Secret shall be subject to imprisonment up to five years when he or she has divulged the Defense Secret acquired through his or her duty. The same shall apply even after he or she is released from the duty of handling the Defense Secret.
- (2) One who has attempted to commit a crime in the preceding paragraph shall be punished.
- (3) One who has committed a crime in Paragraph (1) due to negligence shall be subject to confinement of up to one year or a fine of up to 30,000 yen.
- (4) One who has conspired, instigated or agitated the execution of an act in Paragraph (1) shall be subject to imprisonment of up to three years.
- (5) When one who has committed a crime in Paragraph (2) or one who has committed a crime in the preceding paragraph by conspiring the execution of an act stipulated in Paragraph (1) turns oneself in, he or she shall receive commutation of or exemption from punishment.
- (6) Crimes in Paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall follow Article 3, the Penal Code.

Reference 75. Annexed Table 4, Self-Defense Forces Law

Annexed Table 4 (Pertaining to Article 96-2)

- i. Operations of the SDF or estimates, plans or studies on them
- ii. Radio information, graphic information and other important information collected for national defense
- iii. Collection/arrangement of information listed in the preceding sentence or capabilities for it
- iv. Estimates, plans or studies on defense build-up
- v. Type and amount of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and others for national defense (including vessels, same in Clauses viii and ix)
- vi. Communication network composition or communication means for national defense
- vii. Ciphers for national defense
- viii. Specification, performance or usage of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and others for national defense or prototypes of them in a research and development phase
- ix. Production, inspection, maintenance or testing methods of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and others for national defense or prototypes of them in a research and development phase
- x. Design, performance or usage of facilities for national defense (excluding those listed in Clause vi)

Reference 76. Article 51, Charter of the United Nations

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an Armed Attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Defense Chronology

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
1945		Aug 15 World War II ends Aug 17 Higashikuni Cabinet formed Sep 2 GHQ established Oct 9 Shidehara Cabinet formed Oct 15 General Staff Office and Military Command abolished Nov 30 Army and Navy Ministries abolished	Oct 24 United Nations established
1946		Jan 27 GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands Feb 26 Far East Commission formed Apr 5 First meeting of Allied Council on Japan Apr 24 Civil administration of Okinawa established May 3 International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened May 22 Yoshida Cabinet formed Nov 3 Constitution of Japan promulgated	Jan 10 First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14) Mar 5 Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech Oct 1 International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg delivers verdicts Dec 19 First Indochina War starts
1947		May 3 Constitution of Japan takes effect Jun 1 Katayama Cabinet formed Dec 17 Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)	Mar 12 Truman Doctrine announced Jun 5 The Marshall Plan announced Oct 5 Comintern established
1948		Mar 10 Ashida Cabinet formed Apr 27 Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated Oct 15 Yoshida Cabinet formed Nov 12 International Military Tribunal for the Far East delivers verdicts	Apr 1 USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949) May 14 First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949) Jun 26 Berlin airlift starts Aug 15 Republic of Korea (ROK) established Sep 9 Democratic People's Republic of Korea established
1949		Jul 5 Shimoyama incident Jul 15 Mitaka incident Aug 17 Matsukawa incident	Jan 25 COMECON established Apr 4 North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) Apr 21 Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive May 6 Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany) Sep 24 USSR declared possession of atomic bomb Oct 1 People's Republic of China established

Year		Defense		Domestic		International
1949					Oct 7 Dec 7	German Democratic Republic established (East Germany) Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan
1950	Jul 8 Aug 10 Aug 13 Aug 14 Sep 7	General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the national Police Reserve National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima	Jun 21 Nov 24	John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan	Jan 27 Feb 14 Jun 25 Jul 7 Sep 15 Oct 25 Dec 18	U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries China-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed Korean War (ends July 27, 1953) United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea U.N. troops land at Inchon Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces
1951	Jan 23 Mar 1 Oct 20	Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue-relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth	Jan 29 Sep 8 Oct 26	First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations) 49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan Japn-U.S. Security Treaty concluded House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councillors approval given November 18)	Aug 30 Sep 1	U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed Australia-New Zealand-U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty
1952	Feb 28 Apr 26 Jul 26 Jul 31 Aug 1 Oct 15	Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement signed Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard Japan-U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed National Safety Agency Law promulgated National Safety Agency established Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency Coastal Safety Force inaugurated National Safety Force inaugurated	Apr 28 May 1 Jul 21	Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty enter into force Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ abolished May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force	Jan 18 May 26 May 27 Oct 3 Nov 1	ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line) U.S.-U.K.-France sign peace agreement with Germany European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1952	Oct 30	Kimura appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency				
1953	Jan 1	Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated	Aug 1	Weapons Production Law promulgated	Mar 5	USSR General Secretary Stalin dies
	Apr 1	National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established	Dec 25	Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored	Jul 27	Truce signed in Korean War
	Oct 30	Ikeda-Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength			Aug 12	USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
					Oct 1	U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed
1954	Mar 8	Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed	Mar 1	Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident	Mar 1	U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll
	May 14	Japan-U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels	Dec 10	Hatoyama Cabinet formed	Jul 21	Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed
	Jun 2	House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas			Sep 3	Chinese People's Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time
	Jun 9	Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA			Sep 8	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact
	Jul 1	Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated			Dec 2	U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed
	Dec 10	Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1955	Mar 19	Sugihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	May 8	Protests begin at Sunagawa Base	Apr 18	Africa-Asia conference held at Bandung
	May 6	Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies	Aug 6	First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held at Hiroshima	May 5	West Germany formally admitted to NATO
	Jul 31	Sunada appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug 31	Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	May 14	Signing of Warsaw Pact
	Nov 22	Funada appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov 14	Japan-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed		
			Dec 19	Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated		
1956	Jan 30	Japan-U.S. joint statement on reduction of Japan's share of defense spending	Feb 9	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councillors, February 10)	Feb 14	Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West
	Mar 22	Japan-U.S. Technical Agreement relating to sharing of knowledge on patents and technology signed in accordance with MDA	Oct 19	Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese-Soviet relations	Apr 17	USSR announces dissolution of Comintern
	Mar 23	Defense Agency moved to Kasumiga-seki	Dec 18	Japan joins the U.N.	Jul 26	Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal
			Dec 23	Ishibashi Cabinet formed	Oct 23	Hungarian Revolution

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1956	Jul 2	National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated			Oct 29	Second Middle East War (Suez War) (through November 6)
	Sep 20	First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered				
	Dec 23	Prime Minister Ishibashi concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense				
1957	Jan 31	Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense	Feb 25	Kishi Cabinet formed House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs Japan-U.S. Security Council inaugurated	May 15	U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test
	Feb 2	Kotaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Mar 15		Aug 26	USSR announces successful ICBM test
	May 20	Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet	Aug 6		Oct 4	USSR launches the world's first man-made satellite, Sputnik 1
	Jun 14	First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet			Nov 23	World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration
	Jun 21	First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet Kishi-Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued				
	Jul 10	Tsushima appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1958	Jan 14	First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28)	Apr 18	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs	Oct 23	Dulles talks with Chiang Kai-shek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China
	Feb 17	ASDF begins measures to counter invasions of territorial airspace	Sep 11	Fujiyama-Dulles talks (Washington); agreement on revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	Dec 17	U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM
	Jun 12	Sato appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct 4	Commencement of Japan-U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty		
1959	Jan 12	Ino appointed Minister of State for Defense	Mar 30	Tokyo District Court ruled the stationing of U.S. forces to be unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case	Aug 25	China-Indian border dispute
	Jun 18	Akagi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec 16	Original ruling in the Sunagawa case was reversed by the Supreme Court	Sep 18	Soviet Premier Khrushchev proposes total and complete disarmament at U.N.
					Sep 27	U.S.-Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David
					Dec 1	Antarctica Treaty signed
1960	Jan 11	Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho	Jan 19	New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed (goes into force June 23)	Feb 13	France conducts its first nuclear test
	Jul 19	Esaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul 19	Ikeda Cabinet formed	May 1	U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace
	Dec 8	Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul 20	U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1960					Dec 20	Formation of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front
1961	Jan 13	National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20			May 16	Military junta seizes power in coup d'état in ROK
	Jul 18	Fujieda appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul 6	Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
		Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet			Jul 11	China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
					Aug 13	Construction of Berlin Wall
1962	Jul 18	Shiga appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct 20	Chinese-Indian border dispute (through November 22)
	Nov 1	Defense Facilities Administration Agency established			Oct 24	U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20)
	Nov 9	Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)			Oct 28	USSR General Secretary Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba
1963	Jul 18	Fukuda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug 14	Japan joins to Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Jun 20	Agreement signed for U.S.-Soviet hotline
					Aug 14	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.-USSR-U.K. (comes into force on Oct 10)
1964	Jul 18	Koizumi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 15	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty comes into force for Japan	Aug 2	Gulf of Tonkin incident
			Nov 9	Sato Cabinet formed	Oct 16	China successfully carries out its first nuclear test
			Nov 12	U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time		
1965	Feb 10	Diet debate on Mitsuya study	Jun 22	Japan-ROK Basic Treaty signed	Feb 7	U.S. starts bombing Viet Nam
	Jun 3	Matsuno appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep 1	Second India-Pakistan conflict (through September 22)
	Nov 20	Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)				
1966	Aug 1	Kambayashiyama appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 16	Cultural Revolution starts in China
	Nov 29	Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet			Jul 1	France withdraws from the NATO command
	Dec 3	Masuda appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct 27	China carries out its first successful nuclear missile test
1967	Mar 13	Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan agreed by National Defense Council; adopted by Cabinet on March 14	Mar 29	Sapporo District Court rules in Eniwa Case	Jun 5	Third Middle East War (through June 9)
					Jun 17	China carries out its first successful hydrogen bomb test
					Jul 1	Formation of European Community (EC)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1967					Aug 8	Formation of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
1968	Nov 30	Arita appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan 19 Jun 26	U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan	Jan 23 May 13 Jul 1 Aug 20 Aug 24	Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific
1969	Jan 10	National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet	Nov 21	Sato-Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)	Mar 2 Jun 10 Jul 2	Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island) South Viet Nam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government Nixon Doctrine announced
1970	Jan 14 Oct 20	Nakasone appointed Minister of State for Defense Publication of "The Defense of Japan," the first white paper on defense	Feb 3 Feb 11 Mar 31 Jun 23 Nov 25	Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched Yodo hijacking Automatic extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya	Jan 24 Mar 5 Aug 12	Formation of integrated Warsaw pact forces (involving seven countries) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force West Germany-USSR sign non-aggression pact
1971	Jun 29 Jul 5 Jul 30 Aug 2 Dec 3	Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi) Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense Ezaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 17 Nov 24	Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed House of Representatives resolution on non-nuclear weapons	Feb 11 Sep 30 Oct 25 Dec 3	Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes U.S.-USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan Third India-Pakistan conflict (through December 17)
1972	Feb 7	National Defense Council adopts Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan, approved by Cabinet on February 8	Jan 7 Apr 10 May 15	Sato-Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Return of Okinawa	Feb 28	President Nixon visits China; China-U.S. Joint Communiqué

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1972	Apr 17 Jul 7 Oct 9	National Defense Council decision on SDF deployment in Okinawa, presented to Cabinet on April 18 Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council determines key matters for inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan and measures to enhance civilian control, adopted by Cabinet	Jul 7 Sep 29	Tanaka Cabinet formed Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China	Apr 10 May 26 Jul 3 Dec 21	Signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction SALT-I and agreement to limit ABM signed on the visit of President Nixon to USSR India-Pakistan truce signed East-West Germany Basic Treaty signed
1973	Jan 23 Feb 1 May 30 Jul 1	14th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program) Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength Yamanaka appointed Minister of State for Defense Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa	Sep 7 Sep 21 Oct 8	Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgement) Japan-North Viet Nam establish diplomatic relations Japan-Soviet summit (Moscow)	Jan 27 Mar 29 Jun 22 Oct 6 Oct 17	Viet Nam peace agreement signed (cease-fire takes effect on January 28) U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Viet Nam General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S., convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25) Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies
1974	Apr 25 Nov 12 Dec 9	National Defense Medical College opens Uno appointed Minister of State for Defense Sakata appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec 9	Miki Cabinet formed	May 18 Jul 3	India carries out its first underground nuclear test President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed
1975	Aug 29	Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting (Sakata-Schlesinger, Tokyo)			Mar 26 Apr 30 Aug 1 Nov 15	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) enters into force Fall of Saigon, South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki) First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), since held annually
1976	Jun 4 Jul 8	Publication of second white paper on defense, "The Defense of Japan" (henceforth published annually) Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation	Jun 8 Dec 24	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan Fukuda Cabinet formed	Jul 2 Aug 18 Sep 9	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (unified Viet Nam) proclaimed U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom Death of Chairman of Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1976	Sep 6	MIG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport				
	Oct 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline				
	Nov 5	National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program				
	Dec 24	Mihara appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1977	Apr 15	Establishment of systematic defense programs	Jul 1	Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200-mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters	Jun 30	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective)
	Aug 10	Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study			Aug 1	North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea
	Nov 28	Kanemaru appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Dec 28	National Defense Council decides on introduction of "F-15s and P-3Cs," approved by Cabinet on December 29				
1978	Sep 21	Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study (ASDF) First Japan-U.S. joint training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1)	Aug 12	Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China signed in Beijing	Sep 7	Camp David Agreement
	Nov 27	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28	Dec 7	Ohira Cabinet formed	Dec 16	U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty annulled
	Dec 7	Yamashita appointed Minister of State for Defense			Dec 25	Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia
1979	Jan 11	Introduction of E-2C approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet	Nov 9	Second Ohira Cabinet formed	Jan 1	U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations
	Jul 17	Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980-FY1984)			Jan 7	Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced
	Jul 25	Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26)			Feb 1	Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran
	Nov 9	Kubota appointed Minister of State for Defense			Feb 17	China-Viet Nam conflict (through March 5)
					Mar 26	Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed
					Jun 18	SALT-II signed
					Oct 26	Assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee
					Dec 27	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
1980	Feb 4	Hosoda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul 17	Suzuki Cabinet formed	Apr 11	China-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1980	Feb 26 Jul 17	Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18) Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec 1	Ministerial council on comprehensive national security established	May 18 Sep 22	China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific for the first time Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war
1981	Apr 22 Oct 1 Nov 30	Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation (GSDF) First Japan-U.S. joint exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (until October 3) Ito appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov 30	Reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet formed	Dec 13	Poland declares martial law, and establishes the Army Council of National Salvation
1982	Feb 15 May 15 Jul 23 Nov 27	(GSDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Takigahara, through February 19) Use of some sections of land within installations and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law 1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate (for FY1983–FY1987) presented to and approved by National Defense Council Tanigawa appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 8 Jun 9 Sep 9 Nov 27	BWC enters into force in Japan Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded Supreme Court ruled on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case Nakasone Cabinet formed	Apr 2 Jun 6 Jun 29 Oct 16	Falklands dispute (ends June 14) Israeli forces invade Lebanon Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.-Soviet Union (Geneva) Successful underwater launch of an SLBM by China
1983	Jan 14 Dec 12 Dec 27	Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S. (ASDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Fuchu, through December 15) Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec 2 Dec 27	CCW Protocols I, II and III enter into force in Japan Second Nakasone Cabinet formed	Mar 23 Sep 1 Oct 9 Oct 25	U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) KAL passenger liner shot down by Soviet fighters over Sakhalin 19 ROK government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorist explosion U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada
1984	Jun 11 Oct 16 Nov 1	(MSDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Yokosuka, through June 15) Defense Agency announces procedures etc. of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in “Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies” Kato appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov 1	Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1985	Sep 18	Mid-Term Defense Program approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet	Aug 12 Dec 28	Japan Airlines aircraft crashes Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed	Feb 1	New Zealand refuses to allow U.S. destroyer Buchanan to enter port
	Dec 27	Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded			Mar 11	Mikhail Gorbachev installed as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
					Mar 12	U.S.-Soviet Union arms control talks begin
				Jun 4	China announces cut of one million personnel from the People's Liberation Army	
1986	Feb 24	First Japan-U.S. integrated command post exercise (through February 28)	Jul 22	Third Nakasone Cabinet formed	Apr 26	Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union
	Jul 1	Security Council Establishment Law enacted			Aug 10	U.S. announces termination of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty
	Jul 22	Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep 22	Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm)
	Sep 5	Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S.				
	Oct 27	First Japan-U.S. integrated field exercises staged (through October 31)			Oct 11	U.S.-Soviet Union summit talks (Reykjavik, through October 12)
	Dec 30	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet approve plans for dealing with the Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program authorized by the Cabinet on November 5, 1976 and included in the FY1987 budget				
1987	Jan 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet agree on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity	May 27	Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas	Nov 29	KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists while flying over the Bay of Bengal
	Jan 30	Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)			Dec 8	INF Treaty signed
	Nov 6	Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug 26	Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted		
	Dec 18	Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas			Oct 6	First Japan-U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7)
					Nov 6	Takeshita Cabinet formed

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1988	Mar 2	Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka)	Mar 13	Aomori-Hakodate Undersea Tunnel opens Supreme Court rules on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident Second Takeshita Cabinet formed	Mar 14	Armed clashes between China and Viet Nam in the waters around the Spratly Islands U.S.-Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged) First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada) Cease-fire agreement reached in Iran-Iraq War General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops
	Apr 12		Jun 1		May 29	
	Jul 23		Dec 27		Aug 17	
	Aug 24				Aug 20	
	Nov 29	Tazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development			Dec 7	
1989	Jan 27	Establishment of a commission for the study of defense capability Yamazaki appointed Minister of State for Defense Matsumoto appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan 7	Emperor Showa dies Emperor Showa's funeral Uno Cabinet formed Kaifu Cabinet formed	Feb 15	Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan China-Soviet summit (Beijing): state-to-state and government-to-government relations normalized Gorbachev announces the reduction of the Soviet Far East forces by 120,000 (Beijing) Tiananmen Square incident GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall) U.S.-Soviet summit talks (Malta, through December 3)
	Jun 3		Feb 24		May 17	
	Aug 10		Jun 3		Jun 4	
			Aug 10		Nov 9	
1990	Feb 28	Ishikawa appointed Minister of State for Defense Japan-U.S. Joint Committee confirms that the two countries will push ahead with procedures to coordinate the return of facilities by U.S. forces (23 items) in Okinawa Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security	Feb 28	Second Kaifu Cabinet formed Government decides to donate US\$1 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region Government pledges an additional US\$1 billion of economic aid toward efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region plus US\$2 billion to countries adjacent to the conflict Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet	Aug 2	Iraq invades Kuwait Soviet Union-ROK establish diplomatic relations German unification CFE Treaty and 22-Nation Joint Declaration, signing of Paris Charter Signing of CSBM Vienna document
	Jun 19		Aug 30		Sep 30	
			Sep 14		Oct 3	
					Nov 19	
	Jun 21		Oct 16			

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1990	Dec 20	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet	Nov 10	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled		
	Dec 29	Ikeda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov 12	Coronation of Emperor		
1991	Jan 14	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 17)	Jan 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters	Jan 17	Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm
	Jan 25	Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29)	Jan 24	Government pledges an additional US\$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region	Feb 24	Coalition forces ground troops advance on Kuwait and Iraq
	Apr 26	Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf	Nov 5	Miyazawa Cabinet formed	Feb 28	Coalition forces cease combat action against Iraq
	Jun 3	Disaster relief dispatch with the eruption of Fugendake on Mount Unzen (through December 16, 1995)			Mar 31	Warsaw Pact structures dismantled
	Oct 9	SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time			Jun 25	Croatian and Slovenian Republics secede from Yugoslavia
	Nov 5	Miyashita appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul 10	Russian President Yeltsin takes office
					Jul 31	U.S.-Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow
					Sep 6	Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states
1992	Apr 1	Custody of Government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency	Jun 29	Law Revising Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams comes into force	Feb 7	EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty)
	Sep 17	SDF units dispatched to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (through September 26, 1993)	Aug 10	International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force	Feb 25	China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China
	Dec 11	Nakayama appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct 23	Emperor and Empress visit China (through October 28)	May 25	IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities (through June 5)
	Dec 18	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet authorize modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995)			Jun 16	Massive cuts in strategic arms agreed at U.S.-Russia summit in Washington (through June 17)
					Jul 2	U.S. President Bush announces completion of the withdrawal to the U.S. of ground- or sea-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas
				Aug 24	China-ROK establish diplomatic relations	
				Nov 9	CFE Treaty becomes formally effective	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1992					Nov 24	U.S. completes withdrawal of its Armed Forces from the Philippines
1993	May 11	SDF units dispatched to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (through January 8, 1995)	Jan 13	Japan signs CWC	Jan 3	U.S.-Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed
	Jul 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12)	Jun 9	Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince	Jan 13	Signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
	Aug 9	Nakanishi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug 9	Hosokawa Cabinet formed	Mar 12	North Korea announces secession from NPT
	Oct 13	Japan-Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed			May 29	North Korea conducts ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan
	Dec 2	Aichi appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jun 11	North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.-North Korea consultations
					Sep 1	U.S. Defense Department announces the Bottom Up Review
					Sep 13	Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy
					Oct 3	Armed clashes between UNOSOM II and armed Somali factions result in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and a number of casualties
					Nov 1	European Union established
1994	Mar 1	First Japan-China security dialogue (Beijing)	Apr 28	Hata Cabinet formed	Jan 11	NATO summit adopts the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
	Apr 28	Kanda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 30	Murayama Cabinet formed	Mar 3	IAEA nuclear inspection team starts inspections of seven nuclear facilities declared by North Korea (through March 14)
	Jun 30	Tamazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense			Mar 25	U.S. forces dispatched to Somalia complete their withdrawal
	Sep 17	SDF units dispatched to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees (through December 28)			Mar 31	U.N. Security Council adopts a chairman's statement to urge North Korea to complete nuclear inspections (North Korea refuses April 4)
	Nov 9	First Japan-ROK working-level defense policy dialogue (Seoul)			Mar 31	COCOM dissolved
	Dec 1	First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17)			Jun 14	North Korea notifies U.S., which holds presidency of the IAEA Charter, of its withdrawal from the IAEA

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1994					Jun 17	Former U.S. President Carter visits North Korea and holds talks with North Korean President Kim Il Sung
					Jul 8	North Korean President Kim Il Sung dies
					Jul 25	First ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok)
					Aug 31	Russian troops complete withdrawal from the former GDR and three Baltic countries
					Oct 21	U.S.-North Korea Framework Agreement signed
					Dec 1	Commander of U.S.-ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces
					Dec 5	START I comes into force
					Dec 18	Russia starts military operations against Chechnya
1995	Jan 17	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (through April 27)	Sep 4	Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa	Jan 1	CSCE changes its name to OSCE
	Mar 20	SDF personnel dispatched teams carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23)	Nov 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa	Feb 27	U.S. Department of Defense publishes the EASR
	Jun 5	Japan and ROK defense authorities exchange correspondence on measures to prevent accidents between SDF and ROK military aircraft	Nov 19	Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)	Mar 9	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established
	Jun 9	Security Council of Japan meets for the first time to discuss the state of future defense capabilities (total of 13 meetings through December 14)			May 11	NPT extended indefinitely
	Aug 8	Eto appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jun 7	Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui visits U.S.
	Sep 27	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 1, 1996)			Jul 11	U.S. President Clinton announces the normalization of U.S.-Viet Nam relations
	Sep 29	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture refuses to implement part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law			Dec 14	Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris
					Dec 15	10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non-Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting
					Dec 20	IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations in Bosnia

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1995	Nov 28	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996				
	Dec 14	Security Council of Japan adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) (Cabinet Decision of December 15)				
1996	Jan 11	Usui appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan 11	Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Jan 26	START-II ratified by U.S. Senate
	Jan 31	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Apr 12	Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied)	Jan 27	France carries out nuclear tests (completion of which announced January 29)
	Mar 29	Application for a court order for the Prime Minister to authorize the use of land for U.S. bases as part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law	Apr 15	SACO Interim Report approved by Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee	Mar 8	China carries out missile firing exercises, naval and air force live-fire drills and integrated ground, naval and air force exercises in the waters close to Taiwan on a total of three occasions March 8–25
	Apr 1	Lease expires on part of land being used for Sobe Communication Site	Apr 16	Cabinet approves the promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture	Mar 23	Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected
	Apr 15	Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements	Jul 20	U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan	Jul 29	China conducts underground nuclear test (its forty-fifty), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing
	Apr 17	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued	Aug 28	Supreme Court ruled on suit ordering the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to execute his duty to sign by proxy under the Special Land Lease law for use by the stationing forces	Sep 10	U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
	Jul 26	First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30)	Sep 8	Plebiscite held in Okinawa Prefecture	Sep 18	North Korean mini-submarine run aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory
	Sep 2	First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6)	Sep 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council	Sep 27	Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of a provisional government
	Sep 18	Governor of Okinawa carries out notification and inspection procedures in accordance with the Special Land Lease Law (through October 2)	Nov 7	Second Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Oct 3	Russia-Chechnya cease-fire agreed
	Oct 29	First Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia Pacific Region (through October 31, Tokyo)			Nov 5	Clinton reelected U.S. President
					Nov 18	Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1996	Nov 7 Dec 24	Kyuma appointed Minister of State of Defense Security Council and Cabinet approve responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters	Dec 2	SACO final report approved by Japan-U.S. Joint Security Council		
1997	Jan 20 Apr 23 Apr 25 May 15 Jun 9 Sep 23 Dec 19	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters Partial amendment to the Special Land Lease Law promulgated and enters into force Provisional use of part of Sobe Communication Station land starts Provisional use of part of the land belonging to 12 facilities including Kadena Air Base starts Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) is dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) C-130H aircraft transferred to Utahpao, Thailand for action against armed fighting in Cambodia (through July 16) New Japan-U.S. defense cooperation Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet	Apr 29 Jul 3 Sep 11 Nov 5 Dec 3 Dec 21 Dec 25	CWC enters into force in Japan First artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa carried out on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji)(through July 9) Second Hashimoto Cabinet inaugurated Plans for the construction of a sea-based heliport presented to the local authority and residents Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty Nago City holds a plebiscite on the planned construction of a U.S. heliport Nago City mayor formally announces the acceptance of the sea-based heliport	Mar 14 Apr 29 May 12 Jul 1 Jul 16 Jul 18 Jul 23 Aug 19 Oct 8 Nov 10 Dec 3	China enacts National Defense Law CWC enters into force Russia-Chechnya peace treaty signed Hong Kong reverts to China North Korean soldiers cross the military demarcation line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops NATO and Russia establish a permanent joint council Agreement reached on modification of the framework of the CFE Treaty KEDO holds a ceremony to mark the start of work on the light-water reactors to be provided to North Korea North Korean Labor Party Secretary Kim Jong Il assumes the post of General Secretary China-Russia summit talks: China-Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China-Russian eastern border declared Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signed

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1998	Mar 26	Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel	Feb 6	Governor of Okinawa refuses to accept the sea-based heliport	Feb 23	U.N. and Iraq sign a memorandum of understanding on the agreement by Iraq to allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to inspectors
	Apr 28	The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement	Jul 30	Obuchi Cabinet formed		
	May 18	C-130H aircraft transferred to Payareva, Singapore in the case of riots in Indonesia (through May 27)	Aug 31	Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost sharing after North Korean missile launch	Apr 6	U.K. and France ratify CTBT
	Jun 12	Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force comes into force July 12)	Sep 1	Temporary freezing of Japan-North Korea normalization talks	May 11	India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13)
	Jul 29	Combined search and rescue operation exercise between MSDF/ASDF and Russian Navy—the first large-scale combined exercise between Japan and Russia	Sep 2	Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented	May 14	Large-scale riots in the Indonesian capital Jakarta
	Jul 30	Nukaga appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct 21	Japan lifts freeze on cooperation with North Korea and signs KEDO	May 28	Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30)
	Aug 31	North Korea launches missile over and beyond Japanese airspace	Dec 3	CCW revised Protocol II enters into force in Japan	Jun 11	Government of Pakistan announces unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests
	Sep 3	Former Director-General of Central Procurement Office arrested on suspicion of breach of trust; compulsory investigation to Defense Agency	Dec 22	Cabinet decision on the introduction of information-gathering satellite	Jun 22	North Korean submarine trespasses in waters off east coast of ROK and arrested by ROK military forces
	Sep 3	Based on Okinawa Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee decision of use on May 19, usage of most land of 12 facilities, including Kadena Air Base, begins		Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO)	Jul 12	Bodies of armed North Korean special forces found in waters off ROK east coast
	Nov 14	SDF units dispatched to Honduras with Japan Disaster Relief Team (through December 9)			Jul 27	China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, "Defense of China"
	Nov 15	First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima)			Aug 20	U.S. military attacks terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan
	Nov 19	Announcement of the Basic Policy of Defense Procurement Reform			Sep 5	Kim Jong Il assumes posts of General Secretary of the Worker's Party and Chief of the National Defense Commission of North Korea
	Nov 20	Norota appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct 23	Israel and the Palestinian Authority sign the Wye River Memorandum

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1998	Dec 25	Security Council approves On Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies			Dec 17	U.S. and U.K. military initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20)
					Dec 18	North Korean semi-submersible infiltrates ROK southern coastal waters and is attacked and sunk by ROK Navy
1999	Mar 23	Discovery of a spy ship of the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24)	Mar 1	Entry into force by Japan of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty	Mar 1	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force
	Apr 2	Announcement of Concrete Measures of Procurement Reform	Sep 30	Critical accident at a private uranium processing facility in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture	Mar 24	NATO starts air campaign in Yugoslavia (through June 10)
	May 28	Bill Partially Amending the Self-Defense Forces Law (transportation of Japanese citizens and others in foreign countries) promulgated and comes into force	Oct 5	Second Obuchi Cabinet inaugurated	May 7	NATO forces mistakenly bomb Embassy of China in Yugoslavia
	Aug 5	First Joint Exercise of Search and Rescue Operations between MSDF and ROK Navy (Kyushu western waters)	Oct 12	Suspect Morodomi and 12 others found guilty of malpractice, etc. (Tokyo District Court)	May 20	U.S. inspection team enters North Korean nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni
			Nov 22	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station	Jun 4	Government of the Yugoslav Federation accepts Kosovo conflict peace plan submitted by U.S., EU and Russia
					Jun 10	U.N. Security Council adopts peace resolution which includes deployment of an international security force (KFOR), including operations in Kosovo

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1999	Aug 16	Exchange of official documents and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Japan and the U.S. on Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)	Dec 1	Former Prime Minister Murayama and his Mission leave for North Korea. This Mission and the Workers' Party of North Korea sign a joint announcement (through December 3)	Jul 9	Taiwan "President" Lee Teng-hui describes China-Taiwan relations as a "special state-to-state relationship"
	Aug 25	The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force	Dec 27	Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station	Sep 29	Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya
	Sep 23	SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22)	Dec 28	Cabinet decision on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station	Oct 12	Coup in Pakistan; Prime Minister Sharif overthrown
	Sep 25	Agreement to amend the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States enters into force			Oct 13	U.S. Senate rejects ratification of CTBT
	Oct 5	Tsutomu Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct 25	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution for the establishment of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
	Nov 22	SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for East Timor Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000)			Dec 17	U.N. Security Council establishes UNMOVIC
	Dec 17	The Security Council approves the Investigation of Functions Related to In-flight Refueling			Dec 20	Rule over Macao transferred from Portugal to China
					Dec 31	Russian President Yeltsin resigns

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2000	Mar 29	Disaster relief dispatch for the eruption of Mount Usu begins (through July 24)	Jan 17	Disposal of anti-personnel mines by civilians begins	Jan 4	Italy establishes diplomatic relations with North Korea (first of the G7 to do so)
	May 8	Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building	Feb 16	First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17)	Feb 6	Acting Russian President Putin declares the conclusion of operations to capture cities in the Chechen Republic
	Jun 16	The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force	Apr 5	Mori Cabinet formed	Mar 18	"Presidential" elections conducted in Taiwan; Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party elected
	Jun 27	Disaster relief dispatch conducted in response to the eruption of Mount Miyake (through October 3, 2001)	Jul 4	Second Mori Cabinet inaugurated	Apr 14	Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)
	Jul 4	Kazuo Torashima appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul 21	Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23)	May 7	Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President
	Sep 8	Active MSDF official arrested for leaking secret documents to military attaché of Embassy of Russia	Aug 25	Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established	Jun 13	North-South Korean Summit (through June 15, Pyongyang)
	Sep 11	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 1, 2001)	Nov 20	The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF	Jul 21	U.S.-Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Strategic Stability announced
	Sep 13	SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in Beian, China	Dec 5	Second Mori Cabinet reshuffled	Aug 12	Russian nuclear-powered submarine Kursk sinks
	Oct 27	Defense Agency finishes report on Review and Reinforcement of Classified Security System			Aug 23	Secretary General of the U.N. publishes a report on U.N. Peace operations
	Dec 5	Toshitsugu Saito appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep 25	ROK and North Korea hold Defense Ministers Talks (through September 26)
	Dec 15	Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005)			Oct 12	U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.-North Korea Joint Communiqué in Yemen, a small boat explodes, causing great damage to U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2000					Oct 23	Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visits North Korea (through October 25)
2001	Jan 6	Bureau of Finance and Equipment and Central Contract Office established	Jan 6	Reorganization of Government ministries and agencies into Cabinet Office and 12 ministries and agencies	Jan 15	North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il makes unofficial visit to China (through January 20)
	Feb 5	SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11)	Feb 10	The Ehime Maru, a training boat from Ehime Prefecture Uwajima Fisheries High School sinks off Hawaii after collision with U.S. submarine	Jan 20	George W. Bush becomes president of the U.S.
	Feb 9	Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005)			Mar 7	Gloria Macapagal Arroyo becomes president of the Philippines
	Mar 1	The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect	Mar 7	Former Maritime Self-Defense Official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy	Apr 1	Sharon Administration is inaugurated in Israel
	Apr 26	Gen Nakatani appointed Minister of State for Defense	Apr 1	Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force	Jun 15	Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes
	Sep 21	First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality of National Defense	Apr 26	Koizumi Cabinet formed	Jun 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established
	Oct 6	International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12)	May 3	Suspected North Koreans detained (on suspicion of illegal entry on a falsified passport)	Jul 15	Pakistani President Musharraf visits India and holds meeting with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
			Jun 28	Defense Ministry Bill presented to the House of Representatives by Diet members	Sep 3	President and CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin visits North Korea (through September 5)
			Aug 13	Prime Minister Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine	Sep 11	Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur (two airplanes crash into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon, killing thousands)
					Sep 12	U.N. Security Council passes resolution condemning the terrorist attacks

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2001	Nov 2	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law (guarding operations, strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy (defense secrets)) are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002)	Sep 19	Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.	Sep 14	Australia decides to invoke the right of collective self-defense under the ANZUS Treaty
			Oct 8	Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the First Meeting	Oct 1	U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
			Oct 29	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session	Oct 2	In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty
	Nov 9	SDF warship dispatched to the Indian Ocean for information-gathering	Nov 16	A Cabinet decision is made for a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Oct 7	U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan
	Nov 25	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities	Dec 1	Her Imperial Highness Princess Aiko is born to Their Imperial Highnesses The Crown Prince and Crown Princess	Nov 13	U.S.-Russia Summit held, President George W. Bush announces policy to cut strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next ten years
	Nov 29	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins aerial transportation between USFJ bases	Dec 22	Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu	Dec 1	Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progress Party, led by "President" Chen Shui-bian, wins majority in legislative election
	Dec 2	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, MSDF supply vessels begin refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean			Dec 3	U.S. is successful in missile defense testing
		Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins international airlift			Dec 5	U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START I
					Dec 7	Anti-Taliban force in Afghanistan takes over Kandahar
					Dec 13	Assault on the Indian Parliament
				Dec 20	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	
				Dec 22	Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Mr. Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman	
				Dec 29	Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2001	Dec 14	A bill is introduced to partially amend the Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. PKOs and Other Operations (the abolition of the freeze on Peacekeeping Force headquarter activities, etc.) Security Council approves the Selection of In-flight Refueling Transportation Aircraft Type				
2002	Jan 29	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, MSDF supply vessels begin refueling U.K. warships in the Indian Ocean	Feb 15	Cabinet decision on international cooperation execution plan for East Timor	Jan 8	U.S. Department of Defense submits the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress
	Mar 2	680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to East Timor (through June 25, 2004)	Apr 12	Supreme Court rejected an appeal for the New Yokota Air Base Suit	Jan 21	International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (through January 22, Tokyo)
	Mar 27	Implementation of law to partially amend the Defense Agency Establishment Law and Self-Defense Forces Law (the Introduction of Candidate for Reserve Personnel introduction of Candidates for Reserve Personnel, etc.)	Apr 16	Cabinet decision on the bill to amend the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, the bill to respond to Armed Attacks and the bill to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law	Jan 29	U.S. President Bush depicts "Axis of Evil" in the State of the Union Address
	Apr 1	Establishment of the Labor Management Organization for USFJ Employees, Incorporated Administrative Agency	May 31	FIFA World Cup 2002 Korea/Japan is held	May 4	Russian Army returns Cam Ranh Naval Base to Viet Nam
					May 20	Independence of East Timor The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)
					May 24	U.S.-Russia Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed
					May 28	NATO-Russia Summit reaches formal agreement to establish NATO-Russia Council

Year	Defense		Domestic		International		
2002	Apr 22	2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2)	Jun 11	Investigation Report of Defense Agency Incident Related to List of People Requesting Information Disclosure is released	Jun 13	U.S. officially withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty	
	Apr 29	Prime Minister Koizumi visits PKO unit in East Timor	Jul 29	9th Meeting (i.e. final meeting) of the Consultative Body on Futenma Replacement Facility (CFR) is held	Jun 29	Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL	
	Sep 30	Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense		Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed	Sep 12	U.S. President Bush makes a statement about Iraq at the U.N. meeting	
	Oct 1	One personnel dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (as an Operation and Planning Director)	Sep 11	Suspicious ship raised from the sea floor (offshore Amami Oshima Island)	Sep 20	U.S. Government announces the National Security Strategy	
	Oct 15	Multilateral search and rescue exercise (Southern Kanto waters and Sagami Bay)	Sep 17	Japan-North Korea Summit held	Oct 3	Assistant Secretary of State Kelly visits North Korea (through October 5)	
	Nov 1	Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law, which strengthens penalties to ensure secrecy, is enforced		Kim Jong-Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions	Oct 12	Terrorist bombing breaks out in Bali	
	Nov 18	SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido	Sep 30	Cabinet reshuffle	Oct 16	U.S. Government announces that North Korea admitted the fact that they had a uranium enrichment plan for nuclear weapons when Assistant Secretary of State Kelly visited North Korea	
	Dec 2	One person dispatched to Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peace-keeping Operations (U.N. DPKO) (New York)	Oct 13	First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)	Oct 23	Chechen guerillas seize the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow	
	Dec 16	Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (Dec 6) in the Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Oct 15	5 Those abducted return to Japan			
	Dec 19	Joint Staff Council (JSC) reports on Study of Joint Operations to Minister of State for Defense	Oct 23	APEC Summit held			

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2002					Nov 14	KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December
					Nov 21	NATO Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe, announces the Prague Declaration, and agrees to establish its high-readiness unit
					Nov 27	U.N. Inspection Team visits Baghdad to resume inspections after four years
					Nov 29	IAEA Board of Governors decides to request North Korea to accept nuclear inspection
					Dec 7	Iraq submits a report to the U.N. on its plan for development of weapons of mass destruction
					Dec 12	North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities
					Dec 13	EU Summit decides new membership for ten countries in Eastern Europe
					Dec 17	U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system
2003	Feb 8	Antipersonnel landmines possessed by the SDF are all disposed of (with some exceptions)	Jan 28	Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility concerning to Futenma Air Station replacement	Jan 10	North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
					Jan 24	U.S. Department of Homeland Security established

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003	Mar 30	International peace and cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2)	May 30	Personal Information Protection law partially takes effect	Feb 25	Roh Moo-hyun is elected as 16th President of South Korea
			Jun 6	Three Armed Attack situation response related laws are passed at the Upper House plenary session and enacted	Mar 7	UNMOVIC and IAEA present an additional report on inspections in Iraq
	Apr 21	ASDF in-flight refueling training Meeting (through May 1)	Jul 26	Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed the House of Councilors plenary session	Mar 7	At the U.N. Security Council meeting for foreign affairs officials, the U.S., U.K., and Spain submit a revised resolution draft to request Iraq to disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction
	Jul 17	International peace and cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18)	Sep 14	Government survey mission dispatched to Middle East countries, including Iraq	Mar 15	China's National People's Congress elects Hu Jintao as its President, while Ziang Zemin remains as chairman of the Central Military Commission
	Sep 11	Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial Zone	Sep 30	Cabinet decides to newly establish, in its decoration system, an award for people engaged in dangerous activities	Mar 17	U.S. and U.K. give up adopting the revised resolution draft on Iraq at U.N. Security Council
	Oct 10	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years	Oct 7	Joint communiqué signed for the first time at Japan-China-ROK Summit meeting	Mar 20	U.S. and U.K. forces begin military operations in Iraq
	Nov 3	Former SDF officials decorated for their engagement in dangerous activities	Oct 10	"The Defense Ministry Establishment Bill" was scrapped concurrently with the dissolution of the House of Representatives	Apr 30	U.S., Russia, U.N., and EU present Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian peace, as a new peace process for Palestine
	Nov 15	SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq	Oct 24	Foreign Minister Kawaguchi announces five billion dollars worth of assistance at the International Donors' Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in Spain	May 1	U.S. President Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq
			Nov 19	Second Koizumi Cabinet formed	May 1	U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declares termination of major military operations in Afghanistan
					May 22	U.N. Security Council Resolution adopted by a large majority to allow member states to give assistance for reconstruction of Iraq
					May 31	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by U.S. President for the first time

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003	Dec 19	Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and cabinet meeting)	Nov 27	Supreme Court rules on suit related to dispossession of Sobe Communication Site land	Jun 1	U.S.-Russia Summit meeting held and the strategic offensive reductions treaty between U.S. and Russia ratified
	Dec 19	Order issued to GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF concerning implementation of response measures based on the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law	Nov 29	Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq	Jul 13	Iraq's Governing Council inaugurated
	Dec 26	ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait	Dec 9	Cabinet decision made on basic plan for Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq	Aug 5	Suicide bombing against U.S. affiliated-hotel in Jakarta
	Dec 30	Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (Iran on January 1 and 2)			Aug 6	Shanghai Cooperation Organization holds joint anti-terrorism military maneuvers (through August 12)
					Aug 19	Suicide bombing on U.N. headquarters in Baghdad
				Aug 27	First Six-Party Talks held (through August 29)	
				Sep 12	First joint naval exercise held in the Coral Sea off the northeastern coast of Australia under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (through September 14)	
				Oct 2	North Korean Foreign Ministry announces it has finished reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods	
				Oct 15	China becomes the third country to successfully launch a manned spacecraft into orbit, following the United States and the former Soviet Union	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003					<p>Oct 23 International Donors' Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq (Madrid) (through October 24)</p> <p>Oct 23 Russia establishes air force base in Kyrgyz</p> <p>Nov 6 Russia-E.U. Summit held (Rome)</p> <p>Nov 24 U.S. President Bush makes a statement about emphasis on consultation with allies in connection with global posture review of U.S. forces</p> <p>Nov 26 Kashmir ceasefire agreement comes into force</p> <p>Dec 4 Australia decides to participate in missile defense program</p> <p>Dec 5 First meeting of advisory committee on comprehensive U.N. reform held</p> <p>Dec 13 U.S. forces capture former President Hussein in Iraq</p> <p>Dec 18 Iran signs IAEA agreement</p> <p>Dec 19 Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program</p> <p>Dec 26 Massive earthquake strikes Iran</p>	
2004	<p>Jan 9 Dispatch order issued to GSDF advance team and ADSF main detached airborne unit</p> <p>Jan 16 GSDF advance team leaves for Iraq</p>		Feb 9	Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet	Feb 4	Pakistani government admits Dr. Khan's involvement in suspected nuclear technology proliferation issues

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2004	Jan 22	ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait	Apr 20	Council for security and defense capabilities established (first meeting held on April 27)	Feb 25	Second Six-Party Talks held (Beijing) (through February 29)
	Feb 3	Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities	May 22	Japan-North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang)	Mar 11	Terrorist bombings on commuter train system in Madrid, Spain
	Feb 9	MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8)	Jun 14	5 abductees return to Japan	Mar 22	EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development of the structure and organization of the rapid response capabilities of the EU
	Feb 17	Attempt to fire metal bullets to Defense Agency	Jun 18	Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in Upper House plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved	Apr 28	UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
			Aug 13	Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed		
			Jun 18	Cabinet agreement for SDF's activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces)		
				Aug 13	U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2004	Aug 1	Dispatch of SDF personnel to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as Director of Inspection Bureau	Sep 27	2nd Koizumi reshuffled Cabinet formed	Jun 1	Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated, and Iraqi Governing Council dissolved
	Sep 8	Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary (commemorative) ceremony	Oct 4	Final report of Council on Security and Defense Capabilities	UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq	
	Oct 23	Disaster relief dispatch for Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (until December 21)			Jun 23	The Third Six-Party Talks (Beijing) (-June 26)
	Oct 25	PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, -October 27)			Jun 28	Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government
	Nov 7	Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary commemorative troop review			Aug 16	President Bush delivers a speech on the military posture review
	Nov 10	Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan's territorial waters—Maritime security operations order issued (Until November 12)			Sep 1	Chechen's armed pro-independence rebels seize a school in Beslan of the Russian Republic of North Ossetia
	Dec 10	"National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and after" adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet			The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling for a halt to Iran's uranium enrichment-related activities	
		"Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005—FY2009" adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet			Sep 18	President Hu Jintao assumes the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party
	Dec 28	MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand's Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia's Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (until January 1, 2005)			Sep 19	The U.S. and South Korea announce a plan of three-stage reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in South Korea by 2008
					Oct 6	EU leaders sign the EU Constitution
					Oct 29	Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine's intrusion into Japan's territorial waters
					Nov 16	Karzai sworn in as Afghan president
				Dec 7	Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster	
				Dec 26		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2005	Jan 4	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (All units returned home by March 23)	Jan 19	The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged Chinese nuclear submarines in Japan's territorial waters	Jan 15	China and Taiwan agree on special direct flights Abbas sworn in as Palestinian Authority President
	Feb 19	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2 + 2"/Washington)—The common strategic objectives confirmed	Mar 14	A Japanese boat was attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew were abducted (Released on March 20)	Jan 30	Iraqi National Assembly elections
	Mar 7	U.K. forces take over security mission in Al Muthanah Governorate of Iraq from the Netherlands	Mar 25	Cabinet decision made on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians	Feb 4	South Korea 2004 national defense report released
	Apr 14	Crash of an MU-2 rescue and search plane (ASDF/Mountainous area of Aga-machi, Niigata Prefecture)			Feb 10	North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that the country has already manufactured nukes
	May 2	SDF officially takes part for the first time in the multilateral joint exercise "Cobra Gold 05" conducted in Chiang Mai of Thailand (-May 13)			Mar 5	China holds the 3rd session of the 10th National People's Congress(- March 14)/The Anti Secession Law adopted on the last day Syrian President Assad expresses a policy of withdrawing the troops stationed in Lebanon
					Apr 9	Massive anti-Japan demonstrations in Beijing
					Apr 16	Massive anti-Japan demonstrations in Shanghai
					Apr 28	The Iraqi Transitional Government sworn in
					May 11	North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman announces that the country has completed unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon
					Jun 24	Conservative Ahmadinejad elected as Iran's new president

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2005	Aug 5	Dispatch of a MSDF vessel to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (until Aug 10)	Oct 31	The third Koizumi reshuffled Cabinet is inaugurated. Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year).	Jul 7	Terrorist explosions take place in London
	Oct 12	Dispatch of SDF's units to Pakistan to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc. (All units returned home by Dec 2)	Nov 3	Japan-North Korea intergovernmental conference resumes after the interval of about one year	Jul 20	The United States and India announce a joint statement concerning the formation of "global partnership" and the enhancement of U.S. cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by India
	Oct 20	GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attack for the first time	Nov 11	The Cabinet approves "the government's actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultation Committee held on October 29, 2005"	Jul 26	The first phase of Fourth Six-Party Talks held (until August 7)
	Oct 29	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2"/Washington) announces "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future"	Nov 16	At the Japan-U.S. summit talks, the two countries agree to enhance Japan-U.S. alliance	Aug 18	First-Ever China-Russia Joint Military Exercises, dubbed "Peace Mission 2005," are conducted (until Aug 25)
	Oct 31	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga assumes office	Nov 27	Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture	Sep 1	The Chinese State Council publicizes a white paper titled "China's Arms Control, Arms Reduction and Efforts for Non-Proliferation"
	Dec 24	The Security Council and the Cabinet approve "Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense"	Dec 8	The Cabinet approves the one-year extension of period of dispatch of SDF units to Iraq	Sep 8	Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agree to establish a system to jointly monitor vessels navigating through the Malacca Strait. The three countries agree to implement first-ever joint air patrol.
					Sep 9	MSDF's P-3C patrol aircraft identifies that five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class, are navigating in the sea area surrounding "Kashi" gas field near the midway line between Japan and China in the East China Sea
					Sep 13	The Fourth Six-Party Talks resumes (the second phase) (until September 19)
					Oct 12	China succeeds in launching a spaceship named "Shen Zhou-6"
					Oct 15	Iraq conducts a national referendum for the draft constitution
					Nov 9	The first phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (until November 11)
					Dec 14	The first East Asia Summit is held
					Dec 15	Iraq conducts an election of the National Assembly under the permanent constitution
					Dec 16	The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution denouncing the human rights suppression by North Korea

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Jan 6	Disaster relief dispatch for snow damage from the "2006 Heavy Snowfall" (Relief units were dispatched to six prefectures for twenty days in total until January 28)	Jan 23	A house search is made against Yamaha Motor on charges that the company illegally exported unmanned helicopters that can be used for military purposes to China	Jan 1	Russia temporarily suspends the supply of natural gas to Ukraine
	Jan 10	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga visits United Kingdom, Russia and the United States (until January 19)	Feb 4	Japan-North Korea negotiations concerning abduction question, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/missile problems are held (until Feb 6)	Jan 9	China acquires a right to develop oilfield in Nigeria
	Jan 20	Order for the 9th SDF contingent for the Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities to take over from the 8th contingent	Mar 6	At the Japan-China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (until Mar 7)	Jan 10	Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment
	Jan 23	The "New Special Measures Agreement on Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ" is signed (Effective on April 1, 2006)	Mar 11	Iwakuni City holds a local referendum concerning the relocation of U.S. carrier-based aircraft in connection with the force posture realignment of USFJ	Jan 17	North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong Il visits China and has a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao
	Jan 30	Senior officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency were arrested on charges of interruption of bidding procedures	Mar 31	The Cabinet approves the Prefectural Civil Protection Plans prepared by 24 prefectures. 47 prefectures establish their own Prefectural Civil Protection Plans.	Jan 20	The result of the election of the Iraqi National Assembly is announced. The Shiite ruling bloc becomes the leading party.
	Jan 31	A compulsory search is made against the Defense Facilities Administration Agency	Apr 7	The Mayor of Nago City agrees to the proposed relocation of US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station to the site off Henoko	Jan 25	In the election of the Palestine National Council, Hamas as the Islamic Resistance Movement obtains the majority of seats
	Feb 13	The 21st air transport unit dispatched to Golan Heights takes over from the 20th unit	May 11	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and Minister of State for Defense Nukaga sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ	Jan 26	The United States, Russia, the United Nations and EU urge Hamas to disarm
	Feb 28	MSDF and Japan Coast Guard conduct joint training in responding to a suspicious vessel (off Maizuru)			Feb 3	In almost all of Arab states, protest demonstrations against those caricatures making fun of Muhammad, the Islamic Prophet, that appeared in European newspapers take place
	Mar 8	Japan and the United States successfully conduct a joint performance test of the sea-based interceptor missile (SM3) off Hawaii			Feb 3	The United States issues the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
					Feb 4	Iran refuses to cooperate with an inspection by IAEA. The emergency board of governors' meeting of IAEA adopts a resolution to report the Iran's nuclear program to the United Nations Security Council. A rally asking for the resignation of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin is held.
					Feb 13	Iran gives IAEA a notice of having resumed uranium enrichment experiment
					Feb 17	Large-scale landslide takes place in Leute island, Philippines

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Mar 27	Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture.	May 30	The Cabinet approves the “Government’s Actions to Be Taken in Connection with the Force Posture Realignment of USFJ, etc.”	Feb 19	Mr. Haniya is nominated as Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority
			Jun 20	The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces.	Feb 22	A Shiite temple named “Golden Dome” located at Samara in Iraq is blasted
	Apr 1	Partial amendment (reform of pay structure) of the Law concerning Allowances, etc. of Defense Agency Personnel is enacted	Jun 29	Japan-U.S. summit meeting/a joint note titled the “Japan-US Alliance of the New Century” is publicized	Feb 24	Philippine President Arroyo declares a state of emergency to suppress antigovernment activities (The state of emergency is withdrawn on March 3)
			Jul 5	Security Council meeting held to decide on the response to North Korea	Mar 1	President Bush visits Afghanistan and meets with President Karzai
	Apr 23	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in Washington)/Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ	Jul 12	Japan-Israel summit talks	Mar 2	President Bush meets with Indian Prime Minister Singh (in New Delhi)
			Jul 13	Prime Minister Koizumi meets with Palestinian Authority President Abbas	Mar 4	President Bush meets with Pakistani President Musharraf (in Islamabad).
	Apr 28	Order for the 10th SDF contingent for the Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities to take over from the 9th contingent	Jul 15	Japan-Russia summit talks	Mar 16	The United States announces the National Security Strategy
			Jul 16	Japan-Germany summit talks	Mar 18	Demonstrations protesting the government’s employment promotion measures take place in France
	May 1	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”/Washington) announces the “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”	Jul 19	Decision made to transfer weapons and their technologies to the U.S. to jointly develop a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) sytem, and the memorandum concluded with the U.S.	Mar 21	China-Russia summit meeting (in Beijing)
			Aug 4	Cabinet decision made to change the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq	Mar 29	The chairman of the UN Security Council announces a statement asking Iran to “suspend uranium enrichment experiment within thirty days”
	May 3	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in Washington)	Aug 10	Japan-Mongolia summit talks	Mar 31	The new Hamas cabinet is formed in the Palestinian Authority
			Aug 16	A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia	Apr 4	Thai Prime Minister Thaksin express his intention to resign
	May 25	Japan-India defense ministers meeting (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and Minister for Defense Mukerjee, in Tokyo)/Two countries sign a joint statement			Apr 11	Iran announces that it has succeeded in manufacturing low-enriched uranium (3.5%)
					Apr 20	U.S.-China summit meeting (in Washington)
	May 29	A P-3C patrol aircraft makes a first flight to Australia			Apr 21	North Korea-South Korea ministerial-level meeting (in Pyongyang, until April 24)
					Apr 24	A series of bomb terrorist attacks occur in Dahab in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt

Year		Defense		Domestic		International
2006	Jun 1	Dispatch of SDF units to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java. (All units returned home by June 22)	Aug 29	U.S. Navy deploys Shiloh, an Aegis cruiser with SM-3 missiles, to the Yokosuka base	Apr 25	In succession to last year, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun announces a speech the relationship between Japan and South Korea
	Jun 2	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga attends the 5th Asia Security Conference (sponsored by IISS, in Singapore) (until June 4)	Sep 11	The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station established, and its first meeting held	Apr 28	The Director-General of IAEA reports Iran's response to the UN Security Council
	Jun 9	A "Bill to Amend Part of the Defense Agency Establishment Law" (raising the status of the Defense Agency to a ministry, change of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission, etc.) is approved by the Cabinet, and submitted to the Diet	Sep 19	The third information-gathering satellite launched	May 5	U.S. Department of State releases the 2005 Country Report on Terrorism
	Jun 20	The 10th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities is ordered to discontinue response measures	Sep 26	The Government decides to implement another financial sanction against North Korea	May 9	In the Darfur conflict, the government and a faction of the antigovernment forces reach a peace agreement
	Jul 5	North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan	Oct 8	Abe Cabinet formed	May 9	The first ASEAN defense ministers meeting
	Jul 14	The Committee to Study a New Defense Organization after Dissolution of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency publishes the outline of the reorganization plan	Oct 9	Japan-China summit talks	May 15	The United States removes Libya from the list of terrorist-supporting states
	Jul 16	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga visits Kuwait and inspects the GSDF and ASDF units stationed in the country	Oct 13	Japan-Republic of Korea summit talks	May 20	Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test
	Jul 19	Disaster relief dispatch for the July 2006 heavy rain (until July 29)	Oct 31	Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test	May 23	New Iraqi government is formed
	Jul 25	The 10th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities returns to Japan	Nov 1	Cabinet decision made to change the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	May 27	U.S.-Israel summit meeting (in Washington)
			Nov 18	Partial amendment (extension of the term for one year) of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enforced	May 27	U.S. Department of Defense releases the 2006 Report to Congress on Chinese Military Power
			Dec 8	Cabinet decision made to change the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq	May 27	Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Java, Indonesia
					May 31	India test-fires a Brahmos cruise missile
					Jun 8	The Iraqi government announces that Zarqawi was killed
					Jun 13	President Bush visits Iraq and meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki (in Baghdad)
					Jun 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit meeting
					Jun 16	The Nepal government and Maoists sign peace accord
					Jun 19	Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announces that the authority to maintain public order in the province of Muthanna is transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq
				Jun 23	The first meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Council held	
				Jun 27	The first meeting of the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission held	
				Jun 27	The Israeli army attacks Gaza to recover its soldiers abducted by Palestinian armed groups (cease-fire takes effect on November 26)	

Year		Defense		Domestic		International
2006	Jul 31	A part of the partial amendment (strengthening of facilities administration function of the internal organizations, establishment of the Equipment headquarters, reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices, and so on) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law enforced				Jun 28 Montenegro joins the United Nations
	Aug 8	Japan-Indonesia defense summit talks (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and Minister of Defense Juwono, in Jakarta)				Jul 5 North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles
	Aug 23	Disaster relief dispatch for water supply and other operations in Kure and Etajima cities, Hiroshima Prefecture (until September 11)				Jul 6 North Korea insists that the missile launches were a military exercise
	Sep 5	Japan-Mongolia defense summit talks (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and Minister of Defense Sonompil, in Ulan Bator)				Jul 9 India announces that it conducted its first test-launch of the Agni 3 long-range ballistic missile
	Sep 9	Land SDF Kuwait Evacuation Unit returns to Japan				Jul 10 Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) kills Basayev, the Chechen field commander
	Oct 9	North Korea announces that it conducted an underground nuclear weapon test				Jul 11 The 19th North Korea-South Korea ministerial-level meetings (broken off on July 13)
	Oct 23	Japan-New Zealand defense summit talks (Minister of State for Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Goff, in Tokyo)				Train bombing terrorist attacks occur in Mumbai in western India
	Nov 7	The 11th Tokyo Defense Forum (until October 26)				Jul 12 The Israeli army attacks southern Lebanon to recover its soldiers abducted by Hezbollah (cease-fire takes effect on August 14)
	Nov 29	Disaster relief dispatch for the tornado disaster in Saroma Town, Hokkaido (until November 11)				Jul 13 The authority to maintain public order in the province of Muthannna is transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq
		Japan-China consultation between high-level defense officials (Defense Agency Vice Minister Moriya and then Assistant Chief of General Staff of Chinese People's Liberation Army Zhang Qinsheng)				Jul 14 U.S. and Kyrgyz sign a protocol regarding the use of Manas U.S. air base in Kyrgyz
						Jul 15 U.N. Security Council unanimously passes the Resolution 1695 to condemn North Korea
						G8 Saint-Petersburg (until July 17)
						Jul 17 Russia, India and China summit talks
						Jul 25 ASEAN foreign ministers meeting (Kuala Lumpur)
						Jul 31 U.N. Security Council passes the Resolution 1696 to call on Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities
						Aug 10 U.K. authorities unearth a large-scale aircraft terrorist plot
					Aug 11 U.N. Security Council passes the Resolution 1701 to call on Israel and Lebanon to cease fire and reinforce the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	
					Aug 16 The Russian Coast Guard fires on and seizes a Japanese fishing boat in the Northern Territories waters	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Dec 15	Partial amendment (transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense, upgrading of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission, and so on) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law passed at the plenary session of the House of Councilors with support from the ruling parties, the Democratic Party of Japan, the People's New Party and others (enforced on January 9, 2007)			Aug 21	U.S.-Republic of Korea "Ulchi Focus Lens" joint military exercise (until September 1)
					Aug 23	Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) conducts the Rubezh-2006 joint exercise in western Kazakhstan (until August 26)
					Aug 24	China and Kazakhstan conduct the Tianshan-1 (2006) joint anti-terrorism drill (until August 26)
					Aug 28	The Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the anti-government force, sign a cease-fire agreement
					Aug 29	Taiwanese Ministry of Defense publishes the 2006 National Defense Report
					Sep 4	The Five Defense Power Agreement (Malaysia, Singapore, U.K., Australia, New Zealand) conducts the Bersama Padu 2006 joint military exercise
						The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) takes effect
					Sep 8	The Treaty on establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-free Zone in Central Asia signed
					Sep 14	U.S.-Republic of Korea summit talks (Washington)
					Sep 16	India and Pakistan agree to resume peace talks
					Sep 19	A military coup takes place in Thailand
					Sep 20	The Chinese Navy and the U.S. Navy conduct a joint search-and-rescue exercise (off San Diego)
					Sep 25	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution to establish the U.N. Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)
					Sep 26	The European Commission decides on the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union (EU) in January 2007

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
2006			<p data-bbox="893 224 1216 372">Oct 3 North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that the country will “in the future conduct a nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed”</p> <p data-bbox="893 372 1216 423">Oct 4 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (until October 5)</p> <p data-bbox="893 423 1216 523">Oct 5 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assumes security responsibility for all of Afghanistan</p> <p data-bbox="893 523 1216 624">Oct 8 The 6th plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (until October 11)</p> <p data-bbox="893 624 1216 826">Oct 9 North Korea announces that it “successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under secure conditions” The temporary cabinet formed by Prime Minister Surayud (former army commander) in Thailand</p> <p data-bbox="893 826 1216 927">Oct 13 U.N. General Assembly appoints Ban Ki-moon, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, as the 8th Secretary-General</p> <p data-bbox="893 927 1216 1027">Oct 14 U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts the Resolution 1718 to impose sanctions on North Korea</p> <p data-bbox="893 1027 1216 1107">Oct 15 U.N. Security Council decides to put the situation in Myanmar on its agenda</p> <p data-bbox="893 1107 1216 1186">Oct 16 Terrorist bombing occurs on buses near Habarana in central Sri Lanka</p> <p data-bbox="893 1186 1216 1286">Oct 19 North Korea’s General Secretary Kim Jong-Il meets with Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan in Pyongyang</p> <p data-bbox="893 1286 1216 1365">Oct 24 The Republic of Korea army conducts its first-ever division-level landing exercise</p> <p data-bbox="893 1365 1216 1514">Oct 25 Russia fails in the test-launch of the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a second failure following the previous test on September 7</p> <p data-bbox="893 1514 1216 1615">Oct 29 Incumbent President Kabila wins the presidential election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</p>

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
2006			<p>Oct 30 China and ASEAN summit talks (Nanning)</p> <p>Nov 7 The Democratic Party wins a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives at the U.S. midterm election Tajikistan's incumbent President Rakhmonov wins the presidential election for the third time running</p> <p>Nov 16 Pakistan announces that it conducted an exercise for launching the Hatf-5 (Ghauri) medium-range ballistic missile</p> <p>Nov 18 APEC Summit Meeting (Hanoi, until November 19)</p> <p>Nov 19 The Chinese Navy and the U.S. Navy conduct a joint search-and-rescue exercise (off Hainan Dao) India conducts a test-launch of the Prithvi-2 short-range ballistic missile (conducts again on November 27)</p> <p>Nov 21 The Nepal government and Maoists sign the Comprehensive Peace Accord</p> <p>Nov 22 Iraq and Syria restore diplomatic relations after a quarter-century rupture</p> <p>Nov 28 U.S.-China-North Korea meeting (until November 29)</p> <p>Nov 29 Pakistan announces that it conducted an exercise for launching the Hatf-4 (Shaheen-1) medium-range ballistic missile</p> <p>Nov 30 U.S. President Bush meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki (Amman)</p> <p>Dec 4 The U.K. government publishes "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent" white paper</p> <p>Dec 6 U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution to authorize the peacekeeping mission of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development in Somalia (IGASOM)</p> <p>Dec 9 Pakistan announces that it conducted an exercise for launching the Hatf-3 (Ghaznavi) short-range ballistic missile</p>

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006					Dec 11	A governor election held in the Indonesian province of Aceh in accordance with the peace agreement signed in August 2005
					Dec 18	U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act enacted The second phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (until November 22) Mr. Gates appointed as U.S. Secretary of Defense
					Dec 19	The U.N. General Assembly adopts a resolution condemning the abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea
					Dec 21	Turkmenistan President Niyazov deceases
					Dec 23	U.N. Security Council adopts the Resolution 1737 to impose economic sanctions on Iran
					Dec 30	Former Iraqi President Hussein executed
2007	Jan 4	Japan-Thailand defense summit talks (Minister of State for Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Boonrawd, in Bangkok)	Jan 9	Prime Minister Abe visits four European countries (U.K., Germany, Belgium, France) (until January 13)	Jan 10	U.S. President Bush announces the new Iraq policy
	Jan 9	The transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense	Jan 12	Prime Minister Abe makes a speech at the NATO North Atlantic Council	Jan 12	China conducts an anti-satellite test
	Feb 18	The ceremony held with Prime Minister Abe	Feb 17	F22, the latest U.S. fighter, temporarily deployed at the Kadena Air Base (returned on May 10)	Jan 14	ASEAN Summit begins
	Feb 18	The 23rd air transport unit dispatched to Golan Heights takes over from the 22nd unit	Feb 24	The fourth information-gathering satellite launched	Jan 17	Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists start disarmament under the supervision of the United Nations
	Feb 25	Japan-Republic of Korea defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of National Defense Kim, in Tokyo)	Feb 26	Japan-Mongolia summit talks	Jan 23	U.N. Security Council decides to set up the U.N. political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to oversee disarmament in Nepal
	Mar 6	Japan-Malaysia defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Najib, in Tokyo)	Feb 27	The Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the Prime Minister's Office Regarding National Security submits a report	Feb 23	Taiwanese Ministry of Defense announces that China deployed 60 new J-10 fighters
	Mar 13	Minister of Defense Kyuma pays a courtesy visit to and meets with Australian Prime Minister	Mar 5	An aircraft training relocated from Okinawa to Tsuiki for the first time as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (until March 8)	Feb 6	U.S. announces that it will establish the Africa Command
	Mar 15	Japan-France defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Alliot-Marie, in Tokyo)	Mar 13	Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed	Feb 8	The third phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (until February 13)
					Feb 9	Mecca Agreement (Hamas and Fatah agree to establish the Palestine unity government)
					Feb 13	North Korea agrees to disable all its nuclear facilities during the Six-Party Talks
					Feb 14	Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announces that the government started new security measures in Baghdad
					Feb 27	The 20th North Korea-South Korea ministerial-level meetings

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Mar 23	Emergency response procedures to destroy ballistic missiles prepared	Apr 6	Cabinet decision made on a bill to partially amend the Security Council Establishment Law, and the bill submitted to the Diet	Mar 4	The Chinese government announces its 2007 defense budget
	Mar 25	Disaster relief dispatch for the Noto Peninsula Earthquake (until April 8)	Apr 9	Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki visits Japan and meets with Prime Minister Abe	Mar 17	The Palestine unity government established
	Mar 28	A part of the partial amendment (establishment of the Central Readiness Force, and so on) of the Defense Agency	Apr 11	Wen Jiabao, premier of the Chinese State Council, visits Japan and meets with Prime Minister Abe	Mar 19	The first phase of sixth Six-Party Talks held (until March 22)
	Mar 30	Establishment Law enforced	Apr 24	Cabinet decision made to change the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Mar 23	Iran seizes 15 British sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf (released 13 days later)
		A Patriot PAC-3 system deployed at the ASDF Iruma Base	Apr 25	Chief Cabinet Secretary announces that the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security was formed under Prime Minister (the first meeting held on May 18)	Mar 24	U.N. Security Council decides to impose additional sanctions on Iran
	Apr 1	SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers	Apr 27	Prime Minister Abe visits the U.S. and meets with President Bush	Apr 9	Presidential election in Timor-Leste
		A GSDF CH-47JA helicopter crashes while transporting emergency patients during a disaster relief operation (Tokunoshima Town, Kagoshima Prefecture)	Apr 30	Prime Minister Abe visits five Middle Eastern countries (until May 2)	Apr 10	Iran announces that it began to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale
	Apr 11	Partial amendment (wide-area transfer allowance and so on) of the Law concerning Allowances, etc. of Defense Agency Personnel enforced	May 23	The Special Measures Law concerning Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of US Forces in Japan passed at the plenary session of the House of Councilors, and enacted	Apr 15	The U.S. Department of Finance announces that it agrees to unfreeze North Korean accounts in a Macau bank
	Apr 16	Japan-India vice-ministerial-level talks on defense policy			Apr 15	Russia launches its new nuclear submarine Yuri Dolgoruky
	Apr 19	Japan-U.S.-India naval drill conducted for the first time			May 3	Iraq Compact, an agreement between Iraq and the international community, adopted
	Apr 19	Japan-Germany defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Jung, in Tokyo)			May 16	Mr. Sarkozy inaugurated as French President
	Apr 29	Prime Minister Abe inspects the MSDF units operating on the Indian Ocean under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law			May 17	A test run of the railway connecting South and North Korea conducted
	Apr 30	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, in Washington)			May 20	Mr. Horta inaugurated as Timor-Leste President
					May 28	The Lebanese government force and Fatah Islam, a Sunni Islamist group, clash
					May 29	U.S and Iran begin official talks for the first time in 27 years (ambassador-level)
				Jun 6	Russia announces that it succeeded in launching a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) G8 Heiligendamm (until June 8)	


Year		Defense	Domestic		International	
2007	May 1	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”/Washington) announces the joint statement “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation” Prime Minister Abe inspects the ASDF units based in Kuwait				
	May 3	Japan-Italy defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Parisi, in Rome)				
	May 4	Japan-Belgium defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Flahaut, in Brussels) Minister of Defense Kyuma meets with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer				
	May 18	ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility				
	Jun 1	Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General’s Office of legal compliance and the Local Defense Bureaus, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and so on) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted				
	Jun 2	Minister of Defense Kyuma attends the 6th Asia Security Conference (organized by IISS, in Singapore) Japan-U.S.-Australia defense ministers meeting held for the first time (Minister of Defense Kyuma, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, and Minister of Defense Nelson, in Singapore)				
	Jun 5	Japan-Australia defense ministers meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Nelson, in Tokyo)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Jun 6	Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations held for the first time ("2+2"/Tokyo)				

* Listed in detail for two most recent years (2006–2007) as targeted in this White Paper.

Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces

(As of March 31, 2007)



Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2007)

